This Strategic Studies Institute book provides a comprehensive research guide to radical Islamist English-language online magazines, eBooks, and assorted radical Islamist news magazines, reports, and pocketbooks published between April-May 2007 and November 2016, and generates strategic insights and policy response options.
Ambassador Daniel H. Simpson addresses the question of U.S. interests in Africa and past, present, and future U.S. policy toward that continent of more than 50 countries and 800 million people on an analytic basis, followed by clear recommendations. His presentation of U.S. strategic interests in Africa permits clear analysis of the present and logical planning of future policy and actions. His message, in addition to being an introspective examination of U.S. policy, is forward-looking. He seeks to lay the basis for a long-term, sustainable U.S. policy toward Africa based on both solid economic and commercial concerns--Africa as a supplier and a market--and on the real cultural ties that link what is core to America and the people of the African continent.
Rwanda's horrific civil war suggests that human disasters requiring outside intervention will remain common in Sub-Saharan Africa. The American people want a prompt and effective response to human disasters when the United States becomes involved. The Army is taking steps to enhance its demonstrated effectiveness at such operations. Steven Metz examines the policy and strategy implications of violence-induced human disasters in Sub-Saharan Africa with special emphasis on Rwanda. The author argues that our senior military leaders, policymakers and strategists must better understand the African security environment. He also warns that to avoid overtaxing the military, U.S. objectives in African disaster relief must be limited. This combination of limited policy goals and operational efficiency will allow the U.S. military to serve public demands at a minimal cost to its other efforts.
In October 1994, the Strategic Studies Institute sponsored a roundtable on democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa. Particular attention was paid to the role the U.S. military and Department of Defense played in democracy support. This study developed from a paper presented at the roundtable. Dr. Butts and Dr. Metz reject the notion that the political culture of African states allows or even encourages military intervention in politics. Drawing on case studies from Nigeria and South Africa, they contend that if the fragile democracies in Sub-Saharan Africa are to be sustained, African militaries must be extricated from politics and take decisive steps toward the type of military professionalism seen in stable democracies around the world. U.S. national interests in Sub-Saharan Africa are so limited that the region will receive only a very small proportion of the human, political, military, and economic resources devoted to American national security strategy. This makes efficiency imperative. Dr. Butts and Dr. Metz argue that if U.S. strategic resources are used wisely in Africa, they can have the desired effect. In particular, the U.S. military can play an important part in helping African militaries professionalize. They close with concrete proposals through which the U.S. Department of Defense and the Army could more effectively support African democratization.
U.S. foreign policy in Sub-Saharan Africa seeks stability, democracy, and economic development. Despite recent positive trends, it is clear that not all African countries will move in this direction; some will sink into greater violence and misery. In the central part of the continent, Zaire is the linchpin. Because of its great size and natural wealth, Zaire has the ability to serve as either the locomotive of development or an agent of destabilization. If Zaire collapses, the U.S. Army may become involved in a major humanitarian relief operation. On the other hand, if Zaire succeeds at political reform and democratization, the Army may be tasked to reinvigorate military-to-military contacts. This study is designed to offer Army planners and leaders an understanding of the current crisis in Zaire and provide recommendations on future U.S. policy and Army activities.
Lieutenant Colonel C. William Fox, Jr., a physician who has had extensive experience in U.S. activities in Africa over the past two decades, has personally supervised operations that have considerable potential as models for future regional involvement. In this publication, he offers a rationale and vision for future DoD activities in Africa. His account also serves to remind us that substantial strategic benefits can accrue to the United States even from small, tailored teams deployed under creative, energetic leaders.
Helping Africans develop a capability to avoid or solve their region's security problems has reemerged recently as an important goal of American strategy, and the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) is its centerpiece. Based on their testimony presented to the Africa Subcommittee of the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on International Relations, this study by Dr. Steven Metz and Colonel Dan Henk of the U.S. Army War College examines the ACRI. Significantly, it does so by placing the ACRI in a wider, long-term strategic context.
June 27, 1990, is a significant date in the recent history of Mali. It marks the beginning of what Malians call "The Second Tuareg Rebellion." The first had been staged against the post-colonial Malian government in 1963. The national government had suppressed that rebellion with harsh coercive measures, and the Tuaregs continued to nurture grievances. The second Tuareg rebellion coincided in the early 1990s with turbulent political developments in Malian society as a whole. It soon was clear that Mali's stability and progress were contingent on ending the insurgency. This, in turn, required a solution to Tuareg grievances. By the mid-1990s, Mali apparently had found a solution. Though by no means easy, or assured, that solution may provide useful insights into conflict resolution in the region as a whole. This study describes the nature of the Malian solution and indicates the reasons for its success to date. More specifically, this study considers the Tuareg rebellion from the perspective of a senior Malian military officer who lived the events. It describes a conflict little known and poorly reported outside of West Africa. It emphasizes the trauma of conflict in developing societies and the excruciatingly difficult political and economic choices faced by their leaders. It highlights the appropriate role of the international community in resolving such conflicts. Finally, it illustrates that resolution of intra-state conflict in Africa requires intensive efforts to secure the willing cooperation of local communities with military and civil government agencies.
Operation UNITED ASSISTANCE (OUA), which deployed to Liberia between September 2014 and June 2015, provides an example of how a Joint Force can support a lead federal agency (LFA), in this case the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and other interagency and international partners to end a raging epidemic of Ebola Virus Disease (EVD). This EVD outbreak began in late 2013, when Emile Ouamouno, a two year old from Meliandou, a village in Guinea, close to the border with Liberia and Sierra Leone, died of a hemorrhagic fever.1 Soon after, many of his relatives and their connections, who lived across the region, also became ill and died. In March 2014, a team from the Institut Pasteur in France confirmed that the hemorrhagic fever spreading through the region was EVD. By then, more than 2,400 people had died from the disease. By the time the epidemic ended, in Liberia alone, 15,227 cases of EVD had been confirmed through laboratory tests and 11,310 people had died.
The idea to deny sanctuary to terrorist groups lies at the heart of contemporary U.S. counterterrorism strategy. Violent extremist organizations in North Africa, most notably the group al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), have used remote and sparsely populated areas in the Sahara for protection from security forces to perform a range of activities such as training, planning, and logistics in order to conduct terrorist operations like kidnapping, murder, and bombing. Even after 16 years since the September 11 attacks and the resources dedicated to efforts to deny sanctuary, the concept of sanctuary remains largely unexplored. To deny sanctuary requires an understanding of what sanctuary is as an object and how sanctuary is used by terrorist organizations. This monograph proposes a functional understanding of sanctuary and offers fresh ideas to control sanctuary using a detailed case study of the most notorious of the North African terrorists, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, from his arrival to Mali in the late 1990s until the French intervention in early 2012. This multi-disciplinary inquiry utilizes a wide range of open-source documents as well as anthropological, sociological, and political science research, including interviews with one-time Belmokhtar hostage, Ambassador Robert Fowler, in order to construct a picture of what a day in the life of sanctuary-seeking terrorists is like. Belmokhtar and other violent groups remain active and at large in the Sahara in spite of a large French military presence, a small U.S. military presence, and local security forces conducting counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations. Additionally, the Islamic State movement could be viewed as the emergence of mega sanctuaries for terrorists and other violent extremist organizations. These threats require a new strategy to isolate, contain, or defeat terrorists and violent extremists in their sanctuary areas.