Army War College Publication Repository      Total Publications 2092


Editor: Dr Antulio J Echevarria II

Published: November 2017

FEATURES: Special Commentary. Limits of Negative Peace, Faces of Positive Peace — Patricia M. Shields. A Wake for Counterinsurgency? Abandoning Counterinsurgency: Reviving Antiterrorism Strategy—Steven Metz. Insurgent Defectors in Counterinsurgencies—Jacqueline L. Hazelton. War among (& for) the People. Rethinking NATO Policy on the Protection of Civilians—Sten Rynning. Military Force and Mass Migration in Europe—Matthew N. Metzel and John M. Lorenzen. War and Social Perception. Casualties of Their Own Success: The 2011 Urination Incident in Afghanistan—Paolo G. Tripodi and David M. Todd. Third-Force Influences: Hollywood’s War Films—John Chapin, Marissa Mendoza- Burcham, and Mari Pierce. Army Expansibility. Expanding Brigade Combat Teams: Is the Training Base Adequate?—Esli T. Pitts. Rapid Expansion and the Army’s Matériel: Is There Enough?—Robb C. Mitchell.


Author: USAWC Strategic Studies Institute

Published: November 2017

The United States Army War College is seeking a Director of Strategic Studies Institute and USAWC Press. Serve as Director, Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) and U.S. Army War College Press, a major subordinate element of the U.S. Army War College (USAWC) consisting of a research department of civilian and military Ph.D. level research professors and strategic analysts, the USAWC Press comprised of the "Parameters" Branch, Production Branch, and the Student Publications Branch; an Academic Engagement Directorate, and the USAWC Fellows and CSA Senior Army Fellows Department. Ensures the preparation and publication of high-quality, timely and concise strategic studies of key national security issues, military strategy, joint and combined theater operations, the nature of land warfare, and matters affecting the Army's future. Manages the Army's Academic Engagement Program. Executes strategic research taskings from and develops issues for Headquarters, Department of the Army and the Commandant of the USAWC. Chairs the USAWC Research and Publication Board, facilitating research and publication throughout the USAWC. Administers the USAWC's Faculty Research Grant Program and External Research Associates Program. For complete details and information on how to apply, please visit USAJOBS online through the following link https://www.usajobs.gov/GetJob/ViewDetails/484727900


Editor: COL Todd E. Key

Published: November 2017

For over a decade, the USAWC has published the annual Key Strategic Issues List (KSIL) to inform students, faculty, and external research associates of strategic topics requiring research and analysis. Part I of the Academic Year (AY) 2018 KSIL, referred to as the Chief of Staff of the Army Special Interest Topics, consists of critical topics demanding special attention. A subset of these topics will be addressed by the USAWC as Integrated Research Projects. Part II: Army Priorities for Strategic Analysis, has been developed by the U.S. Army War College in coordination with Headquarters Department of the Army (HQDA) and Major Commands throughout the Army. The KSIL will help prioritize strategic research and analysis conducted by USAWC students and faculty, USAWC Fellows, and external researchers, to link their research efforts and results more effectively to the Army’s highest priority topics.


Author: Dr Robert J Bunker

Published: November 2017

Armed robotic systems—drones and droids—now emerging on the battlefield portend new strategic realities not only for U.S. forces but also for our allies and future potential belligerents. Numerous questions of immediate warfighting importance come to mind with the fielding of these drones and droids that are viewed as still being in their experimental and entrepreneurial stage of development. By drawing upon historical weapons systems life cycles case studies, focusing on the early 9th through the mid-16th-century knight, the mid-19th through the later 20th-century battleship, and the early 20th through the early 21st-century tank, the monograph provides military historical context related to their emergence, and better allows both for questions related to warfighting to be addressed, and policy recommendations related to them to be initially provided.


Author: Mr Jeffrey L Caton

Published: November 2017

In 2011, the Department of Defense (DoD) released its Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace, which officially recognized cyberspace as an operational domain akin to the traditional military domains of land, sea, air, and space. This monograph examines the 2015 DoD Cyber Strategy to evaluate how well its five strategic goals and associated implementation objectives define an actionable strategy to achieve three primary missions in cyberspace: defend the DoD network, defend the United States and its interests, and develop cyber capabilities to support military operations. This monograph focuses on events and documents from the period of about 1 year before and 1 year after the 2015 strategy was released. This allows sufficient time to examine the key policies and guidance that influenced the development of the strategy as well as follow-on activities for the impacts from the strategy. This inquiry has five major sections that utilize different frameworks of analysis to assess the strategy:
1. Prima Facie Analysis: What is its stated purpose and key messages?
2.  Historical Context Analysis: What unique contributions does it introduce into the evolution of national security cyberspace activities?
3.  Traditional Strategy Analysis: Does it properly address specific DoD needs as well as broader U.S. ends in a way that is appropriate and actionable?
4.  Analysis of Subsequent DoD Action: How are major military cyberspace components—joint and Service—planning to implement these goals and objectives?
5.  Whole of U.S. Government Analysis: Does it integrate with the cyberspace-related activities of other U.S. Government departments and agencies?
The monograph concludes with a section that integrates the individual section findings and offers recommendations to improve future cyberspace strategic planning documents.


Author: LTC Joseph C. Guido

Published: November 2017

The idea to deny sanctuary to terrorist groups lies at the heart of contemporary U.S. counterterrorism strategy. Violent extremist organizations in North Africa, most notably the group al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), have used remote and sparsely populated areas in the Sahara for protection from security forces to perform a range of activities such as training, planning, and logistics in order to conduct terrorist operations like kidnapping, murder, and bombing. Even after 16 years since the September 11 attacks and the resources dedicated to efforts to deny sanctuary, the concept of sanctuary remains largely unexplored. To deny sanctuary requires an understanding of what sanctuary is as an object and how sanctuary is used by terrorist organizations. This monograph proposes a functional understanding of sanctuary and offers fresh ideas to control sanctuary using a detailed case study of the most notorious of the North African terrorists, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, from his arrival to Mali in the late 1990s until the French intervention in early 2012. This multi-disciplinary inquiry utilizes a wide range of open-source documents as well as anthropological, sociological, and political science research, including interviews with one-time Belmokhtar hostage, Ambassador Robert Fowler, in order to construct a picture of what a day in the life of sanctuary-seeking terrorists is like. Belmokhtar and other violent groups remain active and at large in the Sahara in spite of a large French military presence, a small U.S. military presence, and local security forces conducting counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations. Additionally, the Islamic State movement could be viewed as the emergence of mega sanctuaries for terrorists and other violent extremist organizations. These threats require a new strategy to isolate, contain, or defeat terrorists and violent extremists in their sanctuary areas.


Editor: Mr Samuel R White Jr

Published: October 2017

The Defense Innovation Initiative (DII), begun in November 2014 by former Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, is intended to ensure U.S. military superiority throughout the 21st century. The DII seeks broad-based innovation across the spectrum of concepts, research and development, capabilities, leader development, wargaming, and business practices. An essential component of the DII is the Third Offset Strategy—a plan for overcoming (offsetting) adversary parity or advantage, reduced military force structure, and declining technological superiority in an era of great power competition.
This study explored the implications for the Army of Third Offset innovations and breakthrough capabilities for the operating environment of 2035-2050. It focused less on debating the merits or feasibility of individual technologies and more on understanding the implications—the second and third order effects on the Army that must be anticipated ahead of the breakthrough.


Author: BRIG GEN Azhar Abbasi

Published: October 2017

South Asia is a pivotal region of over 1.5 billion people where the risk of nuclear war may be increasing. After three previous conventional wars, the nuclear armament of both Pakistan and India has served to deter conflict; but also brought about a shift in strategies. In an effort to overcome the current standoff, India has continued to invest billions of dollars to increase its conventional forces, searched for ways in which to capitalize on its conventional military advantage, and circumvent possible Pakistani nuclear response. India’s adoption of the so-called Cold Start Doctrine (CSD) or Pro-Active Strategy is designed to exploit India’s conventional advantage and preclude possible Pakistani first use. The adoption and possible implementation of CSD portends increased regional tension and possible disastrous consequences. CSD presupposes a wide range of spurious assumptions regarding international, domestic and Pakistani reactions. Similar to the German Schlieffen Plan, Indian strategists have settled on what assumptions they need to make their conventional forces relevant vice what they actually expect to occur. This paper examines the regional context, assesses the factors influencing the adoption of CSD, postulates the possible implications of the strategy on regional security and offers a plausible way forward for regional stability


Author: BRIG GEN Ahmad Nasir Abd Rahman

Published: October 2017

Recent development in the South China Sea (SCS) indicated some positive headway or “silver lining” that brings hope back to the peaceful resolution of the disputes. Amidst all of its aggressive actions, China has nevertheless repeatedly made statements for peaceful resolution and offered a two track approach for China and ASEAN nations for joint management and development activities. ASEAN and its claimants should not miss this window of opportunity opened by China. Using the “ASEAN Way” concept, ASEAN claimants should resolve their overlapping EEZ disputes first before engaging China. Proceeding for arbitration under international law as provided by UNCLOS should only be used as a last resort to contain China to overcome negotiations deadlock. Meanwhile, US military presence is still regarded as guarantor to the region’s peace and stability. The “silver lining” is achievable and the Chinese gesture is a positive indicator that will allow cooperation through diplomacy to forge ahead towards the attainment of regional peace and stability.


Author: LTC Jason P. Affolder

Published: October 2017

This paper reviews Department of Defense and U.S. Army policies, strategies and emerging concepts to discern operational energy and logistics implications to determine if it is possible to reduce our logistics footprint while improving mobility and lethality in the future way the Army will fight. The paper explores and recommends energy-related contingency basing and mobility alternatives (ways) for deployed operations supporting the end of accomplishing the mission by making optimal use of available resources with the lowest possible logistics footprint. The paper recommends several doctrinal, training, organizational and material changes to support improved energy efficiency and combat capability. The paper concludes that it is possible to reduce the logistics footprint while improving combat capability and suggests that a robust operational energy effort is vital to supporting our national interests in the anticipated strategic environment of the future. Leaders must understand the paradox that we become more lethal and survivable when we become more fuel efficient and shift funds appropriately; shrinking the tail through efficiency gains in the tooth enables greater spending on the tooth.


Author: LTC Esther J. Aguigui

Published: October 2017

The research provided in this paper examines the Philippines, China and United States interests in the South China Sea. It presents a challenging question: Given the complexities of the Philippines-China maritime tensions in the South China Sea, how can the US maintain its alliance with the Philippines while avoiding a conflict with China in the Philippine-China maritime dispute in the region? It unfolds the longstanding Philippines-China maritime dispute and proposes possible diplomatic and legal settlements. The analysis will show that America can maintain security in the SCS in three ways: by supporting a new Philippines-China relationship, by empowering the Association of Southeast Asian Nations as a collective security body, and by maintaining a productive relationship with China. Finally, it offers recommendations for the US to strengthen its alliance with the Philippines and to build a partnership with China to achieve America’s strategic goals in the region.


Author: COL Stephanie Ahern

Published: October 2017

In Crimea, Donbass, Aleppo, and over the English Channel, Russia is using its still-modernizing military to (re)gain territory, secure geopolitical access and influence, convey geopolitical strength domestically and internationally, and test the political resolve of others. While the Russians pose a real military threat to the United States and many European countries, the U.S. Army should ensure it prepares against Russian – and not Soviet – forces. This paper builds on tactical and operational analyses of how Russians approach war against a competing power to outline strategic implications for the U.S. Army. The paper concludes that understanding how Russians approach war, while keeping Russian successes and problems in context, will allow U.S. leaders to pursue military and political policies that maintain respect for this resurgent Russian power without overestimating Russia’s military capabilities.


Author: COL Scott T. Allen

Published: October 2017

During World War II the U.S. Army developed an initial military training (IMT) System that was responsible for preparing over two and a half million soldiers for service. Within the military element of national power, trained men and women establish the foundation upon which the Army builds and sustains the means of strategy. As such, the process of inducting civilians and training them to a level where they can seamlessly integrate – and meaningfully contribute – to a tactical unit is an issue of strategic import. Examining the doctrine, organization, training methods, material, leadership, personnel, and facilities employed by U.S. Army in WWII to execute initial military training yields several important lessons. Additionally, it exposes tensions that when left unaddressed created turmoil in the system, forcing the U.S. Army to adopt less than optimal measures in individual training and replacement operations. These tensions revolved around decisions concerning course length, training unit organization, and levels of occupational specialization and expertise. However, the Army can avoid many of these tensions by making changes to contemporary policies related to facilities, force design, and personnel actions.


Author: Lt Col Michael F. Arnone

Published: October 2017

The United States must leverage all elements of national power with an emphases on the countries of Vietnam, Indonesia, and Malaysia to blunt Chinese expansion within the South China Sea. Specifically, China must cease their destabilizing actives, be brought into compliance with the international rules based order, and become a partner for stability and continued economic development within the region. To accomplish this, the United States must set conditions through diplomatic efforts, an information campaign, cooperative military engagements, and economic agreements to facilitate the establishment of a cooperative framework that reduces tensions within the South China Sea.


Author: BRIG GEN Nadeem Ashraf

Published: October 2017

Global dynamics have increased the number, variety and lethality of potential adversaries to include enabling powerful non-state entities. A wide range of non-state actors are acting in consonance with and opposition to traditional nation states in disrupting commerce, seizing resources, threatening security and coercing and undermining governments. Correspondingly, traditional nation states are conducting subversive activities, attempting to avoid attribution and potential retribution, while expanding territory and influence through coercion and provocations short of war. This so-called “Hybrid Warfare” context is emerging with on-going conflicts in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, Africa, the South China Sea and South Asia. This paper examines the key aspects of hybrid warfare, assesses the various uses of the term and arrives at a definition applicable to its whole-of-government context. Next, it assesses the projected vision of the future strategic environment using the US Joint Chiefs Staff’s ‘Joint Operating Environment 2035’ that projects the future conditions relevant to the changing character of war. The paper then proposes a conceptual framework for both analyzing “hybrid war” and for formulating effective stratagems to prevail in those conflicts. It concludes by identifying some essential measures needed to successfully implement hybrid war stratagems.


Author: LT COL Artem Avdalyan

Published: October 2017

The dissolution of the former Soviet Union did not result in the long-desired and internationally recognized self-determination and independence for the region and the people of Artsakh. Artsakh formally used the constitution of the Soviet Union to declare its independence and Azerbaijan utilized the same legal framework when it became an independent republic. However, the resulting Nagorno-Karabakh armed conflict involved Artsakh’s Armenian ethnic population, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. This armed conflict has not formally ended and regularly flares up with low intensity border incidents or more serious military incursions (e.g., the April 2016 “four-day war”), with consequent military and civilian losses. Azerbaijan, an oil-rich but autocratically ruled state, has utilized its oil wealth to dramatically increase its defense expenditures and arms purchases without, however, acquiring the capacity to impose a “military solution” to this ongoing crisis. Azerbaijan has also utilized the Nagorno-Karabakh crisis as a justification for its own domestic politics and as an excuse to avoid meaningful settlement negotiations. Because this crisis involves the interests of multiple actors, e.g., Armenia, Azerbaijan, Russia, Turkey, its peaceful and permanent settlement will serve multiple interests especially economic ones. Past international precedent and U.S. involvement can play a constructive role in this regard.


Author: LTC Richard R. Balestri

Published: October 2017

The tumultuous events of 1979, including the Iranian attack on the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, provided an ominous backdrop for President Jimmy Carter’s January 1980 State of the Union Address. A portion of this speech became known as the Carter Doctrine and signaled to the world that America considered the Persian Gulf region a vital interest and if threatened, would employ all instruments of national power to defend it. During the past four decades, the Carter Doctrine and the associated U.S. military presence in the Arabian (Persian) Gulf region have impacted the American enduring interests of security, economic prosperity, values, and international order to varying degrees. Additionally, the implementation of the Carter Doctrine created an environment conducive to the large-scale export of petroleum from the Arabian Gulf to its most oil-dependent customers: China, Japan, India, and South Korea. A significant incongruence exists between America’s role as the Arabian Gulf’s de facto security guarantor and its low level of reliance on oil from this region. A revised Carter Doctrine proposes that security commitments in the Arabian Gulf are proportional to the economic benefit both exporting and importing countries derive from this security.


Author: COL James Bartholomees

Published: October 2017

As the United States and European nations contend with rising Russian aggression, we are faced with a significant Russian information campaign designed to question western liberal values and portray Russia as the saviors of Eurasia. In order to rise above the chatter and create a clear, consistent imperative, the US should insist that Russia respect the sovereignty of its neighbors. Focusing on independent nation states prospering in liberal institutions of their choice, the US should work with its allies to counter the most egregious cases of Russian disinformation, while seeking to allay Russian fears by publicly rejecting any attempt to destabilize their government and domestic society. This paper will outline a renewed US narrative to support diplomatic, military, economic and informational messages for the benefit of joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multi-national execution across all domains. The goal of the US narrative change is to realistically address Russian aggression with a clear, united message while leaving open conditional invitations for Russia to enter existing European economic institutions.


Author: COL John C. Becking

Published: October 2017

This paper examines the conflict of Constitutionally established state sovereignty and disaster response primacy with the broad federal authority to respond proactively to disasters. This paper examines the legal framework and historical examples that undergird this conflict for Title X forces in disaster response. The author suggests a decision-making framework to guide the federal government in determining when to respond proactively to disasters with Title X forces. This framework consists of three principles to inform a proactive federal response and eight disaster characteristics that support a proactive federal response. The author concludes with four additional state implications that the federal government should consider.


Author: COL Leslie D. Begley

Published: October 2017

In today’s environment of budgetary restraints and an eroding technological edge over its enemies and near peer competitors, the Army is in need of capabilities that spawn innovation and gain efficiencies to improve Soldier and unit readiness. Additive manufacturing is an emerging technology that the Army can leverage to enable innovation and address readiness concerns. Due to the wide-range of applications, from strategic-level research and development to tactical level unit-sustainment functions, additive manufacturing stands as a promising technology to produce the greatest overall impact for the Army. This paper will provide a brief introduction of various additive manufacturing technologies, including types, capabilities and resources; examine how additives manufacturing can assist with maintaining a technological dominance through improvements in the acquisition process; provide possible applications for improving Soldier and unit readiness; and finally identify challenges that the Army must address in order to fully implement additive manufacturing technologies and distribute the capabilities throughout the force.


Author: LTC Marc E. Belscamper

Published: October 2017

Senior leaders from the three Army components – Active Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve – continue to engage in ethical misconduct despite years of experience, knowledge, education, and training. Though ethical misconduct occurs at all levels of leadership amid uniformed and civilian members of the Army Total Force, this paper focuses on this unique group of uniformed senior leaders and the prevalent ethical violations, both perceived and substantiated, between the three Army components. The intent is to look at this unacceptable problem with a balanced approach to determine if the unique cultures of the three components influence ethical misconduct or if there is a systemic Army problem among senior leaders. Using Department of the Army Inspector General data, the top three substantiated allegations against colonels and above are identified, the findings analyzed, and recommendations provided to help prevent future senior leader ethical misconduct and potential strategic implications for both the Army Total Force and the nation.


Author: COL Mark J. Berglund

Published: October 2017

This paper justifies the need and proposes a strategy to establish a Trainees, Transients, Holdees, and Students like account within the U.S. Army National Guard (ARNG) and outlines four key measures that would enable its successful implementation. First, the Army needs to identify the ‘critical’ capabilities and related ARNG organizations that are required early in the force flow or are essential for strategic success against the Four Plus One National Security Challenges; i.e., meets the contingency requirements and threats posed by Russia, China, North Korea and Iran, plus those for countering terrorism. Second, the ARNG should focus its management efforts on the identified ‘critical’ organizations and establish balanced ‘unit groupings of excellence’ of state forces, with the appropriate manning priorities, expertly distributed for over-strength/under-strength manning, collective training and state missions. Third, and in conjunction with the Associated Units Pilot Program, the Army should develop a resourcing strategy to apply additional ‘operations tempo’ resources to enable the ‘critical’ units to meet the postulated contingency requirements. Finally, the ARNG needs to rebalance its force structure across the 54 States, Territories and the District of Columbia to address the existing underlying manning challenges.


Author: COL Michael J. Birmingham

Published: October 2017

ISIS and its predecessor, al-Qaeda, have proven difficult to defeat with any finality. Similarly, violent Salafist ideology has also proven to be resilient and increasingly attractive in numerous populations. In order to craft an effective strategy against these adversaries, we must think of them not simply as organizations, but rather as mass social movements. This paper examines the work of Eric Hoffer to gain better insight into the power and dynamics of mass movements. Many of Hoffer’s ideas can be operationalized to increase our chances of defeating ISIS and its confederates. Key elements of a strategy should include continued targeting of key leaders, dissemination of profiles of at risk individuals, the creation of an effective counter-narrative, and the deepening of civil society to provide competition for violent extremist mass movements. It is through a better understanding of mass movements that we can craft a better strategy for a durable victory.


Author: COL Bilbili Bitri

Published: October 2017

The fall of the Berlin Wall marked the beginning of a new era, an era of change for the world and without a doubt for Albania and its armed forces. Transformation via comprehensive reforms is the only way for Albania to keep up with change and embark on the ‘bandwagon’ of democratic countries. The western-oriented civil-military relations reforms are an important dimension of this transformation and, in many ways, have contributed to the Albanian armed forces’ transformation. Though the overall ‘picture’ of civil-military relations in the post-Cold War Albania at first glance looks good, a closer look would shed light on the real state of these relations. The argument is that Albanian civil-military relations today are merely a reflection of Albania’s overall state of democratic development. This paper will discuss the relevance of civil-military relations theory and its very limited tradition in Albania, the awkwardness of these relations in the communist regime, the emerging of a ‘hybrid’ form of civilian control of the military and the ongoing effort to fully democratize Albanian civil-military relations.


Author: COL James C. Bliss

Published: October 2017

The 1959 Antarctic Treaty System constructed on liberal ideals to address superpower tension and sovereignty claims was successful in the 20th Century, promoting global cooperation through scientific research and environmental protection. This system is redundant for the 21st Century geopolitical environment because realist nations, like China, seek to ascend to global leadership and secure resources to meet national objectives and sustain economic growth. China’s thirst for energy, rare earth minerals and marine resources point to future conflict with other treaty nations. Potential triggers to conflict with China in Antarctica include the dissolution of the Antarctic Treaty System; challenges to China’s rise; Chinese support to flagged vessels; militarization of bases; and exploitation of resources. The Antarctic Treaty System, to survive in the 21st Century, must adjust to address historical sovereignty claims, rising power national interests, representative leadership, and ensure robust international governance and norms. The U.S., as the hegemonic Antarctic power, must lead this transformation in order to ensure future security of this commons.


Author: CH (COL) James L. Boggess

Published: October 2017

Computers are becoming an ever-increasing part of the decision-making process. From managing data to help humans make informed decisions to decision support systems that develop and recommend or select courses of action, computer enhanced decision-making is already impacting the way America fights her wars. As computers carry more and more of the decision-making burden, humans are left to wrestle with the ethical and moral issues. The potential for psychological and moral injury remains and may even grow as a result of computer enhanced decision-making. As decision support systems make decision-making seem more like a game, humans will have less time and may be less likely to fully review courses of action for ethical and moral compatibility. In some instances, especially if collateral damage results in civilian casualties, the human “in, on, or over” the decision loop may feel personally responsible for the action and, as a result, find that their ethical and moral core has been violated, leading to psychological or moral injury. As the military continues to pursue artificial intelligence, automated, and autonomous systems, equal care must be taken to ensure these systems operate within approved ethical and moral boundaries and that their operators are properly trained in ethical decision-making.


Author: COL Remus H. Bondor

Published: October 2017

Russia's destabilizing actions and policies noticeably transformed the geopolitical environment in the region, bringing a threatening uncertainty about regional security arrangements. The purpose of this paper is to present Romania’s options in a strategic environment where Russia act more assertive and aggressive. It focuses on three areas. First, it explains what the historical roots of the perception that Russia is a threat for Romanians are. Second, the paper will explore the current European regional strategic environment and possible future evolutions in Southeastern Europe. Finally, it will present some options to enhance Romanian Armed Forces capabilities and increase their interoperability. These options allow the consolidation of national defense capacity and strengthen Romania’s profile within NATO and the EU.


Author: Lt Col Ralph E. Bordner

Published: October 2017

The increased use of small satellites, or smallsats, by both nation-state and non-nation-state actors violates the assumptions that current, internationally accepted space debris mitigation guidelines are based upon. Consequently, smallsats change the character and level of risk of on-orbit collisions. In an effort to preserve critical orbital regimes, this paper posits that the U.S. should define near-term, smallsat design and operational best practices to be used as a basis for U.S. policy, leadership and international cooperation. To establish an initial set of best practices, the U.S. should leverage the histories of naval, air and space international norm and law development, as well as current and near-term technical capabilities. U.S. policy and international involvement is the best way to steer space community practices and eventual international law, and the strongest evidence for this idea is history and precedent.


Author: CH (LTC) David Bowlus

Published: October 2017

The toxic emotion of shame plays a sinister role in senior leader misconduct. It is a strategic issue for the Army as trusted leadership is a vital aspect of military readiness and civilian-military relationships. Unlike other negative emotions, shame is a core belief that one is alone, worthless, and fundamentally flawed. Military leaders are influenced by contemporary culture, which has transformed from a guilt-culture to a shame-culture. Military culture and the demands on senior leaders enable shame in various ways, however, leaders must recognize shame’s impact in their lives, effectively address it, and shape their organization’s culture to mitigate shame’s effects. Leaders should practice shame resiliency in their lives and organizations by developing greater self-awareness, vulnerability, empathy, and engaging in resources that mitigate shame. The Army can mitigate the toxic effects of shame through clearer policy, training, and leveraging capabilities such as the U.S. Army Chaplain Corps. As a result, the Army’s senior leaders will avoid the corrosive effects of shame, embrace the call to character, and retain the vital trust of their subordinates and a grateful nation.


Author: Mr Joseph A. Brooks

Published: October 2017

Time is tacitly understood and often taken for granted; it is a complex multi-faceted construct that must be fully understood for cogent strategy formulation. Through a multidisciplinary survey of the fields of history, anthropology, science, sociology, and psychology, this paper aims to provide strategic leaders with a deeper understanding of time’s many facets. Moreover, this paper enriches the strategic planning process by exposing the assumption of absolute time. Time is not absolute; it is relative to the observer scientifically and culturally. This paper helps strategic leaders grasp with the unexplored frontier of relative time. This paper also identifies the possibility that leaders can make use of national instruments of power to strategically manipulate time to achieve their ends.


Author: LTC john F. Cadran

Published: October 2017

The theft of intellectual property (IP) threatens the United States' economy and national security. This unparalleled theft of IP is damaging our economy and its current trajectory threatens the future economic security of the United States. This paper examines IP theft by first taking a historical look at economic espionage. This paper then highlights the stark inability to deter IP theft in the cyber domain because of the fundamental differences between virtual IP and physical IP. After which, this paper analyzes current efforts to deter IP theft and shape international cyber behavioral norms. Finally, the paper offers two recommendations in order to counter this risk to national economic security. First, the U.S. must increase funding for the Department of Justice to help deter future theft and reinforce emerging international cyber behavioral norms. Additionally, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) must mandate a data exchange standard so that cyber threat information can be exchanged and acted on in near-real time.


Author: Lt Col Charles B. Cain

Published: October 2017

Combining the strategic lessons of the 2,500-year-old Chinese game of Go with artificial intelligence (AI) has the potential to make those lessons more broadly applicable and improve strategic decision making without requiring a cultural background or expertise in the game. It will allow human decision makers to focus on their strengths and overcome their cognitive weaknesses. By creating a model of the world based on a Go framework, an AI algorithm can become an expert in that world, understand a given situation, and then look far into the future, across many possible courses of action to help human decision makers determine which next moves will best meet their objectives. This could be used to create a real-time, forecasting common operating picture that can advise decision makers on the next best move, while predicting the likely moves of an adversary. In the end, by teaming with human decision makers to think faster, deeper, and more accurately, this type of AI will provide a decisive strategic advantage to those most willing to use it.


Author: COL Steven N. Carozza

Published: October 2017

President Eisenhower, in his final days in office and using the farewell address to the nation as a vehicle, communicated a stark warning to the nation. His counsel was that despite the desire to reduce defense spending during periods of relative peace, it was precisely during these periods that investment would be necessary to ensure that our long-term security could endure. In recent years the foresight of President Eisenhower has fallen victim to the challenges of balancing competing priorities and is undermined by a prevailing assumption that the resources necessary to wage war will be there when we need them. That assumption is visible today in our reliance upon aging infrastructure to both produce and deliver the munitions necessary for any future conflict and the expectation that these facilities, many of which have only received minimal capital reinvestment over the decades, can meet the surge capacity needed to support major contingency operations. Despite its criticality to our national interests, the organic industrial base ammunition production facilities are unlikely to meet those requirements without taking a hard look at the resourcing models that limit investment and prioritizing additional resources to address emerging vulnerabilities


Author: LTC Bradley M. Carr

Published: October 2017

The United States Government and Department of Defense (DoD) placed more priority on influence operations from WWII through the Cold War. It appears the US Government has forgotten historical lessons on the importance of dealing with threats in the information environment, especially when current threats are rapidly increasing their sophisticated influence efforts. Even with current emphasis on grey zone conflicts, hybrid warfare, or third offset strategies, it is apparent that the US does not have a construct to re-weaponize the “I” in DIME as part of any strategic vision, policy, or overall strategy. Failure to adequately shape and dominate the information environment places US national security at risk. Using Mintzberg’s organizational design concepts as a guide, this paper proposes a DoD-led influence joint interagency task for creation at the national level to develop, plan, coordinate, synchronize, execute and asses full-spectrum influence activities in the multi-domain environment.


