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Jointness, Organizational Culture, Mission Synergy, Base Realignment and Closure, Savings
USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

Joint Basing: Time to Give Up, or Reframe?

by

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Abstract

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Is it time to give up on joint basing? The short answer is “no.” Department of Defense leaders have debated the need for “jointness” in military operations for decades, a debate that reached a decisive point with the enactment of the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986. In another step toward jointness, the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) law’s creation of 12 joint bases by consolidating 26 individual military single-service bases also sparked lively debate across the DoD. Adding a perplexing wrinkle in 2012, a Government Accountability Office report highlighted a lack of projected savings thus far from the BRAC joint bases, an outcome that has caused some military service chiefs to question whether joint basing should continue. Rather than viewing the lack of savings as proof of the joint basing concept’s failure, this paper will present a case for reframing the way the DoD views joint basing, moving perspectives from the tactical plain of infrastructure consolidation for administrative efficiencies based on geographic proximity, to a broader strategic framework based on dimensions and levels of jointness, and on opportunities for leveraging joint mission synergies that may ultimately lead to greater cost savings efficiencies.
Joint Basing: Time to Give Up, or Reframe?

In a move toward jointness, the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) law directed the creation of 12 joint bases by consolidating 26 individual military single-service bases. This novel concept sparked heated debate across the Department of Defense (DoD). During deliberations on creation of the joint bases, for example, “. . . communities argued that the ‘clash of cultures’ and service-specific interests would impair installation management by a different service.” Adding another layer to the debate in 2012, a Government Accountability Office (GAO) report highlighted the lack of then current and projected savings from the BRAC joint bases. The finding has caused some military service chiefs to question whether joint basing should continue. Given the dismal savings outlook, should senior DoD leadership pull the plug on joint basing?

This paper contends that joint basing should continue, but under a more realistic evaluation of savings for basing consolidation. Rather than looking at the lack of savings as evidence of the failure of joint basing, this paper will present a case for reframing the way the DoD views the concept. The military must move away from the tactical plain of consolidating facilities for administrative efficiencies based on geographic proximity, to a broader strategic framework based on dimensions and levels of jointness, as well as on opportunities for leveraging joint mission synergies. Operational mission synergies should become the primary goal of joint basing, and that these synergies may ultimately lead to greater efficiencies within a base for both the mission and installation support functions. This paper will recommend a new strategic framework that views joint basing as a potential joint force multiplier in support of Combatant Commanders (CCDRs) and Joint Force 2020. Senior leaders may use this framework as a starting point for further
study and as a way to broaden the thinking behind decisions on the future of joint basing.⁷

Joint basing elicits strong emotions—pro and con—similar to the vociferous debates over the past six decades regarding the need for “jointness” within military operations. This debate reached a decisive point with the enactment of the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986.⁸ The Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps leadership had gained “unprecedented political muscle” during World War II, and the military service leaders used this influence to maintain independence and initially resisted joint integration.⁹ The Goldwater-Nichols Act advanced Dwight David Eisenhower’s concept of unity of command in which he was a strong believer; his experiences as a “unified and combined commander”¹⁰ during World War II had convinced him “that war by separate land, sea, and air forces was no longer feasible.”¹¹ Eisenhower grew familiar with the individual services’ resistance, which unified command sometimes triggered, as well as the frustration he felt when encountering situations where the resources and capabilities needed by one service were under the control of another.¹²

This analysis endeavors to sift through the criticisms of joint basing to find the nuggets of truth amongst the fodder of natural resistance. The findings indicate that this may serve as an opportune time for DoD leaders to reframe the joint basing concept. When changes occur in the strategic or joint operational environment, or when an “assessment reveals a lack of progress,”¹³ leaders often choose to reframe previous conclusions, assumptions and decisions “that underpin the current . . . approach.”¹⁴ Reframing can help leaders step outside of previous perspectives to see a situation in new ways. The proposed new framework includes five suggested dimensions for
determining jointness in basing, as well as levels of jointness to categorize bases, which may help senior leaders rethink the purpose of each base and how much jointness may be needed or desired. The reframing may assist them in making decisions based on a trade-off between, for example: 1) a single-service base’s flexibility and ability to serve as incubator for service culture; 2) a fully integrated joint base’s force multiplying mission synergies in support of the joint force; or 3) a “combination” base with a level of jointness somewhere in-between a single-service and a fully integrated joint base. The proposed framework may encourage a paradigm shift in thinking about the role of basing in national defense strategy, with consideration of basing as a force multiplier in the joint planning process rather than simply another way to save administrative costs. Force multiplying synergies will save money in the long run, but only through a holistic view of basing.

Why Should DoD Leadership Care About Basing?

First, strategic leaders care about the future of basing, if nothing else, for the sheer magnitude and value of infrastructure alone. The DoD manages a large and expensive basing enterprise. As of May 2013, the DoD oversees an $850 billion real property portfolio, including more than 500 installations, 500,000 buildings, and 28 million acres. The Army’s portion of the DoD portfolio includes “… more than 120,000 buildings and 13.5 million acres of land equivalent to the States of Maryland, Connecticut and Rhode Island.” The Army manages approximately half of the DoD’s installations, including 105 active Army; 9 Army Reserve; 102 Army National Guard; and 10 “other” types of installations. One can quickly envision why DoD leadership seized the opportunity to consolidate 26 bases into 12, with the goal of reducing infrastructure costs.
Second, in a time of severe fiscal constraints,\textsuperscript{18} DoD leaders need to discover why joint basing is not producing the expected savings that looked like easy wins. Unfortunately, although the BRAC joint bases have operated for a short timeframe, the GAO reported that DoD is on a path to achieve only 10 percent of the originally estimated savings of $2.3 billion over 20 years.\textsuperscript{19} As part of the reason for the lack of sufficient savings from the bases, the GAO found that the DoD “. . . has not developed a plan for achieving joint basing cost savings and efficiencies or a reliable method for tracking costs and estimated savings.”\textsuperscript{20}

