The Future of Stability

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Location: 2300 Wilson Blvd. Arlington, VA
AUSA Hosts "The Future of Stability Operations" Panel

INCA: Creating an Opportunity for Shared Responsibility

Expansive Role for UN Peacekeepers in Anti-Terrorism Operations

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THE FUTURE OF STABILITY OPERATIONS

17 SEPTEMBER 2015

ARLINGTON, VA
Introduction

On 17 September 2015, a senior group of thought leaders and innovators on Stability Operations convened at the Navy League in Arlington, Virginia. The Association of the United States Army (AUSA) in cooperation with the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) discussed the future of Stability Operations. AUSA President GEN Gordon Sullivan (ret), provided the opening remarks. The keynote speakers were LTG Terry Wolff (ret), Director of the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies, and Anne Witkowsky, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Stability and Humanitarian Affairs. The subsequent panel addressed The Military’s Future in Stability Operations, with PKSOI Assistant Director William Flavin chairing. The distinguished panel consisted of Beth Cole, a Special Advisor at US Institute for Peace, Dr. Janine Davidson, Senior Fellow for Defense Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, BG Kimberly Field (ret), the Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations, MG William Hix, the Director of Strategy, Plans and Policy of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff Army G-3/5/7, Maj Gen John Broadmeadow, Vice Director for Logistics, J4 on the Joint Staff, MG Dan Ammerman, Commanding General of the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (Airborne), and LTG Kenneth Tovo, Commanding General, U.S. Army Special Operations Command. The full findings of the future of stability operations discussion will be featured in the next edition of AUSA’s Torchbearer. This report presents the key takeaways.

Over the last several decades, the Department of Defense (DoD) and its civilian interagency (IA) counterparts have frequently collaborated in culturally diverse locations under operationally different circumstances, such as: Mogadishu and Baidoa in Somalia, Kigali in Rwanda, Monrovia in Liberia, as well as the more recent long term engagements in Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan. Uniformed soldiers enabled other government agencies to attain development objectives to reestablish civil security and civil control. The Balkans is a little recognized success story of U.S.-IA collaboration in contrast to the high profile offensive and counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. DoD has facilitated development projects to repair critical infrastructure, support governance and the Rule of Law, enable economic development and funding, and provide humanitarian assistance. Although the number of deployed troops is decreasing, the demand for Stability Operations (SO) has increased substantially, thereby increasing DoD’s engagement with other government agencies under the Whole of Government (WoG) approach. The question remains whether the U.S. government agencies are effectively leveraging the full spectrum of national power. Since 2006, DoD has continued to cultivate its concepts and doctrine on SO and IA collaboration. In other words, SO is not an incidental mission for the Army; it is a core principal, creating a safe and secure environment.

While DoD has implemented many of the AUSA 2006 Torchbearer concepts, it must continue to incorporate the formative experiences and Best Practices of the past decade. While contemplating a global engagement strategy in this uncertain world, DoD must seek optimal solutions for leveraging the instruments of national power, as we endeavor to synchronize interagency coordination. One of the principal challenges is to determine whether large scale stability operations are the appropriate means for the strategic environment, and whether DoD needs to retain sufficient capability to reconstitute the armed forces for to perform such operations. Capabilities must be aligned with resources, as SO skill sets cannot be generated quickly.

The new norm in the world is predictable instability with state- and non-state sponsored mass killings accounting for the most deaths and the highest number of Internally Displaced Persons and refugees since the early 1990s. Pervasive uncertainty confounds the ability to predict the future. The formative documents for U.S. national strategy recognize the need to rebalance capability, capacity and readiness within the joint force to engage in a broad spectrum of conflict to protect U.S. security interests. However, in a constrained environment, how are these means met? If success is defined as creating a stable and capable government structure that is capable of policing its own territory, sustaining economic growth and providing essential services
equitably to society, then Bosnia might be described as a success story. A WoG effort is essential for bringing all of the tools and instruments of statecraft and government power to bear for U.S. national interests. The world’s problems are not owned by the U.S., which has a tendency to look at the world in terms of U.S. desires, even though the facts indicate otherwise. The U.S. must understand it does not own the timetable or the solution set, and therefore may only be able to impact the situation marginally.

Over the last decade the military has contributed to SO by establishing civil society and civil control, restoring and providing essential services, repairing critical infrastructure, supporting governance, enabling economic development and providing humanitarian assistance as required. This has demonstrated the military’s ability to execute SO across the conflict continuum. Nonetheless, DoD must temper its expectations of the IA. Although the military may not be a suitable actor for a particular task, where the IA and Foreign Service Officers possess the requisite skills-sets to accomplish governance development, the IA alone does not have the training to empower provincial governance. Doctrine must illustrate the roles and capabilities of IA partners, and DoD must organize and engage in joint and combined exercises recurrently with IA partners to establish operational roles and protocols. Further, DoD must strive to engage coalition partners in smaller scale SO, as our NATO partners are looking to eliminate SO from their normal operational procedures.

Best Practices are excellent tools for amplifying interoperability, but Iraq and Afghanistan are unique instances from an authority’s perspective, and they will not be relevant in other situations, such as Europe and South America where the Department of State will be the lead agency. As those who gained experience during the formative years of IA cooperation begin to retire, the U.S. government needs to capture and institutionalize these concepts into training and education. DoD and the IA must engage all prominent think tanks in the coming year, as they will be preparing briefing books for the transition period of the next president-elect. This will be a unique engagement opportunity to rescope SO.