Author: Mr Thomas J. Casker

Published: October 2017

South Sudan—despite a seemingly remote location, limited critical resources, and nearly four years of Civil War—will remain a crucial and complicated foreign policy problem for the Trump Administration. South Sudan’s latest outbreak of fighting has sparked famine, refugee flows, and cross-border fighting that threaten to distract key U.S. regional counterterrorism partners, most notably Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda. Washington can help to contain South Sudan’s instability through supporting a UN-backed Regional Protection Force (RPF) to deter and repel government and rebel attacks against civilians, diplomats, and humanitarian workers. The RPF, however, will require significant U.S. assistance to achieve its mission based on similar peace enforcement missions in sub-Saharan Africa. The RPF will require U.S. diplomatic and military assistance in preventing meddling by the South Sudanese government, in securing troops from regional governments, in equipping the RPF with the capabilities necessary for force projection, and in finding an experienced commander to lead the RPF. The RPF should reduce the spread of fighting and would provide a signal to the belligerents that the U.S. and regional governments are deeply committed to finding a lasting political solution to roots behind the conflict.


Author: LTC Michael F. Charnley

Published: October 2017

The United States, China, and Taiwan have a long and confusing history concerning the “one China” policy. While the United States bears a moral responsibility to recognize Taiwan as a rising democracy it has not done so despite Taiwan being a key economic trading partner and an integral defense partner in the East Asia region. There is a real concern that recognition of Taiwanese independence will result in China engaging in major combat operations to prevent an independent Taiwan from becoming a reality. Arguments will put forth that proper U.S. application of landpower will act as a deterrent and prevent China from exercising a military option in response to formal Taiwanese independence.


Author: COL Bryan J. Chivers

Published: October 2017

It is not surprising that the major factor influencing the career decisions of married soldiers who leave the Army is not salary or lack of opportunities for advancement but rather an inability to balance the demands of work and family. Conceptually, a balanced lifestyle makes sense to most people, but in actuality, balance is an inaccurate and unhealthy paradigm for thinking about and understanding how professional military lives intersect with personal lives. In reality, the too often espoused paradigm or concept of balance is unattainable and contributes to Army service member attrition which affects retention and overall readiness. The evolving character of military families and the military workforce necessitate a change in how the Army, its leaders, and service members and their families approach their respective commitments. This research project asserts that an integrated approach to accomplishing both family and work obligations will better sustain both the individual and his or her family during a rewarding yet challenging military lifestyle, and ultimately yield positive outcomes for military professionals, their organizations, and society.


Author: COL Erik L. Christiansen

Published: October 2017

The 2016 presidential election caused debate over the propriety of retiree endorsements. The debate has occurred every election cycle since at least 1992. The trend toward partisan advocacy in retired senior flag officers threatens the apolitical nature of the U.S. military profession. Past efforts to end retiree endorsements failed due to complacency, key leaders opposing change or remaining silent, and the failure of those seeking change to develop and communicate an effective vision and strategy. Absent a new approach, the increasingly disturbing trend of retiree endorsements will continue. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), as the steward of the military profession, joined by other senior military leaders and key stakeholders beyond the active duty military, must engage in a deliberate, continuous, and holistic effort to change military culture and establish the norm that retired military personnel refrain from partisan campaigning. By developing and communicating an effective vision for change, the CJCS can guide military professionals to promote the military’s apolitical nature, foster healthy civil-military relations, and preserve the military’s trust with civilian leadership and the public.


Author: COL Marc A. Cloutier

Published: October 2017

Colonel is one of the most critical and versatile ranks in the Army. Colonels must be experts at the tactical, operational, and strategic level, and are the bridge between tactical and strategic leader. Surprisingly, the duties, responsibilities, and skill sets associated with this pivotal position are ill defined. So is the way in which colonels are tracked and managed. There is also very little development which occurs once an officer is selected for colonel. Without clear requirements, and a clear view of the colonel population, it is difficult to identify capability gaps in colonel development. If clear gaps are not identified, then the process of building colonels and implementing a leader development program may miss the mark. This paper will explore how the Army can build better colonels.


Author: COL Richard D. Conkle

Published: October 2017

Current Intelligence Warfighting Function training strategies are inadequate to properly prepare Echelon Corps and Below intelligence personnel to provide relevant, timely and predictive analysis to commanders. Iraq and Afghanistan intelligence requirements have focused on network and kinetic targeting. While necessary, this shift has allowed core tasks such as Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield and predictive analysis to atrophy. This paper argues that three concepts influence the success of Echelon Corps and Below intelligence officers: 1) the establishment of a graduated training strategy that culminates in an objective certification for intelligence officers and their sections, 2) the development of an institutional framework that teaches intelligence architecture to officers who likely have little understanding of what it is or what it is supposed to do, and 3) understanding the “intangibles” that can significantly enhance or detract from an intelligence officer’s ability to provide situational understanding at echelon.


Author: Cdr Shannon A. Corey

Published: October 2017

Promoting stability in Sub-Saharan Africa, the least developed Sub-region in the world, presents significant challenges for the U.S. military. Historically, it was not colonial armies, but rather naval supremacy and sea-borne trade routes that have had more of an impact on Africa through the ages. Therefore, it is noteworthy to investigate what landpower capabilities are most useful to a “whole of government” effort to promote stability in Sub-Saharan Africa over the coming decade. This paper analyzes the strategy and policy directives guiding U.S. interests in West Africa, compares and contrast the components of defense, diplomacy, and development that comprise the U.S. strategy, and explores what landpower recommendations are most useful. This analysis reveals that a refinement of military crisis response capabilities, a refinement of military support DoS and USAID activities, and a DoD organizational refocus landpower will be most effective to contribute to a whole of government approach to stability in the coming decade.


Author: COL Susan Coyle

Published: October 2017

The Chief of the Australian Army has set a goal of increasing the female representation rate from 12.1 percent to 15 percent by 2023, with the ultimate goal of 25 percent female representation longer term. This paper will use Meyer and Allen's Three-Component Organizational Commitment Model to analyze how to develop and retain talent in high potential female officers in the Australian Army. This analysis will compare data with other nations attending Army War College, information obtained from Defence reports, and survey data from Australian Army female soldiers and officers. The primary recommendation is that the Australian Army use organizational commitment models to better understand the issue, which is a critical prerequisite to effective action. The paper also recommends analysis on why women leave in greater numbers than men, and recommends the establishment of a Talent Management Strategy focused on retention of high potential female officers within the Australian Army.


Author: COL Cory J. Delger

Published: October 2017

In August 2008 Russia initiated military operations against Georgia to establish domination in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Within five days Russia was able to achieve its strategic objectives with minimal casualties. The swift victory over Georgia was not accidental. Russia thoroughly planned its invasion over the course of several years and formulated a well-balanced strategy that mitigated the risk of violating international norms. Six years later Russia followed a similar design when it illegally annexed Crimea and intervened in eastern Ukraine. Unlike its invasion of Georgia, Russia has been unable to achieve its strategic objectives in Ukraine. This strategy research project argues that Russia’s success in Georgia was a result of a calculated strategic formulation consisting of clearly defined objectives and careful application of its instruments of national power. In Ukraine, however, Russia’s failed to define the ends it sought to achieve before taking armed aggression and has been unsuccessful in gaining a strategic advantage.


Author: COL Santosh K. Dhakal

Published: October 2017

In the aftermath of the political transition of 2006, Nepal’s elected Constituent Assembly embarked on a much awaited writing of a people's mandated Constitution. It was undeniably a significant ambition, as previous such ventures had never seen any fruition in the course of a series of earlier political transitions. It took almost seven years and two elections to finally draft the Constitution. However, the elation of having a new Constitution was relatively short lived as a series of protests mainly by the Madheshi people broke out in the southern plains of the Terai region over the key issues in the Constitution. The bone of contention lay within issues regarding state border delimitation, proportional representation, and provision of citizenship. An open border with India and a sympathetic Indian political establishment further helped to bolster the movement resulting in a six-month long blockade virtually bringing an economic collapse in 2015. The Terai-Madhesh movement presents far reaching and potentially detrimental political, social and security implications for Nepal.


Author: COL Michael G. Dhunjishah

Published: October 2017

From 1981 to 1992 the Active Measures Working Group (AMWG) was an interagency group focused on combating Soviet propaganda and disinformation campaigns. The working group successfully executed many counterpropaganda and counter-disinformation campaigns, to include a campaign launched by the Soviets claiming the US Military created the AIDS virus. However, after the Cold War ended the working group was disbanded. Today, the US is seeing a resurgence in Russian propaganda and disinformation campaigns, yet the current efforts to combat these campaigns have not been effective. This paper will establish a baseline for the critical definitions needed to understand the topic, examine how the AMWG was structured in the 1980s, what they were able to accomplish and what made the working group successful. The paper will also examine whether the AMWG structure and functions, updated for today’s environment, provides the right capabilities the U.S. needs to counter disinformation campaigns. Finally, the paper will highlight current challenges facing the US and provide some recommendations for a modern day AMWG.


Author: Lt Col Mark C. Dmytryszyn

Published: October 2017

Interwar years’ airpower and modern-day cyber promised to change the character of war through the application of technology. Both are contemporarily the same age and at roughly the same point on the warfighting maturation curve, a point ripe for growth in developing and codifying doctrine. This paper examines the development of airpower’s High Altitude Daylight Precision Bombing and industrial targeting doctrines through the evaluation of four decision-making models— Rational Actor, Bureaucratic Politics, Organizational Behavior, and Individual Psychological —to warn of their generic application to doctrine development in the cyber domain. The analysis’ review of decision-making found a collection of like-minded innovators falling into common traps; specifically, advancing the shared beliefs of a dominant few, groupthink, exclusion of dissent, and selecting “good enough” solutions. Today’s doctrine developers are destined to be tomorrow’s commanders, and cyber’s application will compel leaders to make guesses about its use before war’s outbreak. These guesses will be complicated by doctrine preceding capability, and a reliance on faith-based theories over experience-backed principles. However, shrewd application of these lessons learned may cyber decision-makers from falling into the same traps, promises, and pitfalls.


Author: COL Robert C. Donnelly

Published: October 2017

This paper illustrates three important reasons why it is imperative that the United States remain Latin America’s military partner of choice in the 21st Century and beyond. After providing a brief background regarding the nearly 70-year history of United States security cooperation efforts in Latin America, the paper uses Colombia as a recent historical example to highlight the success security cooperation efforts can have and the benefits that can be gained as a trusted military partner of choice. Following the background information and historical example, each of the three reasons illustrating why it remains imperative that the United States be Latin America’s military partner of choice are discussed in greater detail. Finally, the paper concludes that remaining Latin America’s military partner of choice into the 21st Century and beyond is the best way to maintain the vital partnerships required to influence and shape the hemispheric environment, assist regional allies and partners with addressing their own internal challenges, and capitalize on the hard work already invested as a low-cost approach to both achieve regional stability and ultimately secure the homeland and protect United States citizens.


Author: COL Jeton Dreshaj

Published: October 2017

After the failed negotiation at Rambouillet, in France between Kosovar Albanian and Serbs early 1999 left NATO no options but to use the force against the Yugoslav regime. For 78 days from March to Jun 1999, the United States and its NATO allies were engaged in the air campaign to bring an end to Serbian atrocities in Kosovo. UN Security Council resolution 1244 of 10 Jun 1999 and Military Technical Agreement achieved in Kumanovo, Macedonia between NATO and Yugoslavian Army open a new chapter for the future of Kosovo. This paper will address some of the biggest challenges, initiatives and unique approaches for Security Sector Reform (SSR) in post-conflict Kosovo. As such, the paper analyzes the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) program for the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), establishment of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), Kosovo Police Service (KPS) and the transitional government. Secondly, the paper addresses relevant SSR issues, such as rule of law and security force reforms in the political and strategic level, as well as enduring SSR challenges for the transformation of Kosovo Security Force into the Kosovo Armed Forces.


Author: COL Jerrett W. Dunlap

Published: October 2017

This essay explores the need for standards to measures the effectiveness of the military justice system. It analyzes three potential methods for measuring the effectiveness of the military justice system: The Trial Court Performance Standards, the Long and Nugent-Borakove proposal, and the Judicial Proceedings Panel. It concludes the three Long and Nugent-Borakove effectiveness measures best allow policymakers to assess the military justice system. These three types of measures are (1) output/outcome, (2) satisfaction and quality, and (3) efficiency and timeliness. Application of these three measures will allow policymakers to evaluate the effectiveness of the military justice system as well as proposed military-justice-reforms.


Author: COL Stephen F. Elder

Published: October 2017

The United States has invested a great deal of money and effort to defeat Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and attack IED networks over the last decade. This paper aims to identify the strategic impacts and subsequent reactions realized as a result of the IED threat in order to capitalize on lessons learned. It will specifically review organizational structure, policy/doctrine and technology development related to the strategic implications. It will also explore potential emerging threats to be considered as the U.S. and coalition forces prepare a continued defense against the IED threat. Finally, the paper will suggest necessary related improvements to maintain Counter IED (CIED) capability.


Author: COL Joseph E. Escandon

Published: October 2017

A critical assessment of the U.S. Army’s corps of general officers attributes performance in Iraq and Afghanistan to a failure to select, educate, and promote officers with the requisite strategic leadership competencies to achieve victory. The Army also recognizes that success in future conflicts will require strategic leaders with a depth of knowledge and skill sets beyond those required for the tactical realm. Several former general officers have proposed the introduction of professional development models to address these strategic leadership shortfalls. Using one of these models, this strategy research project examines the careers of four Army general officers that embody the quality of military genius – Fox Connor, George Patton, William DePuy, and Colin Powell. Each officer was examined within a framework that assesses the importance of background, education, operational assignments, institutional assignments, to include professional military education, self-development, and mentoring by senior officers. Self-development is assessed within the theory of autodidactism, or the ability of an individual to be self-taught. The findings of this study illuminate which traits account for the development of genius and provides the basis for recommendations for generating future senior leaders.


Author: COL Peter P. Feng

Published: October 2017

Global stabilization requirements provide an opportunity to increase and build partnership capacity. Strategic leaders, seeking to enhance stability, build partnership capacity, and achieve other desired end-states, need a comprehensive understanding of the relevant environments. This research provides three ways in which senior leaders can understand the stabilization operational space. The first way details economic theories that describe human behavior. The economic theories of flow, production possibilities frontier, diminishing marginal utility and expectancy are described with respect to infrastructure investment. The second way explores a combined framework that can be used by operational planners to develop effective approaches to support stabilization and infrastructure investment. Finally, a case study of an infrastructure investment is described using a customer satisfaction framework developed by Van Ryzin that combines performance, expectations, and satisfaction. Survey data collected using the Van Ryzin construct reveals that infrastructure investment in one instance in Central America did not result in a measurable gain in citizen satisfaction, highlighting the need for strategic leaders to more fully understand the stabilization operational space.


Author: COL Calondra L. Fortson

Published: October 2017

Cyberspace operations are critical to the success of the Department of Defense’s (DoD) mission in a volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous multilateral world. Just as the United States envisions major armed conflict, cyberspace operations are an existential risk to American core interests and values. To support the Army’s cyberspace strategic goals to combat growing threats from other countries, the Army must focus and strive to produce world-class cyberspace professionals by investing substantial energies into innovative recruiting, talent management and retention endeavors.


Author: LTC Luis G. Fuchu

Published: October 2017

While the role of the U.S. military in the evolving U.S.–Cuba relationship is severely limited in the near term, a broad range of possibilities exist for how the relationship might evolve in the future. Forecasting how the strategic domestic or international environment will act or react to future internal or external stimulus is almost impossible. The purpose of this paper is thus to assess the evolving U.S.–Cuba relationship and provide security cooperation options under a range of different assumptions about the environment that the military will face in the future. To analyze possible options for military engagements, this work employs three planning scenarios—based on current U.S.–Cuba policy—regarding the U.S.–Cuba strategic-political-military environment in the foreseeable future. These scenarios are: 1) a permissive environment where both governments welcome multidimensional engagements; 2) a mixed environment where one nation is more receptive to expanding engagements than the other; and 3) a restricted environment where both countries are reluctant to engage.


Author: LTC Joseph “Clete” Goetz

Published: October 2017

The United States Army, Europe has at its disposal approximately one division worth of combat power on the continent. However, enabling capabilities, like those found in functional support brigades are almost completely absent. The United States Army should rotationally deploy functional support brigades, specifically engineers, artillery, and military police to Europe. These forces will augment existing mission command capability, assist in integrating their function across the alliance, conduct security cooperation activities with their functional counterparts, and assist in setting the theater. It proposes two deployment models to implement this recommendation.


Author: COL George Hackler

Published: October 2017

Given the need for increased Army readiness in the current operational environment, shrinking budgets, and the looming threat of sequestration, the U.S. Army must do all within its power to optimize the use of resources. In Army Directive 2016-16, Changing Management Behavior: Every Dollar Counts acting Secretary of the Army Patrick Murphy reinforced that the Army must achieve the highest levels of readiness while serving as good stewards of taxpayer dollars. Comparing the U.S. Army’s PPBE process and organization to the other service’s shows that the U.S. Army can improve its ability to break organizational silos, build a more efficient and integrated program, and identify the total cost of resourcing key capabilities. Improving its PPBE organization and processes will allow the Army to more effectively use dwindling resources to maintain the combat readiness required to fight and win America’s wars.


Author: COL John Hall

Published: October 2017

Recent actions and comments made by the Philippine president, Rodrigo Duterte, have led many to believe that the longtime ally could be shifting its allegiances away from the United States and more towards China. In an October 2016 visit to China, Mr. Duterte negotiated $24.5 billion in trade deals that included investments in areas such as manufacturing, transportation, infrastructure, telecommunications, and tourism. Considering the increased tensions between the Philippines and China, few would have predicted a radical shift from a long-time relationship between the United States and the Philippines. This paper will seek to determine suitable, feasible and acceptable policy options for the United States to pursue by examining all variables that may have an impact on its relationship with the Philippines. The author believes, based on an otherwise strong U.S.-Philippine relationship and the risk that any direct actions towards the Philippines may encourage new rash behavior from Mr. Duterte, the best approach is for the United States to wait and see.


Author: Mr. Mark Hamilton

Published: October 2017

The Third Offset strategy is the Department of Defense’s effort to develop future technical capabilities to ensure that it maintains its military advantage. However, it may engender two distinct, yet compounding, moral hazards. The first moral hazard considered originates from the Third Offset’s technical focus. The Third Offset aims to reduce risks by increasing the effectiveness of weapons that remove the human warfighter from the battlefield. By distancing the human from conflict, this technology lowers not only the costs and risks associated with fighting, but the political “bar” to initiating hostilities as well. As a result, the U.S. government could inadvertently set conditions for an increase in international conflict. The second moral hazard results from the overt nature of the Third Offset’s development. The unconcealed approach and design of the Third Offset raises the likelihood that American investments in defense modernization will inadvertently subsidize similar foreign efforts through espionage and foreign material exploitation of U.S. technological designs. These moral hazards, taken together could create a situation where U.S. defense efforts will inadvertently decrease global stability and national security.


Author: COL Bernard J. Harrington

Published: October 2017

As the global strategic environment evolves in complexity, volatility, uncertainty and ambiguity, it is critically important to analyze how the U.S. Army’s talent management strategy prepares officers for service in the future strategic environment. Although the Department of Defense (DoD) emphasizes the strategic importance of talent management, transformational reform has met significant resistance by stakeholders, both internal and external to the organization. To better prepare future strategic leaders who are capable of thriving in a complex, multi-domain environment, the U.S. Army must fundamentally change its talent management culture by implementing additional, new embedding and reinforcing change mechanisms. These mechanisms include the dedication of resources, deliberate role modeling, the implementation of an officer broadening strategy, and the refinement of company grade officer evaluation reports and centralized selection board processes.


Author: LTC Ryan Hellerstedt

Published: October 2017

The direct involvement of Russian and U.S. forces into Syria has provided a new flashpoint for U.S.-Russian relations, but more importantly, provided several lessons learned that should inform the new U.S. administration’s policy on Russia. Syria’s civil war is volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous. The conflict has spilled into or drawn in much of the region, including Syria’s Shia-centric Assad Regime allies Iran, Russia, and Lebanese Hezbollah. Opposing them are the Sunni militia and rebel groups supported by much of the Sunni Gulf Arab states, and finally a third party of U.S.-backed Syrian Kurds fighting the self-declared Caliphate of the Islamic State. Using the analysis from observations in Syria, the U.S. should develop a comprehensive national strategy that encompasses all aspects of national power: diplomacy, information, military, and economics, to address the broader U.S. policy on Russia. This new policy should address concerns in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and the increasingly multi-polar world as China develops and exercises new national power.


Author: Lt Col Timothy Hofman

Published: October 2017

The US has committed military force to two significant operations since the withdrawal from Iraq—the 2011 intervention in Libya and the 2014 intervention against ISIS. In both of these cases, the President has broadly interpreted Article II of the US Constitution and the 2001 AUMF to justify his actions. Meanwhile, Congress has not challenged these expansions of presidential war authority, leading to a divergence from the constitutional design of the US government. Congress should use the opportunity of a new session and a fresh presidential administration to repeal the outdated 2001 and 2002 AUMFs and replace them with an AUMF focused on defeating ISIS. This will restore Congress’ role as the branch with constitutional responsibility to authorize the use of military force.


Author: Cdr Kenneth M. Jensen

Published: October 2017

The Navy has noted its current shipboard air platforms are insufficient to project power in a future conflict with near peer competitors. To alleviate this shortfall, the Navy is making a concerted effort to increase its investment in unmanned air system (UAS) technology. Navy strategic leaders must prepare the Naval Aviation community now to ensure UAS are integrated effectively and efficiently into the fleet. Current Navy manned pilot culture might not welcome this major transition and may present significant resistance against UAS playing a larger role in Naval Aviation. The purpose of this paper is to identify the potential cultural challenges created by the strong personalities of Naval Aviators, project the possible impacts these challenges will pose on Naval Aviation’s future, and recommend possible solutions to Navy leadership. This analysis reviews Naval Aviation’s UAS platforms and current Navy pilot culture. It examines cultural challenges in the US Air Force and US Army to seek lessons for the Navy to consider, and offers recommendations based on the organizational change models of John Kotter and Fred Nickols.


Author: LTC Andrew W. Jones

Published: October 2017

Within society and its military, the complexities of 21st century life embroil leaders in ethical and command dilemmas. From the Commander in Chief down to the newest lieutenant, all take an oath to support and defend the Constitution often without knowing the origins of its most fundamental principles. As United States Army leadership continues to stress the tenets of Mission Command, values, and ethics in their professional military education (PME) curriculum, and struggle with how to apply these in their formations, one question resonates in the halls of senior military institutions: why do we overlook the Age of Enlightenment in explaining these concepts? Re-examining the Enlightenment as a means to broaden an understanding of Mission Command, values, and ethical reasoning cannot be underestimated in the future development of the Army officer corps. Reconnecting with the foundational principles of liberty, fraternity, tolerance, trust, and self-awareness, to name a few, through the prism of those who brought these enduring principles into the light will only enhance critical thinking and leadership studies.


Author: CDR Daniel C. Jones

Published: October 2017

The current layered approach of identifying, interdicting, and securing WMD within the maritime transportation system is effective in preventing the importation of WMD along the East, West, and Gulf coasts but fails to effectively address the short notice and localized requirements in the Great Lakes region. Due to trade growth within the Great Lakes region and the complexities along the U.S. and Canadian border, designated federal response forces are unable to respond to a reported threat in time to prevent a hostile vessel from reaching the U.S. shore. To address this threat, the U.S. Government should implement a new joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational framework to train, equip, and coordinate forces capable of countering these threats. By utilizing federal, state and local law enforcement agencies trained in maritime response and Close Quarters Combat / SWAT, the Captain of the Port will gain the tools needed to address any threat posed by non-compliant large commercial vessels.


Author: COL Derek Jones

Published: October 2017

In 1961, French counterinsurgency theorist and practitioner Roger Trinquier wrote that the “master concept” of “modern war”—wars between nation states and insurgents and terrorists—is the destruction of the clandestine insurgent and terrorist organizations. The theory presented in this work, the Simultaneous Attack/Persistent Pursuit (SAPP) theory, achieves Trinquier’s master concept. It is a theory of war following the historical pattern of military theories aimed at the destruction of the enemy forces through maneuver and annihilation, but does so using an element of complexity theory called “emergence.” The theory achieves decisive success by denying two key aspects of insurgent and terrorist warfare—ambiguity and protractedness. It denies ambiguity by applying overwhelming force simultaneously against all known or suspected elements of the clandestine organization to shock the system and force the emergence or exposure of formerly hidden elements. Persistent pursuit is then used to rapidly force the continued emergence of the remaining elements until decisively destroyed to deny protractedness.


Author: Lt Col Matthew E. Jones

Published: October 2017

The current Air Force officer personnel management system has not been significantly updated since the service’s inception in 1947. Driving the need for personnel management improvements are changing military-family dynamics, expectations from today’s millennial generation, and a growing civil-military gap. Keeping the status quo ultimately risks talent retention. The Air Force is aware and already working on overhauling performance reports, officer stratifications, and promotions. This research focuses on areas that are not being overhauled, namely the officer assignment system and professional military education. Through this analysis, opportunities emerge for the system to not only be more responsive to officers’ and their family’s preferences, but to also develop officers who are more cognitively diverse. In doing so, officers will improve their problem-solving skills and ultimately provide better outcomes. The paper first recommends developing a new market based assignment system where the affected members and the gaining commanders have more input than they do today. The second recommendation proposes more opportunities for mid-career officers to attend civilian graduate programs in lieu of Air Command and Staff College. While these recommendations are responsive to the external environment, the ultimate goal is to improve talent retention and produce better outcomes.


Author: COL Mark G. Kappelmann

Published: October 2017

This paper is an exploration into the status of the American Military Profession in the year 2047. It is based upon a fictional letter written by General Howie Herding, the 48th Chief of Staff of the Army, to General (Ret.) Martin Dempsey on his 95th birthday. The letter explores how we define and assess professions. Many present-day ethicists and military historians predict that the profession is in decline. Given this presumption, this paper looks to answer the questions of ‘Why did the American Military Profession cease to exist?’ and ‘How did it cease to exist?’ The strongest argument regarding the assessment of the profession is centered around professional powers. The loss of power or authority, taken by either the executive or legislative branches, is the manifestation of a decline in the profession. The purpose of this paper is to impart this important lesson in order to guide our self-policing professional requirements.


Author: COL Kapeh K. Kazir

Published: October 2017

Historically, people or groups of citizens have risen to the challenge of combatting perceived or genuine threats to the security of their community and carried out actions in that regard without legal authority. Such groups are generally referred to as “vigilantes.” Their rise usually emanates from the seeming inability of constituted authority to enforce law and order, or perceived delays in carrying out justice. This study examines the Anti-Communist Vigilantes in the Philippines, Anti-Taliban Vigilantes in Afghanistan and the Civilian Joint Task Force in Nigeria. The Civilian Joint Task Force in particular has assisted the Nigerian military in its counterinsurgency operations against the Boko Haram terrorist group in the north-eastern part of the country. However, the continued existence of the group and certain actions of the group’s members have raised questions about their legality, control, conduct and the future of the members of the group at the termination of the insurgency, which this paper explores.


Author: LT COL Kemence K. Oyome

Published: October 2017

From their independence until today, West African countries have wrestled with their civil-military relations which often resulted in instability. In the quest to understand the underlying causes of the challenges, this research project links the root causes with the sudden and too early departure of the colonial military institution from the colonies. The embryonic and immature armies of the new born nations were not professionally educated enough to adopt the proper concept of civil-military relations. By staying longer, colonial militaries would have facilitated the adequate transition of West African national militaries from colonial era into the post-independence era. This research project used a controlled comparison case study between Niger and Senegal, two former French colonies in West Africa to substantiate this fact. Senegal, with a permanent French military presence, is the only West African country to maintain proper civil-military relations and has not required military intervention since gaining independence. In contrast, poor civil-military relations throughout the sub-region have triggered civil wars and political violence, creating strategic concerns. West Africa would benefit from mentorship by the world’s leading powers to establish mature and well-functioning civil-military relations to restore peace and stability in the region.


