Shifts in United Nations Peacekeeping

Volume 6, Issue 4
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FOREWORD


The general structure of the “Sampler” includes (1) an Introduction that provides an operational or doctrinal perspective for the content, (2) the Sampler “Quick Look” that provides a short description of the topics included within the Sampler and a link to the full text, (3) the primary, topic-focused Stability Operations (SO)-related Lessons Learned Report, and (4) links to additional reports and other references that are either related to the “focus” topic or that address current, real-world, SO-related challenges.

This lessons-learned compendium contains just a sample – thus the title of “Sampler” – of the observations, insights, and lessons related to Shifts in United Nations Peacekeeping available in the SOLLIMS data repository. These lessons are worth sharing with military commanders and their staffs, as well as with civilian practitioners having a Stability Operations-related mission/function – those currently deployed on stability operations, those planning to deploy, the institutional Army, the Joint community, policy-makers, and other international civilian and military leaders at the national and theater level.

Lesson Format. Each lesson is provided in the following standard format:

- Title/Topic
- Observation
- Discussion
- Recommendation
- Implications (optional)
- Event Description

The “Event Description” section provides context in that it identifies the source or event from which the lesson was developed. Occasionally you may also see a “Comments” section within a lesson. This is used by the author to provide related information or additional personal perspective.

You will also note that a number is displayed in parentheses next to the title of each lesson. This number is hyper-linked to the actual lesson within the SOLLIMS database; click on the highlighted number to display the SOLLIMS data and to access any attachments (references, images, files) that are included with this lesson. Note, you must have an account and be logged into SOLLIMS in order to display the SOLLIMS data entry and access/download attachments.

If you have not registered in SOLLIMS, the links in the reports will take you to the login or the registration page. Take a brief moment to register for an account.
in order to take advantage of the many features of SOLLIMS and to access the stability operations related products referenced in the report.

We encourage you to take the time to provide us with your perspective on any given lesson in this report or on the overall value of the “Sampler” as a reference for you and your unit/organization. By using the “Perspectives” text entry box that is found at the end of each lesson – seen when you open the lesson in your browser – you can enter your own personal comments on the lesson. We welcome your input, and we encourage you to become a regular contributor.

At PKSOI we continually strive to improve the services and products we provide the global stability operations community. We invite you to use our website at [ http://pksoi.army.mil ] and the many functions of the SOLLIMS online environment [ https://sollims.pksoi.org ] to help us identify issues and resolve problems. We welcome your comments and insights!

United Nations, New York (31 December 2015). The Security Council Considers United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. The Council noted, in particular, the view of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations and of the Secretary General that the lack of effective dialogue between the Council, troop- and police-contributing countries and the Secretariat has generated frustration on all sides and has undermined implementation of peacekeeping mandates. (Photo credit: UN Photo/Rick Bajornas)
INTRODUCTION


Since the founding of the United Nations in 1945, there have been 71 peacekeeping operations beginning with the initial deployment of military observers to the Middle East in 1948. Sixteen missions are currently in operation with a total of 106,830 uniformed personnel, according to the UN Peacekeeping Operations Fact Sheet as of 31 December 2015. See the following two pages of the Introduction for a map and list of current missions.

Peacekeeping, as defined by former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in his 1992 report “An Agenda for Peace,” “is the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well,” (p. 6). In his Agenda, Boutros-Ghali differentiates between peacekeeping and other tools such that “Preventive diplomacy seeks to resolve disputes before violence breaks out; peacemaking and peace-keeping are required to halt conflicts and preserve peace once it is attained. If successful, they strengthen the opportunity for post-conflict peace-building, which can prevent the recurrence of violence among nations and peoples,” (p. 7). The traditional principles of peacekeeping as re-affirmed in the 2000 Brahimi Report (“Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations”) are consent of the parties, impartiality, and non-use of force except in self-defense and defense of the mandate.

In September 2015, President Obama hosted a Leaders’ Summit on UN Peacekeeping for member states to pledge their continuing and renewed support to UN peacekeeping. The United States is the largest financial contributor to peacekeeping but currently only contributes approximately 80 personnel to the missions; at the Summit, the Presidential Memorandum United States Support to United Nations Peace Operations was released, outlining potential ways to expand U.S. contributions. The Summit came after a year-long critical review of gaps in peacekeeping missions culminating in the formation of the June 2015 Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, known as the HIPPO Report. Such a thorough review of United Nations peacekeeping operations had not been accomplished for over a decade since 2000 with the so-called Brahimi Report.

The Secretary-General’s Report on the Implementation of the Recommendations of HIPPO prioritized renewed attention on three pillars for UN peace operations:

1. Prevention / Mediation
2. Regional-Global Partnerships
3. Accountability / Responsiveness / Efficiency
The Presidential Summit and HIPPO report came at a timely moment, as UN Peacekeeping has experienced several shifts over the past decades. Since the Cold War, missions have become more multidimensional and robust, containing civilian, police, and military components, and at times partnering with regional organizations such as the African Union. However, more recently, especially since 2013, UN peacekeeping has experienced a number of firsts – the return of Europe to peacekeeping in Africa in over two decades (MINUSMA in Mali), an increase of intelligence capabilities deployed within a mission (ASIFU in MINUSMA in Mali), the utilization of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for surveillance on a mission (MONUSCO in the DRC), the deployment of a UN “offensive” combat force mandated to “neutralize” armed forces (FIB in MONUSCO in the DRC), and the opening of UN bases to protect civilians (UNMISS in South Sudan). UN peacekeeping has also been subject to both international praise and international censure on recent initiatives and issues – from applauding the success of all-female Formed Police Units (FPU) within peacekeeping missions to condemning a heinous trend of sexual abuse by peacekeepers.

With the influx of so many new experiences, some have said that peacekeeping faces an “Identity Crisis” – torn between the old and the new – the traditional principles that have formed the bedrock of the institution, and changes in response to the environment on the ground. Careful thought is needed to consider the new direction of peacekeeping and whether these firsts ought to become precedents or anomalies.

As such, it is timely to devote a Sampler to understanding the current challenges facing UN Peacekeeping missions in light of these shifts... and the lessons learned from them. This Sampler seeks to explore these complex questions and the implications for recent Shifts in United Nations Peacekeeping.
Current United Nations Peacekeeping Operations:

There are currently 16 UN peacekeeping operations, with a total of 106,830 uniformed personnel from 123 contributing countries, according to the United Nations Peacekeeping FACT SHEET (31 December 2015).  

[Arranged By Date and Region]

Africa

**MINUSCA** (Central African Republic) .................................................. Since April 2014
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic

**MINUSMA** (Mali) .......................................................... Since April 2013
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali

**UNMISS** (South Sudan) .................................................. Since July 2011
United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan

**UNISFA** (Abyei, Sudan) .................................................. Since June 2011
United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei

**MONUSCO** (Democratic Republic of the Congo) .................................. Since July 2010
United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

**UNAMID** (Darfur) .................................................. Since July 2007
African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur

**UNOCI** (Côte d’Ivoire) .................................................. Since April 2004
United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire

**UNMIL** (Liberia) .................................................. Since Sept. 2003
United Nations Mission in Liberia

**MINURSO** (Western Sahara) .................................................. Since April 1991
United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara

Americas

**MINUSTAH** (Haiti) .................................................. Since June 2004
United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti

Europe

**UNMIK** (Kosovo) .................................................. Since June 1999
United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo

Middle East

**UNIFIL** (Lebanon) .................................................. Since March 1978
United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

**UNDOF** (Syria) .................................................. Since June 1974
United Nations Disengagement Observer Force

**UNFICYP** (Cyprus) .................................................. Since March 1964
United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus

**UNTSO** (Middle East) .................................................. Since May 1948
United Nations Truce Supervision Organization

Asia

**UNMOGIP** (India & Pakistan) .................................................. Since January 1949
United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan
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“QUICK LOOK” (Preview of the Lessons)
Click on [Read More ...] to go to full lesson.

- For the past twenty years, European countries have for the most part refrained from donning the blue helmets as UN peacekeepers in the continent of Africa. In 2013, this trend shifted with the involvement of fourteen European nations contributing over 1,000 troops to the United Nations Multidimensional Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)... [Read More ...]

- Since its founding in 1945, the United Nations has shied away from traditional intelligence, which has connotations of gathering information in covert and untoward ways which go against the foundations of the institution as an impartial international organization. However, as on-the-ground realities of peacekeeping have shifted, an intelligence capability at the operational level of the UN (i.e. within UN peacekeeping missions) has grown... [Read More ...]

- Far too often, UN peacekeeping mission have not successfully prevented atrocities for reasons that include lack of situational awareness stemming from inadequate technological equipment. In recent years, however, more missions have been incorporating new surveillance technologies for enhanced monitoring and surveillance... [Read More ...]

- United Nations Peacekeeping operations have become increasingly robust since the end of the Cold War. This trend has intensified since 2013 with the deployment of the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) in the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), mandated with “targeted offensive operations” for “neutralizing armed groups,” which stands in direct contrast with traditional peacekeeping principles... [Read More ...]

- After civil war broke out in South Sudan in 2013, thousands of civilians sought refuge at United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) camps, which became known as “Protection of Civilians (POC) sites.” The mission’s mandate changed to prioritize POC, but resource limitations, government restrictions, and risk aversion prevented UNMISS force projection into conflict-affected areas where 90% of civilians remained... [Read More ...]

- In recent years, egregious incidents of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA) and Conflict-Related Sexual Violence (CRSV) have emerged across UN peacekeeping missions by peacekeepers abusing the very vulnerable populations whom they have been sent to protect. Most recently, a host of allegations of sexual violence by peacekeepers in the Central African Republic (CAR) came to light, including the case of the sexual abuse of several children in exchange for money or food between December 2013 and June 2014... [Read More ...]

- All-female Formed Police Unites (FPU) serving on UN Peacekeeping missions in Liberia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) have effectively improved security in these post-conflict environments. Moreover, they have proven to be an excellent asset for community-level peace building, as well as a major source of inspiration for women and girls... [Read More ...]
SUBJECT: Shifts in United Nations Peacekeeping

1. GENERAL

Over its seven decades of operations, United Nations Peacekeeping has received both international praise and international censure, from winning the Nobel Peace Prize to standing on the sidelines of genocide. In any case, peacekeeping remains a prominent tool utilized by the United Nations in the face of proliferated conflict.

In recent years, however, the operationalization of peacekeeping has experienced several shifts. This lesson report explores these shifts, highlighting lessons from peacekeeping missions in Mali, the Central African Republic (CAR), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and South Sudan, among others, where missions took recent actions largely unprecedented by the UN. Missions welcomed Europeans back to the blue helmets in Africa, incorporated increased intelligence and surveillance capabilities, opened their bases to protect civilians, fought under unprecedented mandated offensive operations, suffered a devastating trend of sexual violence and misconduct, and applauded the success of all-female police units. Continue reading to consider the lessons learned from this wide array of Shifts in United Nations Peacekeeping.

Menaka, Mali (3 Dec. 2015)
A view of the Chinook (foreground right) and Apache helicopters of the Dutch contingent serving with the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) in the town of Menaka in the northern part of the country. These helicopters were not repainted to white, remaining in combat green and yet still carrying the emblem of the UN - an unsettling juxtaposition to some. (Photo credit: UN Photo/Marco Dormino)
2. LESSONS

A. **TOPIC.** Europe's Return to UN Peacekeeping in MINUSMA (2413)

**Observation.**

For the past twenty years, European countries have for the most part refrained from donning the blue helmets as UN peacekeepers in the continent of Africa. In 2013, this trend shifted with the involvement of fourteen European nations contributing over 1,000 troops to the United Nations Multidimensional Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). The re-insertion of European nations into UN Peacekeeping has brought both opportunities of strengthened mission capacity and challenges of differing expectations and requirements.

**Discussion.**

Europeans have consistently deployed to more static UN missions (such as UNIFIL (United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon) and UNFICYP (the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus)), but they have largely stayed out of volatile, high-tempo environment UN peacekeeping in Africa since the mid-1990s, except for a brief period in 2009-2010 when the European Union Force in Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR) was rehatted to the blue helmets (for the UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT)).

In recent years, as the turmoil in North Africa and the Middle East has spread across Europe with waves of refugees, expanded drug-trading routes, and the emergence of a growing Islamic State, this region has gained much more prominent strategic and political significance for Europe. Mali, in particular, has been wracked with instability contributing to these regional networks. In 2012, the Tuareg Movement for the National Liberation of Azawad ousted Malian defense forces to take control of northern Mali, declaring it the “Republic of Azawad.” This was followed by defeats of Malian security forces by AQIM (al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb) and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa against which the French Operation Serval and the African Union’s AFISMA (African-led International Support Mission to Mali from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)) pushed back in March 2013. On 1 July 2013, the United Nations Multidimensional Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) replaced AFISMA in Mali, mandated with stabilization and protection of civilians tasks.