The GAO report also blamed lack of a DoD mechanism for joint base commanders and staff to share lessons learned across all bases while stating that sharing ideas at higher levels within the military services and among DoD leaders is not sufficient.\textsuperscript{21} The report provided various recommendations, such as revising unclear common standards and developing a strategy to share solutions to common challenges.\textsuperscript{22} These recommendations do not address the root causes. The GAO report did not consider whether the joint bases may also miss out on some efficiencies because they lack full dimensions of jointness. For example, if a joint base lacks mission synergy between its units,\textsuperscript{23} then placing them in shared space may create the effect of shifting infrastructure needed from one base to another with only minor efficiencies due to the non-overlapping support requirements of disparate missions. However, consolidating complementary missions under a unified installation support umbrella, such as was done for the amphibious related missions at Joint Expeditionary Base Little Creek-Story,\textsuperscript{24} may lead in the long run to greater overall efficiencies, as well as enhanced joint training opportunities.
Air War College student, Jeffry K. McNeely, researched joint basing funding in 2010, and offered some reasons for lack of savings; he provided a recommendation that DoD reverse the creation of the larger joint bases that may lack the necessary administrative synergies. McKneely’s approach was reasonable, but such a drastic decision to reverse a joint base should not be considered without first doing the necessary reframing. In other words, DoD leaders should reframe how they view basing in general, and joint basing in particular, and then ascertain root causes of the challenges before making such a decision. Working deliberately through the reframing process will provide the best pathway for configuring the bases for realistically achievable cost savings.

Strategic Context

The 2005 BRAC Commission faced a post-9/11 strategic landscape when the armed forces of the United States were deployed and engaged in combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. This was in contrast to the previous BRAC rounds that took place in a post-Cold War environment of force drawdowns. In an environment of “stable or increasing force structure and defense budgets,” Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld clarified for the Commission that the “primary goal for the BRAC process was military transformation.” Notwithstanding that Goldwater-Nichols was in place for nearly two decades, Chairman Anthony J. Principi and eight commissioners sent the final BRAC recommendations to President George W. Bush with “very few” actions that increased jointness. Despite the best intentions, the DoD may have settled for movement toward jointness, rather than achieving a significant jointness goal. DoD leadership referred to Recommendation 146, “Joint Basing,” as one of the
few positive steps toward jointness. The recommendation led to the creation of the 12 bases shown in Table 1.

### Table 1. BRAC 2005 Joint Bases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Joint Base</th>
<th>Supporting Base</th>
<th>Supported Base(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Joint Base Lewis-McChord, WA</td>
<td>Fort Lewis, WA (Army)</td>
<td>McChord Air Force Base, WA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, NJ</td>
<td>McGuire Air Force Base, NJ</td>
<td>• Fort Dix, NJ (Army)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Naval Air Engineering Station Lakehurst, NJ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Base Andrews, Washington, MD</td>
<td>Andrews Air Force Base, MD</td>
<td>Naval Air Facility, MD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling-Naval Research Laboratory, Washington, DC</td>
<td>Bolling Air Force Base, Washington DC</td>
<td>Naval District of Washington at the Washington Naval Yard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall, VA</td>
<td>Fort Myer, VA (Army)</td>
<td>Henderson Hall, VA (Marine Corps)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, AK</td>
<td>Elmendorf Air Force Base, AK</td>
<td>Fort Richardson, AK (Army)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, HI</td>
<td>Naval Station Pearl Harbor, HI</td>
<td>Hickam Air Force Base, HI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Base San Antonio, TX (includes Randolph Air Force Base)</td>
<td>Lackland Air Force Base, TX</td>
<td>Fort Sam Houston, TX (Army)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Base Charleston, SC</td>
<td>Charleston Air Force Base, SC</td>
<td>Naval Weapons Station, SC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Base Langley-Eustis, VA</td>
<td>Langley Air Force Base, VA</td>
<td>Fort Eustis, VA (Army)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Expeditionary Base Little Creek-Fort Story, VA</td>
<td>Naval Mid-Atlantic Region at Naval Station Norfolk, VA</td>
<td>Fort Story, VA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Region Marianas, Guam</td>
<td>US Naval Force, Marianas Islands, Guam</td>
<td>Andersen Air Force Base, Guam</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The step toward jointness proved slighter than projected. Although “joint” in name, under closer scrutiny the 12 joint bases do not demonstrate full jointness. Joint doctrine shows that jointness is a concept that should apply in some form to military basing. The current Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin E. Dempsey, wrote in his *Mission Command White Paper*[^34] that lessons learned from more than a decade of war in Iraq and Afghanistan show the need to “create jointness deeper and sooner in the force.”[^35] One could argue that sooner and deeper in the force includes looking across to the permanent bases in the continental United States (CONUS) where
DoD garrisons or stations the force in peacetime, and where the force resides between deployments during reset.\textsuperscript{36} The garrisoned force at permanent bases trains for future conflicts, which provides an opportunity to inculcate jointness. A truly joint permanent base in CONUS could conceivably provide opportunities for units of more than one military service to jointly train, wargame, interact, and seek ways to improve interoperability, thereby achieving jointness “sooner and deeper” in the force.

In 2004, then Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and Environment, Raymond DuBois, described basing as a platform to capture jointness in the force, in his congressional testimony. He spoke about units living and training jointly on bases as they will fight. He stated:

And to the extent that it is more than just an aggregation of multiple organizations in one facility, it is more about how we are going to use those capabilities, the infrastructure, the base, the air . . . to bring together the forces in a way that is more realistic and more appropriate for the way they are going to train. Witness the difference between Desert Storm . . . to what we did in this most recent set of conflicts . . . We have to take that ability and translate it back to where we train, where we raise our people, where we billet them, etc., so that we get that joint capability and synergy as early as we can into the process and that we live it.\textsuperscript{37}

More recently, a Chief Master Sergeant in the 62\textsuperscript{nd} Aerial Port Squadron at Joint Base Lewis-McCord provides an example of what DuBois envisioned, writing that:

. . . working alongside our brothers and sisters in arms, our sister services, has many great benefits, such as learning new ways of doing business, an ability to look at a process, procedure, plan or operation from another perspective and ultimately a view of the bigger picture.\textsuperscript{38}

Essential questions follow this line of thinking, which views CONUS joint bases as more than cost savings opportunities: would establishing a targeted number of CONUS bases of varying levels of jointness, focused on global regions or on high-priority warfighting capabilities, serve as a force multiplier for CCDRs? Would the United
States gain strategic advantage by establishing certain joint bases with synergistic multi-service units focused on potential regional threats, for example, in the Asia-Pacific, or on global threats, for example, in the cyberspace domain? Did the 12 BRAC joint bases provide such joint mission synergies? To answer these questions and others, one must further examine the concepts of “jointness” and “basing.”

What is Jointness?

