THE FATE OF THE CIVILIAN SURGE IN A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT

Ryan S. McCannell
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Foreword

As the United States winds down its stabilization operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Department of State (DOS) and U.S. Agency for International Development will face bureaucratic and political pressures to abandon their already modest reconstruction and stabilization (R&S) lines of effort in favor of more traditional diplomacy and development assistance priorities. This period of relative peace allow policy makers to reflect on past challenges to creating a “civilian surge” capacity and determining feasible, acceptable, and suitable ways and means to ensure robust civilian participation in future R&S operations. To further inculcate a surge capability, one primary recommendation would be to expand the work of a recently created interagency task force on fragile states to include leading a new generation of civil-military planning tied explicitly to resources, since past planning efforts have not always done so effectively. Civilian agencies should work with the Department of Defense (DOD) to conduct formal interagency after action reviews on R&S activities outside of Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as track and respond to congressional efforts at DOD reform. These interagency partners should also encourage their respective R&S knowledge centers – such as PKSOL, the DOS Bureau for Conflict and Stability Operations (CSO), the National Defense University’s Center for Complex Operations, the U.S. Institute for Peace, and the DOD’s Joint Force Development (J7) Staff – to take stock of existing capabilities and reinvigorate their technical support relationships with policy makers in order to maintain R&S planning and implementation capabilities across agencies.
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The Fate of the Civilian Surge in a Changing Environment

Ryan S. McCannell

Introduction

Fifteen years after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, American policy makers are still struggling to define appropriate national security responses to the challenges posed by fragile states. The United States (US) fights wars with great proficiency, yet it lacks the same finesse in supporting successful transitions to lasting peace. The recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan taught Americans and the world hard lessons about these complex and difficult transitions. These conflicts also highlighted the gaps and seams among key U.S. international affairs agencies – principally the Department of Defense (DOD), the Department of State (DOS) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) – in crafting unified responses to post-conflict instability.

These failures at a unified response have not been for a lack of trying. At the height of coalition-led stability operations¹ in Iraq and Afghanistan, the US government (USG) made a significant, but incomplete effort to bolster its civilian agencies’ capability to contribute to post-conflict reconstruction² and stabilization³ (R&S), as well as improve coordination⁴ with US military forces that struggled to respond to R&S challenges for which they were ill-prepared. The discouraging final stages of both conflicts have created a tendency to minimize and denigrate these efforts, as well as overlook the USG’s substantial contributions to R&S in other contexts. Indeed, policy makers and
bureaucrats alike now avoid the terms “reconstruction” and “stabilization” to describe activities that address state fragility and transnational threats, given the disappointing rate of return on costly reconstruction activities and the continuing – even worsening – instability in areas where the United States and its partners undertook massive stabilization efforts.\(^5\)

Despite the understandable reluctance to adopt nation building as a core foreign policy priority, the United States cannot afford to ignore national security challenges posed by state fragility. Yet the DOD, the DOS and USAID all face institutional and political pressures to abandon collaboration on R&S in favor of returning to conventional defense, diplomacy and development assistance priorities. Instead, policy makers should use this period of relative peace to reflect on lessons learned and determine options for improving R&S responses going forward. If not, the United States risks forgetting these hard lessons learned at considerable sacrifice, as our nation did after Vietnam.

This paper explores the extent to which civilian agencies have managed to retain latent R&S capabilities despite the shift in national security policy away from large-scale stabilization activities. As a USAID specialist in crisis, stabilization and governance, I was motivated to pursue this research as a form of mourning what I believed to be an ultimately fruitless effort at interagency collaboration. Instead, I was surprised to find a relatively rich – but rapidly attenuating – mix of interagency authorities, professional relationships, and persistent communities of practice, some of which are being reassigned (or at least rebranded) to address a new generation of challenges related to state fragility and violent extremism. Unfortunately, this process of retaining and repurposing R&S expertise is taking
place in piecemeal fashion, rather than through a holistic inventory of lessons learned to determine what to jettison and what is worth retention. In contrast, the history of R&S operations underscores the need to capture these experiences deliberately, or risk paying the price in time, dollars, and lives the next time such capabilities are needed.

This paper is based on a literature review and interviews with more than 20 subject-matter experts from across the U.S government who have designed, advocated for, participated in, or evaluated the contributions of U.S. civilian agencies to R&S during the past decade. The goal of this paper is to assess existing capabilities across four core policy objectives: 1) improving policy coherence in U.S. civilian agencies’ R&S efforts, 2) expanding civilian agencies’ strategic planning capacity, 3) mobilizing surge capacity for civilian R&S experts, and 4) encouraging better coordination between civilian agencies and the DOD. The review centers primarily on the headquarters operations – as opposed to field experiences – of the two key civilian agencies engaged in R&S: the DOS and USAID. The final section offers recommendations for filling gaps and capitalizing on gains identified in the analysis.