With the drawdown in Afghanistan and defense budget cuts across Europe, UN peacekeeping provided an opportunity for European Troop-Contributing Countries (TCCs) to both address the emerging instability from Mali while at the same time making use of aviation, engineering, and intelligence capabilities, as well as collecting on reimbursement income. By March 2015, fourteen European countries (including most prominently the Netherlands and Sweden) had
contributed over 1,000 troops to MINUSMA, including special forces, intelligence/surveillance/reconnaissance units, civilian experts/staff, police officers, and personnel for senior mission posts, as well as specific air asset contributions which have ensured air support and medical evacuation capabilities for the mission (helicopters and C-130/C-160 fixed-wing transport aircraft). In addition, Europeans contributed the ASIFU (All Sources Information Fusion Unit) to gather and analyze information using unmanned aerial systems, reconnaissance helicopters, and special forces.

While the European TCCs have strengthened mission capabilities in MINUSMA, the insertion of such nations into peacekeeping at this time has not come without challenges. Due to the time gap, European TCCs faced a loss of institutional memory and a lack of available expertise within their own ministries regarding UN systems, processes, and rationale. Furthermore, during their break from UN peacekeeping in Africa, several European nations were involved with the counterinsurgency in Afghanistan through NATO. As such, they had specific expectations for what it meant to operate in a ‘kinetic environment’ with ‘asymmetric threats.’ UN administrative and financial processes are still primarily designed for static, traditional peacekeeping, and so Europeans in MINUSMA experienced a disconnect between the UN structure and the environment they faced on the ground in Mali. “Standards, requirements, command arrangements, communication lines, planning processes and products, and even mindsets vary from NATO operations to UN operations” (“Europe’s Return,” pp. 5-6; see Event Description paragraph below). As such, European TCCs had higher expectations and at times domestic requirements that differed from the UN system in terms of mission support, mission planning, and force generation, and the UN has struggled to navigate the Europeans’ push for modernization of the UN system.

Several of these challenges revealed themselves in the start-up phase of MINUSMA. Due to domestic political processes, European nations were not able to signal their interest in contributing to MINUSMA at the very beginning of mission planning. Once involved, European TCCs made an agreement with the UN concerning timelines for the UN to provide camps, but the mission support element of MINUSMA was not able to deliver; when it came time for European TCCs to deploy, the ground had not even been broken for the ASIFU camp. As such, European TCCs brought their own construction engineering capacities to construct their own camps. The integration of specific European capacities, especially air assets, into MINUSMA also faced challenges. The availability of aircraft, depending on night flying capabilities, can greatly affect CASEVAC/MEDEVAC and thus the safety of UN personnel. However, Sweden’s parliament-approved offer of a C-130 was turned down by the UN due to lack of proper airfield maintenance that could be provided in the north of Mali; the deployment of Dutch Chinook transport helicopters to the mission ran into complications due to standard UN reimbursement rates vs. added mission value; and, the UN helicopter pilot flight hour requirement limited flying capacity.
because no exceptions were granted to Dutch pilots who were licensed under different requirements. Furthermore, the contingent-owned equipment manual (COE) did not account for the high-tech capabilities needed for maintaining European assets, and European TCCs had to fly specialized technicians in and out of the mission to meet their technical needs.

In addition to these technical difficulties, European TCCs experienced some challenges working with other TCCs in MINUSMA due to differing needs, expectations, experience, training, equipment, and culture. There was a pronounced need for increased partnership, communication, and collaboration among MINUSMA TCCs for increased operational effectiveness. Several of the European TCCs had consistent collaboration in their missions at the New York UN HQ, which carried over into effective communication between European TCCs in MINUSMA. Some challenges to collaboration between European- and non-European TCCs in MINUSMA simply came from the language barrier, as the communication gap made coordination of air support for the entire mission more difficult. Other challenges arose from the stricter requirements of European TCCs for troop accommodations, stemming from national standards. Unfortunately, in a mission support system with finite resources, additional attention given to the security, services, and basic utilities of European contingents may detract support from other TCCs which operated in more austere conditions. Many European and non-European TCCs did share an important commonality, however – exclusion from status as permanent member states on the Security Council who “get a say in whether a mission is deployed, renewed, or ended. This […] will inevitably create a sense among most TCCs of inadequate control over their own destiny” (Ibid, p. 7). This shared experience between European- and non-European TCCs has the potential to produce productive consultation in the future regarding inclusion of more voices in the UN systems.

Despite technical and TCC challenges, overall, “MINUSMA has shown that European TCCs can contribute niche capabilities and enablers to meet pressing UN peacekeeping needs” (Ibid, p. 15). Furthermore, the involvement of European TCCs in MINUSMA symbolically served to “strengthen the overall legitimacy of peacekeeping, reducing the divide between those that finance and mandate UN peace operations and those that provide the boots on the ground” (Ibid, p. 15), further providing an opportunity for all western nations to reflect on how they can continue to contribute to UN peacekeeping.
**Recommendation.**

Utilize European (and future Western) TCCs' capabilities to strengthen UN peacekeeping missions by:

1. Including TCCs earlier in the mission planning process through consistent (in)formal planning consultations that will enable them to begin internal force generation processes; to ensure this opportunity for European TCCs, engage European domestic political audiences.

2. Employing European capacities in the mission start-up phase of future missions, since their independent efforts were so effective in Mali, despite the UN breach of agreement on provision of camps.

3. Creating better information work-flow chart regarding TCC deployment and force generation so that expectations and requirements are clear.

4. Challenging the United Nations to better adapt to new technologies within missions by editing the COE manual and establishing systems that can handle specialized air assets so that the missions can utilize specialized European technical capacities such as certain MEDEVAC/CASEVAC assets.

5. Incorporating lessons learned from Europe’s return to UN peacekeeping in Mali to improve deployment of future Western TCCs to UN missions.

Increase awareness by European TCCs of United Nations systems by:

1. Hiring personnel and staff within various European ministries who have experience and expertise in UN processes.

2. Training all levels of European officials in UN processes.

3. Clarifying the political primacy and rationale of UN missions and of traditional UN peacekeeping principles so that the impartiality and credibility of the UN does not get undermined with the rise of TCCs pushing for more robust missions.

Improve relationships between Troop-Contributing Countries by:

1. Increasing communication and collaboration efforts between European-and non-European TCCs in MINUSMA for increased operational effectiveness, possibly through joint trainings.
2. Limiting contributions of mission capabilities with significant national operational caveats and/or troop accommodation requirements which would cause finite mission support supplies to be distributed to certain TCCs at a detriment to others.

3. Working together for the inclusion of non-Security Council member perspectives into decisions regarding peacekeeping mandates.

4. Increasing communication and collaboration between TCC missions at the UN New York HQ, with the intent that this collaboration follows through onto peacekeeping missions in the field.

Implications.

If European TCCs do not continue to contribute to UN peacekeeping missions, there will remain a divide between European countries who finance missions and other countries who provide boots on the ground, which weakens the symbolic legitimacy of UN peacekeeping. If European TCCs are not consulted early in the mission planning process and if European capabilities are not utilized during the start-up phase, then frustrations similar to those during the planning/start-up of MINUSMA may occur in future missions, which in turn may decrease the likelihood of continued European involvement in the blue helmets.

If proper UN expertise and training are not incorporated into European TCCs deploying to UN peacekeeping, then they may continue to expect NATO procedures instead of UN processes; furthermore, they may not understand the purpose of UN’s traditional peacekeeping principles or the political, civilian-led primacy of the mission, which may cause European TCCs to push for increased militarization of UN peacekeeping to the possible detriment of the UN’s credibility.

If relationships between TCCs in MINUSMA (and other future missions) are not improved via increased partnership, collaboration, and communication, then non-Western TCCs may resent the accommodations afforded European TCCs, and the missions may not be as jointly effective.

Event Description.

This lesson is based primarily on the International Peace Institute’s July 2015 article “Europe’s Return to UN Peacekeeping in Africa? Lessons from Mali” by John Karlsrud and Adam C. Smith.

Lesson Contributor: Katrina Gehman, PKSOI Lessons Learned Analyst
Comments.

See the following map and chart of European vs. non-European TCCs in MINUSMA for additional visualization and comparison.
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[Statistics compiled into map/chart by author.]
B. **TOPIC.** Development of Operational UN Intelligence Capabilities: From JMACs to ASIFU (2414)

**Observation.**

Since its founding in 1945, the United Nations has shied away from traditional intelligence, which has connotations of gathering information in covert and untoward ways which go against the foundations of the institution as an impartial international organization. However, as on-the-ground realities of peacekeeping have shifted, an intelligence capability at the operational level of the UN (i.e. within UN peacekeeping missions) has grown, first through the establishment of Joint Mission Analysis Centres (JMACs) in multiple UN missions since 2005 and most recently in the creation of the All Source Information Fusion Unit (ASIFU) in the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). Increasing intelligence capabilities within UN missions provides the potential benefit of enhanced situational awareness for mission leadership, but it also poses concerns with regard to long-standing perceptions of national sovereignty, integration and communications within missions, and the potential prioritization of western/tactical/military perspectives over non-western/strategic/political viewpoints.

**Discussion.**

With the major exception of the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) from 1960-1964 which used a Military Information Branch (MIB), the UN has largely steered away from utilizing traditional military intelligence from its founding in 1945 to the end of the Cold War, avoiding even using the word “intelligence” (as in the title of ASIFU, above). To this day, even the 2015 High-Level Independent Panel Report on United Nations Peace Operations (“HIPPO” Report), only uses the term once, in order to explain that the UN lacks intelligence capabilities (see “Comments” section below). Instead, the United Nations has focused on “information” collection/gathering, analysis, and dissemination.

What distinguishes intelligence from mere information is the process of the intelligence cycle, which includes how the information is collected, analyzed, validated, disseminated, and utilized, as well as who has access to that information. Intelligence as traditionally conceived in many nation-states carries with it a connotation of acquiring information in covert ways, such as espionage. The information is subjected to an analytic process and validated to produce finished intelligence products which are commonly considered sensitive or classified and to which only certain parties are privy. These products vary from tactical-level actionable intelligence utilized for targeting to strategic level-estimates used for informing leaders in order to make policy decisions. Nation-states have their own national intelligence agencies and classified systems for the storing and dissemination of these products and to control who has access to
them. Specific technologies are utilized at each of these levels (information collection, analysis, and dissemination), and these national technologies may themselves also be restricted or classified in addition to the information/intelligence contained within them.

The United Nations has traditionally shied away from “intelligence” because of the connotations that the information would be acquired through covert methods, including spying, and due to the nature of the organization as an impartial international organization in which members are not seen as adversarial. Furthermore, the United Nations lacks its own secure networking and communications system for transmitting sensitive information. This plays into Troop Contributing Country (TCC) politics and concerns of members nations: if they give the UN information that they consider to be sensitive or confidential from certain other states, there is no guarantee that the UN will be able to safeguard it due to both this lack of secure databases and national security caveats that restrict access to only specified partners. As such, potential impingement on national sovereignty and/or national security of both TCCs and also Host Nation (HN) members of the UN is an underlying concern for both sharing national intelligence products with the UN as well as increasing the United Nation’s own intelligence capacities. Furthermore, incorporating intelligence in UN operations carries with it the potential for commanders to focus their intelligence requirements on tactical targets instead of the political landscape, which would influence the UN towards increasingly targeted operations with more ‘robust’ mandates which may take the UN away from its politically-centered impartial standing and credibility. In addition, most technologically advanced intelligence capabilities come from Western TCCs; as such, if UN operations increasingly emphasize intelligence within missions, this may inherently prioritize Western assumptions, perspectives, and agendas to the exclusion of other TCCs lacking such capabilities.

Due in part to these concerns, the several attempts that have been made at forming a strategic-level intelligence structure at the UN Headquarters have not been met with much success. These efforts include the Information & Research Unit out of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO)’s Situation Centre, established in 1993 but dissolved by 1999. In 2000, the Brahimi Report, an official Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, recommended again the establishment of such a structure for information management at the UN Headquarters (a proposed “Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat (EISAS)” through the Executive Committee on Peace and Security (ECPS), but it was blocked by the Non-Aligned Movement. In 2009, Assessment Teams were established under the Office of Military Affairs to analyze military information across missions, but their tasks remain unclear. As of 2013, the United Nations Operations and Crisis Centre (UNOCC) was created, arising from the DPKO’s Situation Centre and including personnel from across UN departments to provide integrated situational awareness to UN leadership. However, it remains to be seen whether this information-sharing center has any
role in developing capacity for strategic-level intelligence. Due to TCC national concerns about sovereignty and the political dynamics of sharing information with so many other nation-states, the establishment of strategic-level intelligence at the United Nations headquarters remains unlikely.

A much more likely space for the development of intelligence capabilities lies within specific UN peacekeeping missions, at the operational level of the United Nations. Since the end of the Cold War, the nature of conflict environment has been shifting, with peacekeeping missions now being deployed to volatile regions where there is no peace to keep. In such environments, UN peacekeepers have been increasingly targeted to a much higher degree than in traditional, static peacekeeping missions. Furthermore, increasingly, peacekeepers are being tasked with proactive Protection of Civilians (POC) mandates. In order to fulfill these types of mandates, it is crucial for peacekeepers to have access to accurate situational information for early warning and effective response to the situation. With this perceived need for analyzed information for the fulfillment of POC mandates as well as for the protection of peacekeepers, the UN has thus become more open to intelligence, due in part to the realization that intelligence does not necessarily have to be traditional military intelligence, but that it can utilize open source (which is non-threatening to sovereignty) to leverage the wealth of information flowing into the UN mission to produce fused strategic capacity assessments, allowing decision makers to make better informed decisions about the protection of civilians for the international community. Furthermore, mission-specific intelligence limits the regional and topical scope of pertinent information, which makes information and intelligence sharing between TCCs much less complex than it would be at the strategic level at UN HQ.