Author: COL Joshua Kennedy

Published: October 2017

The Russian Federation’s use of information as a weapon is not a new phenomenon. Interest in the subject has grown amongst U.S. foreign policy and defense practitioners following Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and especially the attempted manipulation of the 2016 presidential election in the United States. An objective analysis reveals a lack of institutional memory in the United States rather than a significant change in Russian strategy. Russian leaders since the tsars used false information, propaganda, and deception to control their internal population as well as influence external audiences. An understanding of the Soviet system of active measures and the United States countermeasures shed light on the challenges and opportunities in the new information environment. Russia updated its information tools, so must the United States.


Author: Col Robert I. Kinney

Published: October 2017

Service culture shaped by air minded dogma of the last century obstructed Air Force senior leadership views of an emerging paradigm shift that if accepted in absolute, would exponentially increase airpower’s advantage. The Air Force has struggled with fielding Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA), producing and retaining pilots, and satisfying the Joint Warfighter’s insatiable demand. Regardless of the debate surrounding an enlisted RPA program and a Congressional mandate that intends to fix the problem, the Air Force will continue to face sluggish programmatic evolution and political scrutiny unless the RPA program is given due regard as an equal among traditional weapons systems and their communities. This paper contends that Air Force culture, group think, and biases for manned flight stifles new ways of thinking about employing airpower at its fullest potential when confronted with prospective capabilities that break outside of preferred paradigms.


Author: COL Ernest Kisbedo

Published: October 2017

Burkina Faso, like many African countries, has challenges in civil-military relations. There has never been a peaceful transition of power between two elected presidents since the independence of the country to date. In 56 years of independence, the country experienced six military coups, some very bloody, without mentioning the failed ones. In the same period of time, three civilians totaled only seven years as presidents, while the military, as presidents, ruled the country for 49 years; there is a need for change from military domination to military obedience to civilian political leaders. In a contributing effort to solve the issue, I argue that a concerted effort to set mechanisms, educate, and train the military and society on the professional norms of democratic civilian supremacy over the armed forces, will help prevent the Burkina Faso's military from interrupting civilian political rule. The paper discusses the theory of civilian supremacy or control of the military, the issue of civil-military relations in Burkina Faso, and, lastly makes some recommendations for change to establishing enduring civilian supremacy over the military in the country.


Author: LTC Christopher M. Korpela

Published: October 2017

Advances in swarm technology is part of the Department of Defense’s Third Offset Strategy which is a plan for overcoming reduced military force structure and declining technological superiority against potential U.S. adversaries. The components of the Third Offset represent the enabling capabilities of swarm behavior which could be adopted in the future force. Therefore, this paper investigates whether the U.S. military should focus greater research and development efforts on swarm-capable systems that are low-cost, numerous, unmanned, and fast. The first area of discussion includes swarm initiatives that could allow the military to transition away from expensive and heavy weapons platforms. Second, self-driving vehicles, automated logistics, and aerial drones in industry could translate to autonomous supply trains, reduced soldier error, and targeting missions in the military. Third, adversaries are pursuing swarm capabilities. While swarms show great promise, there are some major legal and ethical obstacles to swarm-capable systems. Lastly, recommendations are offered as a way ahead for swarm initiatives.


Author: COL Christopher T. Kuhn

Published: October 2017

The purpose of this study is to show how the United States’ national policy and directives with regards to landmines creates friction points that inhibit the joint forces’ ability to shape and control terrain. This paper describes the current U.S. landmine national policy, the future strategic threat environment, the current U.S. terrain shaping capability, and the impact on the joint land force’s ability to shape terrain. This paper argues that the current strategic environment, with the recent rise of potential near peer competitors, requires reengagement with our allies and development of a new foundational obstacle system. This paper also provides recommendations that will enhance the United States’ ability to shape and dominate terrain to support expeditionary maneuver and joint combined operations.


Author: COL Stephanie A. Kwortnik

Published: October 2017

The Military Health System is challenged with two enduring missions, Soldier and beneficiary care, and deployment healthcare. Primal to the deployment health mission is the readiness and availability of trained trauma teams and a trauma system. The Department of Defense Instruction 6040.47 sets the policy to initiate a Joint Trauma System but fails to identify an enduring realistic training platform. A Sustained Readiness Model with civilian trauma centers is necessary to bridge the interwar gap for training. New hybrid component units may be an opportunity to support a trauma care training platform. In addition, expanding current recruiting and retention programs within the Critical Wartime Skill providers is essential to ensure trauma team availability. Lastly, building the trauma skills of all trauma team members with paramedic programs and advanced practice nurses will broaden and helps offset the capability gap in light of the enduring physician shortage. The effect will be to promote innovation in talent management in platforms for trauma team providers.


Author: COL John D. Laing

Published: October 2017

The United States has an interest in promoting democracy and religious freedom abroad, as articulated in the National Security Strategy (2015) and the wording of HR 2431, The International Religious Freedom Act. Although the State Department has been given primary responsibility for that promotion, it has had difficulty doing so due to resource and personnel constraints, as well as to internal philosophical and ideological objections. By contrast, the Department of Defense has the resources, personnel, and the interest for promoting religious freedom and democracy and therefore, it can contribute to the effort as part of a whole-of-government approach to the issue. Military chaplaincy is uniquely suited for this task because of its history, function, and reach. It can do so through a two-pronged approach including strategic application/management of religious leader engagements and development of chaplaincy programs in foreign militaries. These efforts support one another, but will require significant coordination, planning, and resourcing.


Author: COL David J. Lambrecht

Published: October 2017

This paper argues for the development and use of lethal autonomous weapon systems by the Department of Defense. Despite the appeal of significantly minimizing human loss of life and maintaining a military competitive advantage, U.S. pursuit of this capability has met with considerable consternation and resistance. The analysis suggests that the benefits outweigh the risks; adversaries are pursuing this capability with or without U.S. involvement; and its value as a deterrent should not be wasted. Many of the objections to pursuing autonomous technologies while seemingly convincing are logically flawed. This analysis includes an examination of concerns over human accountability, responsibility, and trust that underpins the legality of using autonomous weapon systems. While there are legal concerns that must be addressed, a human chain of responsibility exists and will continue to provide the requisite accountability. The analysis concludes with recommendations on a way ahead for DoD’s pursuit of lethal autonomous weapons.


Author: Mr Ryan P. Landrum

Published: October 2017

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is a prolonged state of strategic drift somewhere along the middle seam of a full spectrum of 21st century threats. This paper explores the National Security Act of 1947 and the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 as case studies of unity of effort for large, complex organizations. Then, it investigates the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to provide historical context and define the current strategic environment of DHS. Finally, it proposes recommendations that will help the Department fully profit from economy of force by institutionalizing unity of effort and broadening its succession leadership capability. As the threat spectrum continues to evolve, so too must the capacity of the homeland security enterprise to properly protect the American people and the homeland. In order to increase this capacity, Congress should enact comprehensive reform legislation allowing DHS to accomplish its mission.


Author: Mr Franks Lands

Published: October 2017

On average, installation management makes up approximately 15 percent of the Army’s total annual budget. This study focuses on the Army’s performance system known as the Installation Status Report Services (ISR-S) Program. The ISR-S is a performance metric tracking platform intended to evaluate delivery performance (cost, quality, and quantity) for installation support services (logistics, public works, firefighting, law enforcement, and family programs). This study analyzed the performance scores over a three year period (2012-2014) for 70 base operation services with a total annual budget exceeding $12 billion. Research determined that there was no statistical relationship between ISR-S measurements and resource use. ISR-S performance ratings remained stable despite a 14 percent decrease in funding over the three-year study period. There are a variety of possible explanations as to why additional funding and resources do not directly improve base operations performance in the ISR-S system. These include vague and poorly defined measurements and antiquated budgeting processes that do not include ISR-S outputs in budget formulation strategies.


Author: Lt Col John G. Lehane

Published: October 2017

In November 2012, then Secretary of Defense Carter signed Department of Defense Directive 3000.09 Autonomy in Weapons Systems, which stymies the development and fielding of artificially intelligent autonomous lethal weapons systems. While that policy may be appropriate for weapons systems that presently exist, inhibiting their future development will place the United States at a significant tactical, operational, and strategic disadvantage in the future. This paper will examine the current pace of technological development, forecasts on how those trends may continue, the nascent development of automated killing machines, projected development of those machines, objections of governments and non-governmental organizations, and implications of either DoD Directive 3000.09 or future directives which may be even more restrictive.


Author: COL Lars S. Lervik

Published: October 2017

Following a decade of cooperation between East and West, Russia has now reappeared as the most important threat to members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Russia possesses significant military capabilities, including nuclear weapons and this, combined with a demonstrated intent to use military force against its neighbors, makes interaction with Russia a very challenging task for NATO. This paper discusses key security policy theories and terms, analyzes NATO’s current strategy and the Russian threat, and discusses how NATO can best deter Russia while also engaging in dialogue. This paper argues that NATO must combine credible deterrence with active engagement to address a re-emerging Russia with great power ambitions. Thus, NATO must focus on fundamentals such as transatlantic cohesion, unity, deterrence and collective security. Active engagement with Russia must supplement this deterrent approach to reduce the risk of escalation and conflict.


Author: COL Jay Liddick

Published: October 2017

The Army must be prepared to prevail in conflict ranging from high intensity, peer-to peer conventional battle to irregular warfare or a hybrid of the two, which will take place amidst civilian populations and under the ever present eye of personal cell phones and social and news media that capture and immediately report the U.S. military’s effect on civilians. Operational and strategic success will require translating military gains into sustainable political outcomes. Ensuring the U.S. Army has the right doctrine and mix and amounts of capability is difficult, but paramount. The following pages will explore the Army’s evolution of thought on engaging civilian populations and non-military partners and its Civil Affairs (CA) capability. This paper focuses on defining Army Civil Affairs (CA), reviewing the adaptation of Army doctrine and CA capability, examining CA capability gaps, and recommending changes the Army should implement to improve its CA capability and, thus, better prepare itself to conduct unified land operations.


Author: COL John Litz

Published: October 2017

The U.S. Inland Waterways System (IWS), consisting of lock and dam sites along the Nation’s navigable river channels that are owned, operated and maintained by U.S. Army, has become increasingly unreliable and inefficient. Much of the IWS infrastructure has exceeded its design life and requires increased maintenance, repair, or replacement. Inadequate investment in the U.S. Inland Waterways System (IWS) is negatively impacting the national economy. Recent legislative, policy and process changes do not adequately meet the Nation’s need for a reliable inland waterways navigation system. The project defines the problems caused by underinvestment and describes the U.S. Government’s current approach to IWS infrastructure investment. It explores the adequacy and acceptability of options aimed at solving the problems. Lastly, this project indentifies challenges to implementation of options and makes recommendations for action.


Author: COL James Lock

Published: October 2017

The protracted Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains one of the primary sources of tension in the Middle East today. The same intractable issues that have defined the conflict for decades remain unresolved: the acknowledgement of Israel’s right to exist, the status of Jerusalem, freedom of movement in the West Bank, and the disposition of Israeli settlements. As varied and challenging as these issues are, the most critical obstacles to a negotiated peace revolve around the basic issue of security. The United States Security Coordinator (USSC) plays an important role in U.S. policy by partnering with the Palestinian Authority Security Forces (PASF). Assuming U.S. policy remains focused on achieving a two-state solution in resolving the conflict, USSC will continue to play a vital role in coordinating security issues between the IDF and the PASF. This coordination will help to reduce security concerns between the two parties, an important stepping stone for future bilateral negotiations in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.


Author: LTC Derrick C. Long

Published: October 2017

The United States Army has initiated an aggressive campaign to develop operational concepts and force structure to deal with the volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous characteristics of the future strategic operational environment. However, while these concepts and plans are being developed, the human dimension component should also be addressed. The most important component in the Army are its Soldiers, because they are the ones that will be asked to fight and will in this complex world. Therefore, the Army should develop a process to assess and select future Soldiers in challenging and complex MOS career fields. This research was based on using the 35P (Cryptologic-linguist) and 18 series (Special Forces) MOS to determine if the Army should develop a comprehensive assessment and selection process to determine an individual’s cognitive skills, personality and emotional traits at the Military Entrance Processing Station and before Basic Combat Training. Based on the data collection and analysis, the Army should develop and implement a comprehensive process to assess and select 35P initial entry candidates using 10-Core 35P attributes.


Author: COL Ralph Lounsbrough

Published: October 2017

This paper explores the existence and consequences of a ‘warrior caste’ in the U.S. military. The ‘warrior caste’ is explained as a growing sub-culture within the military composed of legacy family members. The paper both proves that this ‘warrior caste’ exists and demonstrates how it contributes to the larger civil-military gap. It explains this in context with the creation and development of the All-Volunteer force and gives examples of both positive and negative aspects. Finally, it explores some of the consequences. These consequences are considered as they relate to the use of the military, and their effect on society as a whole.


Author: COL Francisco Lozano

Published: October 2017

After 30 years of legislated acquisition reform, the defense acquisition system has become lethargic and ineffective in its ability to deliver needed capability to the United States Department of Defense. Much of the governing legislation was rooted in well-intentioned and necessary changes to improve DoD acquisition outcomes. Yet, during implementation of the statutes the resultant size of the defense acquisition bureaucracy and its associated processes stunted the ability for successful outcomes. As a result, DoD acquisition programs grew in cost, schedule, and did not meet performance expectations, which led to their termination. After examining legislation, beginning with the 1985 Packard Commission to the most recent National Defense Authorization Act for 2017 this paper makes several recommendations to reverse the trend of unsuccessful programs. First, legislatively reduce the number of offices at the OSD level providing oversight on acquisition programs. Second, restructure the Acquisition Category (ACAT) levels to minimize those programs requiring OSD oversight. Finally, grant Milestone Decision Authorities greater authority to approve milestone decisions when systems meet only 80% of their threshold capabilities.


Author: COL Matthew D. MacNeilly

Published: October 2017

Fiscal and political constraints have limited the manpower and equipment resources that would enable DHS to better secure the southern border, and the timeline associated with expanding that force would take several additional years before impacting security. Meanwhile, the dramatic decrease in combat deployments of Regular Army Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (SBCT) prevents large percentages of junior leaders from gaining the experiences that are crucial to their professional development and future combat abilities. These skills include the simple acts of deployment preparation and execution, establishing Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) and communications architectures, as well as the more complex tasks of interagency coordination of current operations and integrating outside forces into a formation. Deploying Regular Army units to the border enables units to gain invaluable deployment and COIN training while supporting DHS efforts to secure the border against illegal activity. The associated strategic communications planning and execution, along with partnered operations would have significant impact on the border region.


Author: LT COL Mamadou A. Mahamat

Published: October 2017

Chad’s recent history has been plagued by interminable political violence. Since the country’s independence in 1960, the syndrome of this violence has been shaping Chadian individual and collective conscience. In the 1980s this ex-French colony fell victim to the uncured ills of its very formation: ethnic rife, religious antagonism, political corruption, and weak institutions. Dozens of political-military factions attempted to conquer state power. In 1990, the current regime ultimately triumphed, though violence did not end until 2010. What happened? While the root causes of violence have not waned, the government has used different stratagems to vanquish the rebellious groups. No doubt, the paramount tool at the disposal of the state was sheer military might. But, as recent history has shown time and time again, the military dimension of power is not always sufficient to achieve victory. In the case at hand, diplomacy and economy have also played a decisive role. This paper will show that, while a successful use of DIME may overcome an insurgency, its peculiar use by the Chadian government, though effective in the short run, might well not preserve a lasting peace if appropriate measures are not implemented to fully integrate these ex-rebels into the social fabric.


Author: LTC Joseph J. Malizia

Published: October 2017

The Army’s ill-advised decision to reduce its active component CA capacity had multiple negative impacts on Joint Force readiness, creating gaps and seams in Theater Campaign Strategies and Integrated Country Strategies at Geographic Combatant Commands and U.S diplomatic missions around the world. Additionally, U.S. Forces Command no longer has sufficient capacity to deploy CA forces for early entry operational requirements. Current mitigation strategy calls for increased reliance on reserve component CA. However, given reserve component mobilization restrictions and the differences in accessions, training, and employment, active and reserve component CA are not interchangeable. Reliance on reserve component CA forces negatively impacts Joint Force readiness and increases the risk to mission when compared to an active component CA unit. This paper reviews the strategic significance of CA in bridging military success to enduring victory and argues that much of the predicament the Army finds itself in with respect to CA capacity stems from a systemic lack of strategic leadership in key positions. Moving forward, the Army must assign its active component CA General Officers to strategic positions in the CA Commandant’s Office and on the Army Staff to leverage their experience and expertise as it pertains to CA and Military Support to Governance.


Author: Dr James Mancillas

Published: October 2017

The emergence of artificial intelligence (AI) offers opportunities to overcome cognitive limits when managing “big data” and further leverage informational superiority into battle space superiority. However, these advantages may only materialize if these future technologies are properly integrated into military operations. To understand and facilitate this integration, this paper establishes baseline definitions and descriptions for key terms such as AI, autonomy, and degrees of autonomy, in-the-loop, and decision loops. Applying these terms, this study establishes a framework based on the Boyd cycle, also known as the Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act loop (OODA Loop), to explore how AI systems participate in military decision processes. For each part of the OODA Loop, this study briefly explores the implications of AI systems using the JCIDS DOTMLPF lens.


Author: COL Stephen C. Marr

Published: October 2017

The Arctic states all agree that “peaceful cooperation” is critical to regional stability; however, none reject the possibility of future conflict. The Arctic occupies a central position within Russia's foreign policy, and Russia has become the dominant regional power. Concerned by Russia’s build up, the other Arctic Nations are strengthening their Arctic capabilities. There are three issues poised to become future regional flash points: competition over strategic resources, challenges to maritime control, and antagonistic geopolitical balancing. Growing regional uncertainty threatens the historically cooperative relationships in the North. In response, the United States must shed the title of the ‘reluctant Artic power’ and lead the effort to increase cooperation. Operationalizing the U.S. Arctic strategy will take time and resources, but it is necessary to mitigate the threat of miscalculations that could lead to future conflict. Increased security cooperation is possible by establishing a viable international security forum, increasing transparency, and defining the acceptable range of military actions and arms in the High North.


Author: COL Adrian A. Marsh

Published: October 2017

Stability operations involve a wide range of inherently complex tasks, the planning and monitoring of which are not core competencies of standard military planning and management processes. Consequently, the Army’s tools manage stability operations are inadequate when compared to the accredited, professional program management best practices employed by private firms, non-government organizations, and civilian agency partners. Applying program management processes to the execution of stability operations -- specifically to manage activities along intermediate objectives of various lines of effort -- will enable more systematic synchronization of activities required to transition an operation to civil authorities. Given the many similarities between the management of stability operations and the skills and processes used to manage acquisition programs, the Army should deploy program managers and employ program management processes to improve the execution and management of stability operations.


Author: Ms Wendy Marshall

Published: October 2017

A central tenet of Carl Von Clausewitz theory of war is its inherent unpredictability. There is always the possibility that military action will create unforeseen impacts, some of which may be counter to strategic intent. This possibility is exacerbated when strategic objectives lack clarity or realism; yet the complex nature of contemporary security challenges makes setting clear, achievable objectives difficult. While the joint forces have made great progress in mitigating the potential for operational design, planning, and execution to create impacts that diverge from strategic intent, there are opportunities for further improvement. These center on better preparing emerging leaders to engage in civilian-military dialogue and better integrating non-military dimensions into operational design, planning, execution, and campaign assessment.


Author: COL Andrew J. Maskell

Published: October 2017

On 24 June 2016 an event occurred that irreversibly changed the strategic direction of the European continent and its political identity. Through referendum over 30 million British citizens exercised their democratic right to determine their Nation’s future. The outcome resulted in BREXIT (The British Exit from the European Union). Whilst, the effects of BREXIT span the social, economic, political, demographic and cultural continuum; this paper will focus on the impact on defense and the consequences for the development of a future U.S. National Security Strategy. There is little doubt that this paradigm shift in British political philosophy will alter the U.S.’s strategic stance in some way. A cursory analysis suggests that the effect may simply be limited to the U.S. use of the UK as an interlocutor within Europe. However, Britain’s exit could influence broader security issues. These may include the ongoing UK involvement in support of operations against ISIS; the potential for a ‘UK pivot’ towards South East Asia and the maintenance of a comprehensive and holistic European response towards Russian expansion.


Author: LTC Charles L. Matallana

Published: October 2017

The security landscape had dramatically changed for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as it moved into the 21st Century. Having adapted and evolved since its inception, NATO looked poised to extend its security umbrella to Eastern Europe and points beyond with the demise of the Soviet Union and the emergence of non-state actor threats. However, renewed concerns over the security challenges presented by recent Russian revanchism, emerging cyber threats, and the persistent burden-sharing debates have all contributed to questions about NATO's relevance and credibility. In order to maintain its legitimacy as a security provider with diminished fiscal means, NATO must first focus its deterrence and reassurance efforts by leveraging NATO’s Allied Land Command in building landpower capabilities. Additionally, NATO must mature its cyber defense capacity by investing in key organizations such as the NATO Allied Command Transformation and the Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence. Lastly, NATO must enforce the pledge that members will spend 2 percent of Gross Domestic Product on defense, while finding additional burden offsets such as collaborative technology development from military platforms.


Author: Mr Darrell D. McCarthy

Published: October 2017

Cybersecurity is one of the United States’ most strategic vulnerabilities. Rogue nations, state and non-state actors are using cyber as a strategic weapon against the United States and its allies. To effectively counter this risk, the United States and its allies need to develop a robust cybersecurity posture. This essentially means having the most advanced technology to counter, coerce, and deter aggressive and nefarious cyber activities coupled with an appropriate response should the need arise. Advanced technology also requires highly trained cyber professionals to operate within the cyber space domain. Since the Department of Defense is the organization that has the mission to defend the homeland from cyber-attacks and mitigate the effects thereof, this SRP analyzes the current Department of Defense cyber recruitment efforts, its training and development strategy, whether the strategy supports the requirement to build technically competent capacity quickly, and how to retain the talent necessary to dominate the cyber domain. I also provide recommendations on how the Department of Defense can achieve their strategic goals.


Author: LTC Ryan McCormack

Published: October 2017

The United States security policy decision-making process crosses multiple constituencies in an environment characterized by ambiguity and complexity. There is no formalized decision-making process that ensures a rigorous interagency outcome-oriented risk assessment when making national security policy and strategy. The process of national security policy decision-making is inherently unstructured and, as a result, introduces risk that if left unmanaged can involve the commitment of vast resources and lead to questionable and often disastrous outcomes. This study attempts to identify and overcome the impediments to decision-making methods that introduce risk and ways to promote outcome-oriented risk management in future national security policy and strategy development.


Author: LTC Jeremy T. McGarry

Published: October 2017

The greatest asset of the United States Army is the American Soldier. They are the heart and soul of the most powerful military in the world. Every soldier devotes their time and energy, endures rigorous training, and prepares themselves to protect our nation. They are the fundamental building block of the Army and it cannot succeed without them. Since 9/11, the experience soldiers gained in the fight against terrorism is invaluable. Unfortunately, most soldiers by default end their military career after active duty service and the Army is losing this talent. Released soldiers have years of experience and training with no way to pass on this information. These soldiers have essential knowledge necessary to prepare future soldiers of the Total Army Force. The best way to access this talent is to promote service in the Reserve Component by adjusting policies and procedures to improve and encourage the flow of soldiers among the Active and Reserve components. This paper examines the importance of continued service in the Reserve Component, reviews the current recommendations for continuum of service, analyzes current policies and procedures, and recommends new ways to retain Active Duty talent in the Army Reserve.


Author: COL Kareem P. Montague

Published: October 2017

Transition to a modular structure was a necessary process for the Army to best meet the needs of a modern fighting force, while accounting for the realities of a post-Cold War environment. However, modularity significantly changed the talent management system of the Army, by greatly empowering Brigade Combat Team commanders to assess talent across a large and branch-diverse population of officers. This paper looks at the impact of that empowerment and argues for a correlation between modularity and a reduction in the branch diversity of the General Officer population. It does so by examining primary-zone and below-the-zone promotion data for one of those branches, the Field Artillery, in comparison to another, the Infantry. The results have not been good for the Field Artillery and, from a development of senior leader perspective, might also not be good for the Army overall. The author presents an argument for a more diverse general officer population and makes recommendations to rectify this unintended consequence of the transition to a modular force.


Author: COL Scott W. Mueller

Published: October 2017

America’s All-Volunteer Force (AVF) is a highly-debated concept in the realm of U.S. civil-military relations. While the quality of today’s AVF is rarely disputed, some question whether or not it has led to a too-frequent use of American military force. This paper contends that the American AVF enables the use of military force as a foreign policy instrument, but not for the reasons laid out by the 1973 Gates Commission. With the return to the AVF in 1973, Congress and America’s military leaders took steps to prevent U.S. presidents from embarking on military adventures. However, U.S. presidents’ use of military force to resolve foreign policy disputes that are not necessarily vital to the national interest is enabled by the AVF as a military manpower system, and is an essential instrument to maintaining the liberal international order from which the United States benefits greatly.


Author: LTC Scott A. Myers

Published: October 2017

The United States continues to increase its military commitments to secure national interests at the expense of implementing other instruments of national power, despite protections deliberately embedded into the Constitution by America’s Founding Fathers to fight this outcome. The nation’s growing propensity to use military force as the primary instrument of national power is rooted in three distinct phenomena: the growing civil-military gap, Congress’s failure to exercise its constitutional prerogatives to declare war, and the country’s failure to ensure citizen sacrifice to support its wars. The result is a country with an empowered Executive that frequently employs the armed forces as the primary instrument of national power to protect its interests. If not rectified, America will continue this trend due to the turbulent strategic environment and growing threats from adversaries, which will likely jeopardize the nation’s standing and reputation. This paper will discuss the causes of America’s growing reliance on the military and offer solutions to better balance the nation’s use of all instruments of national power to return the country to a state in closer alignment with the visions of the Founding Fathers.


Author: LTC Martin J. Naranjo

Published: October 2017

As the Army Reserve (AR) has transitioned from a manpower and a strategic reserve to an operational reserve, the Joint Force has become more reliant on its timely and cost-effective capabilities. This reliance is illustrated in the study of AR units forward stationed Outside the Continental United States (OCONUS). The capabilities of this small subset of AR units play a vital role to the commanders of United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) and United States European Command (EUCOM) when needed during shaping and contingency operations. It is unclear if the OCONUS stationed AR units are capable of overcoming the readiness challenges related to the personnel recruiting base, rapid mobilization, and ability to meet necessary training requirements. This study will examine those challenges in order to determine the specific role of forward stationed AR units. It will also provide recommendations that address the challenges of meeting the desired outcomes of the AR and Joint Force.


Author: LTC Brian Nissen

Published: October 2017

The US is pursuing a Third Offset Strategy to maintain a leading edge in the execution of warfare. What effects will this have on the smaller NATO member’s defense policy and options for force development, continued interoperability with US forces and maintaining relevance in NATO or US-led coalition operations? Today threats posed by potential antagonists like China and Russia, but also the spread of high tech, low cost weapon systems in general, drive the need for a Third Offset strategy. The Third Offset requires new technology and new warfighting concepts. Historically new military technology has been expensive to procure and implement for smaller allies. The focus on new and innovative concepts presents opportunities for smaller allies. The small NATO member state Denmark will be used as a case to validate the thesis that smaller NATO countries should focus their defense investments on fundamental warfighting capabilities. These warfighting capabilities must be able to connect to the future network supporting the Third Offset Strategy. The USA must take steps to mitigate risks to interoperability within NATO caused by the Third Offset Strategy.


Author: COL Joao Alberto d. Nunes

Published: October 2017

Brazil will be a global player and one of the world’s largest economies by 2030. However, given globalization, the rise of non-states actors, and demographics issues, trends point to an increase in individualism and the fracturing of national identity with painful consequences to nationalism. This paper examines whether Brazil's grand strategy for 2030 adequately addresses national identity and national will to support the instruments of national power in achieving the country’s interests. Given the strategy formulation framework, Brazil must identify its threats and its place on the global stage to correctly define its interests. The country must balance its defense expenditures with its economy to protect its sovereignty, citizens, and resources, avoiding the Melian trap of the Peloponnesian war. Thucydides’ fear, honor, and interest construct plays a significant role in the scenarios used to assess risks. The paper closes with the recommendation that, using strategic communications and the educational system, Brazil must bolster its national identity and improve the national will of its population to avoid negative trends and adequately support the elements of power in pursuing the country's interests.


Author: COL Benjamin R. Ogden

Published: October 2017

The US Army has mastered the art of developing officers who dominate the tactical and operational levels of war, but it struggles to produce exemplary strategic leaders who excel within the civilian-military framework and under the complex demands of the strategic environment. What this paper carefully unpacks are the ideas that rigid cultural norms, faulty officer management practices, and significant flaws in Professional Military Education (PME) generate damaging gaps in the development of commissioned officers in the active component. In fact, the analysis will indicate that these discrepancies delicately nudge the Army towards sculpting its junior officers into tactically savvy and combat-effective generals instead of expert strategic leaders. The Army needs to recognize these shortfalls and make systematic adjustments within the Army Leader Development Model to reverse the trends. Recommended adjustments include merging Army University efforts with human resources practices, promoting critical thinking opportunities by redefining and enforcing broadening assignment requirements, enhancing the status of academic proficiency, restructuring inefficient segments of PME, and increasing continuing education requirements for General Officers. Doing so ensures all future Army generals emerge as proficient sources of strategic competency.