**Historical context**

The starting point for current U.S. policy on R&S operations is the National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44, issued by President George W. Bush on 7 December 2005, during the height of stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. NSPD-44 reflected a recognition by the White House that the transition from combat to stability operations in both countries
required a greater contribution from civilian agencies. The directive built upon an earlier action, taken in 2004 by then Secretary of State Colin Powell, to create the Office for the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) within the DOS. The new structure reported directly to Secretary Powell, bypassing the normal DOS chain of command. NSPD-44 tasked S/CRS to lead the USG’s implementation of R&S policy and to organize the “development of a strong civilian response capability including necessary surge capabilities.” The White House directive reflected the perceived need for cabinet-level oversight; as overall coordinator of U.S. foreign policy, the secretary of state would presumably ensure that civilian agencies, including the DOS itself, followed the lead of S/CRS. The decision also reflected the DOS mandate to ensure proper security for civilian diplomatic and development officials conducting operations overseas.

Across the Potomac River, senior DOD officials endorsed NSPD-44’s aims, hoping to shift some of the R&S burden to civilian agencies. On 28 November 2005, just days before the White House released its directive, the Office of the Secretary of Defense issued DOD Instruction (DODI) 3000.05, giving stability operations a “priority comparable to combat operations.” The instruction stated that “integrated civilian and military efforts are key to successful stability operations” and pledged the DOD “to lead and support the development of military-civilian teams... as a critical U.S. Government stability operations tool.” The DOD also worked alongside the DOS and the White House to negotiate authorities to transfer $100 million of its own funds to the DOS, via Section 1207 of the Fiscal Year 2006 National Defense Authorization Act, with the intent of jump-starting S/CRS operations. Subse-
quently, the DOD Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), and later the Joint Force Development (J7) Directorate of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, provided substantive assistance to S/CRS in developing its planning, training exercises, and policy coordination methodologies as well.13

Yet this new policy arrangement faced entrenched opposition within the foreign policy bureaucracy, which in turn complicated its endorsement on Capitol Hill. Congressional researcher Nina Serafino cites the dismay within the DOS at the creation of S/CRS, particularly among existing DOS bureaus that claimed responsibility for elements of R&S, including Political-Military Affairs (PolMil) and International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL).14 In addition, American University professor Gordon Adams notes that the powerful DOS regional bureaus, which manage and coordinate U.S. embassies overseas, resisted the creation of a new office with direct access to the secretary because it threatened their own power within the bureaucracy.15 Finally, embassies in conflict-affected countries lacked confidence that S/CRS teams would add value. In fact, the office’s slow start-up and weak initial capacity exacerbated these doubts.16 Most notably, policy makers at the DOS and National Security Council (NSC) decided against involving the fledgling office in Iraq, to prevent it from becoming overwhelmed by the massive R&S efforts already underway in that country. This arguably sound bureaucratic management decision nevertheless undercut the office’s political standing within the DOS17 – since the Iraq R&S challenge was ostensibly the impetus for NSPD-44 in the first place.18

For its part, USAID supported the DOS lead on policy coordination and its efforts to improve civilian
planning capabilities. However, its leaders questioned the need for S/CRS to design and implement foreign assistance programs in the R&S sector, which became part of the office’s ambitions after NSPD-44. After all, USAID already had two existing offices with significant capabilities to respond to specific R&S challenges. The Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), created in 1964, is the lead federal agency for the U.S. government’s humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) responses abroad: even the much larger DOD follows OFDA’s direction in those circumstances. The Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI), created in 1994, works alongside OFDA to provide rapid-response support to countries experiencing political transitions. OFDA and OTI each receive a modest, dedicated annual appropriation from the Congress to address their specific lines of effort. At the time S/CRS was created, OFDA and OTI already possessed many of the capabilities described in NSPD-44, albeit on smaller scales. These included personnel surge mechanisms, program design and implementation protocols, working relationships with other agency partners including the DOD (especially in the case of OFDA), and robust monitoring and evaluation tools. USAID argued that these existing capabilities should be expanded or replicated within the agency as operational counterparts to the enhanced S/CRS policy and planning role.

These bureaucratic tussles resonated among skeptics in Congress, particularly on the appropriations committees, who were less convinced than their counterparts on the authorizing committees about the need for new funding and personnel support mechanisms to accomplish the difficult and politically unpopular work of R&S abroad. As a result, it took almost three
years for legislation to pass both houses of Congress in order to implement and fund the reforms envisioned in NSPD-44.\textsuperscript{23}

In 2008, the Congress endorsed S/CRS as part of permanent law; in 2008 and 2009, it appropriated a total of $140 million to establish and partially fund a new Civilian Response Corps (CRC), to be managed by S/CRS with personnel detailed from several civilian agencies.\textsuperscript{24} As proposed by the Bush administration, the CRC was to have three components, the first two of which eventually received funding and authorization. The first was an “active” roster (CRC-A) of up to 250 newly hired civilian staff with specialized R&S expertise. The second was a “stand-by” force (CRC-S) of up to 2,000 existing U.S. government employees with relevant skills, who agreed to deploy as needed for periods of up to three months. The most ambitious element of the CRC proposal was a larger “reserve” component (CRC-R), intended as a civilian analogue to the military reserves. The civilian reserve would be open to qualified U.S. citizens whose skills, readiness, and availability matched capability requirements during R&S contingency operations. Despite being requested by both Presidents Bush and Barack Obama, this component never received funding or authorization due to persistent congressional wariness about R&S becoming a standing foreign policy priority of the U.S. government.\textsuperscript{25}