One of the most notable augmentations of intelligence capacity at the operational level of the United Nations (i.e. within UN missions) came in 2005 with the creation of Joint Mission Analysis Centres (JMACs). These mission-level cells are multidisciplinary, with positions for civilian, police, and military analysts located within the same physical working space, who work towards creating integrated analytical products, balancing civilian and military goals for a long-term strategic view of the mission, and report to a common civilian chief. As of 2011, seven (at that time, half) of all UN PK missions at that time already employed JMACs, including MINUSTAH (Haiti), MONUSCO (Democratic Republic of the Congo), UNAMID (Darfur), UNIFIL (Lebanon), UNMIS (Sudan), UNMIT (Timor-Leste), and UNOCI (Côte d’Ivoire). There has been some variance across different missions as to the degree of success of the JMACs, due to factors such as the size of the mission (and thus the degree of need for shared information), senior mission management, the degree of alignment of the mission with the host nation’s government, the interaction with and role clarity between the JMAC centers and traditional military analyst functions within the mission (such as the U2), and the extent to which other mission components are willing to consistently share their own information with the center. Overall, however, many UN personnel cite JMACs as a positive contributor to the missions. The JMAC in
MINUSTAH in Haiti, for example, was involved with an anti-gang campaign. Other missions cite the JMAC as a powerful entity that can challenge notions and “protect[…] senior managers from ‘groupthink’” (Ramjoué, International Peacekeeping, p. 481).

While the concept of the JMAC has taken root in UN peacekeeping missions over the past decade and is now a standard mission component, a new intelligence capability has arisen thus far solely in MINUSMA (mission mandated in April 2013)—the All Source Information Fusion Unit (ASIFU)—due to the collaborative efforts of European TCCs, most notably the Dutch. The purpose of ASIFU is to provide: “fused, relevant, timely, actionable and integrated intelligence analysis” (“Performance Peacekeeping,” p. 66). Unlike the JMAC model, which includes internal civilian and military analysts (although the military officer positions in MINUSMA’s JMAC are currently vacant), the ASIFU is under command of the military component of the mission and provides intelligence products at the request of the Force Commander’s priority intelligence requirements (PIRs). Furthermore, instead of solely relying on various components of the mission to report their own information findings, as the JMAC functions, the ASIFU both gathers and analyzes its own information, using technologies such as unmanned aerial systems, Apache helicopters with reconnaissance sensors, and human intelligence, along with an extensive open source section. The headquarters of ASIFU is located in Bamako with intelligence/surveillance/reconnaissance units in Gao and Timbuktu. Due to lack of secure UN systems for the communication of information between these locations, which has limited ASIFU’s capabilities, the Europeans equipped ASIFU “with NATO systems and nationally sensitive technologies that are off-limits for other TCCs in the mission” (“Europe’s Return,” p. 16). While only the systems themselves are confidential and not the information gathered within them, this still creates challenges in terms of sharing information with TCCs across the scope of the mission, especially because the ASIFU compound is located 45 minutes across Bamako from the MINUSMA HQ.

The reason that ASIFU has taken root in MINUSMA particularly has to do with the conflict environment. As such, part of the question of increased implementation of UN intelligence capacities cannot be divorced from the shift in paradigm and mandates towards robust and more targeted operations. While it is clear that it is necessary for some level of information to be collected and shared in order for the MINUSMA mission to do its job (whether or not it is considered ‘intel’), it is unclear at this point the degree to which ASIFU has augmented the awareness of MINUSMA, and there are still questions as to the legal and moral boundaries and guidance in place which are necessary to preserve the primacy of UN principles and impartiality. Furthermore, there has been some confusion as to the role of ASIFU vis-à-vis the JMAC in MINUSMA as well as other information-analyzing units within mission known as the “U2” and the “JOC.” In MINUSMA, there is a Joint Coordination Board which meets regularly in an attempt to coordinate these different information units and to
reduce duplication. However, there has been much misunderstanding within the mission as to ASIFU’s role, and ASIFU personnel have had to take unexpected time to clarify within the mission their emphasis on long-term tactical pattern analysis. Furthermore, ASIFU is authorized to look within the border of Mali, but this creates challenges for addressing transnational issues that go beyond the border.

**Recommendation.**

1. Clarify roles, coordination, and integration of different information-gathering / management/ analysis cells at the operational level of the United Nations (i.e. within UN missions) so as to improve information-sharing and reduce duplication of efforts/products.

2. Establish standardized interoperable secure communications architecture and secure data storage networks for UN peacekeeping missions for improved communication within missions and between missions and the UN Headquarters. Ensure that all TCCs have access to this system. Close proximity of physical working space can also augment info-sharing capacity of various mission components. In addition, create formal and regular mechanisms for relationship-building between all TCCs, especially between western and nonwestern TCCs and those possessing intelligence systems and those without. Ensure that these relationships stem back to UN Headquarters, which may carry over into improved communication within missions.

3. Continue to implement JMACs for improved capacity of strategic intelligence within UN peacekeeping missions to ensure a balanced civilian-military-police and therefore whole-of-mission perspective of information. This will also ensure that systematic emphasis is placed on subjects of human rights, humanitarian/political concerns, and gender issues to avoid mass-atrocities, serious human right violations, and sexual violence. Furthermore, given the increasingly robust mandates faced by UN peacekeeping missions, the primacy of strategic "civilian" analysis will assist in balancing information-sharing for improved decision-making so that any military action remains situated in the political, especially given the importance of political primacy as reflected in the recent HIPPO Report.

4. Consider carefully all potential short-term and long-term implications of increased use of intelligence in UN peacekeeping missions, as well as the efficacy of whether or not to continue to implement the ASIFU concept in MINUSMA and in future UN missions. Will using increased tactical intelligence for targeting in robust operations divide conflict parties by choosing “enemies” and thereby negatively impact the host nation’s prospects for sustainable peace as well as the UN’s long-term credibility.
and impartiality? Establish values and boundaries for the use of UN intelligence (emphasizing the need for strategic open-source intelligence while reserving the use of tactical intelligence for the protection of civilians vs. targeting conflict parties). Furthermore, ensure that civilian and military leadership provide strategic requirements to intelligence analysts that will enable leadership to use finished intelligence products to make better informed decisions with increased awareness of the greater context.

Implications.

If the roles of various information-analyzing units within UN missions are not clarified, then units may duplicate efforts and/or the mission may miss information vital to understanding and responding to the context. If secure data storage networks are not established within UN missions, then there is the possibility for sensitive information to be leaked. Furthermore, without a standardized interoperable secure communications architecture, the UN will have to continue to rely on systems supplied by TCCs to which other TCCs are not privy. If mechanisms for relationship-building between all TCCs are not created, then communication and collaboration may become more difficult within missions, underlying the divide between those who can access intelligence systems and those who cannot. If multiple perspectives are not incorporated into intelligence analysis (via the JMAC model, for example) and if strategic intelligence requirements are not provided to analysts, then intelligence may focus on military tactical requirements and military goals might supersede political goals, despite the HIPPO’s assertion of political primacy. If tactical intelligence is utilized in UN missions without adequate boundaries and if all potential short-term and long-term implications of the incorporation of strategic and/or tactical intelligence into UN missions are not considered, then intelligence could be used in ways that might negatively impact the host nation and/or the UN’s long-term credibility.

Event Description.

This lesson was primarily based on these articles:

Background of UN Intelligence:


JMAC:
• JMAC Brief, 16 Nov. 2015 from MINUSMA

ASIFU:

Thanks also to the insights of colleagues at PKSOI.

Lesson Contributor: Katrina Gehman, PKSOI Lessons Learned Analyst

Comments.

Use of Terms/Concepts of Intelligence vs. Information in UN Official Reports:


“Intelligence”:

“The Panel believes that UN peacekeeping missions, due to their composition and character, are not suited to engage in military counter-terrorism operations. They lack the specific equipment, intelligence, logistics, capabilities and specialized military preparation required, among other aspects. Such operations should be undertaken by the host government or by a capable regional force or an ad hoc coalition authorized by the Security Council.” (p. 31)
“Information”:

Regarding Systems of Management:

“Timely, high quality and actionable information is central to effective performance. The United Nations has long grappled with the challenges of improving its tactical information systems to provide good situational awareness and a common operational picture. Missions suffer from reporting overload and yet the sum of that reporting often fails to yield the necessary information and analysis. The Panel firmly believes that the United Nations Secretariat needs to overhaul the functioning of information and analysis structures and systems within missions to deliver significantly streamlined reporting, more effective information management and significantly enhanced analytical capacities.” (p. 58) // “The Secretariat should review reporting and information management processes in field missions to produce timely, high quality and actionable information and to streamline reporting burdens.” (p. 58)

Regarding Protection of Civilians (POC):

“Closing the gap between what is asked of missions to protect civilians and what they can provide requires improvements across several dimensions: assessment and planning, capabilities, timely information and two-way communication, leadership and training, and mandates and expectations.” (p. 24) // “To ensure their capabilities are used to maximum effect, missions need timely, reliable and actionable information on threats to civilians and the analytical tools to use it. The best information often comes from communities themselves. To avail of this information, missions must build relationships of trust with local people, leading to more effective delivery of protection of civilians mandates and better protection for peacekeepers. Improved two-way communication strategies with communities are essential to understand their needs, to convey the limits of UN capabilities and, in crisis, to provide information to both the civilian population and responders.” (p. 25)

Regarding Protection of UN Personnel:

“In these more difficult settings, safety and security of peace operations personnel should be a paramount concern of the entire UN System – Member States, the Secretariat and agencies, funds and programmes. The United Nations needs to systematize and professionalize its information collection, analysis, and dissemination system.” (p. 78)

Regarding Intelligence: “United Nations forces for complex operations should be afforded the field intelligence and other capabilities needed to mount an effective defence against violent challengers.” (p. x)

Regarding a proposed new UN headquarters capacity for information management/strategic analysis (which was not implemented): “The Panel recommends that a new information-gathering and analysis entity be created to support the informational and analytical needs of the Secretary-General and the members of the Executive Committee on Peace and Security (ECPS). Without such capacity, the Secretariat will remain a reactive institution, unable to get ahead of daily events, and the ECPS will not be able to fulfil the role for which it was created. The Panel’s proposed ECPS Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat (EISAS) would create and maintain integrated databases on peace and security issues, distribute that knowledge efficiently within the United Nations system, generate policy analyses, formulate long-term strategies for ECPS and bring budding crises to the attention of the ECPS leadership.” (p. x, xi)


Regarding use of term ‘intelligence’: “Intelligence is no longer a dirty word.” (p. 108)

Regarding secure data network: “The panel believes strongly that it is imperative to develop a common intelligence software solution across missions with powerful query and cross-referencing capabilities.” (p. 64) // “One such tool is IBM’s i2 Analyst’s Notebook, which is being used in some missions, as well as by the ASIFU in Mali. Recently, MINUSMA’s JMAC was also provided with this software, which has enabled greater sharing of analysis products between the two components. While some users consider this tool to be overly complex, costly, and requiring a relatively heavy training and human resource burden, others seemed quite content with its performance.” (p. 66)

Regarding co-location of analytical organizations: “Where these and other analytic capacities operate together in a single area of operations, they should build on or complement each other, rather than compound the effects of competing narratives and incomplete operational pictures.” (p. 64)

* Also of note: Chart of what is and is not permitted in UN intel gathering

Also, please see following timeline concerning the development of intelligence capabilities within the United Nations.
C. **TOPIC.** New Surveillance Technology in UN Peacekeeping: Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) in MONUSCO (2410)

**Observation.**

Far too often, UN peacekeeping missions have not successfully prevented atrocities for reasons that include lack of situational awareness stemming from inadequate technological equipment. In recent years, however, more missions have been incorporating new technologies for enhanced monitoring and surveillance. While the introduction of new surveillance technologies to UN peacekeeping missions can help enhance situational awareness and bolster both troop protection and protection of civilians, this can also increase legal and moral obligations of these missions, as with the incorporation of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in the UN Organization Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO).

**Discussion.**

Technology in UN peacekeeping missions can never substitute for willingness to take action to protect civilians; at the same time, a lack of appropriate technology can inhibit peacekeepers from taking action to fulfill their mandate. There has traditionally been some resistance to new technologies being used in UN missions. The UN’s December 2014 Final Report: Expert Panel on Technology and Innovation in UN Peacekeeping addresses these concerns directly, stating that “Technology” and “innovation” must not be seen as euphemisms for the introduction of nontransparent or intrusive technology into mission areas for narrow political purposes. […] Enabling a peacekeeping mission to use technology […] to gather information does not violate the basic principles of peacekeeping impartiality and state sovereignty” (p. 5). As such, while many UN missions do not yet use all available monitoring and surveillance technologies (such as satellites, reconnaissance aircraft, UAVs, and ground surveillance radar), some have started to incorporate them for improved awareness.