The *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations* expounds upon jointness, stating that the “strength of any Joint Force has always been the combining of unique service capabilities into a coherent operational whole,” and goes further to link achieving greater synergies with achieving efficiencies. The term jointness seems simple, but a single official definition proves difficult to ascertain. A survey of the current Joint Doctrine demonstrates gaps with the term jointness for basing, and presents a disjointed and confusing array of references to different types of bases and basing concepts spread across various joint publications (e.g., forward operations bases, forward operating sites, main operating bases, etc.).

The joint doctrine tends to categorize and separate permanent CONUS basing as a tenuously related sister concept of overseas contingency basing. Determining who has responsibility for CONUS basing may cause some confusion to the uninitiated. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has not promulgated a separate Joint Publication (JP) for DoD instruction or directive specifically on basing or joint basing. This may be because joint doctrine considers basing as a sub-set of logistics, and the Joint Staff has yet to consider permanent CONUS basing as a joint area of responsibility. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) also organizationally places “basing” in a small office under logistics. However, the Army, which manages nearly half the DoD’s
installations, separates CONUS basing from logistics (i.e., under the Office of the Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management\textsuperscript{49} versus the Army Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army, G4/Logistics\textsuperscript{50}).

Moreover, the DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms defines “joint” broadly, stating it “connotes activities, operations, organizations, etc., in which elements of two or more Military Departments participate.”\textsuperscript{51} JP 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, provides additional details, stating that “jointness implies a cross-service combination wherein the capability of the joint force is understood to be synergistic, with the sum greater than its parts (the capability of individual components).”\textsuperscript{52}

One can infer from the doctrinal definitions that full jointness requires synergy in all components of the base. Given the ephemeral definitions of jointness and the split oversight responsibilities of basing, DoD leaders may find dividing jointness into dimensions a helpful exercise before contemplating further action. Based on a review and synthesis of joint doctrine and the work of organizational scholars,\textsuperscript{53} five dimensions of jointness in basing, shown in Table 2, should be considered in future joint doctrine, DoD basing strategy, and future BRAC actions.

Based on a review of the Secretary of Defense justification for “Joint Basing,”\textsuperscript{54} as well as the DoD Joint Basing Implementation Guidance (JBI\textsubscript{G}),\textsuperscript{55} the DoD focused almost exclusively on the fourth dimension of jointness, “Administrative Synergy,” with the goal of cost savings. One could argue that the lack of emphasis on the other four dimensions--command and control (C\textsuperscript{2}), mission synergy, systems/process integration,
and cultural synergy—contributes to the challenges in achieving the efficiencies originally desired.

### Table 2. Dimensions of Jointness in Basing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimensions of Jointness in Basing</th>
<th>Goal</th>
<th>Meaning for Unit Personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Joint Command and Control (C²)</td>
<td>Unity of Command</td>
<td>For whom do I work?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Mission Synergy</td>
<td>Unity of Effort</td>
<td>With whom do I team?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Systems and Process Integration</td>
<td>Interoperability and Interdependence</td>
<td>How does my work connect with or complement the joint team?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Administrative Synergy</td>
<td>Base Support Efficiencies</td>
<td>Which of my tasks are duplicative?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Cultural Synergy</td>
<td>Social Connectivity</td>
<td>How do I interact with the joint team?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The dimensions of jointness are interconnected as “effects” of a system. Moreover, this joint basing system requires a holistic approach for success. A clear path forward may appear once leadership shifts away from thinking about joint bases in terms of one-size-fits-all static entities that either succeed or fail, to thinking about each one as a “system” that connects to a larger system, with a range of possibilities for achieving desired dimensions and levels of jointness. The DoD leadership should consider the five dimensions of jointness in basing to find ways to mitigate when determined necessary for improved performance. With a quick comparison, one could conclude that the 12 joint bases do not exhibit the full dimensions of jointness, but the joint bases function at some level of jointness within a portion of the bases (i.e., the area of installation support services). The following sections provide a general overview of considerations within each dimension.
The Dimension of Joint C²

General Dwight D. Eisenhower believed in the principles of unity of command, drawing from his experience commanding “complex joint and combined amphibious operations” in World War II, demonstrating he could “create and run an integrated staff from all services . . .”60 If Eisenhower were alive today, would he affirm the joint bases are “joint” based on the principle of unity of command? While the joint bases fit into the broad definition of “Joint Base” in JP 3-10,61 they may not fully rise to the concept of “unity of command” in JP 1, which states: “Unity of command means all forces operate under a single commander with the requisite authority to direct all forces employed in pursuit of a common purpose.”62

Indeed, two or more services operate on each of the bases, but many of the joint base “mission partners”63 do not achieve maximum mission synergy with each other, or working on shared mission objectives for a Joint Forces Commander (e.g., the airlift wing commander reports to a separate Air Force mission commander64 and continues to run the airfield and retain training resources at Joint Base Lewis-McChord.)65 The DoD consolidated the infrastructure and installation management functions under a lead military service, but the “mission partners” have parallel chains of command; they are not attached to a Joint Forces Commander as may be established at an overseas contingency base.

Under the BRAC 2005 joint basing construct, each lead service became the “supporting” organization to handle installation management services for all other units on the base. The sister service units on the base became the “supported” organizations, and by default, dependent on the lead service’s management skills, philosophies,
resourcing processes, and priorities, although with some mitigating processes established by the JBIG.  

For example, the Army is the lead service for Joint Base Lewis-McChord, and the Air Force became a supported service on the joint base. Although the Army garrison commander’s title is “Joint Base Commander,” he or she reports to the U.S. Army Installation Management Command in the same fashion as does the garrison commander of U.S. Army Fort Hood, Texas, or U.S. Army Fort Belvoir, Virginia. The deputy garrison commander position of Joint Base Lewis-McChord is filled by an Air Force officer to provide the sister service’s perspective, but this bifurcated organizational structure would not meet the definition of unity of command as understood by Eisenhower or defined in JP 1.

The DoD would benefit by applying the insights gained in establishing joint C² for Geographic Combatant Commanders to the joint bases, with the goal of “getting your C² right up front.” Principles to consider include: “effectiveness, simplicity, responsiveness, flexibility, unified action, and readiness.” As it stands, however, the DoD has applied the same C² approach to all 12 bases, which achieves some unity of effort for installation support services, but does not achieve unity of command for the entire base, for both the mission and installation support services portions of the base.