Author: COL Jaimie Ogilvie

Published: October 2017

The return of Foreign Fighters (FFs) from the Middle East to their countries of origin in the Caribbean, have created concerns about the future security and stability of the region, for policy makers and stakeholders alike. The potential negative impact of these persons, whether integrated into criminal networks or engaging in acts of terror, on the developing but vulnerable tourism-based economies of the region, as well as in such close proximity to the United States of America, is palpable. This paper explores approaches to the reintegration of persons with violent skill sets, and draws on the experiences of other countries facing the same challenge, as well as lessons learned from Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) and criminal deportation programs, to make recommendations appropriate for the Caribbean. These include greater information sharing, enhanced detection and monitoring capabilities, the development of structured reintegration programs (RPs) designed to re-socialize and equip returning FFs to positively contribute to society (whether incarcerated or at liberty), the communication of clear policies by governments, and capacity building in regional institutions by external actors to mitigate the threat. A failure to adequately engage these FFs could have negative effects on the security of the region.


Author: Lt Col Derek S. Ost

Published: October 2017

The rapidly changing operating environment of today suggests that landpower forces will increasingly operate in and among congested urban areas where interaction with indigenous inhabitants is required. To be successful, these operations will require a more thorough understanding of the language, region, and culture(s); referred throughout this paper as language, regional expertise and culture (LREC) competencies. The Marine Corps must adopt additional measures to meet the future challenges associated with an increasingly complex and ambiguous operating environment. First, the Marine Corps must create a full-time, single-track foreign area officer cadre within its intelligence enterprise. Second, intelligence specialists must become specialized by region in order to develop a more robust cross-cultural expertise. Third, the Marine Corps must employ a more effective talent management process that will ensure the placement of the right person in the right job. Throughout the paper, I use John Kotter’s eight-stage process of creating major change to examine the difficulties in implementing these recommendations.


Author: COL Darcy L. Overbey

Published: October 2017

The changing strategic environment places greater emphasis on military leaders and the decisions they make. To prepare the leaders of tomorrow, the Army should consider capitalizing on everyday opportunities to improve leadership skill. Parenthood can offer leaders the opportunity to test and refine strategic leadership skills. The ability to transfer skills between personal and profession life, however, is dependent on the degree of separation between the two. Leaders that create a barrier between family and work may miss this developmental opportunity. Leaders that tightly integrate their roles in the work and family realms may be able to accelerate their leadership development. To capitalize on existing opportunities, the Army must change its organizational culture to permit the transference of lessons learned from experiential learning outside the workplace. The result will positively impact recruiting as well as retention.


Author: COL William M. Parker

Published: October 2017

The German leadership philosophy of Auftragstaktik forms the foundation of the U.S. Army’s Mission Command leadership doctrine. Auftragstaktik loosely translates into English as mission-type orders. This translation, however, fails to encompass the true meaning of a far more nuanced and broader philosophy. Due to such discrepancies, U.S. leaders fail to fully understand the unique Prussian-German circumstances, culture, and individuals surrounding the development and evolution of the Auftragstaktik concept. This misunderstanding causes the U.S. Army to struggle with implementation of the Mission Command doctrine. This paper will conduct a thorough analysis of the unique circumstantial and cultural conditions that led to the development and evolution of the Prussian-German construct of Auftragstaktik. Through the lens of this analysis, the paper will then seek to answer the fundamental question of whether the U.S. Army, within its own unique historic, political and cultural conditions, can fully implement a leadership doctrine founded in Auftragstaktik.


Author: Lt Col Richard H. Pitchford

Published: October 2017

Plan Colombia was a multilayered strategy to bolster the Colombian economy, enhance the armed forces, disrupt drug trade, restore territorial control, and strengthen the rule of law. Dr. Gabriel Marcella, a regional expert and former professor at the U.S. Army War College, described the undertaking as “nothing less than a grand strategy for the remaking of the nation.” Moving forward nearly twenty years, it is possible to evaluate the execution and effectiveness of this strategy. Although the progress in Colombia is undeniable, much of the success is owed to factors beyond the scope of the original strategy. In the end, what occurred in Colombia can be most accurately attributed to the evolution of strategy combined with key contextual factors--including popular support, inspired leadership, technological advantages, and timing--that were beyond the scope of the original plan. Examining the plan along with these key contextual factors reveals the true seeds of progress and valuable insights into the nature of strategic success in counterinsurgencies.


Author: LTC Tracey Poirier

Published: October 2017

Coalitions and partnerships with foreign nations is an increasing reality and interoperability with potentially unknown partners is required. The State Partnership Program provides the design, experience and depth to assist with this endeavor and its natural civilian oversight makes the strategic political connection to military and humanitarian assistance efforts stronger. This paper will explore the power of sustained relationships and idea sharing in relation to the National Guard State Partnership Program with the goal of reaching National Security Strategy end states. It will also make a case for logistical preparation of the battlefield through the program for both infrastructure improvement and economic development as part of a formula for improving nation building potential. Furthermore, it will address, as a first step, the ineffectiveness of the current means of State Partnership Program assessment and provide recommendations for measures of effectiveness based on national strategic outcomes. With a modest expansion of the variety of engagements, the SPP can contribute to success in setting the theater and become an integral piece to regional strategy.


Author: COL Luigi Postiglione

Published: October 2017

The protection of cultural heritage presents a dilemma for every commander. The identification of historic buildings with military objectives has often led to the destruction of works of art, robbing humanity of pieces of its history. Over the last decades, culture has moved to the frontline of war, both as collateral damage and a direct target for belligerents who use the destruction of culture as a means to foster more violence, hatred, and revenge. This destruction strikes at societies over the long term, weakening the foundations for peace, hindering reconciliation when hostilities end. Recent conflicts in Mali, in Libya, Yemen, Iraq or Syria have demonstrated that the protection of heritage is inseparable from the protection of human lives, since the destruction of an artifact has become an integral part of a global strategy of ethnical cleansing, which seeks to eliminate all forms of diversity. In this context, military forces need to adapt and strengthen their tools, behaviors and skills to take into account the protection of heritage as an integral part of sustainable strategies to build peace and security.


Author: COL Pat Proctor

Published: October 2017

The U.S. Army failed to heed warnings from Operation Joint Endeavor in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the mid-1990s that it was ill-prepared for low-intensity conflicts. Instead of altering the trajectory of the ongoing Army transformation, Army transformers continued to prepare for high-intensity conflict, an effort that culminated in the creation of the Interim Brigade Combat Teams. This study is an intellectual history focused on the debate between Army transformers and critics of transformation. It examines contemporary doctrine, opinions expressed in military journals and magazines, studies conducted by Army educational institutions, internal Army documents, and speeches from senior Army leaders. It also includes insights from interviews conducted by the author with key senior Army leaders of the time. This study concludes that Army transformers ignored evidence from Operation Joint Endeavor and the arguments of transformation’s critics because of a prevailing Army culture favoring preparation for high-intensity conflict operations over all other activities.


Author: COL Roman J. Przekwas

Published: October 2017

Russia’s military resurgence and claims of its sphere of influence raised concerns for many neighboring countries who are the members of NATO. Since 2014, NATO is providing security to its most exposed members. Decisions taken at the two last NATO summits enhanced the Alliance’s defensive posture on its eastern and southern flanks. This paper analyses the strategic goals of both NATO and Russia, and provides a brief assessment of how they are being achieved. The research proves that the assurance and deterrence measures applied so far by NATO has contributed to the overall stabilization of the situation in the region. However, those measures did not precluded Russia from continuing of its aggressive policy. The study argues also that NATO should further adapt itself by developing its defensive and offensive capabilities to match Russian threat. This should be pursued by a combination of conventional, nuclear and missile defense capabilities and enhancing the resilience to hybrid warfare. NATO should maintain the opportunity to restart a constructive dialogue with Russia, but should avoid this dialogue from a weaker position. Therefore, the paper also advocates for an urgent need to develop a new NATO security strategy.


Author: Mr Patrick b. Quinn

Published: October 2017

The shift from a relatively stable bi-polar world has increased the need for supplements to the existing instruments of national power. To supplement national power without increasing costs, the U.S. should study and apply strategic deception. Deception is an effort to take active steps to manipulate and distract an opponent in order to shift the strategic picture, creating operating space for political as well as military actors. The returns for a modest investment in deception greatly exceed the initial costs. Examined here are Iraqi strategic deception efforts against Iran and against the Gulf War coalition, and the 1973 Egyptian deception campaign against the Israelis. Deception operations should be codified into policy at the national level, where they can then be mirrored down the chain of command into the agencies and the military. The Defense Intelligence Agency would coordinate, train, and monitor the effectiveness of Deception Planning Cells which are staffed by field grade officers with the Additional Skill Identifier (ASI) of Deception Planner. The military could lead a cultural shift to use deception by incorporating it into its planning and operational cycle. This could in turn pave the way to incorporate it in conjunction with other national instruments of power.


Author: COL Brendan C. Raymond

Published: October 2017

The Russian military operations in Georgia (2008), Crimea and Eastern Ukraine (2014), and Syria (2015) demonstrate that the characteristic of Russian warfare is dynamic. Driven by factors of technological advances, changes in doctrine, and the incorporation of lessons from recent conflicts in the Middle East, Russia revolutionized their methods of conducting warfare artfully integrating lethality, coercion, and disinformation to achieve strategic effects on the modern battlefield. To deter Russia’s aggressive behavior and interventionist agenda in Europe, Eurasia and the Middle East, the U.S. Army must increase the size and capability of its forces committed to Europe, incorporate lessons learned to transform current doctrine and training of decisive action, and develop new material to address challenges with joint force entry operations, joint combined arms maneuver, and the integration and delivery of joint fires. A focus on these improvements will enable the U.S. Army to provide a more credible deterrent in Europe, reassure America’s partners and allies, and prepare the military for future conflict against similar near-peer competitors.


Author: Lt Col Mark R. Reid

Published: October 2017

Technological innovation occurs more rapidly, more frequently, and more diffusely today than ever – a reality many of our adversaries have seized upon. Despite evidence that unique human attributes (e.g., creativity, synthesis, empathy) drive success in a more automated world, the DoD still favors technological breakthroughs over human development to maintain competitive advantage. Rather than trying to outpace technological innovations, this paper suggests the Marine Corps focus on cultural changes that fill its ranks with entrepreneurial-minded individuals. Interestingly, the Corps codified several military entrepreneurship concepts in 1989 through its “maneuver warfare” doctrine. This paper summarizes potential characteristics and inputs to military entrepreneurship. It analyzes challenges to instituting entrepreneurial culture through the Corps’ struggle to fully adopt maneuver warfare doctrine. And it recommends several pathways to fostering entrepreneurial spirit from senior leader engagement to recruiting, to re-imagining our professional military schools.


Author: COL Joseph W. Roberts

Published: October 2017

Ask any Soldier about acquisition and they will say it takes too long. During the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Department of Defense undertook several initiatives to get Soldiers badly needed equipment in a timely manner. Some of these initiatives were effective and should be emulated by Army rapid acquisitions leaders going forward. Leaders in organizations such as the Rapid Equipping Force, the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell, and the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization achieved some notably short turnaround times on requests for materiel solutions. The lessons learned were about how they organized, how they managed requirements, how they obtained funding, and how they managed the acquisition and fielding. Recently the Army established a new Rapid Capabilities Office to expedite the delivery of critical combat materiel capabilities to the Warfighter. To learn from the lessons of those organizations this paper recommends what innovative approaches the Army Generating Force leadership should incorporate into the Rapid Capabilities Office to meet the demand for rapid response with materiel solutions and exploit advantages technology that can give the Soldier a competitive advantage on the battlefield.


Author: COL Araon B. Sander

Published: October 2017

The suicide rate in the Army was below the national average in 2001 but had risen sharply by 2008, more than doubling within the institution, and have remained at that level ever since. This paper explores why differences in Service suicide rates exist, and then uses that analysis to make recommendations for Army policy and future studies that may mitigate the alarming and increasing trend of Soldier suicide. Recommendations include placing suicide prevention with the Army medical community that better understands its causation; reviewing the necessity to enlist convicted criminals into the Army; to review the current policy of promoting Soldiers into leadership positions or separating them; to capture the entire legal history of Soldiers who attempt or complete Soldier suicide to conclude whether or not to continue granting criminal waivers to new recruits; and to more closely examine the phenomenon of trauma, particularly interpersonal trauma, as it relates to suicide. In the final analysis, we cannot presently conclude that Army suicide rates are a function of Army policy because the granularity of data needed does not exist.


Author: LTC Andrew O. Saslav

Published: October 2017

The United States Army has developed a Civil-Military relations model based on Samuel Huntington’s The Soldier and the State. Written in 1957, Huntington’s work is the fundamental theory used to develop the current military profession. The military profession needs to abandon this Civil-Military relations model as defined by Huntington. It must build a new Civil-Military relations model inspired by America’s first and greatest strategic leader, General George Washington. The world of developing America’s national security strategy is as much military as it is political. It is the realm of senior military officers as well as of civilian leaders. Learning to effectively operate inside the environment is necessary for a senior military officer’s career, and critical for the future of the Nation. The challenge of providing military advice in the complex national security environment, informed by political considerations and relevant to the nation’s civilian leadership requires a unique skill set. General George Washington thrived in this complex environment and his experience is an example for senior military leaders.


Author: COL Lucas A. Schreurs

Published: October 2017

Modern social technology based connectivity provides chances to improve strategic decision and organizational output. It can bring a new kind of organizational approach, combining a centralized and decentralized approach, improving mission command through better connectivity throughout the organization. Integrating social technology into workflow optimizes internal and external processes providing additional competitive benefits. New opportunities like staff on demand provide better use of collective intelligence using worldwide talent, creating diversity in thought and output. By using external resources when necessary, an organization creates flexibility and agility within its organization. Routine tasks can be transferred to temporary staff personal on demand, providing “more army out of the army.” Crowd-based communities no longer depend on physical proximity. Revenues can be creative ideas, solutions, and it anchors military organizations in public discourse. Strategic leaders can benefit using social technology by developing their personal “crowd,” based on quality over quantity, which helps them in making and improving strategic decisions. These connections provide access to global networks and knowledge. Not just accelerating processes, but improving quality on understanding and broad approaches to problem solving. Organizations making use of modern social technology have proven to be having an advantage over competitors.


Author: COL Corey L. Seats

Published: October 2017

In response to a natural disaster or other emergency, a governor has many state assets available to respond and provide support. If the state’s disaster response needs exceed the ability to which the state can respond with its own assets, the governor may request additional assistance from the federal government. Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA), or federal military support, is one type of assistance the U.S. government can provide. While DSCA offers many valuable response assets, the differing command and control frameworks of active, reserve, and National Guard forces may impede unity of the response effort. The Dual Status Commander (DSC) construct was created to provide unity of command in DSCA activities when the response includes both active and reserve forces. The DSC construct works well to synchronize DSCA activities in security events or disasters contained within single states and FEMA Regions. However, it is ill-suited to synchronize and coordinate DSCA response in no-notice multi-state catastrophes. This research project will examine the current DSCA and DSC structure, assess the use of DSCs in recent events, evaluate DSC shortcomings in a no-notice multi-state complex catastrophe, and provide recommendations for addressing these shortcomings.


Author: COL Mark B. Sherkey

Published: October 2017

This paper provides a compelling narrative that describes and explains several prevailing currents impacting the Veteran Support landscape and ultimately affecting Army readiness. These are seen in the likes of navigation and aggregation challenges; the absence of strategic narratives to inform the ecosystem; restrictive public policies and regulatory obstacles; a lack of investment in technological advancements within the military transition process; and persistent forms of information asymmetry directly impacting the transitioning service member. It aims to explore these challenges facing the transitioning service member and family; as well as, barriers impeding creators wanting to bring innovative technology solutions to bear within this space. Lastly, informs senior military and civilian leaders to current challenges if left unabated will continue to reduce the readiness of the military and veteran support ecosystem. As a potential way forward, an enhanced public-private and non-profit partnership construct for a readiness campaign is proposed.


Author: Cdr David J. Smith

Published: October 2017

The U.S. policy in dealing with Islamic State of Iraq and Syria is flawed. Destroying a terrorist group requires the elimination of a radical ideology, which is impossible. A radical ideology cannot be seen, and it spreads much like a virus. However, if a radical ideology is treated as an epidemic (in a social sense), then the threat it poses can be contained, treated, and immunized against to reduce and maintain its occurrences at politically and socially acceptable levels. A plausible method of combating the threat of radical Islam/jihadism can be developed by exploring the use of epidemiology and using the epidemiologic triangle of agent, host, and environment to identify how this violent ideology spreads. The analysis contained in this paper results in a solution consisting of inoculation, containment, and elimination. Through inoculation, the linkages that connect agent and environment to the host are severed. Containment isolates the host to an “infected” area, and elimination reduces those infected to the maximum extent possible.


Author: LTC Nicole R. Spears

Published: October 2017

Diversity of the (military) force is a key strategic issue that needs to be addressed if the Army’s desires successful navigation within the strategic environment of the 21st century and beyond. The human dimension as it relates to talent management allows us to leverage diversity in support of Soldiers (and Civilians) as the organization’s most valuable resource. The initial step in opening this discussion involves how we define diversity. Is it just through physical characteristics or can we consider the relevance of diversity of thought, also? Venturing into 2025, the Army can better provide national needs if it acts through its Army Reserve Officer Training Corps to address issues concerning diversity. The areas of focus are a declining number of minority commissions, a lack of geographic representation, and a poor representation of students studying Science, Technology, Engineering, and Math. Advertising the military mission, recruiting the right talent in the form of officer production, and mentoring all play a vital role in developing diverse, strategic leaders of the future.


Author: Lt Col Guy T. Spencer

Published: October 2017

Trust is an element of relationships that affects people and organizations. The trust relationship is fragile and influenced by many factors. The relationship between the American public and the military is no different. While this relationship appears strong to date, lapses in judgement and a growing lack of connection between the military and public threaten the strength of this bond. Leaders must understand the environment and the concept of trust to facilitate change. Trust originates from individuals and builds outward to relationships with people and organizations. This makes trust a central component to the Profession of Arms. The military must adjust its culture and embed mechanisms that develop the profession based on values and heritage. Then, the profession must develop a plan to connect with civilian leaders and the American public, exposing them to the military identity, skill and capabilities resident in the armed forces. The military has an obligation to build a genuine trust with the population it swears to protect.


Author: COL Patrick Sullivan

Published: October 2017

Artificial intelligence (AI) is on a developmental trajectory to be the central force in future society. There will be many benefits from this, but serious challenges as well, particularly for the national security setting. AI’s development virtually guarantees that lethal autonomous weapons will someday be unleashed on the battlefield. Although these weapons could conceivably lower the human cost of war, they carry significant proliferation and collateral damage risk as well, and could make the decision to go to war easier. This would be inherently destabilizing to the Westphalian geopolitical order, which is already under strain due to AI’s democratization of information. As the dominant artificial intelligence company, Google is best positioned to benefit from any decentralization and rebalancing of state power that occurs from AI-related disruption, with Silicon Valley as a whole becoming a political entity unto itself. Whatever the resultant decentralized/rebalanced power construct looks like, all stakeholders – transnational technology companies, nation-states, and what remains of the international system – will have a responsibility to provide collective good governance to ensure that AI’s outcomes stay as positive as possible, especially as relates to privacy concerns, job displacement, and increased socio-economic inequality


Author: COL Brandon R. Tegtmeier

Published: October 2017

Commanders of joint inter-agency special operations task forces make hundreds of judgments every day as they target enemy networks. Many of these judgments lead to critical decisions that have wide reaching implications. Joint inter-agency special operations task force staffs make countless judgments, as well, in order to assist the commander in making these decisions. While commanders have been very effective historically, there is room for improvement. Recent findings from decision science research can improve the accuracy of commanders’ judgments through standardization of probabilistic language and documentation of accuracy for all individual judgments. Being wrong comes with the territory of any decision maker. However, commanders of joint inter-agency special operations task forces can make real adjustments to increase their accuracy, thereby lowering the risk to friendly forces, lowering the risk of strategically negative events, and, most importantly, enhancing effects on the enemy.


Author: COL Derek K. Thomson

Published: October 2017

Over the past several years, the Army has unknowingly distanced itself from the interpersonal element of leadership, creating a significant gap between the intentions of the leader and the perceptions of the led. Through its doctrine and statements, the concept of leader development expanded and therefore diluted fundamental principles such as influence and trust. As a result, the Army has lost the basic essence of leadership. To reverse this course, the Army must adopt a coaching culture. This paper recommends four separate and distinct actions, which impact the operational and institutional domains and strongly reinforce the self-developmental domain. They are: establish a unit-level coaching program, place greater emphasis on the Command Climate Survey, revise the MSAF, and re-establish the Army’s Organizational Effectiveness program. Taking these steps will strengthen the personal connection aspect of leadership and improve the effectiveness of our greatest strategic advantage – our people.


Author: COL Theodore F. Travis

Published: October 2017

America’s Founding Fathers viewed a large standing army as a significant threat to the Republic and codified measures to keep the fledgling military under civilian control. For nearly two centuries, their vision was manifested in a small military which consisted of a nucleus of military professionals who were augmented by citizens mobilized to perform their civic duty for America’s common defense in times of crisis. After the Vietnam War, a conscript army became socially unacceptable and politically untenable. The All-Volunteer Force (AVF) was introduced to provide a professional military manned solely by willing volunteers. Over time the AVF has become physically and psychologically isolated from the society it serves, resulting in a civil-military gap. As fewer Americans elect to serve in the military, the AVF is no longer representative of the nation it serves, disproportionately drawing recruits from the same geographic, social, economic, and educational spheres. The resulting American Warrior Caste (AWC) upholds a distinct set of values which it sees as superior to those of a society it views with contempt. As democratic institutions fail, and the populace and government become more polarized, the AWC potentially poses a risk to the United States


Author: Dr James T. Treharne

Published: October 2017

The Army has two professional communities, the Profession of Arms and the Army Civilian Corps. However, Army-wide survey data shows there is insufficient mutual trust between members of the two communities. Perceived lack of leader inspiration, coaching, and counselling; mentoring, and confidence in the ability to certify Soldiers and Civilians in competence, character, and commitment contribute to the lack of mutual trust. This paper examines mutual trust in mixed organizations in the institutional Army where both communities, Soldiers and Civilians, serve together. The Army has numerous initiatives to enhance Civilian development. These include career program management, acculturation, and training. This paper assesses these initiatives and makes recommendations related to career program management, workplace initiatives, culture, and shared professional experiences.


Author: COL Michael A. True

Published: October 2017

The Army has created a culture out of its training enterprise that inhibits sustainment of unit readiness over time. Instead of units maintaining a continuous high state of readiness, they endure cycles of low readiness followed by ramp-up events in preparation for a major evaluation event, known as a Culminating Training Event (CTE). Today’s strategic environment is too dynamic and uncertain to allow the Army to continue on this path. Although the Army developed a new Sustainable Readiness Model to prevent the readiness cliff, it does not address the CTE Culture problem. This paper explores the problems that the CTE Culture causes for the Army and explores remedial options. Because CTE Culture is an institutionalized practice in the Army, institution theory is the analysis tool for identifying its artifacts and rituals as well as the basis for remedial actions. Finally, this paper will offer recommendations to kill the CTE Culture by building a new Sustainable Readiness Cultural in its place.


Author: LTC Trent D. Upton

Published: October 2017

Accurately assessing and reporting readiness are of great importance to the Army in order to fulfill its responsibilities in defense of the nation. Yet, the Army’s current system for this vital requirement is problematic. The Army’s latest attempt to address this challenge is the new Objective-Task, or Objective-T reporting method. Meanwhile, the Army continues to have challenges with implementing mission command in the force. This paper examines the Army’s new Objective-T training readiness reporting system relative to its promotion of mission command, in order to evaluate how Objective-T reinforces or hinders mission command. Further, it will address the Army’s prioritization of objectively assessing and reporting training versus mission command when these two ideas clash. I argue that in the short term the Army’s implementation of Objective-T is a valid method to improve readiness reporting, while assuming risk in its potential impacts on mission command. However, in the long-term Objective-T and mission command are compatible, and can be employed in a complementary fashion. Carefully crafting and monitoring Objective-T implementation can mitigate conflicts with mission command for the Army’s benefit.


Author: LT COL Darius Vaicikauskas

Published: October 2017

“Founding Act on Mutual relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation” signed in Paris on May 27th 1997 was supposed to be the act of warm, cooperative relations which ensures lasting peace in the Euro-Atlantic region. More importantly, the Founding act included commitments to norms of international behavior in accordance with UN charter and OSCE documents as well as explicit commitments to respect sovereign states and their right to choose the means to ensure their security. However, Russia’s thaw policy lasted until the appearance of the new Russian president Vladimir Putin in 1999. Russia’s new president, exploiting opportunity of economic growth, started to consolidate and centralize political power in his hands. During the period of V.Putin and D.Medvedev’s presidency Russia’s behavior had changed back to almost old soviet rhetoric’s. The current aggressive and assertive Russian behavior and rhetoric was reflected in its National security strategy, Foreign policy, and Military doctrine.


Author: COL Eric J. Van Den Bosch

Published: October 2017

The current Army Leadership Model addresses attributes and competencies of leaders that rightfully centers on human-human relationships. In 2050 and beyond, the implications of the Third Offset Strategy on the Army will challenge leaders with an operational environment transitioning to more human-machine relationships, especially with human-machine collaborative decision making and manned-unmanned teaming. Underpinned by mission command philosophy (centered on trust), leadership attributes (character, presence, intellect), and core leadership competencies (lead, develop, achieve), the Army needs to adapt leader development to enable our leaders to trust, understand, and lead increasingly capable levels of robotics and autonomous systems (RAS) - otherwise known as artificial intelligence (AI).


Author: COL Jeff VanAntwerp

Published: October 2017

Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) are currently confronted with disruptive changes in their operating environment which threaten their ability to provide the value the nation requires in the future. To win the current fight and set the conditions for future success, ARSOF organizations must become more innovative. Through organizational ambidexterity, ARSOF leaders can address the disruptive changes in their operating environment by increasing innovation while maintaining the control required to win the current fight. Like any large organizational change effort, the ARSOF leader is the key to developing an ambidextrous organization. Only the leader can hold the tensions between exploitation and exploration, and lead the strategic renewal necessary for organizational change. This paper proposes innovation leadership priorities for ARSOF leaders, and offers practical ideas on how leaders can lead this change and align their organizations to innovate.


Author: LT COL Nestoras Vargemezis

Published: October 2017

Greece and Turkey share a long history over the centuries. As the followers of the Byzantine and Ottoman Empires their relationship is characterized by tension and conflict. As a result the build-up of military capabilities is very important for both countries. Since the current President Recep Tayyip Erdo?an came to power, Turkey has increased significantly its investment in the military with the goal to become totally independent from international suppliers and produce its equipment domestically. One of the major goals of this project was the production of indigenous UAVs with advanced capabilities and the program has already paid off with the production of vehicles capable of launching anti tank missiles. Greece on the other hand, although it has a long history in the research, development and use of UAVs, has not made significant steps to achieve similar goals. This paper will argue the reasons for the Turkish success, the implications for Greece's security and will recommend how Greece should move forward to build its own capacity and advance in the research for similar systems.


Author: LTC Barry K. Vincent

Published: October 2017

Maintaining a large standing Army is costly. Although historically our Nation has been loath to do so, the U.S.’s increasing global role and exigent threats to our National Security and World Order have compelled its being. The challenge for Congress, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), the Army, and ultimately the American people, is to balance the need to deter antagonists in peace and, if required, prevail against adversaries in war, with the high cost of maintaining the large standing Army required to do so. One way to help reduce the high cost of a large army is through the expeditious reliance on the Reserve Component (RC). This paper explores the key factors that led to the creation of the RC (both the National Guard and federal reserve force), examines the current framework for how different types of forces are assigned to the three components (Regular Army, Army Reserve, and National Guard), and proposes subsuming the federal reserve forces within the National Guard and modifying the current force mix between the Regular Army and a consolidated National Guard/Reserve force for both a cost efficient and effective Total Force.


Author: COL William D. Voorhies

Published: October 2017

This strategy research project will argue that the United States should re-balance its strategy from a focus on a short-term war against ideologically inspired groups, to a long-term strategy that assists Islam with rejecting the ideology that feeds the disease of Islamic terrorism. Likening fighting Jihadi-Salafi terrorism to fighting cancer, the U.S. can improve its collaborative approach by enhancing the Informational instrument of U.S. power. The present strategy has failed to prevent ISIL and other such groups from metastasizing globally. Risk has increased to American citizens at home and abroad. Risk is evident with long-term stability within the Middle-East manifested through the Shia-Sunni civil war and regional geopolitics. The U.S. should rebalance its strategy to better contain and stabilize the ISIL tumor. The U.S. can marginalize ISIL’s social media messaging and its ability to grow regionally, then globally through cyber initiatives. Finally, by resourcing the new Global Engagement Center in the DOS to serve as the soft-power arm of U.S. strategy, the U.S. can enable the Muslim world to reject the cancer of Jihadi-Salafism.