IA integrated SO is usually well coordinated at the tactical level, adequate at the operational level, and less well at the strategic level, which is due to bureaucratic silos. Many of the silos have been broken down, but DoD must ensure that they are not rebuilt. Mission analysis is indispensible, and DoD must be sized appropriately and willing to take the lead and help enhance the shortfalls in IA capabilities. When conducting mission analysis, establishing Rule of Law is paramount to successful and sustain-
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Zachary Kalman

Providing supporting evidence (identifying existing case studies, AARs and other citations) for each of the key points in COL Pinnell, PKSOI Director’s pointed version of the truths and imperatives for both Peacekeeping and Stability Operations.

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Tristan Arnold

Political change and military professionalism. This project examines the changing nature of civil-military relations as societies began to experience rapid political change and how differing levels of military professionalism affect the subsequent role that the military plays in the changing society.

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Stephen Spinder

Shippensburg University

Re-write the military portion of the USIP’s “Guide for Participants in Peace, Stability and Relief Operations”

Hanna Therrien

Dickinson College

Review most recent Department of Defense (DoD) responses to disaster and Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA). Analyze and recommend the top ten lessons learned in the form of issue, discussion, and recommendation.

Lisa Knapp-Fadani

Dickinson College

Updating the United Nations Situation Assessment as part of the PORE/PAT/PEASNIK running estimate project initiated the spring 2015. The running project is an automated peace operations information system that provides current assessments of the United Nations.
The Challenges Forum is an international network of 19 civilian, military and police partner organizations from all continents, including major troop and police contributing countries and the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. PKSOI has been the primary U.S. Partner since the establishment of the Challenges Project and Forum in 1997. PKSOI leadership (Director COL Dan Pinnell, Assistant Director Professor Bill Flavin and Professor Dwight Raymond) in coordination with OSD(SOLIC) STATE (IO) and developing an implementing plan for is an integral part of this delegation. To for the Challenges of Peace Operations.

PKSOI Leadership Plays an Integral Role in the Challenges Forum Annual Meeting, Yeravan Armenia

The Challenges Forum is an international network of 19 civilian, military and police partner organizations from all continents, including major troop and police contributing countries and the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. PKSOI has been the primary U.S. Partner since the establishment of the Challenges Project and Forum in 1997. PKSOI leadership (Director COL Dan Pinnell, Assistant Director Professor Bill Flavin and Professor Dwight Raymond) in coordination with OSD(SOLIC) STATE (IO) and developing an implementing plan for is an integral part of this delegation. To for the Challenges of Peace Operations.

USIP led the delegation which focused on the UN SECGEN high level report. PKSOI learn more about the International Forum Challenges Forum click here.
The International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centers had more than 100 countries represented, including all of the major peacekeeping centers. The Brazilian Peace Operations Joint Training Center (CCOP-AB) hosted this year’s conference. Dr. Karen Finkenbinder, PKSOI’s Rule of Law SME, introduced the Vietnam Peacekeeping Centre (VPC) contingent for the first time to the other peacekeeping center commanders. Dr. Finkenbinder is currently working with VPC as a Ministry of Defense Advisor. Dr. Finkenbinder presented PKSOI’s PSOTEW workshop concept to the IAPTC audience, as a venue for future collaboration. Dr. Finkenbinder also led a thematic discussion on the Role of Peacekeepers in countering Transnational Organized Crime.

The keynote speakers, plenary and work group presentations can be downloaded under the additional information tab at the 21st Annual Conference of the IAPTC Website.
PKSOI is the U.S. representative for NATO Training and Education for Peace Support Operations Task Group (TEPSO TG) and has the lead role in NATO for Protection of Civilians policy and doctrine development.

PKSOI’s Chief of Proponency/ Stability Doctrine Analyst Lt. Col. Jurgen Prandtner of Civilians presenting the POC training COL Mark Haseman and International led the NATO efforts on Protection modules.

TEPSO WG - Autumn Meeting 2015
Stans, 28 September - 02 October 2015
The U.S. and Tajikistan hosted exercise Regional Cooperation 2015 in Tajikistan. RC-15 is CENTCOM’s only multilateral exercise in Central Asia. PKSOI’s COL Ray Bossert and COL (R) Tony Lieto provided subject matter expertise and instruction directly related to peacekeeping and stability operations.

This year’s exercise involved over 400 military participants from Tajikistan, the United States, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Mongolia. The exercise involved a computer-based component in Dushanbe and, for the first time, a field exchange component at a Ministry of Defense training area. The field portion involved approximately 120 soldiers from Tajikistan and the United States conducting a series of scenario-based tasks in a realistic field environment. See article on CENTCOM’s website.
PKSOI Support to Training and Education

WHINSEC, FT Benning GA

From 9-11 September Dr. Jim Embrey continued PKSOI’s long lasting relationship with the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC), by providing outstanding lecture support focused on how revolution in military affairs and war dramatically advance national progress.

Army Security Cooperation Planners Course

21-25 September: Army Security Cooperation Planners Course (ASCPC): PKSOI and the Army staff concluded a very effective third and final FY 15 ASCPC course. This five day 40 hour course at the Army Heritage and Education Center (AHEC) familiarizes security cooperation staff officers with the necessary planning methodologies, resourcing processes, execution programs/authorities, evaluation mechanisms, and reference information including best practices and lessons learned.