As a partial mitigation for the lack of unity of command, the DoD JBIG established a committee oversight structure called the Joint Management Oversight Structure (JMOS). This form of oversight, however, cannot match the agility and flexibility of a direct and unified chain of command. The six layers of the committee oversight structure begin with a local Joint Basing Partnership Council; eventually an
issue reaches the desk of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, but only the most significant issues would reach the highest level. The goal is for the participants to resolve issues at the lowest practical level.72

In sum, rather than establishing a joint C² structure for the joint bases similar to the structure that a GCC might configure in a theater of operations, the DoD structured the joint bases with a split chain of command that creates a single-service garrison commander (or Air Force, Navy, or Marine Corps equivalent) who is in charge of providing installation support services to everyone on the joint base, while the “mission partners” on the base (e.g., units from the sister service and other tenants) have separate chains of command. The joint bases, therefore, do not have a unified command to which everyone on the base reports.

The Dimension of Mission Synergy

Did the 12 BRAC joint bases attain mission synergy with the goal of unity of effort? JP 1 states that unity of effort “. . . requires coordination and cooperation among all forces toward a commonly recognized objective, although they are not necessarily part of the same command structure.”73 One could argue that the joint bases achieve partial unity of effort in the installation support area, but not in the operational mission area of the base.74

Although the jointness concept includes striving for operational cross-service and cross-domain synergy,75 the DoD sought primarily to save money through the BRAC joint bases by eliminating redundant and overlapping garrison-type support functions that Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps bases in close proximity were performing, such as facility maintenance, security, and morale, welfare, and recreation services.76 The concept seems simple, but “. . . the trouble creeps in because bases have different
missions, property standards, and cultures. Airmen often go directly into combat from home stations;" Army Soldiers, however, have additional mobilization steps prior to deployment. At the onset of BRAC 2005, the Air Force leadership expressed concern regarding “different missions” potentially creating problems because the sister service would lack experience with providing for the Air Force’s unique requirements.

To mitigate this concern, DoD leadership allowed Air Force to separately control and support airfields on the joint bases when the bases are under another service’s lead, such as the airfields at Joint Base Lewis McChord. This separate airfield support sub-structure on a joint base, by default, would require some redundant administrative services, which the BRAC 2005 goal was to eliminate. However, if two bases with airfields and air missions had consolidated, the need for redundant or parallel airfield support and control mechanisms likely would be reduced due to the synergy between the two missions.

In an example where greater mission synergy exists, the BRAC 2005 Recommendation 146 required the realignment of the Naval Air Facility in Washington, Maryland, by relocating the installation management functions to Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland, to establish Joint Base Andrews. Joint Base Andrews ranks among the best of the 12 joint bases in its ability to meet the DoD standards in providing common base services, to include airfield services. Not to discount the hard work of the joint base personnel in achieving this goal, one could argue they had the wind of operational mission synergy at their backs assisting them. The Joint Base Andrews “host wing” (i.e., the Air Force District of Washington’s 11th Wing) may realize natural efficiencies from the mission synergy between its primary units, which revolves around
airlift and air mobility. Although the units have separate chains of command, they have complementary missions. The units supported by the 11th Wing at Joint Base Andrews, for example, include the Air Mobility Command's 89th Airlift Wing; the Air Force Reserve Command's 459th Air Refueling Wing; the Washington D.C. Air National Guard's 113th Wing; and the Naval Air Facility.

In contrast to the mission synergies of Joint Base Andrews, Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst seems to experience some differences, which the Secretary of Defense BRAC justification acknowledged:

McGuire’s quantitative military value compared to the Fort Dix . . . score was too close to be the sole factor for determining the receiving installation . . . Military judgment favored McGuire AFB . . . for the installation management functions because its mission supports operational forces, in contrast to Fort Dix, which has the primary mission of support for Reserve Component training.

One could argue that placing an Army Reserve Component training mission under the auspices of an Air Force operationally focused commander for installation support sets the stages for Fort Dix units to receive a lesser priority when requesting services from their new host. Whether perception or reality, the Army created an Army Support Activity (ASA) on the former Fort Dix portion of the joint base to provide certain dedicated installation support services to the Reserve Component mission. In addition to other Army-directed support missions, the ASA-Fort Dix pledges that it “. . . supports and conducts Reserve Component Training, Mobilization/Demobilization operations, and facilitates the well-being of Soldiers, their Families, and Civilians in a safe and secure environment.”

The DoD will need to conduct further research to determine costs, benefits, and synergies among the primary mission units, and also with the garrison host charged
with providing the common installation support services. The prevailing thought appears to be that a separately controlled and funded organization can provide garrison support services without causing a detrimental impact on overall effectiveness and efficiencies. This is a precedent set by the Army when it created the U.S. Army Installation Management Command to centrally manage garrison management functions. For the joint bases, however, the DoD does not have a robust corporate structure similar to what the Army established to oversee and provide resources for IMCOM's Army installations. More study is warranted on the trade-offs between "local" versus "corporate" synergies in basing, and what may work best for different circumstances and objectives.

In the Fort Dix example, the Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst's host wing—the 87th Air Base Wing—provides support services similar to what the ASA Fort Dix provides, but most likely would have needed to create new and additional capabilities to provide the training and range type support that an Army Reserve Component mission requires. Unlike the more synergistic units on Joint Base Andrews, therefore, the Army's mission at Fort Dix lacks a high level of operational mission synergy with the Air Force units on the joint base, such as the Air Force Expeditionary Center, 21st Expeditionary Mobility Task Force, 305th Air Mobility Wing, and others, which are focused on serving as the "East Coast Air Mobility Wing, providing America's Eastern gateway for Global Reach."

While searching for the right balance and mix of joint bases to maximize strategic advantage for the United States, the DoD should consider the connection between a joint base's ability to achieve savings and the operational mission synergy among
supported mission units and their supporting host. This connection warrants further study and consideration before the DoD plans to establish joint bases in the future. Meanwhile, the Congress and DoD should temper their expectations for savings from a joint base that lacks cross-service synergy due to disparate missions.

The intent in creating the joint bases focused on consolidating “common functions” that each individual service base performed in support of installation facilities and personnel. The intent also focused on the convenience of geographical proximity and common boundaries. The Secretary of Defense justification did not mention a goal of synergy on the mission side of the bases, and warfighting missions were only briefly mentioned in the JBIG. The joint bases achieve some operational mission synergy at certain of the joint bases, but this seems more from serendipity than from design or forethought. The DoD would achieve benefit from incorporating operational mission synergy as a factor in planning future joint bases or existing joint base reconfigurations.