Author: COL Gary Walenda

Published: October 2017

The United States is facing one of the most complex security environments in history, one that it is ill prepared for and poorly structured to address. Threats are increasingly transregional and hybrid, but US efforts remain regionally focused and departmentally aligned. Adversaries increasingly exploit this gap as an offset against overwhelming US might. Initiatives to increase the lethality of the military without better global interagency synchronization will result in a military that is both awesome and largely irrelevant. Cultural, bureaucratic, and societal factors have made progress elusive. Bureaucratic and cultural changes, made within the context of societal realties, are essential to achieve unified action against these threats. This paper is arranged into three parts. The first attempts to understand the nature of these threats, efforts to address them, and remaining gaps and challenges. The second addresses why security reform has been so elusive. The third offers recommendations based on the analysis from the first two parts.


Author: COL Brittian A. Walker

Published: October 2017

Most popularly known as the 8th President of the United States, Martin Van Buren’s greater impact and legacy is best understood through his role as one of his predecessor’s most influential strategic advisors. As Secretary of State, emissary to Britain, Vice President, and a key member of Andrew Jackson’s “kitchen cabinet,” Van Buren’s influence was undeniable. The establishment of the Modern Democratic Party, the Indian Removal Act, the Petticoat Affair and the Nullification Crisis all occurred during Jackson’s two terms in office (1829-1837) and Martin Van Buren played an historic role in shaping key Jacksonian policies that in turn shaped this nation. As another political outsider like Jackson takes office as the 45th President of the United States, Van Buren’s success and influence remain critically relevant for the aspiring strategic advisor today.


Author: LTC John W. Wells

Published: October 2017

This paper argues that the Army Career Intermission Program should be revised to better address the persistent decline in company grade officer retention rates. The departure of mid-career officers represents a strategic risk to the U.S. Code Title 10 responsibility to provide trained and ready land forces. The Career Intermission Program is intended to address the decline in retention rates by allowing select officers to take a sabbatical from active military service to earn a degree, learn a new skill or start a family. The Career Intermission Program represents an opportunity to preserve and protect the Army’s human capital investment from mid-career flight. Providing options in intermission status service would signal a departure from the “military bureaucracy” and more firmly establish the social compact between service member and organization. A revised Career Intermission Exchange Program creates the opportunity to simultaneously enhance its investment in all three components of the Total Force through cross acculturation between the Army National Guard, the Army Reserves and the Regular Army. Historical environment, organizational and individual culture, and the principles of human capital management are elements of the analysis. A comparison of the current Career Intermission Program with the revised Career Intermission Exchange Program completes the presentation of the proposal.


Author: LTC John M. Wilson

Published: October 2017

Many prominent Cold War-era thinkers and practitioners argued that escalation dominance, a condition where a competitor is more willing and capable of discouraging an opponent from taking an unwanted action at all levels of conflict short of nuclear war, is necessary to achieve success in deterrence strategies. The rapid evolution of information systems and networks has connected people and institutions more closely today than during any other point of human history. As such, the contemporary information environment affords weaker states and non-state actors greater opportunities to employ asymmetric stratagems to deny their stronger opponents’ deterrence objectives. This project examines escalation dominance theory in the modern context and concludes that the contemporary information environment has reduced its value in predicting deterrence outcomes. Today, weaker nations and non-state actors are using the ambiguity and relative novelty of cyberspace to create opportunities to advance national interests without causing escalations with stronger nation states.


Author: Mr Romeo Wright

Published: October 2017

The United States Army (US) enjoyed an unprecedented advantage over its adversaries in large-scale, force-on-force engagements in open terrain since the end of the Cold War largely because of the Brigade Combat Team (BCT). However, the US Army is at a critical juncture. After more than 15 years of war in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is undergoing similar challenges as those that occurred after World War II, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and Desert Storm. There is increased downward pressure on the budget, which inevitably leads to reduction in manpower and structure. In addition, Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran spent the past 15 years analyzing the Army’s tactics, training methods, organization, structure, and command and control methods. Moreover, cyber hacking and the cheap proliferation of technology has made advanced military weapons, computers, and commercial electronics widely available in the world. Finally, it is widely believed that future wars will be fought in dense, urban areas. This paper analyzes the vitality of BCTs given the changing future operating environment, fiscal austerity, emerging technology, and increasing capability of adversaries.


Author: ISGP Institute on Science for Global Policy, USAWC Strategic Studies Institute

Published: October 2017

Why does climate matter for the security of the nation and its citizens? A series of critical evaluations and recommendations focused on how current and deteriorating climate/weather conditions impact U.S. national security and U.S. military missions, domestically and internationally.


Editor: Mister Robert C Browne

Published: October 2017

Welcome to the most recent issue of the PKSOI Peace & Stability Journal. In this edition the PKSOI Director Colonel Gregory Dewitt will introduce the articles of the Journal, go over the past three months of PKSOI's activities and also brief you on the upcoming major activities and events. This journal features articles from PKSOI Subject Matter Experts in their respective fields and also include articles from PKSOI interns. The feature is from PSKOI intern Abdullah Rumman.


Author: USAWC Strategic Studies Institute

Published: October 2017

The United States Army War College seeks to fill the position of (Assistant/Associate/Full) Research Professor of National Security and Military Strategy in the Strategic Studies Institute.


Author: Dr Mary Manjikian

Published: October 2017

Many different actors oppose the use of unmanned autonomous weapons (UAV’s) from adversary states, to international governmental organizations to policymakers and academics. However, the basis for their opposition varies, as do the assumptions behind their arguments. This Letort Paper lays out distinctions between arguments about technology, arguments about policy, and arguments about strategy.


Author: Dr Jean-Loup Samaan

Published: September 2017

Although collective security in the Gulf is the topic of numerous policy publications, most of the available literature focuses on the political environment without considering the operational requirements of this scenario. This monograph offers an evaluation of Gulf defense cooperation programs in order to stir the discussion on the future of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) as the “NATO of the Gulf.”


Author: Mr Roman Muzalevsky

Published: September 2017

A series of megatrends will present a major challenge to the United States in the coming decades, exposing it to crises and opportunities on the battlefield and in the market. The U.S. military should stand ready to harness these dynamics to retain its edge in an operational environment marked by increased complexity, speed, and intensity of global developments.


Author: MAJ Daniel D. Maurer

Published: September 2017

This monograph reimagines war’s fundamental nature, extending Clausewitz’s theory of its political origin and “Trinitarian” elements in a way that embraces alternative, sociological explanations like that of John Keegan. Ultimately, it proposes a new way to visualize the complexities of war’s intrinsic elements, operating at any scale, and expresses war with a completely new and universal definition.


Editor: Prof Frank L Jones

Published: August 2017

The fiscal year (FY) 2017 National Defense Authorization Act, which includes a title to reform the Department of Defense (DoD) security cooperation, has far-reaching implications for U.S. defense interests in Africa. As the Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee notes, “the Department of Defense continues to place greater emphasis on security cooperation, to include building partner capacity.” The term “building partner capacity” (BPC) widens the focus of security cooperation as a whole-of-government effort, and makes clear congressional interest in treating security cooperation as a defense institution building endeavor. In response to the law, this book examines and recommends specific steps the DoD can take to build partner capacity successfully in Africa and meet congressional direction.


Editor: Dr Antulio J Echevarria II

Published: August 2017

The Summer issue of Parameters opens with an essay by Sir Lawrence Freedman entitled “Beyond Surprise Attack.” Surprise, argues Freedman, can come in any number of forms, and sometimes those that come in the middle or end of a campaign prove the most decisive. Our first forum, Reevaluating Diplomatic & Military Power, offers two articles. The first, “What Are America’s Alliances Good For?” by Hal Brands and Peter Feaver, contends the costs and risks associated with America’s military alliances are frequently overstated, while at the same time the benefits are downplayed. Brands and Feaver, thus, provide a more accurate net assessment of America’s alliances in hopes of better informing current policy debates. In the second article, “Employing Military Force in the 21st Century,” Michael Matheny petitions US policymakers look to past uses of force for ways of employing force while managing the global and national violence threshold.


Author: Dr John R Deni

Published: August 2017

The Army’s force posture is out of balance, with a greater percentage of troops stationed in the United States than at any time since the late 1940s. This has forced an over-reliance on lengthy, continuous rotational deployments to achieve deterrence and assurance in theaters such as northeast Asia and Europe. This finding is based on a 9-month study assessing the costs and benefits of rotational deployments and forward stationing. The analysis reveals that in terms of fiscal cost, training readiness, morale and family readiness, and diplomatic factors, the United States could likely achieve deterrence and assurance objectives more efficiently and more effectively with increased forward stationing. The recommendations address what kinds of units would be best suited for forward stationing, where forward stationing would be most efficacious, and how the Department of Defense should go about rebalancing Army force posture.


Author: Dr M Chris Mason

Published: August 2017

In a change from the Vietnam War—where the U.S. military trained at least 45,000 deploying service members to speak Vietnamese and probably twice that number—for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, apart from some remotely-based intelligence specialists doing classified work, the U.S. military trained almost no deploying personnel to speak either Arabic or Pashto fluently. Instead, it relied on interpreters or “terps” as the troops called them. This policy was an unmitigated failure and an important cause of the U.S. inability to get traction at the operational level of war in both countries. All of the thousands and thousands of day-to-day tactical engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan that involved communicating with someone who did not speak English were intended to combine together and attain an operational objective, but they were all essentially gobbledygook.


Author: Dr Colin S Gray

Published: July 2017

Does history repeat itself? This monograph clearly answers “no,” firmly. However, it does not argue that an absence of repetition in the sense of analogy means that history can have no utility for the soldier today. This monograph argues for a “historical parallelism,” in place of shaky or false analogy. The past, even the distant and ancient past, provides evidence of the potency of lasting virtues of good conduct. This monograph concludes by offering four recommendations: 1) Behave prudently. 2) Remember the concept of the great stream of time. 3) Do not forget that war nearly always is a gamble. 4) War should only be waged with strategic sense.


Editor: Dr Larry D Miller

Author: Colonel James M. Efaw, Lieutenant Colonel Benjamin R. Jonsson, Lieutenant Colonel Asariel Loria, Commander Mark O’Connell, Colonel Stephen E. Schemenauer

Published: July 2017

The Army War College Review, a refereed publication of student work, is produced under the purview of the Strategic Studies Institute and the United States Army War College. An electronic quarterly, The AWC Review connects student intellectual work with professionals invested in U.S. national security, Landpower, strategic leadership, global security studies, and the advancement of the profession of arms.


Author: Prof John F Troxell

Published: July 2017

Much has been written about the rise of China and the tensions that this has put on the international system. The potential for conflict between the United States and China can be compared to the Peloponnesian War, as told by the ancient historian Thucydides, and the inevitability of that war because of Sparta’s fear of a rising Athens. There is no doubt that the rise of China has generated, if not fear, at least significant consternation on the part of the United States and our Pacific allies.


Editor: Dr Larry D Miller

Author: Colonel Darren Huxley, COL David C. Menser, Lieutenant Colonel Carter L. Price, Lieutenant Colonel Jaren K. Price, LTC Geoffrey W. Wright

Published: July 2017

The Army War College Review, a refereed publication of student work, is produced under the purview of the Strategic Studies Institute and the United States Army War College. An electronic quarterly, The AWC Review connects student intellectual work with professionals invested in U.S. national security, Landpower, strategic leadership, global security studies, and the advancement of the profession of arms.


Author: Dr Jeffrey Record

Published: July 2017

The author examines the Axis defeat in World War II and concludes that the two main causes were resource inferiority (after 1941) and strategic incompetence—i.e., pursuit of imperial ambitions beyond the reach of its actual power. Until 1941 Axis military fortunes thrived, but the addition in that year of the Soviet Union and the United States to the list of Axis enemies condemned the Axis to ultimate strategic defeat. Germany, Italy, and Japan all attempted to bite off more than they could chew and subsequently choked to death.


Author: Cynthia E. Ayers

Published: July 2017

Recent successful "hacks," allegedly carried out by professionals acting on behalf of, or in concert with nation-states have heightened concerns about cyber warfare and sovereignty in the context of cyberspace. To maintain the integrity of U.S. and allied sovereign borders, it is imperative that security measures and defenses are coordinated and choreographed at the policy, strategy, and operational levels in the cyber domain, as well as in the physical world. The determination of what constitutes cyber sovereignty will greatly influence identification and understanding of threats, Department of Defense (DoD) preparation of the battlefield, the development of capabilities, the identification of participants, and planning for cyberspace operations. Considering the stakes, U.S. leaders cannot afford the consequences of allowing the enemy to define the boundaries of cyber sovereignty and the rules of cyberspace engagement.


Author: LTC Clarence J Bouchat (USAF, Ret)

Published: July 2017

U.S. landpower is an essential, but often overlooked, element of national power in semi-enclosed maritime environments like the South China Sea. This monograph gives U.S. policymakers a better understanding of the role of the U.S. Army, Marine Corps, and Special Operations Forces (SOF) in the region through potential combat operations employing wide area defense and maneuver; deterrence through forward presence and peacetime operations; and security engagement with landpower-dominant allies, partners, and competitors in the region. Landpower’s capabilities are also essential for direct support of the air and sea services and other government organization’s success when operating in this theater in direct support of U.S. national interests.


Editor: COL(R) Christopher M. Bado, Dr Christopher J Bolan, Prof Robert S Hume, COL J Matthew Lissner

Author: Mr Nathan P Freier

Published: June 2017

The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) faces persistent fundamental change in its strategic and operating environments. This report suggests this reality is the product of the United States entering or being in the midst of a new, more competitive, post-U.S. primacy environment. Post-primacy conditions promise far-reaching impacts on U.S. national security and defense strategy. Consequently, there is an urgent requirement for DoD to examine and adapt how it develops strategy and describes, identifies, assesses, and communicates corporate-level risk. This report takes on the latter risk challenge. It argues for a new post-primacy risk concept and its four governing principles of diversity, dynamism, persistent dialogue, and adaptation. The authors suggest that this approach is critical to maintaining U.S. military advantage into the future. Absent change in current risk convention, the report suggests DoD exposes current and future military performance to potential failure or gross under-performance.


Author: Brigadier General Thomas C. Graves

Published: June 2017

This monograph will answer the question: Can the U.S. Army apply to the current “prototype brigade” the lessons that were learned during the development and experimentation of the 11th Air Assault Division (Test)? Having established that the criteria of DTLOMS is a valuable tool for evaluating change in military systems, the next step is to apply those criteria to evaluate the changes that occurred in the formation of the 11th Air Assault Division (Test) from 1963 to 1965. In order to accomplish this, a study of the separate elements of DTLOMS will be conducted in order to determine how the 11th Air Assault Division reorganized itself and conducted operations during that period. The benchmark for studying the elements of DTLOMS will be the use of air mobility during the Ia Drang campaign of November 1965. Specifically, this monograph will attempt to answer the following six questions: 1. How did the division develop doctrine to support the transition to airmobile warfare? 2. How did the division determine the proper organization to facilitate warfighting with the airmobile division? 3. How did the division train leaders to support the new doctrine and organization? 4. How did the division conduct field training to certify its soldiers and units in the new tactics? 5. Did building a new force require any specific soldier skills; and if so, how were those skills cultivated? 6. How did the division adopt and recommend changes to material and equipment to support the new methods of fighting? Each of these questions addresses one aspect of the DTLOMS and will be used to measure change in the 11th Air Assault (Test) Division from the beginning in 1963 to the redesignation to the 1st Cavalry Division in 1965. Finally, this study will synthesize these changes and determine which lessons learned can be applied to ongoing experimentation in the U.S. Army of the 21st century.


Author: LTC John D Colwell, Jr, Dr Tarek N Saadawi

Published: June 2017

Despite leaps in technological advancements made in computing system hardware and software areas, we still hear about massive cyberattacks that result in enormous data losses. Cyberattacks in 2015 included: sophisticated attacks that targeted Ashley Madison, the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM), the White House, and Anthem; and in 2014, cyberattacks were directed at Sony Pictures Entertainment, Home Depot, J.P. Morgan Chase, a German steel factory, a South Korean nuclear plant, eBay, and others. These attacks and many others highlight the continued vulnerability of various cyber infrastructures and the critical need for strong cyber infrastructure protection (CIP). This book addresses critical issues in cybersecurity. Topics discussed include: a cooperative international deterrence capability as an essential tool in cybersecurity; an estimation of the costs of cybercrime; the impact of prosecuting spammers on fraud and malware contained in email spam; cybersecurity and privacy in smart cities; smart cities demand smart security; and, a smart grid vulnerability assessment using national testbed networks.


Author: Mr Nathan P Freier

Published: June 2017

This month, a team of U.S. Army War College (USAWC) researchers concluded a yearlong study on enterprise-level risk and risk assessment inside the Department of Defense (DoD). At Our Own Peril: DoD Risk and Risk Assessment in a Post-Primacy World argues for a new Department-level risk concept for describing, identifying, assessing, and communicating risk in an environment defined by sudden disruptive change. It suggests that a new concept should rest on four foundational principles: diversity, dynamism, persistent dialogue, and adaptation. Among At Our Own Peril’s many insights, perhaps the most enlightening are those concerning the strategic environment and the complex hazards emerging from it. The report characterizes the contemporary environment as one of “post-primacy,” where the United States remains a global power, but one that is commonly confronted by purposeful and contextual defense-relevant challenges that fall considerably outside of the DoD’s dominant bias and convention.


Author: Dr Richard Weitz

Published: June 2017

The U.S.-Indian security relationship has markedly improved since the Cold War with increased cooperation in a range of areas. The two countries have established stronger military, economic, and political ties based on mutual interests in combating terrorism, promoting democracy, preventing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation, and addressing China’s rise. Their bilateral defense engagements now include a range of dialogues, exercises, educational exchanges, and joint training opportunities. The partnership benefits both countries, enabling them to realize their core security goals. Yet, U.S. and Indian national security leaders must take new steps to ensure that the relationship realizes its potential.


Author: Dr Shima D Keene

Published: June 2017

Corruption increases the level of instability and the risk of conflict by undermining the legitimacy and credibility of state institutions. It can be both a cause and effect of poor leadership and governance. States emerging from conflict are particularly vulnerable to corruption, due to the lack of good governance infrastructures; but Western interventions can exacerbate the problem through the unintended consequences of good intentions. For peacekeeping and state-building interventions to be effective, careful consideration must be given as to the reason the problem occurs, and to its broader impact, as well as ways to manage it. This Letort Paper suggests ways in which these unintended consequences may be mitigated in future peace and stability operations.


Author: Dr Anna Simons

Published: May 2017

Leadership receives a tremendous amount of attention, but what about the day-to-day command challenges that confront O-4s, O-5s, and O-6s in today’s war zones? What has command entailed over the past decade and a half for special operations force (SOF) commanders who have deployed to Afghanistan (and Iraq) either to lead or to work under Special Operations Task Forces (SOTFs) or Combined Joint Special Operations Task Forces (CJSOTFs)? In both theaters, officers have had to contend with various competing hierarchies and significant churn. What then might the Army and military do to obviate or mitigate these and other problems? The contours of a potential solution are described and its benefits discussed.


Author: Dr Anna Simons

Published: May 2017

Leadership receives a tremendous amount of attention, but what about the day-to-day command challenges that confront O-4s, O-5s, and O-6s in today’s war zones? What has command entailed over the past decade and a half for special operations force (SOF) commanders who have deployed to Afghanistan (and Iraq) either to lead or to work under Special Operations Task Forces (SOTFs) or Combined Joint Special Operations Task Forces (CJSOTFs)? In both theaters, officers have had to contend with various competing hierarchies and significant churn. What then might the Army and military do to obviate or mitigate these and other problems? The contours of a potential solution are described and its benefits discussed.


Author: Mr Gregory Aftandilian

Published: May 2017

This monograph examines the possibility of Egypt leading the Arab world again, and how that effort, if successful, will present opportunities and challenges for U.S. policy. At the present time, Egypt is not in a position to do so given its many domestic problems stemming from its turbulent politics since 2011 and the challenges facing its economy, which is currently experiencing high unemployment, weak tourism revenues because of terrorist incidents, and high rates of inflation as it implements an International Monetary Fund (IMF) economic reform package. However, Egypt has faced similar problems in the past and has recovered from them, enabling it to pursue an Arab leadership role. Hence, the United States should be prepared to deal with Egypt’s longstanding leadership quest, which this monograph argues will generally be a positive development for the United States in the region, though there will be some issues where the United States and Egypt will not see eye-to-eye. Given the intense Sunni-Shia conflicts in the region that are fed in large part by the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran, having Egypt (a moderate Sunni Muslim country not pushing a religious agenda) in a leadership role in the region will help to dampen this sectarian strife. Moreover, because of its large and competent military, Egypt can be a source of stability and reassurance when other Arab states, particularly the Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia, are feeling vulnerable because of outside threats. Furthermore, Egypt can play a moderating influence in the region by being a bulwark against the radical extremist ideologies of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), al-Qaeda, and like-minded groups. The United States can help Egypt succeed by continuing military assistance, offering counterterrorism training of whole units, and resuming military exercises like Bright Star. This monograph also argues for a boost in U.S. economic assistance to past levels—given Egypt’s strategic importance—to help it cope with economic reform measures even under U.S. budgetary woes. Although the United States and Egypt will continue to differ on the nature of Egypt’s domestic politics, particularly with regard to human rights and dissent and recognizing that the United States has limited influence in this regard, Washington should use whatever leverage it has to persuade the Egyptian Government to be less repressive, because an easing of authoritarian policies and practices will help Egyptian stability in the long run.


Author: Mr Keir Giles

Published: May 2017

This Letort Paper analyzes the drivers of assertive military action by Russia, as exemplified by interventions in Ukraine and Syria. It identifies key turning points in Russia’s perception of external threat, and the roots of Russian responses to this threat making use of a capacity for military, political, and diplomatic leverage that has been greatly enhanced in the current decade. Color revolutions, the Arab Spring, and Western intervention in Libya are all highlighted as key influencers leading to a Russian assessment that the developments in Ukraine and Syria presented direct security challenges to Russia, which needed to be addressed through direct action. This Letort Paper concludes with a range of policy recommendations intended to mitigate the risk of confrontation with Russia through an imperfect understanding of Russian security perspectives.


Editor: Dr Antulio J Echevarria II

Published: May 2017

Mission Command: Strategic Implications – Anthony C. King, Russell W. Glenn, and Thomas-Durell Young. After 15 Years of Conflict – Charlotte F. Blatt, Stanley J. Wiechnik, Ellen "Elle" Klein, Douglas A. Sims II, and Amy B. Adler. Modernization Among US Partners – Ian Langford, and Rémy Hémez. Review Essay – Larry D. Miller. Commentaries and Replies – Conrad C. Crane, Gates Brown, and John. A. Bonin. A Dialogue on Strategy – Gregory D. Miller, Chris Rogers, Francis J. H. Park, William F. Owen, and Jeffrey W. Meiser.


Author: Dr Steve Tatham, Mr. Ian Tunnicliffe

Published: April 2017

The impact of social media on the media environment has been widely recognized; as has the ability of extremist and adversarial organizations to exploit social media to publicize their cause, spread their propaganda, and recruit vulnerable individuals. Supporting the growth of social media has been the phenomenal global increase in mobile telephone usage, and much of this increase is in areas where there are existing conflicts or conflicts are highly likely. These combined revolutions will increasingly have a direct impact on virtually all aspects of military operations in the 21st century. In doing so, social media will force significant changes to policy, doctrine, and force structures. This Letort Paper explores the implications of social media for the U.S. Army.


Editor: Mister Robert C Browne

Published: April 2017

Welcome to the most recent issue of the PKSOI Peace & Stability Journal. In this edition the PKSOI Director Colonel Gregory Dewitt will introduce the articles of the Journal, go over the past three months of PKSOI's activities and also brief you on the upcoming major activities and events. This journal will feature articles from PKSOI Subject Matter Experts in their respective fields and also include articles from PKSOI interns. The feature article is from PKSOI's own Commander Danny King titled: Migrants on the Sea.


Author: LTC Anthony Abbott, Mr Kenneth Michael Absher, COL Gregory A Adams, Dr Christopher J Bolan

Published: April 2017

The primary shortcoming of U.S. policymakers since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, has been a consistent inability to translate tactical and operational military successes into sustainable strategic political outcomes. This was objectively true for both former U.S. Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama as evidenced by the long and tragic history of the continued conflict in Afghanistan and Iraq that has yielded wholly unsatisfying strategic outcomes. It remains to be seen if President Donald Trump and his senior officials can successfully reverse this trend. Doing so will require a long-term strategy that first establishes realistic and attainable objectives and then skillfully marshals all instruments of national power—military and non-military alike—to accomplish those goals.


Author: Prof William G Braun III

Published: April 2017

Dealing with other states, whom the United States has a hard time categorizing as a threat, rival, competitor, or partner requires a new way of approaching national security decision-making. China is a partner in trade, but a rival regarding territorial rights in the South China Sea. Russian support may stabilize the Syrian crisis, but interference in domestic national elections and its intervention through the coercive use of force in Crimea and the Ukraine are threats. Creating actionable solutions to these challenges requires public involvement in decision-making in order to transcend hyper-partisan political positions and rigid adherence to ideologies that dominate the current decision environment.


Author: Dr W Andrew Terrill

Published: April 2017

The Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) has embarked on a campaign to destroy or sell priceless world heritage relics throughout the area under its control. While images of the outrageous destruction of priceless artifacts have been seen throughout the world, the strategic and military implications of comprehensive antiquities looting and ISIS propaganda about antiquities are of vital importance and correspondingly are considered throughout this Letort Paper. In particular, ISIS funding from the illicit sales of antiquities (and high quality fakes) is a serious problem and may help ISIS remain functional even after other sources of revenue are increasingly disrupted or eliminated. Should ISIS experience additional defeats and further loss of territory in Iraq and Syria, an ongoing stream of revenue could fund a nucleus of the organization while it searches for opportunities to rebuild itself and prove its continued relevance through spectacular acts of terrorism. Antiquities, if hidden and trafficked later, along with reproductions marketed as original masterpieces, could give the organization the financial lifeline it needs to stay operational and relevant, even if it is forced to transform itself from a “caliphate” controlling territory to a more simplified type of terrorist organization operating out of portions of the areas it once ruled.


Author: Emma Vialpando

Published: March 2017

The stability operation in Haiti from January 14 to June 1, 2010 demonstrated how over a dozen U.S. Government departments and agencies worked together effectively in an unprecedented large-scale foreign humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (FHA/DR) effort. The 7.0 magnitude earthquake that struck Haiti on January 12, 2010, precipitated the operation. The Haiti action, known within the U.S. military as Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE, was not only a whole-of-government, but also a whole-of-nation and global undertaking. The United States played a significant role in the Haiti earthquake relief effort in collaboration with more than 140 countries and over 1,000 non-governmental organizations (NGOs).


Author: COL Douglas Mastriano

Published: March 2017

Since its occupation of Crimea, Russia has adopted an aggressive and often belligerent approach to the nations on its borders. The on-going war against Ukraine and its occupation of large portions of Georgian territory demonstrates this increasingly hostile foreign policy. However, far more dangerous to the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is the Kremlin's use of a strategy of ambiguity. In this, Moscow keeps hostilities at a low boil, leveraging a Russian diaspora, a web of complex information-campaign-trolls, to stir ethnic unrest that has the potential to destroy NATO and end the unparalleled post-World War II peace experienced in Europe. Yet, there are actions that the United States and NATO can take to prevent Russian aggression from turning into a war and Project 1721 provides the answers to this complex and dangerous security dilemma.


Editor: Colonel Christopher J Holshek

Published: March 2017

For three years now, the Civil Affairs Association and its partners have provided the Civil Affairs Regiment a way to provide experience-based feedback and advice to institutional and policy level leadership on the future of the Civil Affairs force through an annual fall symposium. These symposia result in Civil Affairs Issue Papers published and presented at the spring roundtable. The workshop built upon Lt. Gen. H.R. McMaster’s 2015 Symposium challenge to the CA Regiment to contribute to the discussion of the future force through the Army Warfighting Challenges. This discussion was motivated by the general recognition of CA’s longstanding role as more than a critical “force multiplier” or tactical “enabler” in decisive action.