Leader Development Education for Sustainable Peace

PKSOI's Professor Dwight Raymond supported Naval Postgraduate School’s Leader Development Education for Sustainable Peace (LDESP) class to prepare 593rd Expeditionary Command staff officers for next week's U.S.-India Yudh Abhyas exercise. Yudh Abhyas is the only exercise conducted between U.S. and India exercises this year.
2015 Civil Affairs Symposium

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For more information and to register go to:
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INCA: Creating an Opportunity for Shared Responsibility

by Eric Wolterstorff
Our initial military goal in Iraq was clear: remove Saddam Hussein from power. But, what next? Ideally, we wanted a stable, self-governing, and developing country to emerge. Nation building has long been an important aspect of our country, including Reconstruction in the South after the Civil War and the extended campaign in the Philippines following the Spanish-American War. Stability operations are not only part of our history, but are also a core function of the United States’ foreign engagement today and for the foreseeable future.

Initiatives that work to establish stable, self-governing, and developing countries are crucial for long-term peace, yet, design, and implementation are extremely difficult. The United States cannot lead successful initiatives without the help and cooperation of local actors who share in this responsibility. A joint effort requires understanding all of the local actors’ perspectives of the situation, hopes and concerns for the future. Local stakeholders understand the nature of the conflict and the complexities of their society better than the United States or other international actors. Stability and governance initiatives must take this information into account, both in the initial design and at subsequent decision-making junctures, ensuring that informed decisions are made on a strategic, operational, and tactical level.

In actual practice, there is little coordination among local actors and regional and international stakeholders, creating beginning-to-end confusion which impedes progress and results in serious negative secondary consequences. There needs to be a shared understanding and goal of the situation. stakeholders must develop and agreed upon process for selecting, designing, and implementing stability and governance initiatives. Leaders in these environments need to be able to make quick decisions and act decisively.

The Inclusive Nationalism Country Assessment (INCA) is designed to meet these needs of inclusiveness with speed and decisiveness. INCA is an inclusive strategic planning and implementation tool specifically for stability operations and governance initiatives. INCA is built on the idea that national development efforts should be oriented towards the goal of national sovereignty and inclusive nationalism.

The INCA process organizes all stakeholders around a common goal, thereby generating an enabling environment for successful stability and governance. INCA includes representatives from all segments of a population and from international actors, while strengthening national identity. In these chaotic environments, every actor requires a better understanding of the perspectives of other local, national, and international stakeholders and actors, which are not readily available. The INCA process can fill this information gap and help all stakeholders share responsibility for stability and governance engagements in post-war environments. INCA is a new tool that systematically facilitates a dialogue to formulate a shared understanding among all stakeholders in an unstable situation. Because INCA country assessments are created jointly by all relevant national, regional, and international stakeholders, the assessment provides a foundation on which to define clear and achievable goals, and coordinate the actions necessary to achieve them.

### Sovereignty and Inclusive Nationalism

The INCA process promotes the establishment of a stable, self-governing, and developing country. It combines three separate concepts – sovereignty, inclusiveness, and nationalism. Sovereignty embraces the notion that stability and development depend on self-governance, and that self-governance requires national sovereignty.

Inclusiveness assumes that a country can only succeed when everyone has access to the nation’s political, social, and cultural institutions. To be truly inclusive, a country must embrace every person, subgroup, and stakeholder, regardless of religion, minority affiliation, or gender. A politically inclusive government is desirable as it promotes stability. When everyone is represented, with the opportunity to participate in and benefit from the political process, the incentives for violent extremism are reduced, and the government gains legitimacy by valuing the interests of its entire population, not just elites.

From an economical perspective, a nation also has an incentive to adopt an inclusive approach. Inclusivity leads to greater participation in the workforce, translating to overall increased wealth for the country and a more efficient use of resources. With an increase in wealth across the population, more people are able to invest in their communities, seeing a stake for themselves in the future, which is critical for long-term stability.

Inclusivity alone is insufficient to maintain good governance. As a nation also requires a strong sense of identity. Nationalism, draws a clear distinction for a society, delineating who is and who is not recognized as part of the country. Additionally, nationalism embraces the idea that there should be a shared understanding of, and commitment to, a common social contract. The social contract enables self-governance and development because it sets rules and expectations, and makes the enforcement of agreements possible, whether among citizens or between the government and the people. One of the benefits of nationalism is that both the government and the residents have a better understanding of their role and responsibilities.

A strong sense of identity can result in the exclusion of significant portions of society. Marginalized groups may be treated
differently from the majority, which can lead to violence and instability. Therefore, it is imperative that nationalism is counterbalanced with inclusiveness to protect against marginalization. Nationalism or inclusivity fail to achieve good governance. But, inclusive nationalism, in a sovereign state, balances the two impulses of inclusion and exclusion, or rights and responsibilities, against each other. The ideal result is a sovereign nation that is self-governing with a healthy sense of its identity, but that embraces all segments of the population.

**INCA Process**

Currently, there is no reliable method of collecting the information necessary to achieve inclusive nationalism. An effective tool is needed to help understand and gauge the diverse perspectives of the national and international stakeholders in a post-conflict environment. Through facilitated dialogue the INCA process begins to develop a shared understanding of the situation, then establishes realistic goals for stability and nation-building operations. The INCA process fills this gap by generating a shared assessment of the country made by all local, regional, and international stakeholders.