**Policy Objectives, Gains, and Gaps**

A decade has passed since the issuance of NSPD-44. However, President Obama’s successful election campaign, with his promise to end the war in Iraq, signaled a shift in national attitudes concerning sta-
bility operations. In the ensuing years, a significant
drawdown of U.S. forces in both Iraq and Afghanistan
has taken place despite the ongoing stabilization chal-

lenges in both countries. Because the Obama White
House has not updated R&S policy guidance, much of
the current organization, doctrine, authority, resour-
cing, and personnel architecture related to these tasks
are legacies of the Bush second term. In personal in-
terviews, analysts and practitioners described a sense
of drift and attenuation during the intervening years,
leading some to conclude that NSPD-44’s aims went
t entirely unfulfilled. However, the reality is more com-

plicated.

The rest of this paper picks up the story from 2009
to the present, taking stock of civilian agencies’ cur-
rent R&S capabilities in terms of policy coherence,
planning, civilian surge capacity, and civil-military
coordination.

**Improving Policy Coherence in Civilian Agencies’
R&S Efforts**

NSPD-44 directed S/CRS to “[e]nsure program
and policy coordination among Departments and
Agencies of the United States Government… [and p]
rovide United States Government decision makers
with detailed options for an integrated United States
Government response in connection with specific R&S
operations.” It also directed other U.S. federal depart-
ments and agencies to “[c]oordinate with S/CRS dur-
ing budget formulation for relevant R&S activities
prior to submission to [the Office of Management and
Budget] and the Congress or as required to coordinate
reconstruction and stabilization activities.”
Despite these clear policy statements, the empirical evidence shows a mixed record by the DOS in ensuring policy and budget coherence among civilian agencies, or even among its own bureaus, during the years that followed. To paraphrase one senior DOS official, the State Department found itself hamstrung between its traditional, state-to-state relationships on the one hand, and the need to develop mechanisms to address the growing number of regional – as opposed to bilateral – national security issues and actors on the other. These actors included a plethora of U.S. agencies involved in international affairs that operated outside of the jurisdiction and direction of the DOS, but whose representatives generally coordinated their work at the country level as part of U.S. embassy country teams chaired by the U.S. ambassador or another senior DOS official.

As part of its duties under NSPD-44, S/CRS set about trying to expand upon this DOS-led coordination system for R&S contingencies. S/CRS proposed a three-tiered interagency management system (IMS), with coordination bodies working in tandem in Washington, at the DOD’s geographic combatant commands or equivalent regional platforms, and in support of the local country team or teams, where applicable. Despite technical assistance from JFCOM and the NSC’s endorsement of IMS on 7 March 2007, S/CRS ultimately failed to embed the new structure into interagency operations. IMS proved unable to overcome resistance among DOS bureaus and skepticism from U.S. ambassadors, who saw few problems with the existing system in which they played leading roles. Two years later, the incoming Obama White House reorganized and expanded the national security staff, which eventually absorbed the DOS’s policy
coordination function for dozens of priority countries, including those in which the United States would mobilize or contemplate R&S activities.\textsuperscript{31} Within the DOS, the fate of S/CRS hung in the balance through the change of administrations and the first year of Hillary Rodham Clinton’s tenure as secretary of state. A major turning point was the decision not to mobilize S/CRS crisis response teams in the aftermath of the January 2010 Haiti earthquake, despite a recent table-top exercise conducted jointly with the DOD that had envisioned a similar scenario.\textsuperscript{32} By that time, S/CRS had received criticism for its initial efforts to lead coordination and planning efforts in other crisis situations, such as the Russian invasion of Georgia in the summer of 2008.\textsuperscript{33} Following the Haiti response, the 2011 DOS-USAID Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) announced Secretary Clinton’s intent to pull S/CRS out of the Office of the Secretary of State and reorganize it into the Bureau for Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO).\textsuperscript{34} Beginning in 2012, under the leadership of Ambassador Rick Barton, CSO departed radically from its initial role under NSPD-44 as an interagency planning and coordination cell. The new bureau cut its ties with other civilian agencies by disbanding the interagency Crisis Response Corps, and focused instead on developing an internal DOS capability to design and implement R&S activities using the remaining Section 1207 and other small pots of funding at its disposal. This reorientation led to a major personnel shake-up within the organization and greatly weakened the unit’s claim to lead the civilian response to stabilization challenges.\textsuperscript{35} One DOS official described the relationships with other agencies as “bridges burned, or at least heavily damaged” as a result of these changes.\textsuperscript{36}
Another result of all this turmoil was that S/CRS and its successor, the CSO Bureau, were unable to engage effectively in nations that were of key interest to the United States – the exception being Afghanistan from 2007 to 2013, albeit in a limited fashion and with wavering enthusiasm from the country team. Most notably, S/CRS mobilized several dozen CRC-A advisors from the DOS, USAID, and other civilian agencies to remote areas of what is now South Sudan in 2010. The mission of the advisors was to support the efforts of local leaders to resolve conflicts between different ethnic and religious communities during the tense months leading up to that country’s independence the following year. S/CRS and CSO also contributed to R&S activities in Kenya, Honduras, Burma, Nigeria, and most recently, Syria. However, in all cases, the office’s role has been to support the efforts of the relevant U.S. embassy country team, rather than leading a whole-of-government response from Washington.