The Dimension of Systems and Process Integration

The “Systems and Process Integration” dimension may bring to mind links in communications and computer networks, which when disconnected can grind a joint operation to a halt. This dimension could remind leadership of any number of systems or processes that form the circulatory system of the DoD, such as in financial accounting business systems. However, because the goal for the joint bases is first and foremost cost savings, this section will focus on the installation management processes for the joint bases, which may shed more light on the bases’ level of jointness.

The DoD Base Structure report and the JBIG indicate that each military service manages, and funds their assigned joint bases as if they were their own single-service
bases. This means the joint bases are funded and managed within service stovepipes. There are four primary exceptions or checks and balances established by the DoD JBIG: 1) The lead service assigns a “Joint Base Commander,” with a sister service Deputy; 2) The lead service uses Common Output Levels of Support (COLS) as the common delivery standard for providing base operations support; 3) The lead service provides non-reimbursable services to sister-service units after receiving a resource transfer; and 4) The lead service and sister service units participate in the DoD JMOS, a committee process that allows for joint base issues to receive higher DoD level review, as needed.

With these four process exceptions, why are the joint bases not achieving expected savings? One could argue that due to the myopic focus on eliminating overlapping common installation management functions, the Secretary of Defense missed or discounted five potential underlying factors that make efficiencies difficult to achieve: 1) The affected single-service bases do not entirely use similar or near similar processes and systems that can rapidly become interoperable; 2) A clash of service cultures impairs integration; 3) Lack of a joint C² structure and funding process (i.e., for both the base support and the mission side) causes disunity of effort and priorities; 4) Lack of operational mission synergy among the units on the conjoined bases causes inefficiencies; and 5) Lack of an overarching DoD joint basing strategy, joint doctrine, and related joint training prevents the joint basing concept from thriving.

The OSD developed COLS to address the lack of interoperable base support standards between the military services. Each joint base, however, continues to receive funding and resources through individual service processes and methods, to
include competing requirements in each service’s Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution process against other service priorities. The joint bases are subject, therefore, to service-driven resource reductions. In other words, the DoD has not established a separate joint process or funding stream for the joint bases.

Further, the communities affected by BRAC 2005 mentioned the underlying cultural differences and lack of joint C² during BRAC 2005 hearings. The consensus among community stakeholders was that the “DoD would need to develop a common installation management approach by establishing a joint basing office in DoD to implement the new joint bases so that individual military services do not issue conflicting guidance and procedures.” The DoD followed this advice by creating a Basing Office that reports to the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics), but the office does not provide direct C² over the joint bases, nor does it serve as a program manager for allocating resources to the joint bases. Direct C², program management, and funding allocation is accomplished through the individual services that lead each joint base.

The “supported” organizations on the joint bases transferred Total Obligation Authority (TOA) to the lead service when the joint bases were created (e.g., Army and Navy transferred TOA to Air Force at Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst), rather than to a joint organization with a joint funding stream. The sister service supported organizations, therefore, must rely on the lead services to prioritize installation support resources appropriately in accordance with their sometimes unique needs and processes.
In sum, rather than configuring joint bases with joint resourcing and oversight systems and processes, the DoD nested the joint bases inside the individual military services, albeit with the added checks and balances established in the JBIG. Whether the services will be able to continue funding the higher COLS standards remains to be seen. Moreover, observers will only discover over time whether the checks and balances of the joint base systems and processes will suffice to achieve the joint basing efficiency goals.

**The Dimension of Administrative Synergy**

The joint bases achieve some level of synergy within shared installation management functions. Administrative synergy would include, for example, consolidating two custodial contracts under a single contract officer’s representative. In a more robust example, an Air Force colonel holds the garrison deputy commander position at Joint Base Lewis-McChord “to provide the Air Force point of view . . .” to include “filling traditional Army roles to augment the base commander.” The deputy commander is dual-hatted as commander of the 627th Air Base Group, which has two functions, one that includes deploying and supporting traditional Air Force training and missions, and the other that includes providing installation support services to the entire base. Approximately 85 percent of the Airmen of the 627th are “. . . embedded in the Army organizational structure to provide installation support working in public works, fire and emergency services, dining facilities, and equal opportunity and emergency management . . .” Thus, Joint Base Lewis-McChord demonstrates administrative synergy on the “installation support” side of the joint base, but not necessarily on the Army and Air Force “mission” side.
In an interview with a local newspaper, Hasberry recalled the smooth Army-Air Force working relationship during a January 2012 snow and ice storm that required months of cleanup and base road restoration. The storm “crippled the region” and caused extensive power outages at the base. Hasberry said the joint operation “provided an opportunity to improve communication across the installation.” Improved communications, however, may improve effectiveness of an operation, but is no guarantee of producing measurable cost savings.

Joint Base Lewis-McChord, therefore, demonstrates unity of effort in the dimension of administrative synergy, but not a fully integrated level that encompasses the installation support and primary mission sides of the base. This conclusion is consistent with the Secretary of Defense’s justification for joint basing, which indicated the intent for creating the 12 joint bases included maximizing administrative synergy within the installation support functions of the bases. Joint Base Lewis-McChord is representative of the joint bases; the bases tend to achieve unity of effort on the primarily on the installation support side of the base.

**The Dimension of Cultural Synergy.**

Organizational scholar John P. Kotter states that “anchoring culture” usually comes as the last step last in an organizational change, and that embedding change in culture is the most challenging step. Cultural synergy, therefore, requires additional nurturing if the DoD is to garner efficiencies from joint basing. This is particularly true when realizing that the military services may have natural skepticism about the concept of joint basing and its potential impact on service culture. Hasberry, the former deputy commander of Joint Base Lewis-McChord, once said that a “misconception” lingers that joint basing is designed to do away with service cultures, but she admonished this was
never the intent. Rather, the intent was to gain efficiencies and eliminate redundancies while providing support to everyone on the installation, regardless of “their uniform.”

If joint basing is to continue as a viable option in the future, DoD leadership would need to address the concerns of the military services, assuring them that the long march toward jointness does not mean a retreat from the vibrant individual service cultures and attributes. Thomas Donnelly, a defense and security policy analyst, defines “jointness” in a military construct as “…the separate service perspectives and prerogatives sublimated into a presumably superior synthesis and made subject to more centralized policy control.” Donnelly’s less positive word “sublimated” may help explain why individual military service officials have at times criticized joint basing and have perceived a threat to individual service culture and freedom of action.