The INCA stakeholders are derived from politically, socially, and culturally influential members of the sovereign nation and allied state and nongovernmental organizations. The stakeholders evaluate the country or situation based on their subjective perspectives. The INCA assessment focuses on twenty-three sectors of society, and asks respondents to rate them on a development scale. The sectors range from international relations, the economy, and distribution of power to education and religion. After analyzing the first round of results, the INCA team returns to the stakeholders to discuss the answers of other respondents, especially those with different viewpoints in a non-attribution format. (This protocol, in combination with others, makes it impossible and undesirable for participants to game the assessment.) Each stakeholder re-assesses the country or situation after considering the other perspectives. Over several rounds, stakeholders move toward a consensus of the current state of the country.

**Benefits of INCA**

By contributing to the creation of the assessment, national and international stakeholders share responsibility in defining the national goals. INCA equips the leaders of stabilization, governance, and development initiatives with valuable information that can then be leveraged to make educated and strategic decisions. The INCA process is a tool that helps local actors coordinate with regional and international stakeholders in the establishment of nation-building initiatives that promote stability and development.

**Conclusion**

As a country, we are frequently tasked with stabilization and governance engagements after a war or conflict. The goal is to establish a stable, self-governing, and developing country because these are the conditions that provide a country with the best opportunity for a long-term peace. Otherwise, there is a high likelihood for hostilities to break out again in the near future, as we have witnessed in Iraq. With inclusive nationalism, all local and international stakeholders must work together to define a shared understanding of a national identity in order to establish a stable and self-governing country.

The INCA process does not guarantee success, and it does not prevent failure rather, it generates an enabling environment in which success becomes possible. A stable and self-governing nation cannot be created solely by outside actors. Local actors understand the situation better than anyone else, and will continue to live in the region long after the international stakeholders leave. Therefore, all local stakeholders must profoundly participate in post-conflict stabilization efforts. The INCA process assesses the key local stakeholders in order to understand their positions on the state of the country, and does the same with relevant international parties by assessing their perceptions and interests in the country. The INCA process gives all leaders valuable information for the planning and implementation phases of stabilization operations and governance initiatives, making the establishment of a stable and developing country more likely.
Expansive Role for UN Peacekeepers in Anti-Terrorism Operations for Peace and Security in Africa

by Lt. Col Norihisa Urakami, PKSOI International Peace Operations Analyst
Introduction

In 2014, the UN Security Council addressed in multiple studies and reports the threat posed by terrorist groups that occupy territory and commit atrocities against civilians, such as the ‘Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS)’ and Boko Haram. Today, terrorism in all forms and manifestations constitutes one of the most serious threats to international peace and security. The UN has stated that member states need to address the conditions that contribute to the spread of terrorism, and then work towards conflict resolution, while denying terrorist groups the ability to build local networks and establish safe havens. The UN has called for all member states to address the growing threat posed by terrorism.2

This paper provides an overview of the proliferation of terrorism in Africa, and takes a close look at anti-terrorism peace operations in Africa, especially African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA). Through these observations, the paper highlights the emergence of anti-terrorism practices in support of peace support operations. The paper also considers the prospects for the African Standby Force (ASF), limits of UNPKO’s anti-terrorism operational capability, and reconsiders the division of labor in UNPKO peace support operation.

Diffusion and Growing Terrorism in Africa

Africa has borne witness to a rapid expansion of Islamic terrorists and terrorist acts. These acts can be classified into three major groups and areas. The first is Al-Shabaab in Somalia. Al-Shabaab is a radical Sunni group, which pledges allegiance to al-Qaeda, and its’ terrorist tactics generally consists of employing bombs in Somalia and neighboring countries. AMISOM’s primary mandate is to reduce the threat of Al-Shabaab in Somalia. To counter their efforts, Al-Shabaab conducted bombings against targets in Kenya and Uganda, as both countries have dispatched troops to support the AMISOM mission in the past. In September 2013, gunmen of Al-Shabaab burst into a shopping mall in Nairobi, tossed grenades and indiscriminately targeted shoppers with small arms fire, leaving at least 68 people dead, and more than 175 injured.3 Their terrorist targets include the Government of Somalia and foreign people in Somalia.

The second major Islamic terrorist group is Boko Haram, also a Sunni terrorist group, which mainly operates in northern Nigeria. Boko Haram has primarily targeted Christian churches, police and police stations, governmental organization and UN facilities. In 2014, Boko Haram kidnapped the wife of Cameroon’s vice Prime Minister and also a local religious leader in a separate raid in Cameroon.4 In another case, they abducted more than 200 female students in Nigeria in April 2014. It is reported that the abducted girls are forced to marry Boko Haram fighters, and participate in combat operations and suicide bomber attacks.5 Boko Haram’s intent is to establish an Islamic state in Nigeria. Similar to the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (IS), Boko Haram released videos of executions on the internet in March 2015, during which they displayed the ‘black flag’ as does ISIL.

The third major terrorist group is al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) based in Algeria. AQIM, another extremist Sunni organization, has pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda. AQIM is active mainly in Niger, Mali and Mauritania. Ansar Eddine (AE), a splinter group of AQIM, received funds and military support from AQIM, while AQIM seized northern Mali in 2012. Based on the request by Mali’s interim government, France launched a military intervention in Mali to eliminate the rebels. The AFISMA forces deployed to Mali in coordination with French forces, which accelerated offensive operations against AQIM and AE.6 French and AFISMA forces succeeded in restoring the peace in Mali, and forced AQIM and AE elements to withdraw to northern and border areas within Algeria. However, AQIM and AE are still active in Mali. A splinter group of AQIM captured and took hostages at a gas facility at In-Amenas in Algeria in January 2013, leaving 38 personnel dead from the hostage crisis.7

In addition to these three major groups, there are some additional terrorist organizations, named Ansaru, an offshoot of Boko Haram in Mali, Gammma Islamiyya (GI) in Egypt, and Ansar Bayt al Maqdis in the Sinai. Ansar Bayt became part of Islamic State (IS), and changed their name to Sinai Province of the Islamic State.8 There are two warring government elements in Libya, both of which assert their legitimacy over the other. This ongoing civil war created an environment for IS and other terrorist groups to expand their influence and activity. Since the beginning of 2015, rapid expansion of IS has been observed in Libya.9 Ansal al-Sharia (AAS) in Tunisia also claims to support the IS.