Although CRS and its successor failed to achieve the coordination role envisioned for it in NSPD-44, a parallel reform undertaken at roughly the same time took a step in the right direction. In 2006, the George W. Bush administration created the Office of the Director for Foreign Assistance, also known by its DOS acronym “F,” to unify budget formulation, execution, and reporting across the foreign assistance portfolios of the DOS and USAID. In the ensuing years, F developed a new programming and budgeting framework, as well as common performance measurements, in order to facilitate reporting to Congress and the public on the range and scope of spending and the impacts of foreign assistance activities across dozens of lines of effort. An additional by-product of F and its foreign assistance framework was the articulation of a broad
foreign policy objective, called “Peace and Security,” encompassing civilian agencies’ diplomatic and development efforts to counter national security threats. Ironically, as R&S has fallen out of fashion in the foreign policy realm, its decline coincides with the emergence of a new generation of interagency coordination efforts reflecting other Peace and Security concerns, such as countering violent extremism (CVE), transnational organized crime, atrocities prevention, and security sector assistance. Officials in the DOD, the DOS and USAID noted these new focus areas overlap considerably with what used to be considered R&S challenges: “The capabilities may have shifted, but the habit of interagency coordination has remained.”

Thus, much of the groundwork laid by S/CRS and its partners has actually survived and migrated toward these contemporary priorities – albeit without much deliberate reflection about lessons learned over the past decade.

Expanding Civilian Agencies’ Strategic Planning Capacity

Many analysts of interagency decision making highlight the lack of civilian agencies’ strategic planning capability as another major area of weakness hampering their ability to contribute to stability operations, as well as a key cause of the so-called “mission creep” by the military into traditionally civilian-led areas of foreign policy. To address this problem, S/CRS and its partners at JFCOM undertook an intense, years-long effort to develop an interagency planning framework to support the three-tiered policy management system described earlier, and to help translate civilian agencies’ objectives more effectively to mili-
tary planning staff. These efforts included the development of an interagency planning handbook, numerous tabletop exercises envisioning R&S responses in countries such as Guinea and Haiti, as well as jointly organized conferences and workshops to test and train the concepts for both active and standby members of the Crisis Response Corps.

As with the policy innovations, these planning efforts ran into bureaucratic resistance and ultimately failed. After investing much of its time and energy in creating planning tools, S/CRS was never able to generate sufficient demand for them from among their principal client base: U.S. embassies in conflict-affected countries. Part of the resistance stemmed from the DOS’s organizational culture, which observers like Gordon Adams describe as more comfortable with ambiguity, complexity, nuance and influence than the military’s orderly, mission-focused, readiness-centric orientation. However, officials who worked with S/CRS during this period also note that few embassies understood the value of the planning staff’s capabilities given their limited previous exposure to deliberate or crisis action planning. In addition, a DOD official who worked at the National Security Council (NSC) during this period, faults S/CRS for being unable to effectively link its ambitious and elaborate planning framework – which was geared to long-term and heavily resourced interventions – to the medium-term, modestly funded R&S contingencies facing the interagency during that time.

The specific difficulties of S/CRS took place within a larger context in which civilian planning capabilities made some modest advances. For example, the 2011 and 2015 QDDRs introduced multi-year, strategic-level guidance for both the DOS and USAID, mirroring
the DOD’s Quadrennial Defense Review.\textsuperscript{52} Additionally, since 2014, the NSC has convened an interagency task force on fragile states, which aims to collect and compare political analyses and early warning tools produced by federal agencies to provide better planning tools to senior policy makers.\textsuperscript{53} Despite its narrow focus, this task force represents a potentially expandable platform for interagency planning, replacing an earlier R&S interagency policy committee chaired by S/CRS until its dissolution in 2011.\textsuperscript{54}

Overseas, since 2012, U.S. embassies have produced annual Integrated Country Strategies (ICS) that serve as planning tools for chiefs of mission to amalgamate the efforts of all U.S. government agencies working as part of the bilateral country team, including the DOD’s known local equities.\textsuperscript{55} Complementing the ICS, USAID’s overseas development offices, known as missions, produce five-year Country Development Cooperation Strategies (CDCS) organized into strategic objectives for development and humanitarian assistance activities, including projected financial resource needs and personnel requirements. The CDCS serves as a reference document for budget formulation, personnel allocation, program design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation, and a lessons learned effort to inform the next generation of the strategy. This process amalgamates what defense doctrine defines as deliberate planning and programming. Taken together, the ICS and CDCS provide opportunities for interagency collaboration at the headquarters level in Washington and in individual host countries – although the limited capacity and interest in regional planning among civilian agencies remains a weakness.
For DOD planners, the limited availability of civilian agency personnel creates a challenge for determining the most effective location to integrate their views into the comparatively massive military planning processes to maximize their impact. Some geographic combatant commands, such as the U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM), have taken pains to adapt their theater campaign planning processes to accommodate civilian agency planners and policy makers. However, the fact remains that DOD planners must meet their colleagues more than halfway to ensure their participation in joint planning exercises.