The introduction of UAVs in MONUSCO in December 2013 provides a case study for the opportunities and challenges of enhanced surveillance equipment on a UN mission. After its establishment in 1999 and prior to its renaming as MONUSCO in 2010, the UN Organization Mission in the DRC (MONUC) was repeatedly accused of reluctance to act in protection of civilians, including during the 2002 Kisangani massacre where MONUC peacekeepers did nothing and the 2008 killing of 150 people in the town of Kiwanja, only a half mile from a MONUC field base. The two main justifications provided by peacekeepers for not engaging in these situations were: 1) lack of information/confirmation about atrocities, and 2) “impermissible environments” (i.e. danger to troop movements at night due to limited vision).
The introduction of new surveillance technologies to the mission in 2013 helped to address both of these concerns. UAVs provided the capability for quick confirmation of reports of atrocities and violence against civilians. While having access to more information in and of itself does not necessarily mean that peacekeepers will take action, “The mere availability of UAVs may […] invalidate excuses for not trying to verify rumours about an imminent rebel threat to a village,” making it more difficult to excuse inaction with plausible deniability, according to the Conflict Trends article on which this lesson is based (p. 44). Furthermore, the live footage provided from UAVs of such violence can compel and strengthen the willingness of peacekeepers to act to protect civilians. UAVs (with infrared/night vision sensors) also enhance the mission's night surveillance capabilities, thereby providing greater awareness of the environment at night and contributing to protection of UN peacekeepers.

However, in addition to increasing situational awareness, UAV technologies also raise questions about mandate limitations. For example, information gathered that reveals emergency situations falling outside the mandate can pose quandaries for UN leaders to make difficult decisions about whether or not to intervene. In May 2014, during a testing of sensor equipment and radars for MONUSCO boats, UAVs zoomed in to a section of the lake at random and discovered a boat capsized on Lake Kivu. Although assistance in everyday accidents did not fall strictly within the mission mandate, UN peacekeepers responded by employing 3 boats and 2 helicopters and were able to rescue 14 civilians. While this situation had a positive outcome thanks to the utilization of UAVs and the capacity and willingness of UN troops to respond, in the future, increased awareness by the UN mission from new surveillance technologies could create similar dilemmas.

According to the Conflict Trends article, “In a place like the DRC, aerial surveillance provides large amounts of extra information compared to what may be acquired by ground inspection” (p. 47). While this enhanced awareness will prevent UN missions from using lack of information as an excuse not to act on the mandate, the vast amount of information gathered by aerial surveillance might also uncover numerous situations that fall outside the scope of the mandate. UN missions are limited in resources and capacity and cannot respond to every "emergency" situation. However, heightened access to information about these emergency situations could present a moral obligation to intervene nonetheless. Furthermore, even successful interventions such as the rescue on Kivu Lake could raise expectations within the host nation and could create political ramifications in the future if the mission does not intervene in other similar "emergencies." When a UN mission is faced with numerous "emergency" incidents involving civilian harm gained from aerial surveillance information, more precise guidance will be needed for the mission to prioritize mandated protection of civilians.
Aerial surveillance in UN peacekeeping also raises legal concerns. The International Humanitarian Law reified in Article 57 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I to Geneva Conventions holds that military leaders have an obligation to take all feasible precautions to avoid harming civilians during operations. As such, since UAVs can mitigate classic precaution dilemmas such as the time it takes to gather information and the risks to UN personnel and equipment, if UAVs are available to UN peacekeeping missions, these missions could have a legal obligation to maximize use of UAVs throughout operations. However, with increased use of UAVs for surveillance comes additional privacy considerations. According to the Conflict Trends article, “The ethical dilemmas related to privacy and surveillance that propel heated discussions in, for instance, the US and European states about the regulation of UAVs, should also be considered when drones are used in the non-western world” (p. 47). As such, while the incorporation of new surveillance technologies into UN missions can enhance situational awareness, these technologies also raise legal/moral questions which call for additional guidance.

**Scene showing a range of potential monitoring/surveillance technologies.**
**Recommendation.**

1. Consideration should be given to provisioning UN peacekeeping missions with new surveillance technologies to enhance situational awareness in order to bolster the capability for protection of civilians. However, appropriate guidance and standard operating procedures must be issued to govern the use of these surveillance technologies in order to address the moral, legal, and political dilemmas and obligations arising from their incorporation in UN peacekeeping missions.

2. UN peacekeeping missions need to develop guidance for interventions in situations that fall outside of their mandates. These missions must clearly communicate with people in the host nation about the use of new surveillance technologies and mandate limitations so that unrealistic expectations are not raised about the capability of the mission to intervene in everyday emergencies. Upon becoming aware of an emergency incident that falls outside of their mandate, and when contemplating whether or not to intervene and if they have the capacity to do so, UN peacekeeping missions must notify appropriate local authorities.

**Implications.**

If UN peacekeeping missions do not improve situational awareness (potentially through the incorporation of new surveillance technologies), then missions/contingents might continue to use lack of awareness/information as an excuse for inaction in the face of atrocities. However, if boundaries are not put in place to govern the use of new surveillance technologies such as UAVs, then the utilization of UAVs could violate humanitarian law or the right to privacy of people in the host nation. Furthermore, if UAVs used in UN peacekeeping missions violate human rights, privacy, or humanitarian law, in addition to the harm caused to civilians and the host nation due to these violations, then the UN will also be less trusted as an impartial international organization, which could affect its long-term credibility.

If UN peacekeeping missions do not develop clear guidance on how to deal with situations/incidents outside of their mandate that are uncovered from UAV information/analysis, then UN systems/commanders might be overwhelmed by numbers of incidents and have difficulty making prioritized decisions. If clear communication is not utilized by UN missions with the host nation about the use and limitations of UAVs, then people in the host nation could have unrealistic expectations for UN peacekeeping missions. If UN peacekeeping missions using UAVs become aware of emergency incidents that fall outside their mandate and do not intervene and/or do not notify appropriate local authorities, then people in everyday emergencies might not be rescued, and the mission might lose credibility.
Event Description.

This lesson was primarily based on the article, “The MONUSCO Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Opportunities and Challenges,” by Frederik Rosen and John Karlsrud, found in ACCORD: Conflict Trends, Issue 4, 2014 (p. 42-48).

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Comments.

Recommendations in this lesson also reflect recommendations found in the December 2014 Final Report of the Expert Panel on Technology and Innovation in UN Peacekeeping, “Performance Peacekeeping:

“Aerial data, geospatial/geographic information, and other remotely acquired data are of critical importance to any peacekeeping mission and should be available as a matter of course.” (p. 115) // “Peacekeeping missions should seek to incorporate technology in the design and implementation of protection of civilians strategies, in particular their early warning and early response mechanisms.” (p. 74) // “Peacekeeping should continue to seek ways to use technology as an empowerment tool in protection of civilian contexts, while remaining mindful of possible risks.” (p. 74)

“UN peacekeeping must ensure that strong procedural safeguards and effective oversight mechanisms are in place for the increased use of monitoring and surveillance technologies.” (p. 109) // “The Departments should revise the existing SOP and policy on monitoring and surveillance technology and any other relevant guidance to take account of advances in the technology field.” (p. 109) // “Clear policies should be emplaced, and leadership accountability be established, to help ensure that information is properly and lawfully obtained, stored, used, processed and shared, and that prevailing privacy laws are respected.” (p. 115)

“Regular and transparent stakeholder dialogue on the deployment and use of technology should be held to manage expectations of all stakeholders and ensure political transparency.” (p. 99)

For more information on technical vs. adaptive challenges:

While technologies such as the new surveillance UAVs can be very useful, complex challenges faced by UN Peacekeeping cannot be solved by technical expertise alone. Adaptive creativity and political will are also essential. For more information, see the World Politics Review article “Technical Fixes Not Enough to Shore Up U.N. Peacekeeping,” by Richard Gowan, (22 June 2015). Also of note is The Practice of Adaptive Leadership by Ronald Heifetz, Alexander Grashow, Marty Linsky (2009), which discusses the difference between technical problems and adaptive challenges:

“Adaptive challenges are typically grounded in the complexity of values, beliefs, and loyalties rather than technical complexity and stir up intense emotions rather than dispassionate analysis. For these reasons, organizations often avoid addressing the value-laden aspects and try to get through the issue with a technical fix.” (p. 70) // “[T]echnical problems […] can be resolved through the application of authoritative expertise and through the organization’s current structures, procedures, and ways of doing things. Adaptive challenges can only be addressed through changes in people’s priorities, beliefs, habits, and loyalties” (p. 19).
D. **TOPIC.** Offensive Operations in UN Peacekeeping: The Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) in the DRC (2418)

**Observation.**

United Nations Peacekeeping operations have become increasingly robust since the end of the Cold War. This trend has intensified since 2013 with the deployment of the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) in the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), mandated with “targeted offensive operations” for “neutralizing armed groups” (S/RES/2098 (2013), p. 7), which stands in direct contrast with traditional peacekeeping principles. This raises a host of ethical, legal, and operational questions and concerns regarding the so-called “Death of [UN peacekeeping] Doctrine” (Challenges Forum, Policy Brief 2013:2) and the implications of the United Nations taking a warfighting posture.

**Discussion.**

The Charter of the United Nations was signed on 26 June 1945, in order to “save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.” Although peacekeeping is not explicitly mentioned in the Charter, Chapters VI and VII provide a legal basis for United Nations peacekeeping operations, and the Security Council is given the authority to take military action for the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security. Chapter VI relates to “Pacific Settlement of Disputes,” i.e. traditional peacekeeping into more static environments where a peace agreement has been reached, while Chapter VII deals with “Action with Respect to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression,” i.e. more volatile contexts of conflict. As held since the UN’s founding and re-affirmed in reports such as the 2000 Brahimi Report and the 2008 Capstone Doctrine, the traditional principles of peacekeeping are consent of the parties, impartiality, and non-use of force except in self-defense and defense of the mandate.

After the first military observers were deployed by the United Nations in 1948, peacekeeping during the Cold War primarily emphasized maintaining cease-fires for stabilization in order for nations to find political resolutions. However, with the end of the Cold War, the utilization of peacekeeping shifted into intra-state (vs. inter-state) situations where a peace agreement had not yet been achieved, and missions became more multi-dimensional, including military, civilian, and police capabilities. Peacekeeping efforts were deployed more frequently under a Ch. VII mandate. These missions were increasingly given “robust” mandates with the authority to “use all necessary means” (i.e. the use of force) to “deter forceful attempts to disrupt the political process, protect civilians under imminent threat of physical attack, and/or assist the national authorities in maintaining law and order” (Capstone Doctrine, p. 34). Robust peacekeeping, however, is differentiated within the UN from peace enforcement. As noted in the 2008 Capstone Doctrine, “…although the line between “robust peacekeeping and
peace enforcement may appear blurred at times, there are important differences between the two. While robust peacekeeping involves the use of force at the tactical level with the consent of the host authorities and/or the main parties to the conflict, peace enforcement may involve the use of force at the strategic or international level, which is normally prohibited for Member States under Article 2(4) of the Charter unless authorized by the Security Council” (p. 19).

Over the past two decades, a trend has emerged in which the UN delegates peace enforcement tasks to regional organizations such as the African Union, reserving peacekeeping tasks for UN forces in an effort to maintain impartiality. During these decades, peacekeeping missions have been authorized more frequently with Ch. VII mandates. New developments since 2013, however, have also seen a significantly marked shift towards increasingly robust mandates and even offensive operations by the UN, causing what many would consider to be “peace enforcement.” This shift of the United Nations towards increasingly robust peacekeeping can be tied to a few developments. First among these are the horrific genocides in Rwanda and Bosnia (Srebrenica) in the mid-1990s when the UN failed to respond and sat idly by as thousands were massacred. Ever since these failures, the UN has struggled to find ways to equip peacekeepers for robust action so that they can respond actively to protect civilians. Furthermore, “the lessons from more than a decade of war-fighting in Afghanistan have over time permeated into the doctrinal thinking of Western forces and their approach to conflicts in international fora, including the UN Security Council” (Karlsrud, p. 49). Among western states with considerable influence in policy development in the UN Secretariat are the UK, USA, and France which are often the ‘pen holders’ for new UN Security Council resolutions. Many non-western TCCs perceive the push towards more robust mandates, a posture resembling peace enforcement, and offensive capabilities as an outcome of the influence of these western states on drafting these resolutions.