All of these groups have some common characteristics. They do not acknowledge existing borders, and do not allow democracy or other Western civilization influences. They declare the establishment of Sunni state. The terrorist groups demonstrate extreme inhumanity in their activities, and have no qualms about targeting large numbers of innocent civilians as well as governmental organizations and UN facilities. Women are treated as plunder in seized areas. They display the black flag, use propaganda on the internet to advance their rhetoric, and employ methods of execution that are similar to the IS. Through pattern analysis, one can infer these groups have modeled their modus operandi after IS, Boko Haram, Sinai Province of the IS,
and other Sunni terrorist groups in an effort to present a united front. Active terrorist cells from different locations are beginning to show cooperation with each other. Transnational terrorist’s networks are encouraged and strengthened with a common ideology, and a mutual support and funding network. These activities of Boko Haram in Nigeria, AQIM in Mali and Algeria and IS in Libya should be considered serious and pose immediate threats to Africa and international community.

Peace Support Operation in Africa: Trending towards Anti-Terrorism

**AMISOM**

AMISOM was established in 2007 as a successor to Inter-governmental Authority on Development Mission in Somalia (IGASOM), and is tasked to support the Transitional Federal Institution’s (TFI) efforts towards stabilization of the country, the provision of humanitarian assistance, and the creation of conditions for long-term stabilization, reconstruction, and development in Somalia. Since 2009, the AMISOM efforts to target insurgents was shifted to Islamic elements, particularly Al-Shabaab, rather than its original focus on feuding armed clans and militias. The stabilization operation of the AMISOM mission has transformed into a campaign to eliminate Al-Shabaab. The UN Security Council resolution stated terrorists, in particular Al-Shabaab, constituted a threat to Somalia and the international community. Since then, AMISOM’s operation focuses has prominently featured counter-terrorism over stability operation.

Regional powers such as Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda contributed troops to AMISOM, which has achieved a certain degree of success in eliminating Al-Shabaab. However, Al-Shabaab is dispersed and hiding in the surrounding area of Mogadishu. AMISOM is attempting to encircle the operational area of Al-Shabaab, cutting off their supply line and isolating their cells, which has slowly weakened Al-Shabaab’s strength and lessened their activities. However, AMISOM seems to be facing difficulties in accomplishing their counter-terrorism campaign, since the area AMISOM is trying to surround is vast. Another challenge to the AMISOM mission is the identification of dedicated terrorists from civilians because some young men join Al-Shabaab simply to obtain meals for a day. This dynamic is described as, “a battle uniform yesterday and civilian clothes today.” Al-Shabaab's operational network is based mainly in southern Somalia, where AMISOM has limited intelligence collection capabilities, which is needed to accomplish AMISOM's counter-terrorism operations.

Success requires technical support from capable nations like the U.S. and regional organizations such as NATO. A possible course of action would be to continue the containment strategy of Al-Shabaab further weakening their operational capabilities by depriving them of funds and supplies.

**AFISMA**

AQIM, AD and other Islamic insurgents groups seized northern Mali in 2011. The Interim Government of Mali was not able to completely eliminate the rebel forces with their own resources, and requested French military intervention. The UN Security Council adopted a resolution to establish AFISMA in December 2012. French troops launched military operations in Mali in January 2013. AFISMA was originally scheduled to deploy in September 2013, but their timeline was advanced following an unexpected offensive by rebel forces in early January 2013, which prompted French intervention operations, resulting in the Economic Community of West African States’ (ECOWAS) decision to immediately deploy AFISMA. Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Benin, Togo, Senegal were the primary forces providers out of the 22 countries which deployed military forces.
troops in support of AFISMA. The military operations by the French and AFISMA succeeded in re-securing northern Mali, causing the total withdraw of Islamic rebels from the northern region.

22 European nations from the European Union Training Mission in Mali (EUTM Mali) are engaged in supporting and supplying military personnel in support of AFISMA’s mission in Mali.17 The EU provided training and advising support to AFISMA’s troop contributing countries (TCCs) on command and control, tactics and logistics. French and AFISMA anti-terrorism operations were able to restore the territorial integrity, peace and security in Mali. In April 2013, the UN Security Council established the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), which assumed the AFISMA mission.18

AFISMA was the first military operation which employed the African Standby Force framework.19 The sub-regional organization, ECOWAS, showed political initiative in employing the regional standby force framework to conduct multinational operation.20