Author: Dr R Evan Ellis

Published: March 2017

This monograph comparatively examines the content and country focus of high-level diplomacy for each of the two actors, as well as the volume and patterns of trade, the activities of Indian and Chinese companies in the region, and their relationship to their respective governments in eight sectors: (1) petroleum and mining; (2) agriculture; (3) construction; (4) manufacturing and retail; (5) banking and finance; (6) logistics and port operations; (7) technology such as telecommunications, space, and high technology; and, (8) military sales and activities. This monograph finds that Indian engagement with the region is significantly less than that of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and concentrated on a more limited subset of countries and sectors. In the commercial and military sector, it finds that the efforts by the Indian government to support their companies in the region are generally more modest and less coordinated than those of the PRC. Nonetheless, despite such limitations, the nature of Indian companies and their engagement with the region create opportunities for significant advances in the future, in a manner that is relatively well received by Latin American governments and societies.


Author: Dr John R Deni

Published: March 2017

Questioning long-held assumptions and challenging existing paradigms in U.S. security policy can be a useful way to ensure that American leaders are not pursuing strategies that do not actually support and promote U.S. interests. However, on the question of whether the European Union’s (EU) existence is in U.S. interests, the evidence is consistently clear. It most definitely is, and undermining it—for example, by promoting Brexit or suggesting other countries would or should follow the United Kingdom’s (UK) exit from the EU—risks the further unraveling of the international order that is central to American prosperity and security.


Author: Dr Elizabeth Wishnick

Published: March 2017

China has been elaborating its position on the Arctic at the same time as the United States has been refining its own Arctic strategy as Chairman of the Arctic Council through April 2017. This Letort Paper examines the geopolitical implications of China’s growing involvement in the Arctic for U.S. interests. First, the evolution of U.S. Arctic strategy is discussed, including its political and military components. Next, China’s interests and goals in the Arctic are addressed. A third section examines the Arctic in China’s relations with Canada, Russia, and the Nordic states. This Letort Paper then evaluates the consequences of China’s expanding Arctic presence for U.S. security interests and concludes with policy recommendations.


Author: Prof Louis G Yuengert

Published: February 2017

Successful warfighting and other military operations do not occur without well-trained, properly equipped, and doctrinally sound forces. National security professionals invest the time to understand how the Joint community and Services develop, train, resource, equip, and sustain military forces. Defense Management (DM) is the course devoted to the study of the processes and systems within the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) that develop and produce trained and ready forces and their resultant capabilities for employment by Combatant Commanders.


Author: Dr Christopher J Bolan

Published: February 2017

U.S. President Donald Trump has proved himself willing to question and challenge many of the conventional wisdoms embedded in contemporary American foreign policies. During his presidential campaign, he questioned the utility of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) that has formed the bedrock of American foreign and security policies throughout the Cold War. During his presidential transition, he rocked the foreign policy establishment by accepting a phone call from the Taiwanese President and hinting that he may no longer adhere to America’s long-standing “One-China” policy. In examining these early signals, many analysts anticipate that the foreign policies of his administration will be non-ideological, unconventional, and characterized by a business- like transactional approach emphasizing the costs and visible benefits of American policies and programs.


Author: Dr Paul Kamolnick

Published: February 2017

The al-Qaeda Organization (AQO) and the Islamic State Organization (ISO) are transnational adversaries that conduct terrorism in the name of Sunni Islam. It is declared U.S. Government (USG) policy to degrade, defeat, and destroy them. The present book has been written to assist policymakers, military planners, strategists, and professional military educators whose mission demands a deep understanding of strategically-relevant differences between these two transnational terrorist entities. In it, one shall find a careful comparative analysis across three key strategically relevant dimensions: essential doctrine, beliefs, and worldview; strategic concept, including terrorist modus operandi; and specific implications and recommendations for current USG policy and strategy. Key questions that are addressed include: How is each terrorist entity related historically and doctrinally to the broader phenomenon of transnational Sunni “jihadism”? What is the exact nature of the ISO? How, if at all, does ISO differ in strategically relevant ways from AQO? What doctrinal differences essentially define these entities? How does each understand and operationalize strategy? What critical requirements and vulnerabilities characterize each entity? Finally, what implications, recommendations, and proposals are advanced that are of particular interest to USG strategists and professional military educators?


Author: Mr Samuel R White Jr

Published: January 2017

In 1994 the Army embarked on the Army After Next (AAN) study plan to explore new concepts and think innovatively about how the Army would fight in the future. Envisioned as way to develop the Army after Force XXI (thought to be the Army of 2025), the AAN project was chartered by the Chief of Staff of the Army and grew to involve a wide range of participants. The Army War College contributed to the AAN effort through strategic wargames, experimentation and student and faculty research. One of the initiatives was the AAN Seminar – a special program in Academic Year 1997 – composed of students who were interested in contributing to the development of the future Army. The current Army War College Futures Seminar is loosely modeled on the AAN Seminar. As with the AAN seminar, Future Seminar students and faculty collaborate to explore the Army of the Future…in this case, the Army of 2030 and beyond. As with previous years, the seminar focused on the requirements for an Army of the future – and sought to explore the question: “What kind of Army does the nation need in 2030 and beyond?” This 3rd annual compendium is one output of their thoughts.


Author: Dr. Robert D. Lamb

Published: January 2017

In early 2003, the Association of the U.S. Army and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) released the final report from their joint, blue ribbon Commission on Post-Conflict Reconstruction (PCR) that had completed its year-long study in 2002.1 The PCR Commission had extracted lessons from U.S. and international stabilization, reconstruction, and transition efforts over the previous decade and distilled them into a framework intended to inform such efforts in the future. The United States did not have long to wait to put those lessons into practice; it entered Iraq just 2 months later.


Author: Mr Keir Giles

Published: January 2017

The application of international law and legal principles in cyberspace is a topic that has caused confusion, doubt, and interminable discussions between lawyers since the earliest days of the internationalization of the Internet. The still unresolved debate over whether cyberspace constitutes a fundamentally new domain that requires fundamentally new laws to govern it reveals basic ideological divides. On the one hand, the Euro-Atlantic community led by the United States believes, in broad terms, that activities in cyberspace require no new legislation, and existing legal obligations are sufficient. On the other, a large number of other states led by Russia and China believe that new international legal instruments are essential in order to govern information security overall, including those expressed through the evolving domain of cyberspace. Russia in particular argues that the challenges presented by cyberspace are too urgent to wait for customary law to develop as it has done in other domains; instead, urgent action is needed. This Letort Paper will provide an overview of moves toward establishing norms and the rule of law in cyberspace, and the potential for establishing further international norms of behavior.


Author: Dr David Alpher

Published: January 2017

In the lead-up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the short-lived Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) briefly held a mandate to lead post-war reconstruction efforts. The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) under L. Paul Bremer replaced ORHA before its plans could be implemented. Autopsies of replacing the ORHA and the consequences of the CPA’s subsequent handling of the Iraq mission abound, but they focused on the Iraq mission as a historical narrative. However, the United States (US) now faces a lengthening list of probable reconstruction and stabilization (R&S) missions in the near future. Rather than burying the autopsies, the contrast between ORHA’s plans and the CPA’s implementation offers instructive lessons for future R&S missions.


Author: Dr Azeem Ibrahim

Published: January 2017

Diplomacy has all but failed in Syria, and it is difficult to envisage when and how diplomatic efforts could be restarted in light of the continued difficulties between Russia and the West. With these difficulties, it is imperative to change focus and tackle the one area where the United States might still be able to have a positive impact: the humanitarian situation in Syria. The first priority in this regard must be the establishment of safe zones within Syria, where civilian populations who fear being targeted by either side can find safe refuge until the conflict can move toward some kind of resolution. Achieving this first priority will require a much more serious commitment than any Western power has yet been willing to make. Failing to do so will carry even higher costs over the medium and long term: the continued migration of refugees into Europe, where the political impact of the migration crisis so far has already had serious political and social costs; as well as the possible spread of the instability contagion to neighboring Lebanon, Jordan, and perhaps most seriously, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member Turkey.


Author: Dr Mason Richey

Published: January 2017

After contextualizing North Korea’s capacity for belligerent rhetoric directed toward the United States and its northeast Asian allies, the author examines the contention that rhetoric from Pyongyang represents a conflict escalation risk or even a casus belli. The results of statistical tests indicate a negative correlation between Pyongyang’s rhetoric and international diplomatic initiatives, but no correlation between North Korea’s verbal hostility and its provocations.


Editor: Mister David A Mosinski

Published: December 2016

This SOLLIMS Sampler [Special Edition] comes at a critical moment as global forcible displacement reaches an all-time high, surpassing levels post-WWII, and as violent conflicts driving displacement continue without abate, echoing in war-ravaged Aleppo. While Refugees & Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) often result from conflict, if the needs of both displaced people and host communities are not addressed, displacement itself may produce further instability. This publication specifically examines lessons from Syria's ongoing refugee crisis in the Middle East and Europe, drawing on insights from prior situations of displacement to inform response to current crises.


Author: Dr R Evan Ellis

Published: December 2016

In the 2016 U.S. presidential debates, as on other occasions, the theme of Latin America and the Caribbean was remarkably absent. Important events in the region occasionally insert themselves into the U.S. consciousness through the mainstream media, including: the arrival of thousands of Central American child refugees at the U.S. border; the U.S. re-establishment of diplomatic relations with Cuba; the impending collapse of Venezuela; and the Colombian public’s rejection, on October 2, 2016, of the agreement between the government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Yet even with its geographic connectedness to the United States, and although Latin America eclipses even China and Asia as the U.S. principal foreign trading partner, and despite the fact that more U.S. residents have family in the region than any other part of the world, Latin America, and the Caribbean continue to be remarkably absent from the U.S. strategic and foreign policy discourse.


Author: COL Heidi A Urben

Published: December 2016

According to a Gallup poll conducted July 18-25, 2016, the 2016 presidential election campaign had set an inauspicious record: never before have so many Americans held such unfavorable views of each party’s presidential nominee. Among registered voters, 58 percent held negative views of both Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton. Social media platforms like Facebook and Twitter offer immediate and accessible venues for the average citizen to express their support or displeasure on a host of political topics, especially during an election year. For most citizens, that commentary is a natural extension of their freedom of expression, but for members of the U.S. military, it should represent a “no-fly zone.”


Editor: Dr Antulio J Echevarria II

Published: December 2016

Special Commentary The Army's Identity Crisis by Gates Brown Toward Strategic Solvency Ensuring Effective Military Voice by William E. Rapp The Crisis of American Military Primacy and the Search for Strategic Solvency by Hal Brands and Eric Edelman Are Our Strategic Models Flawed? Faith in War: The American Roots of Global Conflict by Gregory A. Daddis Solving America's Gray-Zone Puzzle by Isaiah Wilson III and Scott Smitson Strategic Uncertainty, the Third Offset, and US Grand Strategy by Ionut C. Popescu Ends + Ways + Means = (Bad) Strategy by Jeffrey W. Meiser Regional Issues in Asia Turning It Up to Eleven: Belligerent Rhetoric in North Korea's Propaganda by Mason Richey Foreign Military Education as PLA Soft Power by John S. Van Oudenaren and Benjamin E. Fisher


Author: Dr Mary Manjikian

Published: December 2016

View the Executive Summary

Perhaps the best starting point for those looking to “borrow” a deterrent strategy for cyberspace from other fields is not the example of nuclear deterrence but instead the example of United States-Mexican border security. The nuclear deterrent analogy is not the best fit for understanding cyber-deterrence—due to the ways in which rewards and payoffs for would-be attackers in cyberspace are different from those in the nuclear analogy—among other factors. The emphasis here is not on deterrent effects provided by specific weapons but rather on the ways in which human actors understand deterrence and risk in making an attempt to violate a border, and the ways in which security architects can manipulate how would-be aggressors think about these border incursions. This Letort Paper thus borrows from the criminology literature rather than the military-security literature in laying out how individuals may be deterred from committing crimes in real space and in cyberspace through manipulating rewards and punishments. Lessons from attempts at deterring illegal immigration along America’s borders are then presented, with lessons derived from those situations, which are helpful in understanding how to deter incursions in cyberspace.


Author: Doctor Thomas P Galvin

Published: December 2016

View the Executive Summary

Identity development is touted as an important leader development need, but it often gets short shrift in professional military education (PME) environments, including the Senior Service Colleges (SSC). The inculcation of professional values, resiliency, and critical and reflective thought are essential to properly operationalizing the skills and knowledge learned in an SSC, but they are highly subjective, difficult to measure, and therefore difficult to develop educational activities around. New policies for officer and civilian professional education include provisions for developing leaders, such as the recent inclusion of six Desired Leader Attributes (DLAs) in the Joint officer PME continuum, but it remains unclear how to operationalize those goals. This Letort Paper presents a way ahead using role identities and Bloom’s affective domain to identify developmental objectives to parallel the development of skills and knowledge in SSC programs and shows how this approach can be generalized across PME.


Author: Mr Werner Selle, Dr Phil Williams

Published: December 2016

View the Executive Summary

Urbanization is one of the most important mega-trends of the 21st century. Consequently, the possibility of U.S. military involvement in a megacity or sub-megacity is an eventuality that cannot be ignored. After elucidating the nature of urbanization and developing a typology in terms of smart, fragile, and feral cities, we give consideration to the kinds of contingencies that the U.S. military, especially the Army, needs to think about and prepare for. Understanding the city as a complex system or organism is critical and provides the basis for changes in intelligence, recruitment, training, equipment, operations, and tactics.

One of the key takeaways is the need to understand the urban environment and the need to work with (instead of against) the flows and rhythms of a city. Without such an approach, the results of military involvement in such a formidable environment would likely be disastrous; with it, the prospects for success would at least be enhanced.


Author: Dr Thomas R Mockaitis

Published: December 2016

View the Executive Summary

Counterinsurgency (COIN) continues to be a controversial subject among military leaders. Critics argue that the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have made the U.S. military, particularly the Army, "COIN-centric." They maintain that equipping U.S. forces to combat insurgency has eroded their conventional war fighting capabilities. Those committed to preserving and even enhancing COIN capabilities, on the other hand, insist that doing so need not compromise the ability of the military to perform other tasks. They also point out that the likelihood of even a mid-level conventional war remains low while the probability of unconventional engagements is high. This monograph reviews the COIN debate, analyzes current force structure, and concludes that contrary to the more extreme positions taken by critics and proponents, the U.S. military has achieved a healthy balance between COIN and other capabilities.


Author: COL Douglas W Bennett, Dr Richard A Lacquement Jr

Published: November 2016

Theater Strategy and Campaigning focuses on the study of strategic and operational art to employ the military instrument of national power in pursuit of achieving national goals. This course explores and evaluates U.S. military ways and means to connect operational efforts to strategic ends (policy aims) through the understanding, analysis, synthesis and application of doctrine, organizations, and concepts, translated into theater strategies and campaign plans to conduct joint, unified, and multinational operations.


Author: COL Douglas W Bennett, COL Tarn D Warren

Published: November 2016

The purpose of this document is to assist United States Army War College students during the Theater Strategy and Campaigning (TSC) course. It also serves to assist commanders, planners, and other staff officers in combatant commands (CCMD), joint task forces (JTF), and service component commands. It supplements joint doctrine and contains elements of emerging doctrine as practiced globally by joint force commanders (JFCs). It portrays a way to apply doctrine and emerging doctrine at the higher levels of joint command, with a primary emphasis at the combatant command level.


Author: Dr John R Deni

Published: November 2016

In mid-September, European Union (EU) Commission President Jean Claude Juncker delivered the Commision's annual State of the Union address.1 Coming on the heels of the British vote to leave the EU, the address provided a roadmap for overcoming the challenges brought about by what Juncker termed an “existential crisis.” Among the key components of the roadmap were several initiatives related to defense and security. For example, Juncker noted rather bluntly that Europe could not rely on soft power alone and that it therefore needed to “toughen up.” This was music to Washington’s ears, particularly when Juncker went on to argue for Europe to stop “piggy-backing” on the military might of others (read: Washington). European countries already appear to be heeding his call. After years of flat budgets and defense austerity, there is a growing body of evidence that European states have in fact begun to increase defense spending over the last couple of years.2 Although some European states, such as Poland, have been increasing defense spending—if only slightly—for many years, evidence now indicates that such increases are broad-based, if perhaps uneven. For example, recent defense spending increases in Eastern Europe are greater than what is occurring in Northern or Western Europe. Regardless, Juncker was right to promote and encourage this emerging trend.


Published: November 2016

The Collins Center Update is a quarterly newsletter detailing the activities of the Center for Strategic Leadership, United States Army War College. Articles in this double issue include, Basic Strategic Art Program Situation Report, C/JFLCC Course 3-16, USAWC Hosts International Analytical Exchange, Cyber Sovereignty - Operations Focus Workshop, The Human Dimension Department, Full Mobilization Wargame, Wargaming: Application of Innovative Approaches and Solutions, and the Department of Technology Integration (DTI) Update.


Author: Dr Tami Davis Biddle

Published: November 2016

The American soldiers who returned home from the war in 1945 were greeted with joy and open arms. They were feted in parades, and celebrated in books, films, and songs. They were the heroes of the war that created modern America—wealthy, technologically-advanced, and sitting astride the world. Later they would come to be known as “the greatest generation”; it is a label that many of them eschew, but it speaks to the way they have been appropriated in American public memory and national identity. The soldiers who returned home from the war in the early-1970s came back to a nation that wanted nothing to do with them. Hostile stares, sometimes worse, greeted them on their arrival. American confusion, anger, and guilt about Vietnam were re-directed to its draftee army. After the war, the U.S. military adopted an all-volunteer force structure. For the services, this choice solved many of the problems of dealing with unpredictable civilian draftees and the sometimes-fickle population from which they were drawn. For the American people, it meant that their husbands, sons, and brothers faced very low odds of being asked to go to war. This shift, however, went far to sever the link between American civilians and the military that represents them, protects them, and does their bidding in the world.


Editor: Mister David A Mosinski

Published: November 2016

This publication showcases the value of Strategic Communication / Messaging in Peace and Stability Operations – with lessons from Europe, Africa, the Middle East, Afghanistan, and the Philippines.  This product also offers an extensive list of references/reports/articles that can serve as a “toolkit” for leaders, planners, and practitioners.  [Review - 1 Feb 2017]


Editor: Prof William G Braun III, Dr David Lai

Author: Prof William G Braun III, Dr David Lai

Published: November 2016

The context of the Asia-Pacific rivalry between the United States and China has evolved over the last 5 or 6 decades. Issues associated with territorial dispute resolution, response to a bellicose nuclear-armed North Korea, and partner concerns over China’s increasingly assertive foreign policy now challenge the relationship, once characterized by strong elements of cooperation and economic growth. This report examines U.S.-China gray zone competition in the Asia-Pacific, and identifies land forces capabilities and initiatives necessary to advance U.S. national interests in the face of that competition. The report offers nine specific recommendations and a two-tier implementation plan to integrate those recommendations into defense management processes.


Editor: Mr Henry D Sokolski

Author: Mr Henry D Sokolski

Published: November 2016

View the Executive Summary

Nuclear deterrence and nonproliferation no longer enjoy the broad support they once did during the Cold War. Academics and security experts now question the ability of either to cope or check nuclear rogue states or terrorists. On the one hand, America’s closest allies—e.g., Japan and South Korea—believe American nuclear security guarantees are critical to their survival. If the United States is unwilling to provide Tokyo or Seoul with the assurance they believe they need, would it then not make sense for them to acquire nuclear forces of their own? On the other hand, with more nuclear-armed states and an increased willingness to use them, how likely is it that nuclear deterrence will work?

This volume investigates these questions. In it, six experts offer a variety of perspectives to catalyze debate. The result is a rich debate that goes well beyond current scholarship to challenge the very basis of prevailing nonproliferation and security policies.


Author: Ms Diane E Chido

Published: November 2016

View the Executive Summary

The U.S. military recognizes that it will be required to engage in dense urban areas in the near future, whether under combat, stabilization, or disaster response conditions. The military also recognizes that it is not prepared to effectively operate within such complex terrain and populations. Alternative governance structures, which can be ethnic- or religious-based civil society groups or even organized criminal networks, emerge to provide basic services when the state fails to govern effectively. Leaders of these groups maintain control through various means including violence, coercion, and service provision or through tribal, religious, or other cultural ties and structures.

Developing a flexible toolkit of currently available and vetted resources to understand the alternative governance structures existing or emerging in that environment would provide crucial foreknowledge, which will serve as a force multiplier for planning and operating in an urban environment, particularly one as dense as a megacity.


Author: Dr David Lai

Published: October 2016

There is a widely-shared view in China that the United States has ill will toward China and is always looking for opportunities to make trouble for China. The Chinese believe that this was the case when China was a poor developing nation; and they particularly believe it to be the case today as China is rapidly becoming a great power. The Chinese claim that U.S. influence on every aspect of Chinese foreign and domestic relations is so ubiquitous that they have a name for it: “U.S. factor/shadow/specter”. The Chinese view, however, is largely based on unsubstantiated speculations, erroneously-formed impressions, and poorly-staged analyses; and cannot stand up to close scrutiny. The Chinese assertion that the Philippines vs. China arbitration of 2016 is a U.S.-orchestrated, directed, and supported farce is an excellent example.


Author: COL Robert E Hamilton, Dr Richard A Lacquement Jr

Published: October 2016

The National Security Policy and Strategy (NSPS) course focuses on national security policies and the strategies that put them into operation. It examines the elements that underpin national security policy and strategy, including the international and domestic environments, the American political system, national security policy and strategy formulation, the instruments of national power, and the processes employed by the United States Government for integrating and synchronizing those instruments to formulate national security policies and strategies in the pursuit of national security objectives. The course also examines the role of the current national strategic documents to include the National Security Strategy (NSS), the Defense Strategy Review (formerly known as the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)), and the National Military Strategy (NMS), among others.


Editor: Dr Larry D Miller

Author: Dr Larry D Miller

Published: October 2016

The Army War College Review, a refereed publication of student work, is produced under the purview of the Strategic Studies Institute and the United States Army War College. An electronic quarterly, The AWC Review connects student intellectual work with professionals invested in U.S. national security, Landpower, strategic leadership, global security studies, and the advancement of the profession of arms.


Author: Dr Mohammed El-Katiri

Published: October 2016

View the Executive Summary

North Africa's security landscape has worsened in the aftermath of the political events of the Arab Spring. Libya's dire state of affairs has had significant repercussions not only on its internal security and stability, but also on that of its neighboring countries, particularly the ones with long and exposed land borders. The worsening of the security situation has led North African countries to cooperate on strengthening their military and security collaboration. However, while rapid progress has been made in establishing bilateral cooperation between Algeria and its neighbors, Tunisia and Libya, there has been a grave failure to launch a regional security initiative that is effectively capable of dealing with the range of cross-border and internal security threats that face all of these countries.

The failure to construct a regional-security structure in North Africa is due primarily to decades-long differences between Algeria and Morocco over a variety of pending issues, including the disputed Western Sahara territory. In addition, the fluid political and security situation in Libya has impeded engagement in any bilateral or regional security cooperation framework.


Editor: Dr Antulio J Echevarria II

Published: September 2016

Special Commentary: Rebalancing Offshore Balancing Michael G. Roskin Adapting to Strategic Change Brian McAllister Linn, J. P. Clark, Charles Hornick, Daniel Burkhart, and Dave Shunk Myths about the Army Profession Don M. Snider, C. Anthony Pfaff On Strategic Communications Today James P. Farwell and Darby J. Arakelian Christopher Paul Gideon Avidor and Russell W. Glenn


Author: Dr Richard A Lacquement Jr, Dr George J Woods III

Published: September 2016

The Strategic Leadership course of the U.S. Army War College (USAWC) resident core curriculum is designed to introduce you to the concepts to effectively lead within the national security environment through an examination of responsible command, leadership, and management practices. Although generally applicable to the broader national security environment, it focuses on the integration of the military instrument of national power with emphasis on challenges faced in the development, sustainment, and application of Landpower.


Author: Andrew H Fowler

Published: September 2016

This stability operations case study project emerged from a Joint Requirements Oversight Council task to examine how Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) institutions teach operational planning for steady-state peacekeeping and stability operations. The Joint Staff J-7 requested the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI), as the Joint Proponent for Peace and Stability Operations, accomplish a number of tasks to improve JPME curricula. As part of this effort, PKSOI is developing a series of professionally focused, historical case studies of successful joint peacekeeping and stability operations. The purpose of these case studies is to provide balanced analyses of the strategic conditions and guidance underlying each selected operation, and describe how military leaders successfully interpreted and implemented this guidance during the conduct of joint operations.


Author: Colonel Steven J. Adams

Published: September 2016

Winning in a complex world requires more than highly trained, educated, and experienced individual soldiers and leaders. While our greatest asset is the American Soldier, the Army is a team of teams and winning depends on how effectively Army leaders are able to harness the collective knowledge and power of teams to achieve success. Cohesive and effective teams provide a competitive advantage to the Army as it navigates through a complex and rapidly changing strategic environment. Building winning teams requires growing effective leaders, creating a positive command climate, and placing a greater focus on the team rather than the individual. From a review of academic leadership concepts, effective leaders focus on trust, commitment, purpose, and communication when developing quality teams. To better develop the next generation of Army leaders to build winning teams for a complex world, the Army should mandate command climate surveys at the Brigade and Battalion level; update ADP 6-22, Army Leadership, to reflect a greater emphasis on teams; and mandate that leaders conduct a follow-up personalized assessment with professional coaches as part of the MSAF360 Multi-Source Assessment and Feedback.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Brian Albon

Published: September 2016

Iranian supported Houthi rebels are the primary destabilizing factor in Yemen. Iranian provision of money, training, and lethal aid to this quasi-Shia minority empowered them to oust the internationally recognized government of Yemen and plunge the impoverished nation into civil war. This Houthi-caused strife precipitated a significant humanitarian disaster by creating over one million internally displaced people that greatly exacerbated preexisting food, water, and fuel shortages. The Houthis also expanded the fighting into Saudi Arabia in retaliation for the Saudi-led coalition fighting to return ousted Yemeni President Hadi to power. Iranian armed Houthi fighters could easily threaten global shipping passing through the Bab el-Mandab Strait in which 4.7 million barrels of oil transit daily. Lastly, the Houthi-generated civil war disrupted U.S. counterterrorism operations targeting Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, arguably one of the most dangerous extremist groups attempting to target the U.S. homeland. U.S. intervention through diplomatic dialogue and economic incentives to persuade Iran to abandon their lethal aid and decrease financial support to the Houthi rebels would likely revert the Houthis to a localized danger vice a regional threat.


Author: Colonel Erik Anderson

Published: September 2016

The Army’s professional identity is critically important to maintain its legitimacy with the American people and to operate effectively in today’s morally ambiguous operational environment. In 2010 the Army embarked on a Campaign of Learning to assess the health and understanding of the Army Profession among its members after nearly a decade of conflict. While the renewed emphasis on the Army Profession raised overall awareness, implementation activities to date have failed to reach the audience and echelon most effective at fostering a professional identity and enduring commitment to the Army Ethic among Army Profession practitioners. Rather than continuing to develop more programs and activities at the strategic level the Army needs to focus on the organizational level, specifically the battalion command teams, as the best source to foster the Army Ethic in Army professionals.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel David R. Anzaldúa

Published: September 2016

This paper builds on the Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction manual and the Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments (MPICE) metrics framework. The Guiding Principles manual outlines strategic principles for conducting stability and reconstruction (S&R) operations and serves as a foundation for the development of S&R mission priorities. The manual espouses five major end states and seven cross-cutting principles to guide the execution of S&R missions. The MPICE companion publication provides recommended objectives, goals, indicators and measures for each of the five end states, but does not include measures for the seven cross-cutting principles. Based on the research conducted, the paper proposes outcome-based objectives, goals, indicators and measures for measuring progress for the first four of the seven cross-cutting principles of the stabilization and reconstruction framework. A discussion on why S&R competencies remain important to the U.S. military, the contemporary environment in which these missions are being conducted and the evolution of metrics in the S&R community are also included.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Bethany C. Aragon

Published: September 2016

The information instrument of national power, which has neither a recognized government lead nor a clear strategy for employment, remains the most misunderstood and underutilized element of D-I-M-E (Diplomacy, Information, Military, Economic). However, an examination of the application of information power from the First World War through the Cold War revealed that information has served as a potent instrument of national power. It is most effective when it is directed and supported by the President, guided by strategy that recognizes it as a fundamental component of official policy, coordinated across the whole of government, and implemented across the broadest spectrum of communication. Administrations should first decide whether the application of information power comports with enduring national values, their respective policy and national security objectives. Then, once the decision is made to employ information power, it must be adequately resourced to ensure its application aligns with the four key requirements.


Author: Colonel Brendan Arcuri

Published: September 2016

The forces of globalization are eroding state sovereignty, empowering non-state actors, and increasing the prospect of intra-state conflict. Greater interdependence between states has reduced the prospect of state-on-state conflict between powerful industrial age armed forces. However, the likelihood of intra-state conflict with non-state armed groups and conflict with globally networked non-state actors has increased. The United States lacks a credible deterrence for dissuading undesirable behavior in violent non-state armed groups. Consequently, the United States must consider the policy and strategy implications of the changing global environment and the character of war. The author recommends changing USSOF doctrine, organization and training in order to increase success against violent non-state actors and networked insurgents, who take advantage of asymmetries in power, economy, and technology to challenge state sovereignty and the international order.