Since 2013, mandates written for missions in Mali (MINUSMA), the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), have become increasingly aggressive, “oriented towards stabilization, with a high level of robust use of force” (Karlsrud, p. 43). MINUSMA was mandated to “deter threats” (Karlsrud, p. 45), supporting Malian authorities, with capabilities that have caused some to wonder if it will become a counter-terrorism or counterinsurgency operation, even though that would go against the 2015 High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations’ (HIPPO Report’s) recent assertion that “UN troops should not undertake military counterterrorism operations” (p. x).] In the DRC, the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) was deployed and mandated with “targeted offensive operations” for “neutralizing armed groups” (S/RES/2098 (2013), p. 7), a first-time UN combat force authorized only “on an exceptional basis and without creating a precedent or any prejudice to the agreed principles of peacekeeping,” (“Legal Issues,” p. 2).
The Force Intervention Brigade in particular materialized due to the inability of the UN to quell a bloody cycle of violence within the DRC. War erupted in eastern DRC during Rwanda’s 1996 invasion to pursue perpetrators of the 1994 genocide, compounded by the country’s thirty years of dictatorship following a legacy of Belgian colonialism; a peace process in 2006 was unable to halt another outbreak of violence. Due to this continuation of violence, the UN presence in the DRC has spanned the past 15 years; initially deployed as the UN Mission to the DRC (MONUC) in 1999 for ceasefire observation, the UN presence evolved to engaging with the political process and guaranteeing a transitional government until its expansion into a stabilization mission in 2010 with a name change to the UN Organization Stabilization Mission to the DRC (MONUSCO). Unfortunately, both MONUC and its successor MONUSCO have been repeatedly accused of inaction, failing to perform their mandate to protect civilians in the DRC, including the May 2002 massacre of over 160 civilians in Kisangani, the 2003 refusal of the UN to act in Ituri, the May 2004 failure of the UN to protect the city of Bukavu, and the October 2008 killings of civilians in Kiwanja near a UN base. Although “regular MONUSCO forces have robust rules of engagement authorizing them to use force beyond self-defense in order to protect the population under imminent threat of physical violence,” differing interpretations of the mission’s mandate and authorization for the use of force have often underlined this inaction (IPI Issue Brief, p. 6). In 2012, the M23 rebellion, cited with repeated human rights violations, took and occupied Goma in the DRC while UN peacekeepers once more were reluctant to act. Subsequently, in February 2013, 11 regional countries formed the Peace, Security, and Cooperation Framework, proposing the establishment of a Neutral Intervention Force under the Southern African Development Community (SADC). Due to funding issues, the UN proposed to instead form a Force Intervention Brigade under the auspices of the UN with troops from SADC countries, and the FIB was authorized by the UN Security Council in March 2013.

The Intervention Brigade deployed in July 2013, at which time a 48-hour ultimatum was given to ‘rebel forces’ near Goma to disarm. The FIB’s operations then began in August. By November 2013, M23 (Mouvement de 23 mars)’s insurgency had ended. Many attribute this to a military defeat by the Congolese National Army (FARDC) with support from the FIB (SOLLIMS Lesson 1307). However, others assert that it could be as much due to timely bilateral diplomatic pressure and financial leverage put on Rwanda. The next armed group in eastern DRC for potentially working against in conjunction with the FARDC was the Forces Démocratiques de la Libération du Rwanda (FDLR, Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda), but the FIB showed more hesitation to pursue them, which has led some to have the perception that the FIB was a tool of the SADC countries to eliminate the M23. Furthermore, a point which raises legal and moral issues, FIB was working closely with / supporting FARDC despite its accusations of serious human rights and IHL violations.
The deployment of the FIB has been controversial. When the FIB deployed, a group of humanitarian and non-governmental organizations issued a statement that they no longer wanted to operate in same area, due to threats to their humanitarian operations that the offensive operations would cause. The crisis predicted for the humanitarians has not at this time come to pass, but as the FIB remains in DRC (its mandate renewed in March 2014 via Security Council Resolution 2147), the lashback of UN warfighting interfering with humanitarian efforts could still come, just as crises have continued to erupt in the past. In addition, the FIB’s deployment in the DRC has affected the MONUSCO mission’s ability to operate as ‘one UN,’ with unified lines of effort and participation. Since MONUSCO’s forces already had robust rules of engagement that allowed them to use force to protect civilians, “The addition of the Intervention Brigade’s mandate may reflect deficiencies of political will and capacity, more than it does the legal authority to use force. The Intervention Brigade may therefore risk undercutting the legal interpretation of MONUSCO’s and other missions’ long-standing mandates for the protection of civilians” (“Legal Issues,” p. 1-2).

When the FIB was initially mandated in March 2013, all legal issues had not been considered or understood. International Humanitarian Law (IHL) requires the distinction between civilians and combatants, proportionality in attack, and humane treatment of civilians, and it addresses the allowance of attacks on military objectives despite collateral damage. Legal questions pertaining to whether and how International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and International Human Rights Law (IHRL) apply to FIB include “whether the Intervention Brigade may be considered a party to the armed conflict, and whether this classification extends to the rest of the UN forces” (“Legal Issues,” p. 7). The biggest question has been the latter. The peacekeepers in both FIB and MONUSCO operate under a single commander, with the same blue helmets and UN emblems, sharing logistics, communications, and support structures – so it is difficult to distinguish between them. Furthermore, due to its direct support for FARDC, which is a conflict party, MONUSCO can be considered a conflict party by its support. A November 2014 publication by Scott Sheeran and Stephanie Case under the auspices of the International Peace Institute asserts that “MONUSCO as a whole, and not just the Intervention Brigade component, is considered a party to the armed conflict, (…) [and that] all military members of MONUSCO will have lost the protections afforded to them under international law (…) therefore no longer enjoy[ing] legal protection from attacks” (p. 1).

This issue also has consequences for UN civilian personnel, who can now be considered collateral damage if they become casualties during an attack, and for the MONUSCO bases which can be considered military objectives due to IHL. Issues are also raised concerning the legal treatment of detainees; detainees have attempted to surrender to the UN instead of to FARDC for fear of torture, and this raises the question as to the UN’s obligations if they know the detainees may be mistreated if handed over to the government authorities. There is also the issue of accountability and responsibility for any damage or loss caused by
MONSUCO and/or FIB during operations compounded by limitations within the UN system due to claims processes that are not independent, which make achieving recompense and justice for victims hurt by UN action difficult or questionable.

**Recommendation.**

Develop additional clarity and guidance on doctrine and practice in UN peacekeeping.

1. Now that the HIPPO Report has been released and yet there is still clearly a mismatch between current UN peacekeeping doctrine and current UN peacekeeping practice, serious consideration ought to be given as to how to align doctrine and practice. Greater transparency, open debate, and additional consideration are needed of all legal, moral, political, social, and humanitarian implications for the trend of robust peacekeeping and offensive UN operations.

2. Sort out and clarify the different terms and roles of peace enforcement, peacekeeping, and peace building and to what degree each approach builds or tempers sustainable peace. Consider the underlying theories of change and whether emphasizing the pursuit of offensive military operations with the UN as a conflict party would indeed open the space for political solutions and sustainable peace.

3. Additional clarity on the use of force within Ch. VII mandates is needed so that peacekeepers are assured of their rules of engagement to use force in certain Protection of Civilians (POC) situations and do not need an additional mandate specifying the neutralization of certain forces (such as the FIB’s) in order to feel free to take action. The FIB mandate blurs the lines of what is acceptable use of force in other less robustly-worded Ch. VII mandates.

Do not use the FIB to set a precedent for offensive operations and war-fighting in UN peacekeeping, but continue to prioritize the protection of civilians.

1. Despite the label of “success” that some have given to the Force Intervention Brigade in the conflict situation in the DRC, other non-military factors were also at play in the cessation of the M23’s insurgency. The FIB effort emerged from a specific set of regional circumstances and its long-term implications have yet to be seen; as such, the utilization of this type of brigade should not be “cut-and-pasted” as a precedent for interventions in the future. The very wording of the FIB’s mandate precludes this, such that “the Security Council authorized it ‘on an exceptional basis and without creating a precedent or any prejudice to the agreed principles of peacekeeping,’” (IPI, p. 2).
2. Future UN Security Council mandates ought not to specify particular enemies for targeting or include “euphemisms such as ‘neutralize,’” (Karlsrud, p. 50). Both for the sake of achieving sustainable peace grounded in political solutions where grievances of all parties are acknowledged and for the maintenance of the UN’s impartiality to this end, any use of force by UN peacekeepers should remain strictly for the protection of civilians, without bias towards state actors.

3. However, that being said, additional discussion is merited to build a response framework for situations where the degree of threat to civilians falls outside the UN’s traditional scope of rules and guidelines. The United Nations must listen to local civil society and early warning alarms sounded for the need for protection when designing interventions. If the needed intervention for protection falls beyond the UN’s capability or guidelines, one possible way to handle this is to support and/or work more closely with regional organizations such as the African Union. In any case, political will must be bolstered to prevent too much caution from leading to inaction resulting in massacre and genocide.

(See also SOLLIMS Lesson 1307, “UN Force Intervention Brigade against the M23,” which recommends the future utilization of intervention brigades by the UN if the mission analysis requires it in order to protect the civilian population.)

**Implications.**

If additional consideration is not given to the doctrine vs. practice of peacekeeping as well as to the various “peace” terms used and their implications, then there may continue to be a marked contrast between what is said and what is done in UN peacekeeping. Furthermore, this leaves the door open for confusion and inaction by TCCs: “Until clear doctrine is formulated by the UN on the nature and meaning of peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations, TCCs will continue to interpret mandates rather than implement them.” (IPI Issue Brief, p. 13). If consideration is not given to all possible ramifications of the UN’s trend towards increasingly robust mandates, then UN peacekeeping may continue lose its traditional principles and become a conflict party in additional missions, which may impact its ability to provide humanitarian and political support. The UN may become increasingly militarized, which puts in jeopardy the necessity of political primacy for finding solutions that can lead to sustainable peace in the host nation.

If an intervention brigade formed by the UN performs offensive operations, it is a party to the conflict, and the entire UN mission in country as well by default. If the UN mission is a party to the conflict, then military members of the mission will lose legal protections from attack under international law. If missions lose legal protections from attack, not only may attacks increase against all components of the mission (including civilian personnel and bases), but TCCs may be less
willing to contribute forces to the mission. Furthermore, the potential for bases to be targeted as military objectives under IHL and that UN civilian personnel may be considered collateral damage may cause the UN to have additional responsibilities towards its mission staff (as well as towards any detainees).

More importantly, offensive operations by the UN that specifically identify a conflict party as problematic and targeted instead of a conflict behavior as problematic may overly reduce the complexities of conflict and be counterproductive in terms of aiding the region to find a sustainable peace. Furthermore, if the UN works alongside a group with known human rights violations (such as the FARDC) without speaking out, this may show a complicit bias towards state actors instead of towards justice. According to the article “The Spoiler Concept, Conflict and Politics: who ‘spoils’ what, for whom?” by Ben Shepherd, the London School of Economic and Political Science, Foreign & Commonwealth Office (2010):

“[T]he idea of a ‘spoiler’ is built on a misapprehension as to the true nature of peace processes; the transition from violence to peace is not natural, nor linear, just as actors are neither entirely committed to peace nor implacably opposed to it. It also assumes that peace is ‘A Good Thing’, while in reality many political processes or deals ending armed conflict can lead to the political or economic exclusion – even persecution – of actors. (…) It is all too easy to assume that actors are static in their views, and therefore fixed in their behaviour; compelled by their worldview to follow a given course of action, regardless of the costs. In fact, the vast majority of actors in conflict situations (…) act in response to the situations they find themselves in, and deploy tactics designed to achieve a given goal. Rather than seeking to understand their essence, it may be more fruitful to look at the political context within which a group or individual is operating. A label such as ‘spoiler’, applied to an individual or group, makes this political context harder to appreciate, and easy to disregard. (…) Thus actors are divided between those ‘in’ and ‘out’, reducing real-world complexity to a simple binary. The most extreme way that this occurs is through the use of legal or military instruments; sanctions lists, arrest warrants or so-called ‘kinetic’ counter terrorism. (…) [Furthermore], [w]e should be aware of the bias towards engaging with other ‘state’ actors, even if they are part of the problem. The default setting of the international community is to fall in behind states,” (p. 3, 5, 1).

Event Description.

Sources utilized in this lesson include:

Concerning MONUSCO / FIB:

• John Karlsrud (2015) *The UN at war: examining the consequences of peace-enforcement mandates for the UN peacekeeping operations in the CAR, the DRC and Mali*, Third World Quarterly, 36:1, 40-54, DOI: 10.1080/01436597.2015.976016.


Concerning Shifts in UN Peacekeeping:

• “The Death of Doctrine? Are ‘Fit-for-Purpose’ Peace Operations the Way Forward?” Challenges Forum, Policy Brief 2013:2


UN Peacekeeping Principles:

• “An Agenda for Peace, Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping,” Un Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali (17 June 1992).


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**Comments.**

Regarding Theories of Change:

• *Theories of Change and Indicator Development in Conflict Management and Mitigation*, USAID (June 2010).

• *Review of the use of ‘Theory of Change’ in international development*; Isabel Vogel for the UK Department of International Development (DFID), (April 2012).
Quote from the 2015 High-Level Independent Review of Peace Operations:
“...the Panel believes that UN troops should not undertake military counterterrorism operations. Extreme caution should guide the mandating of enforcement tasks to degrade, neutralize or defeat a designated enemy. Such operations should be exceptional, time-limited and undertaken with full awareness of the risks and responsibilities for the UN mission as a whole. Where a parallel force is engaged in offensive combat operations it is important for UN peacekeeping operations to maintain a clear division of labour and distinction of roles,” (HIPPO, p. x).

See this Chart based on a diagram developed by Hizkias Assefa which explores a spectrum of conflict handling mechanisms, indicating a level from low to high of the degree of mutual participation in the search for solutions.

Kiwanja, DRC (31 October 2013).
Members of the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) of the UN Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) go on patrol in Kiwanja, 70 km north of Goma, the capital of the North Kivu province. (Photo credit: UN Photo/Clara Padovan)
E. **TOPIC. Protection of Civilians by the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) (2408)**

**Observation.**

After civil war broke out in South Sudan in 2013, thousands of civilians sought refuge at United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) camps, which became known as “Protection of Civilians (POC) sites.” The mission’s mandate changed to prioritize POC, but resource limitations, government restrictions, and risk aversion prevented UNMISS force projection into conflict-affected areas where 90% of civilians remained. For UNMISS and future UN missions to proactively protect civilians both within and beyond POC sites, mission adjustments in resources, communication, and mentality are necessary.