AU-led Force counter Boko Haram
The AU established an AU-led multinational force of 7,500 personnel to counter Boko Haram in the Sahel area of West Africa on January 25, 2015. Once this mission is launched, it will become the third anti-terrorism peace operation deployed to restore the peace and security in Africa. With the expansion and intensification of Boko Haram’s attacks, the government of Cameroon requested military intervention from Chad. Chad’s troop deployed to the northern area of Nigeria as well as to Cameroon to eliminate the influence of Boko Haram.21 To date, Cameroon, Chad and Niger are carrying out military operations against Boko Haram based on bilateral agreements with the government of Nigeria. Cameroon deployed several brigades along the border with Nigeria, and a 700 strong force is dedicated to direct engagement with Boko Haram to eliminate the remaining elements.22 The UN welcomed the Chadian intervention and approved military interventions against Boko Haram by neighboring countries.23 Boko Haram has not affected Nigeria. The deteriorating security situation encouraged AU to hasten the establishment of a multi-national force. The countries that provided the bulk of the AU forces were Chad, Cameroon, Niger, Nigeria and Benin, all of which will fall under the operational control of the unified AU force headquarters.24

Funding and logistics issues are significant problems for the AU-led force in anti-terrorism operations. These shortcomings make the initial deployment and sustainability of troops very difficult. The AU has to secure funding for military operation for at least the initial 6 months.25 Furthermore, technical issues like intelligence, communication and transportation will require additional funding which creates other challenges for the AU planner. The growing threat of terrorism and the implementation of AMISOM and AFISMA highlights the challenges of operationalizing and institutionalizing the African Standby Force.

Expanding Role of UNPKO and PSO into Anti-Terrorism Operations

Effectiveness of African Standby Force (ASF)
The need for the AU to adopt a military structure is well recognized from the perspective of regional security; however there has been little progress due to the funding issue. Even if the AU adopts a military structure, it does not mean the AU will be able to form a military headquarters by itself. The African Standby Force (ASF) is made up of five Regional Standby Forces (RSF). The RSFs are aligned into five regions: North, East, West, Central and South. Each RSF consists of troops from multiple member states. RSFs are largely disparate in regard to institutionalizing a standard Headquarters and logistic bases (LOG-BAS) structure and function, the effectiveness of operational capabilities and facilities, and the maturity of military troops and equipment.

ASF operational challenges include the shortfalls of funding, the military capability of member states, and the lack of subject matter expertise. The most institutionalized standby forces are
The Eastern and Western RSFs. The Eastern African Standby Force (EASF) became operationalized at the end of 2014, and its member states include: Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda and Djibouti. These states gained experience through their participation in AMISOM, which greatly enhanced their operational capabilities.

Since its establishment in Western Africa in 1992, ECOWAS has retained a military structure called the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). ECOMOG intervened in civil wars in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Côte d’Ivoire. The ECOMOG was replaced by the ECOWAS standby Force (ESF) under the ASF regional structure.

The South RSF will finalize their posture and capability by the end of 2015 under the oversight of South Africa. The Central RSF may also become operational by the end of 2015. However, there is no prospect for operationalizing the North RSF due to serious delays in many areas. Libya, currently fighting a civil war, is not ready to address the establishment of an RSF. Member states of the North African region, such as Algeria and Tunisia, also face their own internal security issues from terrorism. Due to Algeria and Tunisia small military force structures, they have no additional capacity to contribute funds and troops for the RSF, making it extremely difficult finalize the North region standby force by 2015.

The two major challenges with ASF operational capacity are readiness and sustainability. Due to the interconnected nature of readiness and sustainability, it is not possible to delineate between these two functions in regard to peace or anti-terrorism operations. Readiness requires rapid deployment of troops in response to a crisis, while sustainability requires effective logistics support to maintain military operations. Readiness will be realized with well-trained troops, effective command, control, intelligence, and the implementation of an efficient human resource system. The rapid deployment of troops and the sustainment of logistics requires the development of pre-positioning stockpiles in peacetime, and the strategic placement of troops in the mission phase. The RSFs hope to achieve this operation capability in 2015. The fundamental cause affecting both readiness and sustainability, is the lack of an adequate AU LOGBASE structure.

Reconsidering the Division of Labor of UNPKO in PSO
As of 2015, 16 UNPKO missions are being conducted employing 104,235 military personnel in 128 countries. Of these missions, 9 UNPKOs are deployed in Africa accounting for 85,051 troop, or 82% of the deployed troop strength. A key feature of these UNPKOs is that they are international interventions intended to eliminate internal armed conflicts or civil wars.

MINUSMA’s background and situation is quite different from other UNPKOs in Africa, in that it was established to take over from AFISMA. AFISMA was a peace support operation aimed at eliminating AQIM and associated groups in Mali. The AFISMA mandate was to protect the Mali population and to recover national integrity of the territory. AFISMA was authorized to take all necessary measures in order to fulfil this mandate under UN Chapter VII, which included dealing with terrorist organizations, notably AQIM and associated groups.

MINUSMA’s mandates is to ensure the stabilization of key population centers, especially in the north of Mali, and to support the implementation of a transitional road map, including a national political dialogue and electoral process, and protection of civilians. Even though their mission is defined under Chapter VII, MINUSMA is a multidimensional peacekeeping operation tasked with protecting civilian and providing a secure environment. However, these mandates do not reflect the direct offensive operations aimed at eliminating terrorist groups.

The UNPKO capability limits are highlighted in MINUSMA’s mandates and military force structure. During the initial military deployment in Mali, French forces employed modern systems such as the Mirage 2000D and Rafale fighter jets along with attack helicopters. The French conducted special forces and airborne operations against terrorist elements. The leveraging of these modern force capabilities and networking technologies led to the destruction of terrorist elements. However, MINUSMA’s forces are not equipped with such weapon systems or operational capabilities. A reduced number of French
troops and equipment remains in Mali to support MINUSMA’s operation, as it is beyond their capability to autonomously conduct anti-terrorism operations. Augmentation by French troops in peace support operation against terrorist groups is crucial for the implementation of MINUSMA’s multidimensional mandates.