**Mobilizing Surge Capacity for Civilian Experts in Reconstruction and Stabilization**

The civilian agencies’ modest progress in deliberate planning, contrasts sharply with the significant backsliding in crisis response since the demise of the CRC in 2012. Civilian agencies face four key obstacles: their own organizational cultures, uneven coverage across the breadth of capabilities needed to address R&S challenges, limited personnel capacity, and operational security issues.

From the standpoint of organizational culture, creating and maintaining even a modest civilian surge capacity exclusively for R&S contingencies has proven difficult for agencies, whose missions gravitate around managing multiple priorities incrementally and simultaneously in steady-state operating environments. Thomas S. Szayna and his colleagues at RAND use an analogy drawn from domestic crisis responders to describe the contrast between civilian foreign policy agencies and their military counterparts:
Civilian agencies operate on the police department model of continuous full employment of resources and have little slack in the system, whereas the military operates more on the fire department model of preparing for a contingency. The different orientations mean that, in reality, unless the United States made a choice to abandon or scale down many of its responsibilities abroad, most of the civilian personnel with [R&S] expertise cannot be redeployed for [those] contingencies without a damaging impact on current U.S. commitments.\textsuperscript{56}

The CRC experiment did not function as planned in this environment. Although several civilian agencies\textsuperscript{57} contributed to the active and standby components, the delays in authorizing and resourcing the CRC created a mismatch between the supply of crisis responders and the demand among embassies for personnel surge capacity. With the exception of Sudan/South Sudan and Afghanistan, in which dozens of CRC-A deployments occurred in succession, most deployments consisted of one or two advisors fulfilling temporary duty assignments in low-priority conflict-affected countries. Between deployments, these staff often got assigned temporarily to offices at agency headquarters, where they remained “on call” for quick deployment. As described by one former CRC-A member interviewed for this report, “We spent most of our time in limbo, unable to do substantive work in Washington while awaiting field assignments that rarely came.”\textsuperscript{58} Eventually, the agency in question renegotiated the term “crisis response,” using funding in the account associated with R&S activities to cover the costs of deploying CRC staff to countries unaffected by conflict. The rationale was that ongoing direct-hire staffing shortages in these countries amounted to a crisis. This example
perfectly exemplifies the conversion of Szayna’s bureaucratic firemen into policemen.

In terms of capabilities and capacity, civilian agencies maintain trained and ready personnel in narrow lines of effort along the R&S spectrum. USAID’s OFDA and OTI are organized, authorized, and resourced to address HADR and political transitions respectively. Within those narrow lines of effort, OFDA and OTI maintain an appropriate range of capabilities and can access surge personnel using dedicated “bull pens” of specialized civilian contractors. These individuals, often with years of international experience in crisis response, allow OFDA to mobilize disaster assistance response teams, while OTI jumpstarts transition activities within days or sometimes hours of an emergency. In addition, OFDA maintains standing agreements with municipal first responders in Fairfax, Virginia and Los Angeles, California, which function as a corps of civilian reservists for its work in disaster response.59

Outside of these specialized realms, the DOS and USAID each employ several hundred personnel with Peace and Security capabilities – a small force covering a wide area of operations.60 The recently created Office of the Undersecretary of State for Citizen Security, Democracy and Human Rights – known by its acronym “J” – oversees seven DOS offices and bureaus that manage Peace and Security resources, including CSO. At USAID, the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA) comprises offices devoted to conflict management and mitigation; democracy, human rights and governance; emergency food programs; and civil-military coordination – as well as OFDA and OTI. Posted overseas in the Foreign Service, State Department human rights officers and USAID crisis, stabilization and governance officers
analyze and report on conflict and violence, as well as design, manage and evaluate political development and peacebuilding programs. As a cadre, these staffs specialize in a wide range of functions, and possess highly valued experience that could contribute to crisis response. Theoretically, they can be mobilized and organized to respond to an R&S contingency – and indeed, for short-term, high-priority crises, this often happens. However, the longer a crisis lasts, the more difficult it becomes for civilian agencies to sustain a response without surge support mechanisms, because most staff with relevant capability already have full-time responsibilities elsewhere in the bureaucracy.

Fortunately, both USAID and the DOS began investing modestly in surge support mechanisms in the wake of CRC’s dissolution. In 2013, USAID’s leadership transformed the office managing the agency’s contribution to CRC into an internal “firehouse” of crisis surge support staff, composed of a few dozen individuals with relevant skills, active security clearances, and an ability to perform inherently governmental work through congressionally authorized personal services contract mechanisms. This fledgling effort replicates the OFDA and OTI bullpen model across a broader range of capabilities. Recently, CSO launched a similar effort after consulting with USAID. It remains to be seen whether other civilian agencies will follow suit.