This perceived threat is not new. Fleet Admiral William F. Halsey, Jr., successfully commanded joint forces in the South Pacific during World War II before promotion to Fleet Admiral, yet demonstrated fierce resistance to the joint concept when he testified at a Congressional hearing, saying:

I, for one, am unwilling to have the Chief of the Army Air forces pass on the question of whether or not the Navy should have funds for building and maintaining a balanced fleet. One might just as well ask a committee composed of a Protestant, a Catholic, and a Jew to save our national souls by recommending a national church and creed.

As if reading from Fleet Admiral Halsey’s playbook, Air Force generals in the joint basing planning stages expressed concern about potential harm to the Air Force from sublimation under Army and Navy leads on joint bases. An Air Force Magazine synopsis explains the Air Force leadership’s angst: “For the Air Force, the stakes are high. Joint bases, should they be improperly set up, may damage USAF’s combat power, morale, and retention.”
The worry about the dilution of service cultures, however, may prove unfounded.
In his *White Paper on the Profession of Arms*, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Dempsey defines jointness as inclusive of individual service cultures and attributes,
stating jointness is “a manifestation of strength from diversity.”\(^{115}\) He further writes that:
“Jointness is derived from the integration of service cultures and competencies, and
requires teamwork amongst all services and Military Departments to accomplish
objectives in the best interest of National security . . .”\(^{116}\)

Dempsey’s *White Paper* acknowledges that “Service cultures provide a source of
strength for honing their unique expertise and competencies.”\(^{117}\) Although his
statements provide assurance that the goal of jointness is not to subsume service
cultures, he also cautioned that “parochialism”\(^{118}\) is the antithesis of effective cross-
service jointness.

In short, jointness stems from cross-service unity of effort toward shared
objectives, while preserving unique service attributes and understanding that
parochialism (e.g., placing service equities above higher priority joint mission objectives)
goes too far. How, then, should senior leaders determine the appropriate level of joint
versus single-service operations in basing? Eisenhower once said, “I don’t believe any
of us is smart enough to lay out a blueprint for a perfect organization. I believe you have
to try something and correct a little, and try something else and correct it a little.”\(^{119}\) This
may prove sage advice for the future of joint basing.

A Framework to Categorize Levels of Jointness

To help senior leaders better envision jointness in basing and to assist with
basing decisions in the future, this paper proposes a simple framework depicting levels
of jointness, from 0 (inter-service cooperation) to 3 (maximum jointness). (See Figure
1). For example, Joint Base Lewis-McChord would fall into level 1 (minimum jointness) as a “Single-Service Lead” base. The framework is not meant to offer joint basing as a template for all DoD bases; such a goal would never pass an analysis for feasibility, acceptability, or suitability. On the contrary, an underlying assumption for the new framework is that the DoD requires an appropriate mix of:

- “Single-Service” bases to preserve and foster unique service attributes;
- “Partially” joint bases for efficiencies and moderate operational mission synergies;
- “Fully integrated” joint bases for maximum operational mission synergy in targeted high-priority joint force capability areas.

In using this framework, leaders should expect bases to evolve and fluctuate with levels of jointness over time as the strategic environment, required capabilities, and strategic approaches change. The bases should not be viewed as fixed, as some may view the current joint bases. The framework proposes seeing all DoD bases as existing somewhere along the spectrum of jointness. Leadership may use this framework to determine the existing level of jointness, the level of jointness desired, the gap between the existing and desired end state, and the strategy to close the gap.

The goal of this framework is not to encourage all bases to grow in jointness, or to eventually eliminate single-service bases altogether, but rather to provide a starting point for analysis. In making decisions on the appropriate mix of bases, leaders should note that individual military service flexibility diminishes as the base grows in the level of jointness, and vice versa. (See Figure 1).

Therefore, a service-unique capability that is more dependent on individual service culture may be more successfully nested at a single-service base, while service
capabilities that are more enhancing to—or enhanced by—joint interoperability and integration, may be better nested at a higher level joint base. The key is for leaders to view basing strategically and holistically as a force multiplier, rather than as inert or neutral infrastructure with interchangeable military units moved between bases at will, whether or not the units complement the missions on the base or comport with a grander long-term strategy.

The proposed levels include:

- Single-Service base (level 0) – A base under management control of one service, characterized by inter-service cooperation in accordance with DoD Instruction 4000.19;¹²¹

- Service-Lead Base (level 1) – Units and/or infrastructure, of more than one military service consolidated under a service lead, characterized by minimum dimensions of jointness (e.g., primarily administrative synergies within installation support functions);

![A Strategic Framework for Evaluating the Levels of Jointness in Basing](image)

**Figure 1. Levels of Jointness in Basing**

- Combination or Hybrid base (level 2) – Units of more than one military service stationed at a base designated as joint, characterized by moderate dimensions of jointness (e.g., joint C2 and some operational mission synergies, with efforts
underway to improve systems/process interoperability and cultural synergy over time);

- Integrated base (level 3) – Units of more than one military service stationed at a base, characterized by maximum dimensions of jointness.

Figure 2. Sample Characteristics at Varying Levels of Jointness

Figure 2 provides a depiction of some of the characteristics one might find at the different levels of jointness, while Table 3 provides an example of how leadership might apply both the dimensions and levels of jointness toward analyzing the 12 joint bases. Figures 3 through 6 provide notional examples of how base organizational structure might appear at the different levels of jointness. The 12 BRAC joint bases appear to fall into level I, “Minimum Jointness,” which is depicted approximately in Figure 4.
Figure 3. Example of a Single-Service Base Structure

Figure 4. Example of a Service-Lead Base Structure
Figure 5. Example of a Combination/Hybrid Base Structure

Figure 6. Example of an Integrated Base Structure
Table 3. Sample Analysis that Applies Dimensions and Levels of Jointness to Bases