In such scenarios, the restoration of peace requires the use of force, thus increasing the risk that UN forces will become a warring party instead of a peacekeeping force. While the use of force is necessary to accomplish the mandates, particularly protection of civilian, another entity other than the UN must assume the ‘use of force’ role to discourage the perception of the UN being seen as a warring party. In Mali, AFISMA and French troops assumed the use of force role. AMISOM’s use of force in Somalia, clearly indicates its role as a warring party.32 The UN Mission in Somalia supports AMISOM with logistics and funding. AMISOM’s commitment to anti-terrorism operation is significant, and would be difficult for the UN to replace AMISOM with UNPKO forces. Since there is no cease-fire agreement in Somalia, the belligerent parties continue to commit atrocities, necessitating a robust, offensive force to contain extremist’s activities. UNPKO chapter VII authorities include a mandate for protection of civilian, however, protection of civilian is not synonymous with offensive operations. The extent of the mandate for the use of force encompasses the need to create geographical areas that are free from armed attack, secure freedom of movement and access for humanitarian agencies, and protects camps and safe heavens. These activities do not embrace direct offensive operation against terrorists. The current operational environment is unlikely to be conducive for a political process. This complex political situation does not encourage the establishment of a UNPKO to assume the AMISOM mission, particularly with respect to counter-terrorism enforcement operations.

When the AU deploys a peace operations mission, it always needs external assistance.33 The strategic transportation assets, particularly fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters, as well as funding for operation is limited within the African states. It is estimated that it will take one to two decades for the RSFs and their member states to become fully equipped with such assets. In other words, it is not realistic to expect AU’s member states and RSFs to have their own strategic operational capabilities and funds.

In the past, to support AU-led military interventions, external nations and regional organization outside Africa have provided the funding and strategic lift capabilities needed for troops, supplies and equipment, by providing cargo planes and medium to heavy lift helicopters. For example, NATO provided AU strategic airlift for peacekeepers from African TCCs moving into Darfur. The air assets transported almost 5,000 troops in 2005.34 The United Kingdom supported the deployment of the Africa-led international Support Mission to CAR (MISCA) by providing €2 million to the AU to cover immediate MISCA shortfalls, including food, fuel and water in 2013.35 NATO has been supporting AMISOM with strategic airlift and sealift support since 2007.36 The U.S. provided equipment, training and logistical support directly to troop contributing countries participating in the AMISOM mission.37 The EU supports the running cost of the AMISOM mission. The EU also provided logistic support and funded €50 million to Mali through the African Peace Facility (APF) for AFISMA.38 The combination of French military intervention and EU funding and technical support was essential for the AFISMA operations.39

These cases prove that funding and logistic support by great powers and regional organizations outside of Africa are absolutely essential for the success of AU-led military operations. The main reason that military operations by the AMISOM have been successful to some extent in Somalia is that TCCs from Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti, are neighboring countries, which share national border with Somalia. The neighboring states are able to sustain their TCC military operations within their inherent geographical scope by using existing ground transportation assets, in lieu of needing extensive airlift capability.40 AMISOM has only been able to sustain operations with the funding and logistic support from the U.S. and NATO. It is difficult to eliminate terrorists completely, therefore, cutting off their supply line and trying to isolate their terrorist cells over the long-term is the most effective approach for the AMISOM.

Another factor to fight the expansion of terrorism is to strengthen border controls to prevent illegal immigration and the illegal transfer of funds. Increased border control must be carried out by each state. Some states need technical support by capable nations and international organization to develop effective regulation and procedures.

Observing the successes of AMISOM in Somalia, highlights the international community and Africa’s efforts in deal with the terrorist organizations and threats. In Somalia, regional powers like Ethiopia and Kenya have conducted AU-led military operation with the funding and logistics support of the U.S. and regional organization like NATO. The division of labor between African regional TCCs, funded and logistically supported by great powers and regional organization outside Africa, demonstrates an effective operational collaboration for eliminating Al-Shabaab by AMISOM.
In Mali, given military and financial support by France and EU, the AFISMA has achieved operational success against AQIM and AE. AU-led force consisted of sub-regional organization's member states, and funds and logistic supports by great powers and regional organization like EU and NATO, has led to effective military operations.

Conclusion

This paper provided an overview of the proliferation and growth of terrorism in Africa. With this in mind, it is important to note that Al-Shabaab, AQIM, Boko-Haram and the expansion of IS that exists in Africa are serious threats. There are some commonalities among these terrorist organizations which point to the strengthening of the terrorist's network, funding relationships, and the support provided by fighters.

Considering anti-terrorism peace operations in Africa, this paper assessed the military operations of the AMISOM and AFISMA. Both missions achieved successful results to some extent, given funds and logistic support by great powers and regional organizations such as NATO and EU. These two anti-terrorism peace operations need to continue to shape the role of the AU, sub-regional organizations, great powers and regional organization outside Africa against increasing terrorist threats.

The AU needs to continue to operationalize the ASF, specifically focusing on increasing readiness and sustainability. The readiness challenge is rapid deployment capability; while the sustainability challenge is achieving effective logistics support. The ASF and its 5 RSFs cannot meet the challenges of readiness and sustainability. In order to fulfill ASF’s capability, it is critical for great powers and regional organization outside Africa to continue to support the ASF.