The final personnel challenge, which requires little elaboration, is the increased concern about operational security for civilian agency staff and contractors in the wake of the September 2012 attack on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi, Libya. The political salience of the issue in the current presidential campaign makes it difficult to forecast how civilian agencies’ presence
and participation in conflict zones may be curtailed. In the meantime, policy makers will continue to turn to the DOD for contingencies that risk overwhelming civilian agencies’ limited capacity, or for exposing their employees and implementing partners to lethal force. This tendency will make civil-military coordination as important in future stability operations as it has been over the past decade.

Encouraging Better Civil-Military Coordination

Much of the literature on interagency relationships in the national security sphere highlights the cultural and political conflicts that may hamper coordination between foreign affairs agencies. However, several representatives of the DOS, the DOD, and USAID interviewed for this research paper agreed that working relationships between the DOD and its civilian agency counterparts have improved noticeably during the past decade. In this respect, NSPD-44 and other policy actions succeeded in creating bureaucratic structures and personnel networks that supported joint interagency experiments in conflict zones, such as provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs). These structures and networks provided a range of prosaic coordination mechanisms that sought to ensure that DOD’s “development-like” interventions contributed to, or at least did not interfere with, other diplomatic and long-term development objectives.

One example of a bureaucratic locus for coordination is USAID’s Office of Civil-Military Cooperation (CMC), formerly the Office of Military Affairs (OMA), established in 2005 to support the goals of NSPD-44. At the time, members of USAID’s non-profit industry base, as well as some of its own personnel, voiced
concerns about the militarization of foreign assistance and reluctance about coordinating closely with military officials. Over time, that cultural backlash receded, particularly as USAID staff and implementers participated in R&S activities in Iraq and Afghanistan alongside their military colleagues, or received training from OMA/CMC on how to work effectively with military officials. Perhaps most importantly, personnel hiring policy changes led to an increased number of military veterans joining the civilian agency’s staff. These personal interactions helped to break down stereotypes and reinforce the value of each agency working in parallel lines of effort to accomplish unified goals.68

As a USAID Crisis, Stabilization and Governance Officer Benjamin Kauffeld notes69 his and other civilian agencies, such as the U.S. Department of Agriculture, have joined the DOS in placing senior advisors in most of the combatant commands and at the Pentagon, both to influence military decision making and to help identify, filter, and steer the most legitimate military requests to the appropriate civilian authority. Embassy country teams serve as another key point of convergence between representatives from a range of civilian agencies and the military liaison teams and defense attachés serving in each post. In Kauffeld’s words, in the wake of the recent Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts, “USAID and DOD have never appreciated and respected each other’s capabilities better than right now.”70

The June 2015 “USAID Policy on Cooperation with the Department of Defense” sought to capitalize on this new reality.71 Developed by CMC in coordination with other USAID regional and functional bureaus, the policy formalizes the previous decade’s efforts to
bridge the cultural, strategic, and programmatic distance between development assistance and the work of the DOD. To take one example, the policy specifically directs USAID missions abroad to share CDCS plans with their military counterparts, and to participate, where possible, in developing DOD country plans and theater campaign plans.\textsuperscript{72} Similarly, a 2012 policy instruction from the Office of the Secretary of Defense instructs senior military officials working as part of an embassy country team to obtain approval from the chief of mission and senior USAID representative in country before implementing “development-like” activities funded by the DOD’s Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDACA) and Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA) accounts.\textsuperscript{73}

Finally, CMC facilitates staff-level contacts between USAID and the DOD. The office has developed a training program for military audiences on development assistance and USAID’s role in the national security community, called “Development in Vulnerable Environments.” It also oversees the selection and placement of more than a dozen USAID officials annually as students and faculty at professional military education institutions.\textsuperscript{74}

Despite these positive steps, as wartime coordination recedes and concerns about operational safety persist, civilian agencies will be increasingly unwilling or unable to play a leading role in response to R&S challenges. New priorities in the Peace and Security realm such as CVE, transnational organized crime, atrocities prevention, and defense institution building, provide new opportunities for interagency collaboration, but they also absorb most of the limited capacity in this field. As civilian agencies complete their retreat from R&S in favor of these new priorities, the DOD must re-
visit its own strategic posture in light of the changing interagency environment or risk going it alone again when the next major R&S contingency occurs.  

**Recommendations**

The recommendations offered here for addressing the capability gaps in the U.S. approach to R&S derive from captured lessons learned and acknowledging the advancements made in R&S that are benefitting interagency coordination in other areas. The first three recommendations aim to strengthen the goodwill and teamwork of public servants across the U.S. government, who collectively work to advance the nation’s common security goals, but whose relationships became strained during the conversion of S/CRS to the CSO Bureau.

1. Expand the work of the interagency task force on fragile states – currently focusing on early warning mechanisms and conflict assessment tools – to refine other technical tools that facilitate interagency coordination and best practices. For example, develop joint vocabulary to define security challenges and the capabilities required to address them. The task forces should also develop and test common performance indicators and standards, while providing these as technical assets for the incoming administration.