**Discussion.**

After more than 20 years of war within Sudan, a 6-year interim peace process, and an independence referendum to determine the status of South Sudan, the Republic of South Sudan gained independence on July 9, 2011, with the overwhelming support of 98% of the South Sudanese population. On that same day, the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), successor to the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) which had served in Sudan during the 6-year interim period, was established in order to assist the new government with state-building activities. Unfortunately, two and a half years later, conflict erupted again due to a power struggle between President Salva Kiir and former Vice President Riek Machar. The situation escalated rapidly into civil war across the country along ethnic lines between the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), led by President Kiir (ethnically Dinka), and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army – In Opposition (SPLA-IO), led by former Vice President Machar (ethnically Nuer).

The severity of the conflict’s impact on civilians hit mere days after the outbreak of the December 2013 violence. Civilians were deliberately targeted by both sides of the conflict through killings, abductions, sexual violence, destruction of homes/crops, and cattle pillaging, often along ethnic lines. According to the October 2015 report from CIVIC (Center for Civilians in Conflict), “The conflict has arguably been waged principally through violence against civilians,” (p.9). As such, overnight, UNMISS was forced to reassess and re-establish its role in South Sudan. Protection of civilians became top priority, and UNMISS’s mandate was officially changed in May 2014 to reflect this reprioritization. Since both conflict parties (including the government’s military) were perpetratiing violence against civilians, this shift of mandate focus also implied that UNMISS was no longer primarily in the country to support the new government. In fact, some of UNMISS’s activities now went counter to the government’s interests, and this change of roles was not always communicated clearly with the
government, causing tension between UNMISS and the South Sudanese government.

As the violence continued, more than 2 million people were displaced as IDPs or refugees, 200,000 of which fled to seek protection by UNMISS. In a largely unprecedented move, UNMISS sheltered civilians in six of their camps, “POC sites,” across five states in South Sudan. The number of civilians in the camps quickly surpassed plans for the worst-case-scenario; in Malakal, a camp with capacity for 20,000 sheltered 50,000, and in Bentiu, a camp planned for 70,000 sheltered 110,000 or more. This growing number of civilians in need of protection became a resource burden to UNMISS, whose Assessed Budget did not incorporate adequate POC site-related costs. Procurement obstacles and short-term thinking in budget planning prevented UNMISS from acquiring necessary supplies (fencing, lighting) to secure the perimeters of the POC sites, many of which were only secured by berms or ditches. As a result, weapons and arms have been smuggled into the camps, increasing criminality and raising suspicions of UNMISS harboring combatants. Women leaving the camps to collect firewood have been attacked and assaulted and are in need of additional UNMISS patrols. Despite these challenges, UNMISS has been successful in providing protected areas for many of the South Sudanese who were able to reach POC sites.

Although the camps served to protect the people who sought shelter within them, the vast majority (90%) of the South Sudanese population remains outside the camps, lacking adequate protection. Several challenges have prevented UNMISS from pursuing POC beyond the gates of the POC sites. Since road infrastructure in South Sudan is weak, air support is critical for UNMISS to gain access to conflict-affected regions; however, UNMISS lacks sufficient engineering and air assets. Furthermore, those air assets to which UNMISS did have access were not able to be used effectively due to government restrictions. Due to the Flight Safety Assurances (FSA) process, UNMISS had to de facto ask permission from the conflict parties to carry out any operations by air, which greatly impeded UNMISS’s freedom of movement. Furthermore, UNMISS and the South Sudanese government had signed a Status of Force Agreement (SOFA) when UNMISS initially deployed in July 2011, guaranteeing UNMISS the right to access regions of the country in fulfillment of its mandate. However, after UNMISS’s mandate shifted focus, the government no longer viewed the SOFA as legitimate and began violating its terms, repeatedly blocking UNMISS’s access to areas where there had been violence against civilians.

The passive mindset among UNMISS troops has compounded these challenges, as “peacekeepers often see more reasons to avoid, rather than to engage in, projection of force” (CIVIC, p. 32). Instead of asserting the legitimacy of the SOFA, UNMISS troops routinely avoid confrontation and leave contested areas, due in part to national caveats that favor inaction over the risk of action. As such, UNMISS’s force projection into conflict areas is affected by high risk aversion.
among the Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs). Lack of MEDEVAC support also undermines the willingness of peacekeepers to travel to remote high risk areas to protect civilians. Fortunately, some strides have been taken to address these short-comings in force projection and in POC site perimeter security; for example, Operation Unity II was designed by an inclusive process with humanitarian organizations to establish regular patrols and temporary operations bases. However, its full implementation has not yet been realized, and it does not address the underlying problem of a passive culture around protection.

On August 26, 2015, both parties in the South Sudanese conflict signed a peace agreement, but in the subsequent weeks, there have been several ceasefire violations. Even though the peace agreement has been signed, it is doubtful that civilians will feel comfortable leaving the POC sites any time soon. Physical protection and food insecurity are often linked, as many people who fled to the camps have had their livelihoods destroyed. Some do leave during the day to pursue their normal activities, but most do not feel comfortable spending nights outside of the camp. Furthermore, as the conflict has continued, rifts between communities in South Sudan have deepened, and the probability of increased inter/intra-community violence remains high. As such, POC sites may need to continue long-term for the time being, with greater investment in infrastructure. In November 2015, UNMISS’s mandate will be up for renewal, and it will be for the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to decide whether to continue to prioritize the protection of civilians in UNMISS.
Recommendation.

For UNMISS in particular: To mitigate the high likelihood of revenge killings and inter/intra-ethnic violence continuing despite the August 2015 peace agreement in South Sudan, the UNSC should keep the UNMISS mandate focused on Protection of Civilians (POC) both inside and outside of the POC sites.

Since many South Sudanese IDPs do not feel safe enough to return home, UNMISS should continue to provide POC at POC sites:

1. Incorporate long-term thinking into improving security at POC sites through establishing perimeter lights/fencing, patrols, and communication with women about patrol timing; increased POC site security will then free up more troops for involvement in force projection outside the sites.

2. Continue to include humanitarian organizations in planning/decision-making and risk assessment processes related to POC site sustainment, such as in the conceptualization of Operation Unity II.

Since the majority of South Sudanese civilians in danger are outside the POC sites, UNMISS should provide POC in outlying regions through Force Projection. To do so:

1. Request additional air and engineering resources to overcome lack of road infrastructure.

2. Communicate with the South Sudanese government for clarification of SOFA and SFA flight restrictions to enable increased mobility and access to different regions.

3. Invest in locally-relevant ways to assist local communities to build trust, increase UNMISS’s presence in outlying regions, and bolster UNMISS’s regional awareness for improved early warning capability.

4. The UN should endeavor to change the TCC mindset of protection from passiveness to assertiveness via:

   a. Establishing Policy to:
      1) Address TCC national caveats that would restrict TCC action;
      2) Provide incentives for action over inaction, and

   b. Enabling Resources to:
      1) Ensure all TCCs receive the pre-deployment training – particularly scenario-based POC training;
      2) Provide adequate MEDEVAC capabilities which could increase willingness for TCCs to enter high-risk areas.
Other UN Peacekeeping missions with a protection of civilians mandate should consider both hosting POC sites and proactively providing POC outside the camps, by: 1) employing the resources at hand to fulfill the mandate to the greatest extent possible, and, if those resources are insufficient, then requesting additional required resources, 2) utilizing effective communication with all stakeholders (locals/community leaders, humanitarians, government officials), and 3) actively working to shift the mindset around protection of civilians from passivity to assertiveness.

Implications.

If long-term thinking is not incorporated into planning budgets for (UNMISS) POC sites, then there will not be sufficient resources allocated to invest in POC site perimeter infrastructure (fences, lighting); If POC sites lack adequate perimeter infrastructure, then security will be a problem in the camps (crimes, weapons, lack of control); if insufficient security remains a problem in the camps, then UNMISS personnel will spend their efforts within the POC sites instead of actively protecting civilians elsewhere. If humanitarian organizations are not included in planning/decision-making processes at the POC sites, then poor decisions could be made that have a negative impact on other humanitarian efforts: According to a 2014 International Crisis Group report, "If humanitarian actors are too closely associated with UNMISS and forced to deliver aid under its operational parameters, it would seriously jeopardise their ability to provide food and other essential services" (p. 14).

If sufficient air/engineering resources are not allocated to the mission, then UNMISS will not be able to access other regions of South Sudan due to the extremely poor infrastructure and roads. If SOFA restrictions are not clarified and if UNMISS is not more assertive about SFA flight restrictions, then UNMISS will continue to have to ask permission from both conflict groups (including government) to operate, which will greatly restrict its ability to protect civilians in outlying regions. If UNMISS contingents do not engage to assist local communities, then UNMISS will have less awareness of community activities and be less able to address the high likelihood of inter- and intra-ethnic violence and revenge killings. If policy and resource enablers are not put in place to actively change the mindset of protection from passiveness to assertiveness, then TCCs will only focus on protecting civilians within POC sites, neglecting the majority of civilians in danger outside of the camps.

Event Description.

This lesson is primarily based on the Center for Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC)'s October 2015 article, “Within and Beyond the Gates: The Protection of Civilians by the UN Mission in South Sudan," which stems from research interviews conducted by CIVIC and the Better World Campaign (BWC) in August 2015 in
Juba and Bentiu with various South Sudanese civilians, UN/government/military representatives, local civil society leaders, and humanitarian organizations.

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This lesson was also based on information found in the following sources:

- Mandate Information from the [UNMISS Website](https://www.unmiss.org/
- "South Sudan: A Civil War by Any Other Name" - International Crisis Group Report, 10 April 2014.

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Comments.

The recommendations in this report reflect findings in the June 2015 Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations:

“Closing the gap between what is asked of missions to protect civilians and what they can provide requires improvements across several dimensions: assessment and planning, capabilities, timely information and two-way communication, leadership and training, and mandates and expectations.” (p. 24)

Resources:

“Mandates must be aligned with capacities.” (p. 48) // “A greater focus by the General Assembly, the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) and the Secretariat on results rather than the incremental costs of mission budgets could provide the basis for a new partnership in the resourcing of missions.” (p. 87) // “The Secretariat has developed much needed guidance and scenario-based training materials on the protection of civilians but lacks a mechanism to confirm this training has been effectively delivered to all deploying military personnel.” (p. 26)

Communications:

“Engaging with host countries and local communities must increasingly be regarded as core to mission success. By shifting from merely consulting with local people to actively including them in their work, missions are able to monitor and respond to how local people experience the impact of peace operations.” (p. xii) // “Humanitarian organizations play essential roles in protecting civilians. Where appropriate, timely coordination between missions with humanitarian actors is
indispensable […] to support the creation of a protective environment.” (p. 23) // “To ensure their capabilities are used to maximum effect, missions need timely, reliable and actionable information on threats to civilians and the analytical tools to use it. The best information often comes from communities themselves. To avail of this information, missions must build relationships of trust with local people, leading to more effective delivery of protection of civilian mandates and better protection for peacekeepers.” (p. 25)

Mindset:

“Any national caveats beyond the national restrictions expressly accepted by the Secretariat at the outset should be treated as disobedience of lawful command.” (p. 28) // “The […] readiness of mission personnel to perform in the face of threats to civilians will ultimately define the effectiveness of any protection response. A determined, proactive posture – both politically and operationally – must be driven from the top by mission leadership as well as by the Secretariat. Uniformed peacekeepers must have a common mindset and commitment to deliver on an agreed operational concept and the intent of the force commander to protect civilians.” (p. 26)

Malakal, South Sudan (13 January 2016).
Women leaders at the POC site in Malakal, Upper Nile State, South Sudan, congregate as JMEC Chairperson Visits UNMISS Protection of Civilians Sites. Festus Gontebanye Mogae, Chairperson of the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC), the principal oversight body for South Sudan’s peace accords, visited two Protection of Civilians (POC) sites run by the UN Mission for South Sudan’s (UNMISS) this week. UNMISS POC sites are currently home to close to 200,000 of the more 1.6 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the country. (Photo credit: UN Photo/JC McIlwaine)
F. **TOPIC.** The UN’s Response to Sexual Abuse by Peacekeepers in the Central African Republic (CAR) (2417)

**Observation.**

In recent years, egregious incidents of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA) and Conflict-Related Sexual Violence (CRSV) have emerged across UN peacekeeping missions by peacekeepers abusing the very vulnerable populations whom they have been sent to protect. Most recently, a host of allegations of sexual violence by peacekeepers in the Central African Republic (CAR) came to light, including the case of the sexual abuse of several children in exchange for money or food between December 2013 and June 2014. Alleged perpetrators in this case primarily included soldiers from the French Sangaris Forces - peacekeepers authorized by the UN Security Council but not under direct UN command. An Independent Panel established by the UN in June 2015 to investigate the UN’s response to these incidents found that a fragmentation of responsibility within UN agencies led to inaction, bringing further harm to the victims and reinforcing an implicit culture of impunity within UN peacekeeping concerning sexual violence.