AMISOM is an ongoing AU military operation, while AFISMA was taken over by a UNPKO mission. However, UNPKO missions are not independently capable of conducting a counter-terrorism campaign without a separate peace support operation. There will need to be collaboration between UNPKO and a great powers or sub-regional multinational forces to conduct successful anti-terrorism operations to help UNPKO to fulfill their mandates.

The expansion and increase of terrorism in Africa affects the peace and stability of international community as well as Africa. To fulfill the shortfalls of UNPKO's capability, capable powers and regional organization must play a role in anti-terrorism operations.

Notes:

20 Ibid.
25 Mr. Zinurie Alghali, June 15, 2015.
27 Interviewed Mr. Nadir Fath Elalim, Head of the AU delegation in Egypt, at Cairo, February 16, 2015.
30 UN Doc. S/RES/2039, April 25, para.16.
31 Michael Shurkin, ‘France’s War in Mali: Lessons for an Expen-
The Peace Operations Training Institute (POTI) Offers Free On-Line Courses on UN Peacekeeping Operations

by U.S. Army Colonel (Ret) Christopher Holshek
PKSOI has made available free introductory e-learning on United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UN-PKO) to U.S. military personnel through the Peace Operations Training Institute (POTI).

Changes in the strategic and operational environment and mission sets require a greater understanding of UN-PKO, not just in working alongside UN field missions in conflict and PKO settings, but also in building the capacity of partner troop contributing countries through security sector assistance and other theater cooperation activities. The courses are designed for forces involved in engagement activities in theater security cooperation settings, such as Civil Affairs and Regionally Aligned Forces.

A U.S.-based non-profit organization, POTI is offering several free courses on UN-PKO to hundreds of thousands of military or civilian audiences, individuals, military units, and international peacekeeping partners and their training centers worldwide in multiple languages. POTI provides globally accessible, self-paced, online, on-demand courses on peace support, humanitarian relief, and security operations in 194 countries.

POTI received recognition from the International Association of Peace Training Centers as their “Trainer of the Year” and is “acknowledged” each year in the annual report of the United Nations Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C-34) as a provider of international distance learning training to UN peacekeepers.

“We’re glad to be back in the Army system,” noted Dr. Harvey Langholtz, POTI’s Executive Director. “POTI’s curriculum was part of the Army Correspondence Course Program [ACCP] for many years, but it fell by the wayside. Now that the U.S. military has regained interest in peacekeeping, we are able to take advantage of a positive and collaborative relationship with PKSOI and POTI have had for a long time to make our curriculum available again to members of the Armed Forces.”

As a start, POTI is currently offering two free UN-PKO common core courses as well as four specialized courses from its 29 multiple language course offerings. The core courses are:

- Principles & Guidelines for UN Peacekeeping Operations, an introduction to the UN “Capstone Doctrine” on peacekeeping
doctrine, definitions, procedures, and policy. It also explains the decision and planning processes to deploy a peacekeeping operation as well as addresses the management of peacekeeping operations, how they are supported and sustained, and how they are concluded. The four specialized courses are:

- Core Pre-deployment Training Materials (CPTM), based on the CPTMs designed by DPKO. This course provides the common and essential training required for all personnel – military, police, and civilian – who serve on UN peacekeeping missions, and represents the baseline level of understanding and knowledge that the UN demands of any personnel serving on a UN peacekeeping mission.

- Ebola Virus Disease: Awareness and Precautions for Peacekeeping Personnel: This course was developed in partnership with the World Health Organization (WHO), and is a general introductory primer on Ebola for peacekeepers not working in a medical or public health capacity. The course teaches awareness and preventive measures and precautions for Ebola and many other communicable diseases peacekeepers may encounter in the field. It also presents a compilation of WHO materials on general information about Ebola, how the virus is spread, the symptoms and diagnosis, infection prevention techniques, possible treatments, and mission protocol.

- Implementation of the UN Security Council Resolutions on the Women, Peace, and Security Agenda in Africa: This class is based on UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325, which is the most comprehensive work to date on linking gender equality with peace and security. Developed in collaboration with the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN Women), the course on the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) Agenda provides background on this bedrock international norm and outlines its sustainable implementation at regional and national levels in Africa. The course was especially designed for people who require a practical tool to support and facilitate the implementation of the women, peace, and security agenda.

- Implementation of the UN Security Council Resolutions on the Women, Peace, and Security Agenda in Asia and the Pacific: This course is the Asia-Pacific version of the POTI course on UNSCR 1325. This course will also address the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women of 1979, the 1995 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action and other agreements and resolutions.

- Implementation of the UN Security Council Resolutions on the Women, Peace, and Security Agenda in Latin America and the Caribbean: This course discusses UNSCR 1325 and other agreements and resolutions specific to Latin America and the Caribbean.

There are three ways to gain access to the courses – through the PKSOI website; through the Army Training Network/Regionally Aligned Forces Training Program (https://atn.army.mil/dsp_template.aspx?dpID=471), which requires a DoD Common Access Card (CAC); or by simply going directly to the POTI’s landing page (http://www.peaceopstraining.org/programs/pksoi/). Additional courses are available for a nominal fee on the POTI website.

Both PKSOI and POTI are looking to have more courses made available to military training audiences, based on interest and demand from commands, units, and organizations. Some of these courses may apply for additional credit beyond course certificates, including promotion and retirement points, as was done under the ACCP.

To express interest or inquire, contact Dr. James Embrey, Col. U.S. Army (ret.), Professor for Stability Operations at PKSOI, james.h.embrey.civ@mail.mil, or the author at holshek@hotmail.com.
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