2. Under the auspices of the interagency task force, conduct “3-D” planning exercises focused on addressing current or impending challenges related to state fragility. Use these interagency
exercises to introduce new or refined analytical tools, and develop options for coordination in addressing regional and transnational threats, where the biggest gaps exist between agency cultures and platforms. Crucially, task force leaders should direct agencies to identify resources for implementing those planning outcomes determined to be feasible, acceptable and suitable to achieving long-term policy objectives. By tying resources more explicitly to planning processes and outcomes, the task force can improve upon recent experiments with joint interagency planning in the Sahel region of northwest Africa, the Horn of Africa, and Syria. While those earlier efforts succeeded in clarifying whole-of-government objectives, implementation options, and vulnerabilities (ends, ways and risks), they failed to generate the resources (means) required to follow through – thus negating much of the practical value of such complex, time-consuming, and culturally challenging efforts.

3. Perform a formal interagency after action review (AAR) on USG R&S activities outside of Iraq and Afghanistan (given the multitude of research already done on those two cases). The purpose of this effort would be to facilitate and inform the new generation of coordination now taking place in CVE, atrocities prevention, and other Peace and Security focus areas. Focus on past efforts that encouraged and supported regional planning and implementation, which is a recurring weak point in civilian agencies’ capabilities. To ensure participation, the AAR
should be commissioned as a joint venture of the three lead agencies’ policy bureaus; or by State/F and a DOD-affiliated knowledge center, such as the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) or Center for Complex Operations (CCO). The AAR should include a well-respected U.S. academic institution that can contribute objective outside expertise, as well as serve as a repository of collected lessons learned documentation. This academic partnership will insure materials remain available for study in the event that USG entities involved in R&S get defunded, as has happened in the past.

4. Civilian agency leaders should weigh in on the current legislative efforts at military reform tied to the 30th anniversary of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act, given that some of the proposed efforts to change the DOD’s global posture and organizational structures would affect diplomacy and development work as well as defense. For example, the outcome of decisions related to combining USAFRICOM and the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM), and the U.S. Northern and Southern Commands (USNORTHCOM and USSOUTHCOM), would impact the work of DOS and USAID in Africa and Latin America, just as the creation of USAFRICOM a decade ago rippled through the region and influenced the relationships between U.S. civilian agencies and their host nation counterparts. Civilian agencies should join forces with the DOD to seek congressional action to improve the alignment of authorities and resources among them, with the aim of re-
balancing civilian and military capabilities to address peace and security challenges more effectively across multiple lines of effort.

5. Convene a conference of R&S knowledge centers to take stock of current capabilities and develop strategies for reinvigorating relationships with policy makers, with the goal of ensuring that these earlier investments in knowledge management can help inform a new administration facing a new generation of complex international challenges. Examine how these institutions – such as CSO, PKSOI, CCO, USIP, and the J7 staff – can draw from their past work to contribute more strategically and robustly to current discussions around CVE, defense institution building, atrocities prevention, transnational organized crime, and emerging issues that parallel (or re-brand) an earlier generation of R&S concerns. Representatives from these government-sponsored centers should be prepared to re-introduce themselves to current and future foreign policy makers and outline their capabilities. Doing so would serve to refresh their mandate and ensure that their work remains relevant to an insular, evolving, and easily distracted foreign policy community in Washington.

Concluding Thoughts

Planning ahead for future R&S efforts is essential for the United States, given the number of fragile states in the world and the nature of contemporary security threats to our nation and its allies. As Ameri-
can leaders learned over the years, however, these efforts rate among the most complex and least popular foreign policy challenges. No civilian U.S. government agency claims responsibility for reconstruction and stabilization. Even the DOD accepts the leading role reluctantly. American public opinion can swing quickly from demanding intervention in response to some atrocity or disaster, to opposing a lengthy and dangerous commitment of U.S. troops and resources. As a result, R&S activities provoke an almost superstitious reaction among otherwise rational policy makers, as if planning to deal with these contingencies will make them inevitable.

That political backdrop, as well as the nation’s current resource constraints, does not invalidate the need for serious reform to address R&S capability gaps. However, it does make wholesale changes to the government’s foreign policy infrastructure and budget extremely unlikely. Some contemporary authors and analysts advocate for grand proposals to create a new U.S. office for contingency operations, engineer a Goldwater-Nichols-type reorganization of the interagency, or undertake a massive rebalancing of resources and authorities from the military to civilian agencies. Few expect that such prominent changes can be accomplished by the current political system. The relatively modest recommendations presented in this paper reflect that skepticism.

The civilian foreign affairs agencies have key roles to play in helping to shape and implement R&S lines of effort as part of the U.S. foreign policy toolkit. Their past experience, both positive and negative, has taught valuable lessons and created some key elements of capability to help stabilize and rebuild fragile states, whenever doing so is consistent with
U.S. national security interests. These agencies must resist the temptation to draw back into more familiar, less dangerous settings, leaving the hard cases to our brothers and sisters in uniform. With a few modest efforts and some focused attention, agency leaders can preserve and build upon the gains they have achieved at such great cost with faith that in the long run, those actions will have been worth the investment.

**Endnotes**

1. *operations* is defined in Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 3000.05 as “an overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.” U.S. Department of Defense, *Stability Operations*, Department of Defense Instruction Number 3000.05 (Washington, DC: Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, September 16, 2009), 1.