**Discussion.**

According to a June 2015 report from the UN’s Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) evaluating sexual exploitation in 11 peacekeeping missions from 2008-2014, more than a third of all allegations between 2008-2013 involved children (p. 4). Transactional sex was also found to be quite common but underreported, as peacekeepers would pay dresses, mobile phones, cash, and other items for sex with women seeking a way out of hunger and poverty. The four missions in this study which have accounted for the most consistently high numbers of sexual violence allegations by peacekeepers include MINUSTAH (Haiti), MONUSCO (Democratic Republic of the Congo), UNMIL (Liberia), and UNMIS/UNMISS (Sudan/South Sudan). The Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) was not included in this OIOS investigation, but its reputation for SEA violations has grown as news reports as recent as January 2016 have highlighted cases of rape, sexual abuse of children, and transactional sex by peacekeepers (see “News Reports” under “Comments” section, below).

The sexual violence perpetrated by peacekeepers in the Central African Republic emerged from the background of a crisis within the country. After decades of political instability and several coups since its independence from France in 1960, CAR saw a resurgence of overt violence in 2013 when the Seleka opposition forces overthrew the standing government. By December 2013, fighting between Seleka and anti-Balaka forces intensified, precipitating a humanitarian crisis in which as many as 1.2 million people faced food insecurity and over 800,000 fled as refugees or internally displaced persons (IDPs) to...
camps such as the M’Poko Camp at CAR’s capital Bangui; children – as much as half the population of CAR - bore the brunt of the conflict. In response to the violence and its aftermath, the UN Security Council authorized the deployment of both the French Sangaris Forces and the African Union-led International Support Mission in the Central African Republic (MISCA) in December 2013. MINUSCA was subsequently established on 10 April 2014, transferring authority from both MISCA and the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the CAR (BINUCA) to MINUSCA by 15 September 2014. MINUSCA’s mandate prioritized the protection of civilians and also included the promotion and protection of human rights (see “Mandate” under “Comments” section, below). The French Forces were authorized to stay alongside MINUSCA “to use all necessary means to provide operational support to elements of MINUSCA” (S/RES/2149 (2014), p. 13/14).

The allegations of the sexual abuse of children by peacekeepers in CAR took place between December 2013 and June 2014 at M’Poko Camp, at the peak of the violence in CAR and during the transition from MISCA to MINUSCA. During May and June 2014, after a local NGO leader reported the incidents to the Human Rights and Justice Section (HRJS) of MINUSCA and the United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF), a Human Rights Officer (HRO) interviewed six children who had reported abuse. Their experiences revealed serious sexual abuse of the most egregious nature, not only to the children interviewed, but also acts witnessed to other children in exchange for small portions of food or cash, primarily by soldiers with French Sangaris forces, several with specific identifying markings. This sexual violence experienced by the children fell under one of the six grave violations against children in armed conflict (see “MRM Guidelines,” under “UN Child-Protection Mechanisms” in “Comments” section, below). UNICEF referred the interviewed children to a local NGO partner with whom UNICEF already had a standing agreement to provide “medical care, psychosocial support, and legal assistance to victims of sexual violence, including children” (Independent Review, p. 42). However, no attempt was made by the NGO to assess and provide for the children’s medical and security needs or to locate any additional children who may have been abused, and UNICEF did not follow up with the NGO or the children to assure that their needs were being met.

One year later, in May of 2015, international media brought attention to these allegations. Due to the media, attention was again given by the UN to the original children interviewed, and it was discovered that some of them had become victim to additional abuses since the original interviews and that the number of victims had grown. At that time, UNICEF finally arranged for medical examinations for the children and for housing, clothing, and schooling, but the year delay was too late to protect some of the children from additional abuse. After international media brought attention to the allegations, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon convened an Independent Panel in June 2015 to investigate the UN’s response to the allegations and to determine whether or
not there had been any abuse of authority. During the course of the Panel’s investigations, it became clear that “[t]he manner in which UN agencies responded to the Allegations was seriously flawed” and that “information about the Allegations was passed from desk to desk, inbox to inbox, across multiple UN offices, with no one willing to take responsibility to address the serious human rights violations,” (p. i). This fragmentation of responsibility ultimately led to inaction on the part of the UN on behalf of the victims and to hold their alleged perpetrators accountable.

Two distinct policy frameworks within the United Nations address sexual exploitation and sexual violence by peacekeepers: 1) SEA as misconduct, and 2) SEA as a human rights violation. The Secretary-General issued a 2003 Bulletin affirming a Zero Tolerance Policy for sexual violence by UN personnel and prohibiting sexual exploitation and abuse, sexual relations with minors, and any type of transactional sex; the bulletin also strongly discourages sexual relations between UN personnel and “beneficiaries of assistance” (see OIOS, p. 7). However, this Zero Tolerance policy for peacekeeper misconduct only applies to troops directly under UN command, and as such, allegations of abuse by peacekeepers without blue helmets, such as the French Sangaris forces, do not fall under this framework. Furthermore, the TCCs, not the UN, have the authority to investigate allegations of misconduct by their personnel. The second policy framework to address SEA by peacekeepers acknowledges SEA and CRSV as human rights violations. The recent Human Rights Up Front Initiative seeks to place human rights at forefront of all UN activity, reaffirming the primacy of human rights in the Charter of the UN (See “UN Human Rights Policies” under “Comments” section below). UN peacekeeping missions have an obligation to investigate, report, protect victims, and promote accountability regarding human rights violations, as well as to monitor and report on grave violations against children in armed conflict.

Unfortunately, “In the course of the Review it became clear that in the eyes of many UN staff, the human rights framework does not apply to allegations of sexual violence by peacekeepers,” (p. iii). Several UN agencies reported the allegations in some way but did not see themselves as needing to take responsibility to take action to protect the victims or to hold the perpetrators accountable. On the ground in CAR, HRJS did not search for other victims to protect despite information from the original interviews that would suggest a high likelihood of additional victims; furthermore, HRJS did not urgently report these violations to the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) in Geneva. The head of the MINUSCA mission – its Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) – also failed to follow up on the abuse allegations, and the Independent Panel found both leaders to be guilty of an abuse of authority concerning the handling of these SEA allegations. (Due to mishandling of peacekeeper misconduct, the SRSG of MINUSCA was replaced in August 2015.)
In Geneva, the focus of the SEA allegations became political instead of protecting the victims and seeking justice. At the end of June 2014, the HRO sent her interview notes to OHCHR Geneva, which landed in the desk of the Director of Field Operations and Technical Cooperation Division (FOTCD). He thence sent the unredacted notes directly to French authorities in the hopes that the French would take action to prosecute the alleged perpetrators since TCCs have more authority than the UN to prosecute misconduct of peacekeepers. This did jumpstart the French investigation. However, seven months later, the Director of FOTCD was put under investigation himself due to allegations that he had improperly “leaked” the interview notes. Several UN agency leaders prioritized the investigation into the Director of FOTCD instead of taking further action towards the SEA victims in CAR, and the Panel found the Under-Secretary-General (USG) of OIOS to have also committed an abuse of authority. Furthermore, the UN’s own policies of immunity and confidentiality worked against themselves during cooperation with the French investigation into the allegations. UN personnel typically enjoy immunity from national legal proceedings, but this is for the protection of victims, not to keep UN personnel from providing information that would aid investigations. The UN’s internal services failed to recommend that the Secretary-General waive the immunity of the HRO until almost a year after the allegations, greatly delaying the French investigation and the collection of evidence to hold the perpetrators accountable.

The failure of the UN to respond adequately to the allegations of sexual abuse in CAR was more than just the abuse of authority of individuals – it underlined a systems problem within the United Nations. Indeed, “A system in which everyone is meant to be responsible for addressing sexual exploitation and abuse has produced a leadership vacuum in which no one is ultimately responsible or accountable” (Independent Review, p. 80). As the Independent Review so poignantly states, “It is not enough for the UN to report on acts of sexual exploitation and abuse perpetrated by peacekeepers” (p. v); “Zero tolerance cannot be achieved with zero action” (p. 6).
**Recommendation.**

*Improve the UN’s Response to SEA by Peacekeepers.*

**Address the culture of impunity for SEA by peacekeepers by:**

1. Acknowledging any SEA by any peacekeepers as CRSV and as a human rights issue (and not just a misconduct issue for blue helmeted troops under UN command), and focusing on prevention, in part by implementing the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP).

2. Harmonizing SEA policies and Human Rights frameworks, clearly communicating this to all peacekeepers, including those authorized by the UN but not under direct UN command.

3. Holding perpetrators accountable, and giving the UN recourse to hold perpetrators accountable if TCCs do not take immediate action to do so.

**Reduce/Eliminate the fragmentation of responsibility within the UN by:**

1. Providing clear guidelines as to which agency is ultimately responsible for following up on which aspect of SEA violations and clarifying that responsibility towards SEA violations entails not just immediate reporting but also taking protective action.

2. Creating a centralized unit with the responsibility to monitor/report and follow-up on sexual abuse allegations so that the current fragmentation of responsibility will stop and accountability will stop being passed across UN agencies leading to inaction. (The Independent Panel recommends the creation of a “Coordination Unit in OHCHR reporting directly to the High Commissioner for Human Rights,” (p. xv)).

3. Clarifying confidentiality requirements so that UN personnel like the Director of the FOTCD do not get put under investigation for trying to take action to pursue accountability.

**Promote a victim-centered process of accountability by:**

1. Attending immediately to victim’s psychosocial, medical, and protective needs and following up to make sure these are being met (not only reporting violations but addressing the needs that they create).

2. Expediting investigations into SEA allegations so as not to obscure medical evidence that could aid victims.
3. Waiving the immunity of UN personnel for information-sharing for TCC investigations.

4. Ensuring transparency about accountability and prosecution processes for victims so that they know what actions are being taken on their behalf, especially if the process is happening in the TCC, and so that an appearance of inaction does not feed a culture of impunity regarding sexual violence.


Implications.

If the culture of impunity for SEA by peacekeepers within UN missions is not addressed, then there will be the real and/or perceived notion that perpetrators will not be held accountable. As such, peacekeepers may continue to sexually exploit and abuse vulnerable populations whom they are sent to protect. If peacekeepers sexually exploit and abuse the very populations whom they are sent to protect, this doubly-traumatizes this vulnerable host population as well as undercuts the population’s confidence in the mission and limits the benefits that the overall peacekeeping mission can provide to the host community.

If the fragmentation of responsibility within the UN is not reduced and/or eliminated, then various agencies will continue to pass on reported cases of SEA by peacekeepers, assuming someone else will take responsibility to address it, and the end result will be inaction. If no one in the UN takes responsibility for following up or addressing SEA/CRSV incidents, then victims may not have their needs met in a timely manner. Furthermore, investigations may be delayed or nonexistent, which will hamper accountability processes. If perpetrators are not held accountable, then a culture of impunity for SEA by peacekeepers within UN missions will grow (which leads to the above stated implications).

If accountability processes are not victim-centered, then victims may suffer either re-traumatization, lack of protection, lack of immediate care, lack of immediate evidence which will hurt their case, and/or lack of closure. If victims do not receive immediate psychosocial and physical attention, they may have more difficulty healing from the abuse. Furthermore, without protective measures, victims may suffer additional abuse. If the UN immunity policies are not waived or clarified or improved, then UN personnel may be unable to provide necessary information to investigations, which will cause delays. If victims are not given immediate attention by the investigation, there may be less physical evidence of the abuse that would aid victims’ case against the perpetrators. If there is no transparency in the investigative and accountability processes, then victims will not know what is happening and then they will have a lack of closure and their
justice needs will not be met which may affect their ability to heal; furthermore, a lack of transparency about the process may make it appear as though no action has been taken against perpetrators, which will feed into the culture of impunity, which again will have the adverse effects as listed above.

**Event Description.**

This lesson was primarily based on the 17 December 2015 report, “Taking Action on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by Peacekeepers: Report of an Independent Review on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by International Peacekeeping Forces in the Central African Republic,” by Marie Deschamps (Chair), Hassan B. Jallow, and Yasmin Sooka – an independent panel convened on 22 June 2015 by the Secretary-General of the United Nations “to conduct an independent external review of the response of the UN to the Allegations” (p. 7).

Lesson Contributor: Katrina Gehman, PKSOI Lessons Learned Analyst

**Comments.**

**Additional Resources:**

**UN Investigative Reports into Prior Cases of SEA:**


**UN SEA Policies:**

- UN Peacekeeping Website for Conduct & Discipline, Sexual Exploitation, Addressing Misconduct.
- UN Fact Sheet on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse. September 2015. (Includes measures currently in place to prevent SEA, also mentioning actions taken due to the SEA in CAR in 2015).
UN Human Rights Policies:

- **UN Human Rights Up Front Initiative** (Launched in 2013).
- **Charter of the United Nations** [See Article 1 regarding the primacy of human rights]
- **Human Rights Due Diligence Policy** on UN support to non-UN security forces (HRDDP) (endorsed July 2011).
- **UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989); Summary of Rights**

UN Child-Protection Mechanisms:

- **Child Protection at the UN (Website)**
- **Specialised Training Materials on Child Protection for Peacekeepers** (UN Training Modules).
- Monitoring and Reporting Mechanisms on Grave Violations against Children in Situations of Armed Conflict (MRM Guidelines), June 2014; See MRM website page on UNICEF.