<table>
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<tr>
<th>I. Dimensions of Jointness in Basing</th>
<th>II. Goal</th>
<th>III. Analysis of the Jointness Level Achieved by the 12 BRAC Joint Bases</th>
<th>IV. Rationale for Jointness Level determined in Column III.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Joint Command and Control (C²)       | Unity of Command | Inter-service Cooperation (Level 0) | • Joint Base Commander answers to his/her lead service.¹²³  
• Units/mission partners attached to separate services for C².  
• Joint Management Oversight Structure (JMOS) partially compensates for lack of unity of command, but only on the installation support side. |
| Mission Synergy                      | Unity of Effort | Between Inter-Service Cooperation and Minimum Jointness (Levels 0-1) | • Unit missions may not complement or synchronize with the primary base mission.¹²⁴  
• Unity of effort may not be achieved on the installation mission side, as unit missions may not complement each other.¹²⁵  
• Unity of effort achieved on installation support side.¹²⁶ |
| Systems and Process Integration      | Interoperability | Minimum Jointness (Levels 0 - 1) | • Individual unit systems and processes may not intersect or correspond.  
• Common Output Levels of Support (COLS)¹²⁷ partially helps to level the playing field, but only for common installation services, not unit missions.  
• Resources compete in individual service lead’s Planning Programming Budgeting Execution process.  
• Installation support functions funded and prioritized by lead service rather than by a Joint Forces Commander. |
| Administrative Synergy               | Efficiencies and Savings | Minimum Jointness (Level 1) | • Some installation support redundancies may be necessary for non-synergistic missions.  
• According to GAO report:¹²⁸  
  • “Lessons learned” not communicated well enough across the joint bases.  
  • Joint Bases on track for only 10% of expected savings. |
| Cultural Synergy                     | Social Connectivity | Minimum Jointness (Levels 0-1) | • For most joint bases, a hybrid culture is needed for taking advantage of synergies, while preserving service-specific cultures to avoid force “brittleness”¹²⁹  
• “Anchoring” change in culture comes last, after successes are achieved over time.¹³⁰  
• Services tend to resist jointness-related changes.¹³¹ |

Conclusion

Is it time to pull the plug on joint basing? The short answer is “no.” Instead, the Secretary of Defense should take a fresh and pragmatic look at joint basing. This paper
is meant to provide a starting point for further study and discussion. Significant opportunities exist for the use of basing, both single-service and joint, as a global joint force multiplier. However, the DoD cannot take full advantage of these opportunities unless leadership further develops the joint basing concept, structure, and strategy. At this crossroads between military conflicts and BRAC rounds, DoD may decide to seize the initiative, or allow joint basing to continue down the existing path that focuses primarily on administrative cost savings, and shedding of excess infrastructure, rather than focusing first on the strategic purpose of the bases and what they can do for the joint force in optimal configurations.

This review of the joint bases has shown that common boundaries and geographic proximity between two single-service bases alone is insufficient rationale to form a joint base. When considering whether to develop joint bases in the future, the DoD should contemplate the dimensions of jointness, as well as a geographical location or a joint basing center of gravity that best leverages mission synergies to fulfill joint force capabilities. Then, once a joint base’s foundation is properly settled in strategy, the mission synergies will likely lead to greater cost savings efficiencies with the application of best business practices.

Reframing the concept of joint basing should not be undertaken lightly. Leaders should strive for the right balance, without assuming maximum jointness is always the best path, nor assuming single-service structure is always the right answer. Leaders should proceed with caution, using strategic and systems thinking. The existing CONUS joint base design via BRAC 2005 establishes a minimal level of jointness, and this may indeed contribute to the inability of the bases to demonstrate expected cost savings.
Cost and energy efficiencies are vital and necessary goals, but the DoD cannot manage basing successfully without a holistic approach that takes into account the interplay between the dimensions of jointness. Striving for a portion of one dimension as the gold standard—installation support administrative synergy—will lead to disappointing results. The DoD must consider all components of the base and all dimensions of jointness, along with broader strategy, planning and forethought. With DoD requesting another BRAC round for 2017, the ideal time is now to further develop the concept of jointness in basing to underpin a new global basing strategy.

Endnotes

1 Single Service Base - A base that contains forces primarily from one Service and where the base’s primary mission is under the control of that same Service. Base commanders of these bases are normally designated by the Service component commander. See U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Security Operations in Theater, Joint Publication 3-10 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, February 3, 2010), II-12.


5 Force Multiplier — A capability that, when added to and employed by a combat force, significantly increases the combat potential of that force and thus enhances the probability of successful mission accomplishment. See U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, DoD Dictionary of Military Terms, Joint Publication 1-02 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 08 November 2010, as amended through 15 February 2014), 100.

6 General Martin E. Dempsey, U.S. Army, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020, (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff,

7Ibid., 1.


11Ibid., 3.

12Jablonsky, 56.


14Ibid., 2-11.


20Ibid., 9.

21Ibid., 27.

22Ibid., 9.


Jeffry K. McNeely, Joint-Basing Funding, Research Report (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air War College Air University, February 17, 2010), 21.


Ibid., 1.

Ibid., iii.

In addition to Chairman Anthony J. Principi, the BRAC 2005 Commissioners signing the report included James H. Bilbray; ADM Harold W. Gehman Jr., USN (Ret); GEN James T. Hill, USA (Ret); Samuel K. Skinner; Philip E. Coyle III; James V. Hansen; Gen. Lloyd W. “Fig” Newton, USAF (Ret); and Brig. Gen. Sue Ellen Turner, USAF (Ret). See Principi, 2005 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission Report to the President, 1.

Principi, 2005 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission Report to the President, 221, iii.

Ibid., iii.


Reset – A balanced 6–month process that systematically restores deployed units to a level of personnel and equipment readiness that permits resumption of collective training. Reset encompasses those tasks required to reintegrate Soldiers and Families, then organize, man,


39Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) is the Army’s vision for providing combatant commanders with “versatile, responsive, and consistently available Army forces.” RAF will meet combatant commanders’ requirements for units and capabilities to support operational missions, bilateral and multilateral military exercises, and theater security cooperation activities. See John M. McHugh, Secretary of the Army, and General Raymond T. Odierno, Chief of Staff Army, Statement before the *Committee on Army Services United States House of Representatives*, 113th Cong., 2nd sess., *On the Posture of the United States Army*, March 25, 2014, http://www.army.mil/standto/archive_2014-03-26/ (accessed April 2, 2014).


42Ibid., 1.

43Joint Doctrine – Fundamental principles that guide the employment of US military forces in coordinated action toward a common objective. Joint doctrine contained in joint publications also includes terms, tactics, techniques, and procedures. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application. See U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *DoD Dictionary of Military Terms*, Joint Publication 1-02 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 08 November 2010, as amended through 15 February 2014), 141.