3. Again following the lead of the USIP *Guiding Principles* handbook, this paper uses the United Kingdom Stabilisation Unit definition of *stabilization*: “one of the approaches used in situations of violent conflict which is designed to protect and promote legitimate political authority, using a combination of integrated civilian and military actions to reduce violence, re-establish se-

4. As an additional clarification, civil-military coordination refers in this paper to the peer-to-peer bureaucratic relationships between the DOD and other agencies of the U.S. Government. It does not address Samuel L. Huntington’s preoccupation with the dynamics between uniformed officers and the elected and appointed civilian leaders to whom they report. Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957).

5. Several officials from the State and Defense Departments, as well as USAID, made this point when interviewed by the author in early 2016. However, I am continuing to use the terms reconstruction and stabilization (or R&S) in this paper to reflect the historical record and to contrast their past use with new terms used to describe similar issue areas, such as countering violent extremism, atrocities prevention, defense institution building, security sector assistance, and transnational organized crime.

7. Nina M. Serafino, *Peacekeeping/Stabilization and Conflict Transitions: Background and Congressional Action on the Civilian Response/Reserve Corps and other Civilian Stabilization and Reconstruction Capabilities* (Washington: Congressional Research Service, June 16, 2009), 9. However, the Reconstruction and Stabilization Civilian Management Act of 2008, which formally enshrined S/CRS into law, specified that the president, rather than the secretary of state, appoints the S/CRS coordinator, with the advice and consent of the Senate; he or she then reports to the Secretary of State. Nora Bensahel, Olga Oliker, Heather Peterson. *Improving Capacity for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND National Defense Research Institute, 2009), 37.


10. Ibid., 3.

11. Ibid.


24. Ibid., 14.


28. Interview with Department of State (DOS) official, February 29, 2016.


34. was also a factor in the decision to restructure S/CRS into CSO, particularly as Section 1207 funding phased out after Fiscal Year 2010. Up to that time, S/CRS’s efforts to coordinate and lead civilian agencies’ R&S efforts and manage the CRC had cost over $100 million a year, whereas the transition to CSO reflected a more modest funding level drawing primarily from DOS resources. Telephone interview with Neal Kringel, a current CSO official, February 24, 2016.
35. Interviews with two former officials of the DOS Office for the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), Washington, DC, December 4, 2015 and February 12, 2016; telephone interview with Neal Kringel, February 24, 2016.


41. Telephone interview with Julie Werbel, a former USAID official, February 25, 2016.


44. Gordon Adams and Shoon Murray, eds., Mission Creep: The Militarization of U.S. Foreign Policy?, (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2014), 15-16. A more charitable view of the situation is that the differing forms of planning undertaken by various agencies reflect and support their different functions and missions. For example, the DOS compiles and issues annual re-
ports on human rights, trafficking in persons, and religious freedom, while the USAID Office for Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM) – a sister office to OFDA and OTI – produces an annual Alert List measuring state fragility and instability. These tools provide critical information about the operating environment facing diplomats and development workers worldwide. In addition, CMM, OTI and CSO jointly developed an Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF) tool to identify the root causes of conflict and instability in various operating environments. In Afghanistan, the U.S. military adopted the ICAF methodology, which now appears in doctrine as the District Stability Framework approach to local engagement during counterinsurgency operations.

45. USJFCOM, Draft Planning Framework.


50. Telephone interview with a former USAID Crisis Response Corps-Active (CRC-A) member, January 12, 2016.

51. Interview with DOD official, December 29, 2015.


58. Telephone interview with a former USAID CRC-A member, January 12, 2016.


60. During the Obama Administration, both agencies succeeded in increasing their direct-hire staff across the board by several hundred new foreign service officers, as well as bringing aboard hundreds of others using term-limited personnel appointments known as “foreign service limited” positions. Many of the latter positions have expired since the build-up of civilian staff in Iraq and Afghanistan that accompanied the expanded coalition military presence in the region. Telephone interview with Michael Hryshchysyn, February 25, 2016.
61. A recent example is the 2014 Ebola virus disease response, for which dozens of USAID and State Department staff mobilized to assist the embassies and missions in affected countries.


63. Telephone interview with Mark Pickett, Director of the USAID Office of Crisis Surge Support, February 22, 2016.

64. Ibid., and telephone interview with Neal Kringel, February 24, 2016.

65. For example, Adams and Murray eds., Mission Creep.


68. Interviews with several current and former USAID officials, November 2015 to March 2016.


70. Ibid., 1-2

72. Ibid., 7-8.


75. In fact, this is already occurring; the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, OSD (P), is preparing a revision to DOD Instruction 3000.05 to clarify the military’s roles and responsibilities in stability operations, including the conditions under which the DOD should support rather than lead such efforts. Interview with OSD (P) official, 29 December 29, 2015.


77. In fact, USAID’s Office of Civil-Military Cooperation has circulated an internal memo advising agency leadership to pay greater attention to the Senate Armed Services Committee hearing process associated with the Goldwater-Nichols anniversary. Interview with Michael Hryshchyshyn, 25 February 2016.


79.Tierney, 15.