Author: Mr. Brent G. Bahl

Published: September 2016

The 2015 National Military Strategy identified strengthening the U.S.' global network of allies and partners as a national military objective. Specifically how to provide security force assistance (SFA) is an Army Warfighting Challenge. However, Geographic Combat Commands (GCC) have conducted security cooperation, including SFA, with varying results. While structural inefficiencies are widely acknowledged, it is unlikely the underlying law will change significantly in the near term. This paper proposes as a practical matter, GCCs should increase cooperation with Ambassadors and better employ the senior defense official/defense attaché (SDO/DATT) to leverage country teams to develop a Common Operating Picture (COP) of the countries receiving the security assistance. This will result in increased and shared situational awareness and unity of effort between the GCC and the Country Team. Security cooperation officers (SCO) should consider adopting a more balanced approach to cooperation and assistance and GCC deploy a Special Operations Command – Forward, if appropriate. These practical measures will result in better implementation of security cooperation.


Author: Colonel John K. Baker

Published: September 2016

Congress has deemed the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) Arctic Strategy inadequate to address the national security significance of the region. Diminishing Arctic ice has increased human access for trade routes and natural resources, including an estimated twenty-five percent of the world’s untapped oil and gas reserves. The geopolitical and environmental impacts, particularly with Russia’s aggressive economic and military posture, threaten the relative stability of the Arctic region and challenge U.S. interests. Budget cuts and a proposed drawdown of U.S. troops in Alaska may have created the perception of a U.S. retreat from the region at a time when the U.S. holds the chairmanship of the Arctic Council and has no better time to lead internationally. As it revises its Arctic Strategy in the next year to comply with Congressional mandate, DOD has the opportunity to develop and articulate a more comprehensive and collaborative approach. This paper proposes recommendations by which DOD can address threats in an uncertain future to help achieve U.S. Arctic policy objectives.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Richard J. Ball

Published: September 2016

This paper advocates that Military Police are the most viable force to “establish police primacy as the military exit strategy” as part of Phase IV operations. The concept of Rule of Law and its importance to the legitimacy of governance and its necessity as part of re-establishing a police force during transition and stability operations is reviewed. Historical case studies will compare where Military Police were used successfully in transition law enforcement tasks as well as instances where they were not at the forefront in assisting with Rule of Law and police operations and the corresponding affects. Alternative forces to Military Police will be assessed for their capabilities and capacity to support Rule of Law and post conflict police units. Lastly, current force structure capabilities, partnering initiatives with local, state and federal law enforcement agencies within the United States and advancements in professionalism and certifications within the Military Police will also be explored. These points will reinforce that Military Police are best qualified to bridge the transition between military forces and post conflict police forces during Stability operations.


Author: Colonel Andre P. Balyoz

Published: September 2016

From 2001 through 2014 the United States spent nearly $165 billion on reconstruction in Afghanistan and Iraq. As a part of these efforts, infrastructure construction programs managed by military engineers during Operations Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Iraqi Freedom (OIF) provided new government facilities, road networks, and utility support infrastructure for the host-nation governments. These efforts reflect the tremendous capabilities of military engineers but they also highlight the importance of aligning work on the ground with national policy and military doctrine. This paper recommends: 1. Department of State taking the lead for stabilization and reconstruction; 2. Defining the scope of reconstruction as an interagency team before beginning; 3. Involving the host-nation in planning, prioritization, and oversight; and 4. Establishing security and legitimacy prior to beginning construction.


Author: Colonel Andrew M. Barr

Published: September 2016

The health of the force is among the most important indicators of Army readiness and is critical to both the present and future readiness of the force. The Army defines individual medical readiness (IMR) as the ability to achieve medical fitness standards within 72 hours of deployment. Future health readiness focuses on Soldier wellness, maximization of holistic health, and prevention of chronic disease and injury. Improvements in future health readiness should increase rates of IMR, improve the health of the force, and decrease DoD and Army healthcare costs. Army doctrine, systems, and programs such as the System for Health, the Performance Triad, and the Army Wellness Centers provide a strong framework for Army health promotion. Improvements in Army doctrine, systems, programs, and policies as well as further alignment with wellness industry best practices will increase future health readiness in the Army and provide cost savings to the Military Health System.


Author: Colonel Richard C. Bell, Jr.

Published: September 2016

Following periods of major conflict, reductions to United States (U.S.) defense budgets and military forces are the norm as the nation reprioritizes resources from international to domestic concerns. The two most recent military drawdowns in U.S. history include the post-Cold War drawdown of the 1990s and the current drawdown that began in 2011. Driven by the contentious Budget Control Act of 2011, however, today's drawdown of Regular Army forces presents a greater risk to national security than the post-Cold War drawdown. While the current drawdown promises to be less significant in terms of total personnel reductions, it is also less consistent with stated U.S. foreign policy goals, it is hampered to a larger extent by domestic political disagreements, and it begins with more internal program risk. Accordingly, the Army should revise its current strategic messaging to better communicate the challenges of the current drawdown to both external and internal audiences.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Jason B. Blevins

Published: September 2016

The U.S. military has experienced tremendous success in winning the conventional combat phases of its wars since World War II, but struggles to win the peace during post-combat hostilities. Informed by the lessons of OIF and the historical success of the U.S. Zone Constabulary in Germany after WWII, the Army should develop conventional units focused on a hybrid combination of stability and limited Irregular Warfare operations. These units, referred to in this paper as U.S. Army Constabulary Brigades, serve as a force modernization effort that supports “the process of improving the Army’s force effectiveness and operational capabilities through force development and integration.” Constabulary brigades balance the efforts of the U.S. military’s unmatched ability to succeed in conventional warfare, and its decade’s long struggle to win the peace during post-conflict stability operations. Several options exist for forming a constabulary force including reassignment of stability operations as service specific roles and converting existing structure to fill this capability gap. This paper recommends the U.S. Army convert selected BCTs to constabulary brigades, who serve as solider-police trained and focused on stability and limited IW operations.


Author: Mr. Douglas A. Boerman

Published: September 2016

The use of Clausewitzian-based limited war strategies have increased the frequency for United States policy makers to use war as a political tool while delivering less effective results. Clausewitz left indications in his writing that suggest he was still deliberating aspects of his theory, in particular the strict reliance upon force-on-force strategies. This paper provides analysis on how successful the United States military has been in delivering desired political results through war both before and after it began its strict adherence to limited war strategies. The results show that the adoption of limited war strategies coincides with increased frequency and decreased effectiveness at applying war as a political tool. The paper then provides an international politics framework that might be applied to enhance the development of grand strategic thinking. Based upon the assessment findings, recommendations are made to expand the strategic options available to military planners. Finally, the ongoing war against radical Islamic terror is used as a case study for the application of the political model


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Chris Marie Briand

Published: September 2016

After years of deployments, the US Army Reserve Components (RC), comprised of both the Army National Guard and Army Reserve, have emerged and been recognized as critical components of the “operational” Army. As the military continues the post OIF/OEF drawdown, the Army needs to reexamine its Total Force concept and revise its current readiness model to capitalize on the capabilities as well as the economies and efficiencies inherent with the reliance on the RC. The RC provides a cost effective solution to help field a balanced and affordable force capable of meeting the full range of mission requirements. Importantly, the USAR provides capabilities that augment, supplement and are unique with those provided by the Active Component (AC). Central to optimizing the AC-RC force mix for the Total Force is the development of a viable force generation model and codification of what has been loosely termed as the “Operational Reserve.” This paper examines and defines the “Operational Reserve,” assesses readiness and resourcing challenges with operationalizing the RC, and recommends a stratified strategic management process to exploit the capabilities and cost effectiveness of the US Army Reserve.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Richard D. Butler

Published: September 2016

The concept of feasibility is a central, but often underappreciated, part of the planning processes and resulting senior leader dialogues that allow civil and military leaders to make difficult choices. Identification of flexible military options demands that political, strategic and operational echelons coordinate to maintain the means-ways-ends balance. Discussions and synchronization of means allows military leaders to know what is within the realm of the possible and enables a discussion of ways with civilian leadership. The narrative of this paper seeks to explain some of the more salient points that allow senior leaders to accomplish good feasibility assessments. The selected historic examples illuminate where many of these points either aligned to provide the civilian-military leadership team with the flexibility to meet the final desired end state, or where non-adherence to feasibility assessments resulted in a less savory end.


Author: Colonel Edwin Callahan

Published: September 2016

The United States (U.S.) Army is a large organization with more than a million soldiers. It is an expensive organization to sustain, and one that is constrained by resources. Uncertainty, complexity, declining resources, and increased demand define the Army’s current strategy. The Army’s strategic leaders are responsible for creating good strategy that solves complex problems and inspires organizational change. They are responsible for reducing uncertainty and complexity while balancing resources and demands. In short, they are responsible for creating good strategy. The Army has a strategy to adapt it towards the future; however, it is difficult to understand because it suffers from the pitfalls of bad strategy. As a result, the Army’s strategy increases uncertainty and a resistance to organizational change. Good strategy provides direction and focus for the organization to follow. It reduces uncertainty, and is necessary for leading organizational change and creating competitive advantages. The purpose of this paper is to describe good and bad strategy, uncertainty and organizational change, and provide recommendations for improving the Army’s current strategy to adapt the Army toward the future.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Kevin S. Capra

Published: September 2016

The Army is currently in the process of cutting the size of its headquarters as well as reducing the grade plate structure within them. Although seen as a method of preserving readiness of combat formations, it may be counterproductive given the current strategic environment. By cutting Army Service Component Commands (ASCCs), Corps and Division headquarters to preserve force structure and readiness at the tactical level, the Army is creating a capability gap and shrinking readiness at the theater-strategic and high operational level. Winning at the strategic level requires the focus and synchronization of the elements of national power and the integration of allies and other partners, which itself requires well-led, senior staffs. In short, the need for more and permanent Joint Task Force (JTF)-capable headquarters with senior personnel in key positions is growing, rather than shrinking. This paper will examine the challenges with reducing headquarters within three critical Army organizations: the Army Service Component Commands (ASCCs), Corps and Divisions based on their requirement to serve as a JTF headquarters and how these cuts have caused a gap between the Army Operating Concept (AOC) and force structure.


Author: Mr. Mark A. Carter

Published: September 2016

On July 20, 2015, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) endorsed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), an international agreement on the nuclear program of the Islamic Republic of Iran, hereafter referred to as Iran. The JCPOA was negotiated between Iran and the five permanent members of the UNSC, plus Germany (P5+1) to eliminate Iran’s path to the development of a nuclear weapon. The signatories to the JCPOA state the agreement puts in place safeguard measures that prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon or weapons-grade nuclear material. The JCPOA is the first agreement to limit fissile material and uranium enrichment capability since the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty entered into force in 1970. As a historic agreement and one that affects the Middle East, and possibly global, security, it is appropriate to analyze its safeguard provisions to determine if deficiencies in coverage exist and the ramifications of such deficiencies. This analysis will demonstrate that P5+1 claim that the JCPOA has completely, and indefinitely, blocked Iranian attempts to develop a nuclear weapon is not verifiable.


Author: Colonel John R. Cavedo Jr.

Published: September 2016

Science and Technology is the “seed corn” for the Army’s Future warfighting systems. As such it must be exceptionally managed if the Army is to be prepared to fight and win in a Volatile, Complex, Uncertain, and Ambiguous environment. The recently released Army Operating Concept (AOC) asserts that innovation is required to ensure the Army is prepared to fight and win in that complex world. Further, the AOC highlights how the Army must be able to “continuously learn, adapt and innovate” and that this ability must not only be mastered by the operational forces, but by the institutional forces as well. Army S&T efforts are managed by bureaucratic institutional “enterprise”, which may be ill-suited in its current construct and policy limitations to meet the demands of the future. The Army S&T enterprise may require a period of punctuated equilibrium, where, as an enterprise, it must be adaptive and innovative lest the Army finds itself at a technological disadvantage in the Future Force 2025 and Beyond (F2025).


Author: Colonel Chad Chasteen

Published: September 2016

Diversity presents a paradox. On one hand, it is a source of creativity and innovation contributing to competitive advantage. On the other hand, diversity can create social divisions which degrade team cohesion, communication, and performance. Increasing diversity, therefore, presents a proverbial Gordian knot, or seemingly unsolvable problem, for many organizations. Fortunately, some have found ways to cut through the cord, untangle the complexity, and achieve positive results, including increased trust, satisfaction, and productivity. With demographic diversity rising, the U.S. Army needs to better understand the potential challenges in order to align policies and programs to improve organizational effectiveness in the future force. The purpose of this research project is to discuss the benefits and burdens of diversity on team outcomes, evaluate the effectiveness of diversity training, assess the alignment of current DoD diversity initiatives, and offer recommendations to improve the diversity-performance relationship in the Army.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Jung W. Choi

Published: September 2016

The thesis of this paper is that the current U.S. policy toward North Korea has created an imbalance between the objectives and concepts at the strategic level. As a result, the U.S. has not been able to achieve its stated policy objective of denuclearized North Korea. In an effort to secure effectively U.S. national interests, the Obama administration forthwith should reevaluate the policy of “strategic patience” and consider approaches that could ameliorate the imbalance. The strategic environment has changed significantly since Obama took office in 2009. Significant changes in the strategic environment require significant modifications to the current policy. President Nixon in 1972 proactively took steps to seek rapprochement with the communist China—then, and still, a nuclear weapons state—against the Cold War policy of containment. Recently, President Obama made a historic visit to Cuba, once a nuclear weapons proxy state, and made a historic deal with Iran, a member of the axis of evil and once an aspiring nuclear weapons state. The strategic environment is now conducive to a new engagement approach that is proactive, principled, pragmatic, and persistent with a hint of realism.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Andrew M. Clark

Published: September 2016

United States civilian law enforcement agencies (LEAs) are largely ignorant of the capabilities and limitations inherent to our nation's armed forces. Specifically, they are unaware what assistance Active Duty (Title 10) forces can and can't offer when they approach capability or capacity limits. Consequently, there is a certain amount of friction between the military and the interagency communities, as well as a lack of adequate contingency planning on the part of both. This is due in no small part to the very limited exposure that most LEAs have to military operations. This research project explores the military-civilian relations problem and attempts to identify a means of bridging the knowledge gap. The ultimate goal of this work is increased exposure and a baseline of common understanding at the federal, state, tribal, and local levels.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Corey Collier

Published: September 2016

The collaboration of technology and weapons development occasionally yields strategic advantages, dramatically changing the way war is waged and significantly shifting power projection and great power alignment. Many believe lethal autonomous weapons (LAWs) to be in that category. Others, however, contend that removing human oversight from the offensive targeting process violates the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC), specifically the principles of discrimination and proportionality. In order to stop their development, numerous organizations are calling for an international ban on the development of LAWs, claiming their use violates the basic human code of morality derived from Just War Theory. Conversely, developers are pursuing programmable, human-like intelligence, capable of the autonomous application of International Humanitarian Law and the LOAC. Regardless of the opposition, technology continues to advance. The author addresses both sides of this issue for consideration and offers recommendations on a possible compromise for the way ahead.


Author: Colonel Rob Connell

Published: September 2016

This paper states that emerging nations are not an existential threat to the U.S. Instead, the primary threat to U.S. power and influence is dual natured and revolves around the nation’s massive debt and inability to adapt to the changing world. To address these threats and maintain its position as a global leader, the U.S. must adopt a strategy focused on becoming more economically competitive via a smart power approach designed to contain emerging powers economically by dominating global market shares. To ensure effectiveness, the executive branch must develop, sponsor and maintain this strategy in the same manner that the U.S. government managed the containment of the USSR under NSC-68.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Patrick M. Costello

Published: September 2016

The current strategic environment and threat pose an immense challenge for outnumbered Air and Missile Defense forces. It is not possible for U.S. forces to deter and defeat current ballistic missile threats alone. Building partner capacity and seeking opportunities to work together with partners and allies are mandates in current defense strategic guidance. Critical to meeting the evolving and expanding threat that ballistic missiles pose, is establishing an interoperable and Integrated Air and Missile Defense capability with partners that have purchased U.S. defense systems through Foreign Military Sales. However, current policy constraints limit the ways in which integration can be achieved, rendering the current strategy inept. Updating policy guidance and ensuring process synchronization offer a possible solution to attain synergy and enable burden sharing to partially mitigate the risk currently imposed by the supply versus demand imbalance.


Author: Colonel Eric S. Crider

Published: September 2016

Creating adaptability in Soldiers is an Army Chief of Staff strategic priority and a critical requirement for the future Army. The purpose of this paper is to make a recommendation to create adaptability in the current Army training system through initial research of behavior performance measures and then embed the results into the training system. Arguably, the Army training system produces some level of adaptability as a byproduct of producing ready units. However, adaptability performance behaviors are too critical to leave to chance creation. To address this imbalance, the Army needs to be deliberate in its goal to increase adaptability through the existing training system. Defining adaptability’s trainable aspects and understanding how the Army trains are the first steps in determining how to change current mechanisms to create a system that fosters purpose-driven adaptability. The tasks trained in the system are the key to driving adaptability behavior change in the Soldiers tasked to win in a complex world.


Author: Colonel Rory A. Crooks

Published: September 2016

In the words of author Robert D. Kaplan, “the South China Sea is the future of conflict.” With vital national interests at stake and frequent military activities occurring in close proximity, parties involved in the South China Sea must develop ways of managing tensions that inevitably accompany sensitive interactions. While all military confidence building measures (CBM) generate a degree of improved communication, transparency of intent, and predictability, the magnitude of beneficial outcomes beyond these becomes a function of how well interests align between the parties. To achieve sustainable success, CBM activities must meet a short list of prerequisites and must trend toward inclusivity by building on small successes. Norms established through multiple successful CBM iterations between a small number of partner militaries serve as a baseline for incrementally including other militaries. Deliberately including key militaries in this process ultimately contributes to stability in this volatile region.


Author: Mr. Elver Sherrell Crow

Published: September 2016

The President and the Secretary of Defense recognize global climate change as a national security risk in the 2015 National Security Strategy and a Department of Defense report to Congress. Two significant implications for the United States are sea-level rise affecting coastal areas (particularly during severe storms) and drought-induced wild land fires in the western part of the country. The National Guard provides significant defense support to civil authorities during emergency response to events in these categories. This paper measures the Guard’s “Essential 10” mission capabilities against the emergency support functions used by the Federal Emergency Management Agency as a framework to evaluate adequacy of the distribution of National Guard units to respond to coastal flooding and wild land fires. It proposes a number of force structure changes across the Army National Guard to better align “Essential 10” capabilities against these two climate-related threats. Finally, the author offers an assessment of the risk these changes might pose to future global National Guard combat missions.


Author: Colonel Robert A. Culp II

Published: September 2016

This paper outlines the Kremlin’s hybrid warfare strategy, operational design and associated tactics. Included are how Moscow integrates unconventional warfare, information operations and cyber operations along with diplomatic and economic coercion to achieve political and military objectives. Understanding the Kremlin’s hybrid warfare strategy offers the United States and its allies opportunities for exploiting vulnerabilities embedded in the ways and means of Russian hybrid warfare. Recommended are actions, all of which fit into a Political Warfare strategic construct, to exploit vulnerabilities associated with Russian hybrid warfare. Implementing them aligns the ways and means necessary to successfully counter future Russian hybrid warfare and achieve our political objectives. Recommendations include changing personnel policies to better enable Strategic Landpower by making long-term investments in human capital to successfully engage in the human domain. Additional recommendations include organizational and policy changes to better organize the US Army, Cyber Command and our information operations enterprise across the Interagency to conduct Irregular Warfare and counter hybrid threats. Also recommended are changes to our intellectual culture and the professional military educational that underpins it.


Author: Colonel Samuel W. Curtis

Published: September 2016

This paper proposes that national security decision makers consider using special operation forces (SOF) forward in contested security environments outside of theaters of war to enable partner forces to combat violent extremist threats. Assumption of low-risk presence early buys down risk later as U.S. forces gain needed situational understanding. To the degree that SOF enablement activities are successful, the United States can achieve positive effects for U.S. national security interests in an acceptable time horizon. Additionally, time is gained for long-term institution building and governance activities to achieve sustainable results. First, this paper addresses key concepts and assumptions concerning the strategic indirect approach in terms of security cooperation and shaping operations. Second, we discuss the strategic environment and threat in North and West Africa. The paper then addresses the USSOF enablement model of select regional partner forces. By analyzing SOF supporting actions in North and West Africa, we present four specific insights for future potential enablement operations outside of areas of declared combat operations.


Author: Colonel Peter E. Dargle

Published: September 2016

Installations play a vital role in power projection capability and contribute to overarching unit, Soldier, and Family readiness during the force generation process. Given current realities result in reductions to force structure, the Army can still provide military professionals with the training, education, and experiences to enhance installation leadership. In a resource-constrained, complex operating environment, Garrisons require strategic leaders to maintain the foundation of Army readiness, navigate the challenges of community partnership, and ensure preparedness to serve as joint power-projection platforms. Garrisons can better accomplish the myriad of complex strategic tasks by creating a military career path specifically aligned to Installation Management. Deftly applying resources to develop a core of military leaders, knowledgeable in the complexities of installation management programs and policies, allows the Army to lead, sustain, and guide installations through assured challenges in a volatile future.


Author: Colonel Robert A. Davel

Published: September 2016

US forces remain increasingly engaged in stability operations throughout the world. Achieving the level of operational adaptability needed to perform these operations requires the Army to complement its traditional lethal capabilities with Non-Lethal Weapons (NLW). NLW enable U.S. forces to achieve strategic objectives while minimizing collateral damage both inside and out of mega-populated urban centers – such as harming non-combatants, destroying critical infrastructure, and poisoning the environment. The use of NLW is essential to stability operations. Accordingly, the DoD should develop NLW capabilities to enhance full spectrum operations. In an era of austere budgets, NLW must be affordable, effective, and suitable. NLW must provide feasible support to all services, regardless of the service’s mission set and personnel. The DoD must incorporate NLW and synchronize efforts to meet our strategic and operational challenges for all forces 2025 and beyond. This SRP describes tactical, operational, and strategic applications of non-lethal weapons. It concludes with recommendations for the military’s employment of non-lethal weapons in full spectrum operations.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel John L. Dawber

Published: September 2016

The most recent and highly publicized major defense policy evolution the United States has pursued is the rebalance to the Pacific. Essential to stability and security of the greater Asia-Pacific is ensuring the stability of Northeast Asia, where maintaining a tenuous armistice on the Korean peninsula is vital. U.S. defense policy for the peninsula over the last half century has been remarkably resolute in maintaining this fragile peace. Although this policy has failed to deny North Korea the acquisition of nuclear weapons, it has ensured security and stability in a complex geopolitical environment where military options risk escalation, immense devastation, and de-stabilization of the region. The question is not whether the United States should maintain a forward presence on the peninsula; rather, how better can it maintain this defense posture within the U.S.-ROK alliance. Pre-occupation with events in Southeast Asia must not risk diminishing the strategic priority of the U.S. commitment to Korea.


Author: Commander Michael R. Dolbec

Published: September 2016

Over the past three decades, the Department of Defense (DOD) has developed and fielded a fleet of unmanned drones without a Joint coordinated strategy. Contrary to service interoperability encouraged by the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the military deferred unifying drone programs and development in 1988. This has resulted in years of wasteful duplication and a drone fleet in which interoperability is an afterthought. Conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan created significant demand for drone capabilities, and nearly unconstrained military budgets fueled service-specific drone development. Drones are the largest growth market in the aerospace industry, and the DOD is predicted to spend $93 billion on them in the next decade. Attempting to coordinate service-specific drone development, the DOD has published many unmanned vehicle roadmaps and established several advisory task forces. However, without a truly Joint strategy to consolidate efforts and resources, as well as an organization with the authority to enforce it, little change has occurred. The wasted effort and resources of service-specific drone capability development weakens the U.S. military and is not sustainable in a fiscally constrained environment.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Sean Duvall

Published: September 2016

Defending the United States Homeland, allies, and interests against attacks of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is a vital national interest. As America wrestles with the best way to deter or respond to a WMD attack, the National policy and National strategy to counter WMD has undergone a subtle but significant evolution since the terrorist attacks in America on 9/11. Defending the U.S. from WMD attack evolution can be categorized into two frameworks: Combating WMD (2002-2009) and Countering WMD (2010-Present). These frameworks for national strategy and policy can be traced all of the way through multiple levels of national documents to Army doctrine. The change to countering WMD policy and strategic guidance is generally consistent from National and Department of Defense (DoD) documents. The Joint doctrine and service doctrine is also generally consistent with the National and DoD guidance. Army strategic guidance and doctrine does not reflect some of the changes from the combating to countering WMD framework and should be updated to avoid confusion in the Joint Force and Army leadership.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Brian P. Elliott

Published: September 2016

The Army Reserve has shifted from a strategic to an operational reserve since 9/11. An effective way for the Army to achieve national defense and national military end states is for Combatant Command (COCOM) to assign United States Army Reserve (USAR) forces to Combatant Commanders. While the concept of regionally aligned Army forces begins to address this pursuit, a formal relationship, such as assignment, has not been established. Legislation, such as Goldwater-Nichols, Total Force and Total Army policies, and both Army and Joint doctrine support COCOM assignment while granting Operational Control to the Army Service Component Command. Evidence of successfully executing a proper formal relationship is the assignment of the 351st Civil Affairs Command (CACOM) to US Pacific Command. Assignment of the remaining CACOMs should happen at the earliest opportunity. Foregoing the Army Reserve Engagement Team concept at the Geographic COCOM and focusing efforts on the Army Reserve Engagement Cells will better integrate assigned USAR forces into Joint, theater activities. Assignment of additional USAR commands gives Combatant Commanders the tools they need when they need them.


Author: Colonel Peter H. Fechtel

Published: September 2016

Germany’s rise in the last five years as a regional and global leader has caused domestic and international elites to question its traditional reticence for foreign engagements. Correspondingly, the German government has begun work on a new security policy, also known as a “White Paper.” This study posits that Germany must align its new security policy to enhance its relevance as an ally and partner for regional and global stability. It examines Germany’s evolving security policy by: 1) analyzing relevant statements from German and other international leaders on the topic; 2) reviewing German security engagement over the last five years; 3) exploring the foundational components of German security thinking; 4) analyzing the current process of developing the new White Paper; and 5) considering what policy changes may be contained within the document, and the associated implications for United States policy makers. This paper concludes that Germany’s proclivity for engagement within international organizations will increasingly make it impossible for Germany to remain a reluctant power. It also concludes that stability operations may be a domestically palatable way for German security engagement.


Author: Colonel Kyle E. Feger

Published: September 2016

Donald Rumsfeld’s desire to transform the Department of Defense into a lean, flexible, and expeditionary organization in 2001 was not a bad initiative. However, in applying the transformation based on three strategic influencers to the plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom, the result was a failed strategy. The first was a wrongheaded application of the lessons learned in Operation Desert Storm. Second, an emerging Revolution in Military Affairs predicated on network centric and rapid decisive operations underestimated the amount of military power required on the ground in Iraq. Finally, a “New American Way of War” focused on small numbers of special operations forces supported by airpower that initially saw success in Afghanistan reinforced Rumsfeld’s concept for regime change in Iraq. The combination of these factors in the decade between Operation Desert Storm and the 9/11 attacks resulted in flawed assumptions and a failed strategy for Operation Iraqi Freedom.


Author: Colonel Sean N. Fisher

Published: September 2016

The purpose of this research project is to examine the challenges and opportunities inherent in the practice of mission command in a multinational environment. The research paper begins with an analysis of past and recent multinational operations to emphasize the relevance of mission command in this context. The paper then transitions to an examination of three of the six mission command principles; building cohesive teams through mutual trust, creating shared understanding, and accepting prudent risks. These three principles prove particularly challenging primarily due to disparities in training proficiency, combat capabilities, and importantly cultural differences among partner nations. In examining and analyzing these challenges, this research paper advocates the importance of cross-cultural competence, places emphasis on the need to focus on capabilities as opposed to limitations among partners and allies, and addresses the importance of common doctrinal language. Addressing these three important factors through education, experience, and training better prepares leaders to apply mission command during multinational operations.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Kristofer W. Gifford

Published: September 2016

The current strategy against ISIL is best described as containment plus with a lead from behind approach. There is a gap between the rhetoric and reality of the proposed endstate to defeat ISIL. The strategy employs ill suited proxy forces that are committing atrocities against the people they liberate. The strategy also attempts to win slowly and avoid stability operations. Though an effective degrade strategy, it cannot achieve the desired end state of destroying ISIL because of a weak Iraqi Security Force and limited U.S. means and resources. Current strategy also fails to address the root causes of the conflict, offer lasting political solutions, or win the information war. To correct these deficiencies, U.S. leaders should reframe the problem set and better align ends, ways, and means with the following strategic adjustments. Utterly defeat ISIL using rapid, decisive, kinetic and non-kinetic means. The Coalition must embrace a U.N. led Arab ground force, strike at ISIL’s ability to govern, and attack ISIL’s ideology more aggressively. To win the peace a new political order should be established, granting semi-autonomy to Sunnis and Kurds, and stabilized by the U.N. led Arab forces. It is also crucial to achieve similar objectives in Syria through diplomacy with Russia and Iran, similar to the P5+1 negotiations.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Kennon S. Gilliam

Published: September 2016

With shrinking budgets and force structure, the Department of Defense (DoD) has requested congressional authority to conduct another round of base realignment and closures (BRAC) in fiscal year 2019. Multiple stakeholders, both inside and outside the DoD, influenced by BRAC history and representing competing objectives, are critical players in an already complex environment. Developing the appropriate organizational structure armed with the proper analytical guidance is essential to a successful BRAC analysis. Instead of building upon historical BRAC examples or currently existing organizational structures, the three frames of operational design can assist the DoD in exploring alternative structures for the next BRAC. Framing the operational environment allows the Department of Defense to understand the current and desired environments. Accurately defining the problem provides insights on how to achieve the desired endstates. Developing operational approaches for organizing the BRAC analytical groups can produce structures that are noticeably different from previous BRAC efforts.