44Forward Operations Base — In special operations, a base usually located in friendly territory or afloat that is established to extend command and control or communications or to provide support for training and tactical operations. Facilities may be established for temporary or longer duration operations and may include an airfield or an unimproved airstrip, an anchorage, or a pier. See U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *DoD Dictionary of Military Terms*, Joint Publication 1-02 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 08 November 2010, as amended through 15 February 2014), 104.
Forward Operating Site — A scaleable location outside the United States and US territories intended for rotational use by operating forces. Such expandable “warm facilities” may be maintained with a limited US military support presence and possibly pre-positioned equipment. Forward operating sites support rotational rather than permanently stationed forces and are a focus for bilateral and regional training. See U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, DoD Dictionary of Military Terms, Joint Publication 1-02 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 08 November 2010, as amended through 15 February 2014), 104-105.

Main Operating Base — A facility outside the United States and US territories with permanently stationed operating forces and robust infrastructure. Main operating bases are characterized by command and control structures, enduring family support facilities, and strengthened force protection measures. See U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, DoD Dictionary of Military Terms, Joint Publication 1-02 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 08 November 2010, as amended through 15 February 2014), 163.


Deputy Undersecretary of Defense (Installations and Environment) Dorothy Robyn, “Modification to the Joint Basing Implementation Guidance (JBig),” memorandum for DoD and


60. Jablonsky, 105.


63. Mission Partner – The term refers to the supported units on the joint base.


Ibid., 4.

The approach includes, as an example for an Army-led base, a single-Service garrison commander serving as a “joint” garrison commander, with a sister Service deputy garrison commander. See Robyn, *Joint Base Implementation Guidance*.


Ibid., F-1.

Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, V-1.

For the purposes of this discussion, the installation support area consists of the municipal services, public works, infrastructure support, security, and other common functions that form the backbone of an installation, while the mission area of the base consist of the assigned operational functions of the units stationed on the base (e.g., units may have missions assigned such as criminal investigation, military intelligence, air mobility, infantry, artillery, etc.). The installation support services and unit missions generally form two “sides” of an installation that together form a whole.


Ibid., 30.

Ibid., 30.


Ibid.


The Secretary of Defense’s Justification gave no indication that consolidating the bases would boost “jointness” or improve the DoD’s ability to support the Joint Force 2020 vision through increased joint training opportunities or wargaming. The justification did not mention operational mission synergy between the affected units, or the challenges the consolidated bases might find in trying to reduce supporting structure for non-synergistic unit missions. See Principi, 219-220.

The JBIG emphasizes efficiencies and savings throughout the introductory sections. Almost as an afterthought, the guidance mentions the warfighting missions of affected units, but only in the context of making sure mission capabilities are protected or improved while saving money:

While enabling the Department to identify, capture, and continue significant savings through consolidation thus freeing resources for other priorities, Joint Basing implementation will allow flexibility to consider the best business practices and ensure that warfighting capabilities are preserved or enhanced. (italics added for emphasis) See Robyn, JBIG, 2.


According to the GAO: DoD is one of the largest and most complex organizations in the world. For fiscal year 2012, the budget requested for the department was approximately $671 billion—$553 billion in discretionary budget authority and $118 billion to support overseas contingency operations. To support its operations, DoD performs an assortment of interrelated and interdependent business functions, such as logistics, procurement, health care, and financial management. As we have previously reported, the DoD systems environment that supports these business functions has been overly complex and error prone, characterized by (1) little standardization across the department, (2) multiple systems performing the same tasks,


94The DoD Base Structure Report shows the joint bases as “Active Army,” “Active Air Force” or “Active Navy,” in accordance with the military Service that has the “lead” or supporting role for the joint base, rather than as a “Joint Base” with ownership by a Joint Forces Commander or DoD agency. For example, the Base Structure Report lists the former Fort Dix in New Jersey as an “Active Air Force base;” Fort Story as an “Active Navy” base; and Fort Eustis as an “Active Air Force” base. See 2013 DoD Base Structure Report, 4.

95Robyn, JBIG, 3.

96Ibid, 8.

97The military Services include joint base resourcing requirements in their individual Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) processes to compete for resources among military Service requirements. See Robyn, Joint Basing Implementation Guidance, 6.

98Ibid., 10.

99The BRAC Commission addressed factor 1—lack of similar processes—in its findings, stating: The Commission concurs with the…(GAO) that DoD needs an analytic process for developing BOS requirements. Also, while each military service has standards, there are no DoD-wide standards for common support functions. See Principi, 2005 Base Realignment and Closure Report, 221.

100In his research, McNeely came to the conclusion that the enforcement of higher COLS standards actually contributes to the lack of savings realized by the joint bases. He concluded: New multi-Service requirements for Common Output Levels of Service for base support services added over 1,000 new civilian billets and additional Base Operating Support costs. New organization structures added overhead requirements. The net result was the originally predicted SAVINGS will become overall cost INCREASES. Unless the baseline criterion is changed, the Services will have to source additional manpower and funds to support the Joint-Basing initiative at the expense of other installations. See McNeely, Joint-Basing Funding, 21.


102Ibid., 221.
Robyn, JBIG, 6

Smith, “Profile Hasberry: there from joint base beginnings, Deputy commander reflects on time here.”

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

The SECDEF justification states: Because these installations share a common boundary with minimal distances between the major facilities or are in near proximity, there is significant opportunity to reduce duplication of efforts with resulting reduction of overall manpower and facilities requirements capable of generating savings, which will be realized by paring unnecessary management personnel and achieving greater efficiencies through economies of scale. See Principi, 2005 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission Report to the President, 220.


Smith, “Profile Hasberry: there from joint base beginnings.”


Ibid., 5.

Ibid., 5.

Ibid., 5.

Jablonsky, 221.

DoD Instruction 4000.19, “Support Agreements,” provides instructions for single-Service bases hosting tenants of other military services. Support provided is normally reimbursable for incremental direct support costs.

This analysis may be performed in greater detail for an individual base. This table analyzes the 12 joint bases collectively for demonstration of the framework.


Some shared military activities are less joint than are “common;” …“common” simply means mutual, shared, or overlapping capabilities or activities between two or more Services. See Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, I-2.

Smith, “Profile Hasberry: there from joint base beginnings.”


Locher, *Victory on the Potomac*, 195.

Hagel, *2014 Quadrennial Defense Review*, VI.