MINUSCA Mandate

MINUSCA’s Mandate Initially focused on these priority tasks:

a. Protection of civilians
b. Support for the implementation of the transition process, including efforts in favor of the extension of State authority and preservation of territorial integrity.
c. Facilitate the immediate, full, safe and unhindered delivery of humanitarian assistance
d. Protection of the United Nations
e. Promotion and protection of human rights
f. Support for national and international justice and the rule of law
g. Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration (DDR) and Repatriation (DDRR)

(For additional details on these and further tasks as conditions permit, see website: MINUSCA Mandate)

- **S/RES/2127 (2013)** - UN Security Council Resolution authorizing deployment of African Union-led International Support Mission in the Central African Republic (MISCA) for twelve months and authorizing French forces (Sangaris) to support MISCA in CAR
- **S/RES/2149 (2014)** - UN Security Council Resolution establishing MINUSCA from the date of the adoption of this resolution to 30 April 2015, the transition from BINUCA to MINUSCA, and the transfer of authority on 15 September 2014 from MISCA to MINUSCA
Additional non-UN Resources on General Trauma Awareness:

- *Trauma and Recovery: The aftermath of violence – from domestic abuse to political terror*, Judith Herman, M.D. (1997).
- Eastern Mennonite University (EMU)’s Center for Justice & Peacebuilding (CJP)’s [Strategies for Trauma Awareness & Resilience (STAR) Program](https://www.emu.edu/center-for-justice-and-peacebuilding/star-program)

News Articles Pertaining to SEA in CAR:

- Regarding Allegations of abuse by Sangaris Forces:


  Article about the December 2015 release by the Panel of its report, claiming 14 French soldiers under investigation over the Allegations: “UN slammed for ‘gross failure’ over CAR abuse allegations”

  Documentary about SEA in CAR from French Sangaris Forces in October 2015, including interviews with the HRO, NGO workers, victims, etc. (in French): “ENQUETE FRANCE 2: Envoyé spécial. Viols en Centrafrique: l’armée savait-elle plus tôt qu’elle ne le dit?”

  An original media report from the Guardian about the “leaking” of the Sangaris Notes to France from the Director of FOTCD (April 2015): “UN aid worker suspended for leaking report on child abuse by French troops”

  Article mentioning how Ban Ki Moon fired the head of the Peacekeeping Mission in CAR due to the handling of misconduct allegations (August 2015): “Ban Ki-moon says sexual abuse in UN peacekeeping is ‘a cancer in our system’”

  Regarding current investigations into Sangaris Forces (8 December 2015): “French soldiers interrogated in child sex abuse inquiry”

  - Additional Cases of SEA in CAR:

    “UN peacekeepers in Central African Republic face fresh abuse claims.” (5 January 2016) – Concerning abuse of four underage girls.

    “UN reveals new sexual abuse allegation against peacekeeper in CAR.” (3 September 2015) – Concerning sexual abuse of girl and paternity claims.

G. **TOPIC. All-Female Formed Police Units (1257)**

**Observation.**

All-female Formed Police Units (FPUs) serving on UN peacekeeping missions in Liberia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) have effectively improved security in those post-conflict environments. Moreover, they have proven to be an excellent asset for community-level peace building, as well as a major source of inspiration for women and girls.

**Discussion.**

In January 2007, India deployed a contingent of 103 policewomen to the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). They provided the core of the first all-female Formed Police Unit (FPU) to ever serve on a United Nations peacekeeping operation. Initially 22 male staff personnel supported the FPU, but after several months, the organization was turned into an all-female FPU. Since then, there have been successive contingents of all-female FPUs in UNMIL, contributed by India.

The original tasks of the all-female FPU consisted of guarding the president's office, providing security at various public events having high-profile leaders in attendance, carrying out night patrols with members of the Liberian National Police (LNP) in and around the capital (Monrovia), and conducting riot control when needed. With each rotation, the FPU's roles expanded beyond their mandated tasks to include supporting a wide range of community-focused programs, with particular emphasis on those involving Liberian women and girls. For example, the all-female FPUs conducted community summer camps, in which they taught self-defense, first aid, and classical Indian dance for Liberian girls.

Several researchers have indicated that the time and energy that female peacekeepers expended on interacting and communicating with the community had an amazing influence. It was reported that when the all-female FPUs noticed decreasing attendance in various community programs, they made a concerted effort to approach both men and women, seeking to understand the reasons for their absenteeism or their withdrawal from certain activities. This approach resulted in a detailed understanding of the concerns, needs, and prevalent challenges of the community, which in turn facilitated the improvement of community programs, greater participation by community members, and significant strides in peace building to overcome friction and grievances.

Of note, in the areas where all-female FPUs operated, it was reported that sexual abuse and exploitation of women dropped sharply. Reports also showed an increase in the number of girls remaining in, and completing, primary school in those areas. An increase in female recruitment in the LNP was also ascribed to
the all-female FPU, which is said to have inspired women to take on non-traditional roles such as the security profession.

Overall, the presence of the Indian all-female FPU has led to enhanced physical safety and security in Monrovia and surrounding districts. Support from the Government of Liberia was contributory to the all-female FPU's success, as the Government not only supported the activities of the FPU, but also created awareness of its activities among the local populace. By increasing the FPU's visibility at public events and drawing attention to its presence in the community, security continued to improve.

In November 2011, Bangladesh deployed an all-female FPU to the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO). This first all-female FPU from Bangladesh began its work at a crucial point in time for the DRC, needing to establish security in a tense environment plagued by the violence surrounding the presidential and national legislative elections of 2011. The all-female FPU not only performed its tasks successfully, it also proved instrumental in saving many civilian lives during one period of heavy fighting in Kinshasa. Based on the FPU's success, Bangladesh replaced this unit with another 125-member all-female FPU in February 2013, and Bangladesh has committed to subsequent rotations as well.

The tasks of the all-female FPU have included: crowd control, the protection of the UN staff and its facilities, and escorting UN personnel into various areas deemed insecure. In addition to these security-related tasks, the all-female FPU has also worked to support various programs and events within the communities it has served. For instance, the Commander of the second FPU contingent, Shirin Jahan Akter, arranged to have the FPU participate in the International Women's Day event held in Kinshasa on 8 March 2013, where it provided a demonstration of martial art skills under the theme "Rise up Women, Awaken Your Power." Such activities by the all-female FPU have had a significant positive impact on Congolese society at large, and its women in particular.

**Recommendation.**

1. The UN should continue the approach of sending all-female FPUs on select peacekeeping operations. This should be done on a case-by-case basis, depending on the UN's assessment of the given host nation environment and the willingness of contributing countries to deploy such units. In certain environments, all-female FPUs may be able to serve as key role models for host nation women and girls.

2. The UN and other organizations/coalitions engaged in peacekeeping operations should consider the benefits of having their deployed
police/security forces engage in community peace building programs and activities.

**Implications.**

If the UN does not pursue the option of deploying all-female FPUs on appropriate missions, then an opportunity to provide role models for women and girls of the host nation by way of a cohesive, professional security organization may be lost. Also, the failure to couple "peacekeeping/stability operations" with "peace building activities" may translate to achieving only short-term security gains – without resolving long-standing grievances, maximizing participation/inclusivity, and potentially achieving long-term stability/peace.

**Event Description.**

This lesson is based on the article "Women in Peacekeeping: The Emergence of the All-Female Uniformed Units in UNMIL and MONUSCO," by Catherine A. Onekalit, in *Conflict Trends*, July 2013, published by ACCORD.

Lesson Contributor: David Mosinski, PKSOI Senior Lessons Learned Analyst

**Comments.**

Related references:


3. CONCLUSION

As evident in these lessons, UN peacekeeping in the last few years has seen a number of significant shifts and unprecedented developments. Many of these shifts have the potential to vastly change the nature of peacekeeping, and as such remain controversial, not welcomed by all member states. While there is a push to “modernize” UN peacekeeping with the inclusion of new capabilities and technology, these assets may implicitly prioritize assumptions shifting the United Nations into a more militarized posture. It is important when considering these shifts to listen to all voices on the subject, not only western voices whose power lies in the Security Council but whose troops are not deployed in great numbers and whose host nations remain largely unaffected by United Nations operations.

Recommendations from lessons in this report highlight several themes concerning these shifts...

1. The need for improved Inclusion, Communication, and Relationships:
   From including TCCs earlier in mission planning processes, increasing collaboration and communication between European and non-European TCCs, improving mechanisms for narrowing the gap between those who make and those who implement Security Council decisions, clarifying roles and responsibilities with the host nation, involving victims in accountability processes for SEA violations, and including women in police units, investing in relationships can and will improve United Nations peacekeeping.

2. The need for sufficient Resources and Capabilities:
   TCCs have continued to effectively employ capabilities such as JMACs and all-female FPUs. TCCs have also called for additional resources to support their missions including interoperable secure communications networks, new surveillance technologies, MEDEVAC/CASEVAC air support, and engineering resources for POC sites. It is essential to equip peacekeepers with the resources and support necessary to fulfill their mandates. However, the importation of certain equipment into UN peacekeeping may also import a certain mindset and may prioritize western/ technical/ military perspectives in missions; as such, new technology also requires new guidance.

3. The need to develop Additional Consideration and Guidance:
   As the United Nations charts new territory with unprecedented actions, consideration, clarification, guidance, and potentially additional doctrine are needed on a variety of subjects including: boundaries and obligations regarding intelligence capabilities and surveillance technologies, the differentiation of roles between information-management units at the mission level, policies concerning the interpretation of mandates for their limitations in terms of everyday emergencies as well as rules of engagement, incentives, and national caveats affecting the protection of civilians, the harmonizing of policies and procedures concerning sexual exploitation, human rights, and misconduct by peacekeepers, and the mismatch between current peacekeeping doctrine and practice especially concerning ramifications for deviation from traditional peacekeeping principles.
4. The need for improved **Organizational Structures**:
   As evident by both 1) the Independent Review on sexual exploitation by peacekeepers in CAR calling for the establishment of a new unit so that too much responsibility spread out over the UN system does not lead to inaction and 2) the gaps that have formed between those who have permanent voice on the Security Council and those who do not, a review of organizational structures at the UN and the development of improved mechanisms for inclusion in the Security Council may be in order.

5. The need for a focus on **Mindset**:
   One of the biggest challenges that still faces UN peacekeeping is how to form a mindset of action over inaction, so that peacekeepers will not only actively protect civilians in POC sites but also go beyond their gates… so that personnel will not only report incidents of SEA by peacekeepers but also address victims’ needs and promote accountability processes. The mindset of UN personnel must be geared towards understanding the political primacy and rationale for UN missions, with an understanding of the UN system, respect for dignity of people in the host nation, and a comprehensive awareness of the short-term and long-term implications for the recent *Shifts in United Nations Peacekeeping*.

The needs and recommendations identified within this lesson report on *Shifts in United Nations Peacekeeping* are interconnected. With the use of new technologies, new guidance must be drafted, mindful of the potential effects of various technologies on both relationships and mindsets. Improved organizational structures may enhance communication and relationships which may, in turn, change mindsets and therefore affect action. In any case, it is important to remember that UN peacekeeping operations remain situated in a complex web of conflict dynamics. The world today is not the same as the world when the United Nations was born and when peacekeeping missions made their first deployments as ceasefire observers. And yet, the United Nations still operates with a Security Council designed from power dynamics of the past, dependent upon state actors. The question remains: how can UN Peacekeeping, given both the structures of the past and the shifts of the present, be in the service of sustainable peace for the future?

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4. **COMMAND POC**

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Related Documents, References, and Links

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**UN Peacekeeping Reports:**

**Related to HIPPO & the 2015 Peacekeeping Summit:**
- Fact Sheet: U.S. Support to Peace Operations 2015 Leaders' Summit on UN Peacekeeping (White House, Office of the Press Secretary) (28 September 2015)

**Miscellaneous UN Peacekeeping Resources:**
- UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) Website
- UN DPKO Organizational Chart
- Chart of the United Nations System
- UN Peacekeeping Operations FACT SHEET (31 December 2015) Peacekeeping Fact Sheet Website
- List of Peacekeeping Operations from 1948 – 2013
- UN Security Council Resolutions Depository
- What’s In Blue: Insights on the work of the UN Security Council
- Designing Mandates and Capabilities for Future Peace Operations, Challenges Forum (2014)
Non-UN Websites Related to Peacekeeping:
- International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations
- ZIF-Berlin Center for International Peace Operations
- International Peace Institute
- Providing for Peacekeeping

Other UN Agencies - Websites
- United Nations
- UN Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights (OHCHR)
- UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)
- UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR)

Landmark UN Resolutions
- Charter of the United Nations
- UN Resolution on Women, Peace & Security
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**Coming Soon!**

Watch out for the new POET Portal on SOLLIMS…

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**Peace Operations Estimate & Tool (POET)**

[Formerly the Peacekeeping Assessment Tool (PAT) Portal]

The POET Portal will include:

- Running Estimates/Assessments of Current Peace Operations
- Peace Operations Toolkit with References and Resources
- Interactive Peacekeeping Situation Map

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1988 Nobel Peace Medal

Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar announced on 29 September that the Nobel Peace Prize of 1988 has been awarded to the United Nations Peacekeeping forces. (Photo credit: UN Photo/John Isaac)
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