Author: Colonel Ricardo Gonzalez

Published: September 2016

Transnational Organized Crime in Latin America has expanded in the last decade and is responsible for most of the illicit trafficking of drugs, contraband goods and humans in the Western Hemisphere. These criminal activities take place along well-established and resourced networks, which lack effective government control measures. This sophisticated grid with access into U.S. territory could conceivably be used by extremist terrorist organizations to inflict harm inside the United States. Yet ironically, if Transnational Crime Organizations allow the use of illicit networks by extremist organizations, it could bring about adverse consequences for their own lucrative international operations. This Strategic Research Project examines these networks and potential links to terrorism that could be manipulated by religious extremist terrorist organizations. It also assesses the possible U.S. response to a significant terrorist event borne out of this convergence. The study concludes by providing recommendations for U.S. policymakers.


Author: Ms. Alice Y. Goodson

Published: September 2016

The use of cyberspace capabilities during peacetime by state and non-state actors is having a disruptive effect on the international system and the community has varying views on how to deal with these issues. The lack of technical and legal limitations threaten key cyberspace terrain and offers state actors with the political will and technical capability a way to achieve the strategic advantage against an adversary. Cyber operations conducted against a state’s critical infrastructure could lead to misinterpretations that result in conflict escalation from the cyberspace domain to traditional air, land, or sea. This paper recommends the international community collaborate to define international characteristics for key cyberspace terrain; develop standards that ensure states provide timely technical attribution to states accused of cyberwarfare; and create guidelines to verify state intentions in order to increase understanding, promote fairness, and decrease the chances of conflict escalation.


Author: Colonel Gary R. Graves

Published: September 2016

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) remains not only relevant, but an essential component for the protection and advancement of U.S. national interests in Europe, with ancillary effects globally. By maintaining a strong collaborative transatlantic security approach between the United States and its closest and strongest allies, the member nations of NATO, the United States can advance U.S. national interests while supporting the international order of the 21st century. However, the United State must assist NATO in increasing its overall capabilities (Means), to respond to a multitude of threats, by applying interoperable resources across all of the warfighting domains (Ways), to achieve the desired political end states – i.e. deter, and if required, defeat regional sources of instability, while promoting political integration and economic interdependence (Ends). NATO effects not only U.S. policies, but also influences a variety of U.S. national interests. By accepting this, and continuing to invest in the growth and strength of the alliance, the United States will direct its own diplomatic and economic destiny, and guarantee continued access and influence not only in Europe, but also around the world.


Author: Commander Jeff Guerrero

Published: September 2016

2013 National Strategy for the Arctic Region establishes the line of effort, “advance United States Security interests in the Arctic”, and stipulates that we must "enable our vessels and aircraft to operate through, under, and over the airspace and waters of the Arctic." While U.S. submarines have a proven track record of under-ice capability, U.S. surface force has limited capability to operate in the Arctic region except for a few weeks in mid to late summer. Expanding U.S. surface force capability to support Joint, Coalition or Interagency operations for longer durations will require additional resources in order to increase maritime capability in the Arctic. This paper will explore U.S. National Objectives in the Arctic, Strategic Concepts and National Power, available through current surface force capabilities, and project whether future maritime force capabilities require adjustment or alignment to support the overall Arctic Strategy.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Andreas S. Hau

Published: September 2016

This paper examines the reasoning behind Vladimir Putin’s intervention in the Syrian civil war within the historical context of Russian strategic needs and objectives in Europe and the Middle East. There are three main reasons for Russia’s intervention in Syria. The first reason is to protect Russia’s long-standing Syrian ally and Russia’s Mediterranean naval base located there. A second reason -- both evolving and opportunistic -- is to intensify the Syrian civil war in order to increase refugee migration to Europe and thereby destabilize the European Union (EU) and NATO. The final driver for Putin’s Syrian intervention is his desire to become a major stakeholder in the Syrian peace process. Three recommendations for overcoming Putin’s strategy are also presented. These include fully funding the United Nations request for Syrian refugees, increasing the participation rate of Gulf States in the mitigation of the refugee crisis, and finally pursuing diplomatic efforts to reach a peace deal inside Syria.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel (P) David R. Hibner

Published: September 2016

The United States and other nations have struggled to find a widely accepted strategy to defeat the Islamic State because they oversimplify understanding the operational environment by focusing on what can be seen by an outsider as a reflection of their own biases and experiences. The resulting lack of understanding of the deeper culturally and religiously oriented values and assumptions that provide the strength and purpose to ISIS and its corresponding strategic objectives is perpetuated throughout the strategic planning process. In order to develop effective strategies and policies to solve these problems, the Islamic State's culture, objectives, and strategy must be clearly understood from the perspective of those doing the fighting. By analyzing and understanding Islamic State operations from the deeper aspects of values and underlying assumptions of the organization, strategists and policy makers will have a better understanding of the unique strategic implications of the Islamic State, which is a necessary foundation for defining and following an effective, widely accepted strategy to contain or defeat them.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Christopher W. Hoffman

Published: September 2016

The Army's approach to Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) is not properly synchronized to adequately support National and Defense security objectives. The Army stakeholder groups and processes for CWMD are varied, complex, and not properly nested. There are three non-medical proponents that provide the bulk of the expertise for CWMD efforts; this, combined with the Army Medical Department's efforts, the responsibilities the Army holds in the Chemical Biological Defense Program, and its associated RDT&E infrastructure, challenge the Army's ability to produce a coherent and consistent CWMD strategy that can be understood by all stakeholders and leveraged in pursuit of resources in defense processes. The absence of one single synchronized Army CMWD strategy prevents the development of appropriate capability and capacity in ground forces to achieve strategic CWMD goals. Proper designation of a general/flag officer on staff as the CWMD synchronizer, appropriately enabled with existing staff, combined with streamlining of non-medical proponency under one authority, would go a long way to correcting this shortcoming and deliver ground forces capable of countering dynamic threats.


Author: Colonel Brant D. Hoskins

Published: September 2016

Beginning in the late 1990s, the U.S. government began to demonstrate a growing appreciation for the threats posed by Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). In near continuous efforts since that time, strategic leaders have developed policy, multiple iterations of strategy, and Joint doctrine to counter WMD (CWMD). At the same time, various proponents throughout the Army developed or enhanced operational, tactical, and technical capabilities to CWMD. While these developments are encouraging, they do not address the Army’s most significant CWMD challenge which is the lack of an effective CWMD program. Specifically, the Army Staff is not optimally organized for this task, the Army lacks a unifying CWMD vision and strategy to guide and synchronize CWMD programs and, operational doctrine lacks the clarity required for the entire force to plan, prepare and execute CWMD. In order for the Army to, “lead CWMD in the land domain” as declared in the 2014 Army Strategic Planning Guidance, the Army should consider establishing the office of Chief, CWMD at the two star level on the Army staff and him/her with the authorities required to develop, unify and enable a new CWMD program for the Army.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Keith Richard Jarolimek

Published: September 2016

Current Army doctrine for character development falls short of what the Army needs to develop leaders of character. This paper demonstrates an approach to improve character development for junior leaders. Impressions gained by junior leaders in their first operational assignment are formative for the rest of their service in the profession of arms. Battalion commanders and Command Sergeants Major play the most important role in character development as they are the moral exemplars and developers of junior officers and non-commissioned officers during this influential time. The character development portion of a battalion’s leader development program should include five components: an understanding of Army character attributes; appreciation of the origins and content of the Army Ethic; individual character assessment and feedback; training and feedback in moral dilemmas; and modeling of moral, ethical behavior. To support this character development strategy, the Army needs to adopt or develop a character assessment tool and update leader development doctrine.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Jason J. Jones

Published: September 2016

The Army must develop strategic leaders who can excel in a future operating environment marked by complexity and uncertainty. The questions becomes, is the Army developing officers that are prepared to serve as future strategic leaders? Unfortunately, operational demands placed on the military since 2001 created a culture that precludes this from happening. This culture rewards tactical experiences over the pursuit of broadening assignments and shaped a cohort of senior leaders that mentor subordinates to maximize time at the tactical level. These issues, combined with limited opportunities in an officer’s career timeline to pursue broadening assignments, created a miss-alignment between the Army Officer Professional Development Program and career management system. This research paper highlights those issues that led to this misalignment, offer recommendations that will alter the Army’s culture, change mentors attitudes, and increase time in an officer’s career timeline to pursue broadening opportunities. The application of these recommendations will realign these programs and lead to the development of diverse strategic leaders able to lead the Army into the twenty-first century.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Benjamin R. Jonsson

Published: September 2016

This strategy research project examines the relationship between the rhetoric of the Islamic State and their actions on the ground. This research effort aims to examine how the Islamic State's framing of its own role in the struggle for Syria explains the group's actions, provides insights on what to expect in the future, and analyzes areas of strategic vulnerability. The paper focuses on provincial Twitter posts from January 2016, drawing out the following key themes of the Islamic State’s narrative: battling God’s enemies, military strength, piety, and the caliphate as a prosperous place. Finally, the paper discusses implications for U.S. policy: Namely, that the United States urgently needs a robust information campaign, that it must address the increasingly sectarian nature of the Syrian conflict that will impact regional dynamics for decades, and that any strategy must be informed by the deeply religious appeal and claims of the Islamic State.


Author: Colonel Ernest J. Karlberg

Published: September 2016

The Army faces a challenge today similar to the one faced following the Vietnam War. The past decade of war created a generation of agile and adaptive leaders focused on the current fight. Army leadership of the 1970s developed concepts that generated the most tactically and technically proficient army in the world exhibited in the tactical success of Desert Storm. The Army leadership of today must prepare the force for the future while engaged in the challenges of today. General Milley’s initiative to make Readiness priority #1 and the recently published Army Directive 2016-05 set the conditions to create an Army prepared to train to win in a complex world. This strategic research project examines the training revolution following Vietnam, the effects of ARFORGEN on how the Army trains, and the initiatives outlined in Army Directive 2016-05. It goes on to examine the change effort of GEN Dempsey to engrain Mission Command in Army culture and compares that effort to GEN Milley’s effort to make readiness priority #1. Highlighting the critical challenge: failing to educate and train those required to execute the requirements and enable them to monitor and correctly report readiness status per the EXORDs puts the entire effort at risk.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Joshua Keisler

Published: September 2016

The cyber revolution is changing the characteristics of warfare. The land, sea, and air domains each have their own theorists who have attempted to provide the principals of warfare. Cyber does not have its own defining grand theorist, but perhaps it does not need one. Sun Tzu outlined an enduring framework for tactics. Kautilya provided a theory on statecraft. Clausewitz, Jomini, Mahan, Douhet and countless other theorists have provided characteristics of warfare that cross domain boundaries. Cyber does not need its own theorist. Existing theory sufficiently provides principals of warfare within the cyber domain. More so than theory, the cyber domain needs definition and behavioral norms. In order to maintain freedom within cyberspace, while also securing public, commercial, and governmental access, a framework for governance is needed. The U.S. should take an active role in leading the international community in developing a set of cyber norms.


Author: Colonel Jason Knight

Published: September 2016

The Secretary of Defense’s ‘Force of the Future’ initiative has yet to reform the up-or-out promotion system. This may be because senior leaders do not believe the case for change has merit or they may have difficulty visualizing an alternative. Valid concerns sufficient for driving change include a shift from an industrial to an information era, competition for talent, poor talent management, and a history of criticisms. Any alternative promotion system must account for the philosophies associated with the windows and ceilings that regulate officer flow through and out of the military. The three philosophies driving the current system are timelines, promotability, and generalization. However, relevant literature identifies the three philosophies that should be paramount: competencies, employability, and specialization. A viable alternative to the up-or-out promotion system uses competencies to determine promotion eligibility, focuses on employability to retain valuable members, and facilitates specialization. Implementing such a system will not be simple; however, the benefits will be worth the effort. If senior leaders become down and out about the up-or-out system, there is a viable alternative.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Bob Krumm

Published: September 2016

The U.S. military has proven itself adept at creating a decentralized culture that produces innovation during long periods of conflict, as in World War II and more recently during the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. However, the military has been less successful at being able to maintain that type of culture in peacetime. This paper analyzes the concepts of entrepreneurship, competition, and knowledge through the filter of the lessons of the “Austrian school of economics” and applies them to the current U.S. military. This analysis concludes that the military retains vestigial conscription-era controls that inhibit a culture that encourages disruptive innovation. This paper proposes that DoD move to a post-conscription professional model, redefine and make greater use of mission command, add bottom-up experimental units, and create an internal, competitive marketplace by giving greater requirements validation and funding authorities to the regional combatant commanders instead of to the service chiefs.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Joseph P. Kuchan

Published: September 2016

Russia seized Crimea by force, intervened militarily in Eastern Ukraine, and has shown no sign of stopping its aggression. The U.S. wants to deter Russian aggression but has been unable to find the right formula, especially when faced with fiscal constraints and other demands. Imperial Roman systems of deterrence, conventional deterrence theory, and examples of U.S. deterrence during the Cold War all provide insight into the current U.S. predicament in Europe. The U.S. must deter against both Russian conventional attacks and its so-called hybrid war. In order to do so, the U.S. should station a Joint Task Force-capable division headquarters, additional enablers, two additional armored brigade combat teams, and additional equipment in Europe to deter Russia through denial. Combined with effective diplomacy and deliberate communication, clear when required, vague when necessary, the U.S. will deter Russian aggression while maintaining a free and friendly Europe in furtherance of U.S. interests.


Author: Colonel Michael B. Lalor

Published: September 2016

Often the largest force in a joint area of operations, the Army owns the majority of the tasks and responsibilities required to set the theater. With finite resources and the preponderance of its sustainment units in the Reserve Component, the Army’s recent operational experiences in Afghanistan (2001-2002), Haiti (2010), and Liberia (2014) offer recurring and actionable lessons for planners, staffs, and commanders. The Army is often challenged to set the theater due to an inadequate logistics command and control structure, an inability to rapidly build logistics capacity to meet sustainment requirements, and incomplete planning and resourcing that routinely results in capability gaps during the opening phases of operations. The Army should improve the employment of its logistics force structure through a combination of different initiatives sponsored across the Army and the joint force. These initiatives will improve logistics command and control, provide more responsive support during contingency operations, and mitigate recurring capability gaps.


Author: Colonel Nicholas F. Lancaster

Published: September 2016

Combatant and Joint Force Commanders are comfortable weighing operational risk, however they must also weigh legal risk when operating in cyberspace. Four areas of legal risk for cyber operations include avoiding inadvertent armed attacks, complying with the law of armed conflict, following the intelligence oversight rules, and ensuring operations do not qualify as covert action. An armed attack under international law is the trigger for a response in self-defense, so commanders must conduct their cyber activities below this threshold and conduct their operations in accordance with the law of armed conflict. On the domestic side, commanders must carefully plan and supervise their operations to ensure they comply with intelligence oversight rules designed to protect U.S. persons. Finally, because cyber operations are innately devoid of attribution, commanders must be vigilant to ensure their operations do not qualify as covert action that the President must independently authorize and report to Congress.


Author: Captain Scott E. Langum

Published: September 2016

The Arctic is changing. U.S. policies and resource allocation must also change. On September 3, 2015, President Barak Obama became the first sitting President to travel above the Arctic Circle. The purpose of his trip was to raise awareness of regional issues created by climate change. This administration has advanced U.S. Arctic interests compared to its predecessors. However, there is still a long road ahead fraught with political and logistic challenges that must be resolved. As environmental conditions and technological advances have increased man’s ability to operate in the Arctic, the need for persistent presence has increased proportionally. Operational implications of these emerging missions have affected not only the USCG, but the Department of Defense and a plethora of other governmental agencies as well. As a nation, the U.S. currently does not have the physical nor the political resources to support national security objectives. However, by focusing on the four greatest areas of strategic interest economic expansion, international diplomacy, national security strategy, and the projection of power across the full range of military operations, one can begin to prioritize areas within the national strategy for resource allocation increases.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Paul Larson

Published: September 2016

This paper explores the dynamics of an emerging grand strategic competition between the United States and China over the future of the norms and institutions underpinning the liberal world order as we know it. By comparing China’s behavior in the South China Sea and Africa, we can begin to see the elements of a political-military “encirclement” strategy, designed to gradually advance China’s aims without resorting to direct armed conflict. It concludes with policy recommendations for the United States to begin countering China’s encirclement strategy.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Shawn Leonard

Published: September 2016

Despite being engaged in the region for over 15 years, the United States Army War College does not offer a perspective on Middle Eastern thought regarding warfare. Yet the War College’s students—senior officers—continue to receive a Western-based foundation of strategic thought centered on the writings of Clausewitz and Jomini. This short survey seeks to explore the writings of the Islamic social scientist, Ibn Khaldun, who described the world’s first social cycle and the tribal phenomenon which fuels it, known as “asabiyyah.” Next, the paper focuses on two of Islam’s foremost commanders, Khalid Bin al-Waleed and Saladin, who demonstrate the innate Arab-turn-Muslim reliance on mobility and surprise to consistently defeat numerically and technically superior opponents. Finally, the paper offers a pedagogical recommendations section to further discuss the rationale for introducing these topics into the AWC curriculum. There are clear linkages between the concept of “asabiyyah” and the strategic acumen of Bin al-Waleed and Saladin to America’s contemporary adversaries throughout the Middle East, sub-Saharan Africa, and Central and South Asia.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Sherri LeVan

Published: September 2016

Chinese provocative actions in the South China Sea (SCS) have intensified U.S. and Chinese military interactions and any corresponding miscalculation could bring the two nations into direct conflict. This paper examines the tensions in this region that stem from China's rapid and large-scale land reclamation projects in the SCS and overlapping claims with U.S. allies on islands in the region. It analyzes U.S. national interests that are directly opposed to China's "Core Interests" in the SCS and that are driving diplomatic, economic and military relations. Conflicting national interests coupled with China's escalatory actions against U.S. allies and partners contributes to the current military tension between the two nations. The paper concludes that China's continued provocative actions in the SCS will be a recurring source of friction. Thus, the U.S. should maintain its presence to preserve regional security and stability. More important, the U.S. can dictate how and when to respond to Chinese provocations and the paper argues that now is the time for the U.S. to draw the proverbial line in China's man-made sand.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Andrew Liffring

Published: September 2016

Energy security, defined as having assured access to reliable supplies of energy and the ability to protect and deliver sufficient energy to meet mission essential requirements, is a strategic issue for the United States. The U.S. Army is the DoD’s greatest energy user, consuming 36 percent of the DoD’s total in 2014, and therefore has a vested interest in increasing its energy security posture. However, the Army faces a critical energy security threat in the form of domestic utility disruptions due to the service’s dependence on commercial power grids, especially due to enemy action such as cyber-attack. However, the Army is only funded to meet current energy demands, receiving very little to invest in renewable energy projects. Currently, the Army must rely on third party financing and prioritize projects based on economic variables to increase energy security on Army installations. This strategy fails to increase readiness and allocate the Army’s limited means efficiently. By using the Energy Security framework proposed in this paper, the Army can better manage energy security projects in a risk-informed way.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Christopher G. Lindner

Published: September 2016

In January 2013, the Chief of Staff of the Army directed the Army Medical Department (AMEDD) to conduct a study aimed at improving development of its officers for leadership and command positions. The AMEDD determined that many officers inadequately develop as leaders through professional military education, training, and assignment experiences. The purpose of this research paper is to evaluate current AMEDD strategies to develop and employ talent in its active duty officer corps. Additionally, the paper identifies evidence-based courses of action derived from both military and private sector best practices to improve AMEDD’s talent management. Developing talent in the AMEDD requires an overhaul of competency identification and building, as well as performance management to meet current and future leader-development demands. The AMEDD must also adapt its practices of employing talent through matching talents to the right jobs, supported by more quantifiable talent management systems. Improving development and employment of talent in the AMEDD fosters an organization ready to meet future readiness demands, decrease costs, and improve beneficiary satisfaction.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Craig Maceri

Published: September 2016

There are multiple players in the global community - governmental, non-governmental, and private sector, who focus their efforts on economic development in post-conflict, fragile, or failed states. In 2006, a new player emerged from the Department of Defense, known as the Task Force for Business and Stability Operations, focused on promoting economic development in Iraq. This novel task force consisted mainly of civilian business personnel who leveraged their private sector expertise to help revitalize Iraq’s industrial economy. After eight years of operating in both Iraq and Afghanistan, the TFBSO shut down operations and transferred its open projects to United States Agency for International Development (USAID). This paper seeks to answer how successful the Task Force was in helping to promote a sustainable economy in Iraq and Afghanistan and what role the Department of Defense should play in economic development activities. It also provides recommendations on what actions should occur to regenerate a more effective capability for future contingencies.


Author: Colonel Robert E. Lee Magee

Published: September 2016

NATO is required to protect each Alliance member. Based on current political and military conditions in the Baltic States, NATO can no longer successfully deter Russian aggression as revealed by recent open source war games conducted by RAND. NATO would be left with nothing with bad options if Russia pursued a campaign similar to its efforts in Ukraine. Therefore, NATO must continue to adapt to the 21st Century and a resurgent Russia. This adaptation would include a military force capable of deterring Russia’s Western Military District, broadening its exercise program, and a earmarking a force capable of relieving the deterrent force. These military options would be supported by a NATO information campaign and political commitments. NATO must consider Russian interests and how best to work with and around President Vladimir Putin’s current administration.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Frank A. Makoski

Published: September 2016

The Asia-Pacific has the most natural disasters than any other region in the world. It is also an area of increasing economic growth and urbanization. The devastating costs associated with natural disasters have direct and indirect implications, not only for the region, but also for the United States. As the U.S. shifts its focus to Asia, it is essential to understand and mitigate the effects natural disasters have in the Asia-Pacific in order to promote stability and protect U.S. interests. This paper will examine the causes of natural disasters in the Asia-Pacific, assess the costs associated with these events, and link how environmental catastrophes in the region affect the United States and its interests in the region. In addition, it will provide recommendations on how the U.S. government can better support endeavours to build resilience against the effects of natural disasters with the goal of maintaining stability and security in the Asia-Pacific, and ultimately in the United States.


Author: Colonel Robert W. Marshall

Published: September 2016

The Army has made mission command the cornerstone of its operations and leadership doctrine. Despite its inclusion in doctrine for more than 10 years, the Army still struggles to fully enact mission command. There are significant cultural barriers that drive this inability to realize the full potential of mission command. This paper uses Kotter’s organizational change model and Schein’s methods of cultural change to analyze current Army culture and its level of misalignment with the precepts of mission command. From this analysis, it identifies cultural embedding and reinforcing mechanisms to enable senior leaders to create and sustain needed change to fully embrace mission command. Army senior leaders, at multiple levels, must make mission command a focus area and provide role-modeling and coaching to their subordinates. The Army must incorporate mission command principles into its philosophies and creeds and continue to tell the story of why mission command is necessary for future success. Army systems, including performance evaluation, education, training and assignments must be modified to create culture change to better align leader development with mission command.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Earl G. Matthews

Published: September 2016

Al-Shabaab is Al-Qaeda’s East African franchise and is in the midst of a diffuse ten-year insurgency against the United Nations-backed Federal Government of Somalia and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Consistent with its ultra-violent expansionist jihadist vision of an Islamic caliphate, al-Shabaab has in recent years grown into a transnational actor determined and able to orchestrate sensational and horrific terrorist incidents outside of the contours of Somalia. Al-Shabaab has been characterized as fiscal-military state. It has adapted an innovative and resilient funding model which has allowed the organization to sustain itself over the long haul, despite the loss of significant territory or the removal of key leadership figures. The United States has devoted significant resources to training and equipping AMISOM troop contributing nations and to identifying and directly targeting key leaders within Al-Shabaab. This paper argues that a necessary component of any successful effort to permanently cripple and ultimately defeat the organization will require a concerted whole-of-government effort to uncover and comprehend the al-Shabaab financial apparatus and to dismantle that operation. Cutting off al-Shabaab’s money flow will not alone achieve victory over the organization, however, without doing so, victory is unobtainable.


Author: Colonel Kevin A. McAninch

Published: September 2016

To be successful in the dynamic global security environment of the 21st century the United States Army must retain and develop its talent: its people. The Army places a premium on leadership and developing leaders through the best possible education, training and experiences. The Army’s 360-degree assessment tool, the Multisource Assessment and Feedback (MSAF), provides feedback to leaders on how well they are leading and gives leaders an opportunity to engage in self-development. However, the MSAF is not currently seen or utilized as a catalyst for the learning and development of leaders, and analysis shows there are negative trends with the program. Additionally, the leader competency of developing others is consistently rated as poor. Negative perceptions by the force regarding the MSAF’s utility have given rise to a high percentage of officers initiating an MSAF event only to fulfill the regulatory requirement of including a date on their officer evaluation report. In light of this, the Army has an opportunity to stop lying to itself and add needed structure to ensure the learning sticks, and that the organization doesn’t fall victim to the creation of a leadership gap in the formation.


Author: Mister Ryan Sean McCannell

Published: September 2016

As the United States winds down its stabilization operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development will face bureaucratic and political pressures to abandon their already modest reconstruction and stabilization (R&S) lines of effort in favor of more traditional diplomacy and development assistance priorities. Yet this period of relative peace allow policy makers to reflect on past challenges to creating a “civilian surge” capacity and determine feasible, acceptable, and suitable ways and means to ensure robust civilian participation in future R&S operations. The author recommends expanding the work of a recently created interagency task force on fragile states to include leading a new generation of civil-military planning tied explicitly to resources, since past planning efforts have not always done so effectively. Civilian agencies should work with the Department of Defense (DOD) to conduct formal interagency after action reviews on R&S activities outside of Iraq and Afghanistan, track and respond to congressional efforts at DOD reform, and encourage R&S knowledge centers to take stock of existing capabilities and reinvigorate their relationships with policy makers.


Author: Colonel J. Frank Melgarejo Jr.

Published: September 2016

This strategic research project (SRP) analyzes the challenge of combating transnational organized crime in Central America’s Northern Triangle. It then describes DoD programs and authorities which best support U.S. and partner nation CTOC efforts on the land domain. To determine the combination of DoD programs and authorities that could best support CTOC efforts, the SRP defines TOC; describes the Northern Triangle and its environment; reviews U.S. CTOC policies and supporting strategies; analyzes current DoD CTOC authorities and offers examples of how such authorities can be leveraged; and finally recommends how DoD can best support CTOC on the land domain in Central America’s Northern Triangle.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Michael D. Mierau, Jr.

Published: September 2016

Professions require rules for the conduct of its members, and a system to enforce those rules through discipline if necessary. The Army’s Judge Advocate General’s (JAG) Corps, which governs the profession of law within the Army and the Army’s courts, is no exception. Although the Army JAG Corps has both rules that govern the ethical conduct of lawyers and a system to investigate and discipline lawyers that violate those rules, an analysis of the studies done at the national level with regard to lawyer discipline demonstrates that the Army has room to improve its system of lawyer discipline. This paper proposes that the Army should designate a specific duty position for the role of disciplinary investigator and then train lawyers in that duty position in the specialized area of the law governing lawyer discipline. Additionally this paper proposes that the Army should change the standard of proof in lawyer disciplinary investigations to that of clear and convincing evidence. These changes will bring the Army system into greater compliance with the national standards for lawyer discipline established by the American Bar Association, and will afford greater consistency and fairness in the Army’s disciplinary system for lawyers.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Joseph C. Miller

Published: September 2016

The United States became an Arctic Nation in 1867 when it purchased the territory of Alaska and has demonstrated varying levels of interest, commitment, and concern for the region since that time. Rapidly changing climate conditions in the Arctic have resulted in melting ice and with it increased possibilities of commercial transit and an associated increase to security threats. These climatological realities, coupled with the increased attention the Arctic is garnering across the globe, has forced a relook at strategy. The United States has begun responding to the dynamic regional situation with an updated national policy and implementation plan, however, more should be done to lead change and in response to the actions of other Arctic nations. The current implementation of U.S. strategy falls short in forcing action in several key areas. The U.S. should ratify the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, formally appoint the State Department’s U.S. Special Representative for the Arctic to the rank of Ambassador, begin procuring icebreakers for the U.S. Coast Guard, incentivize civilian investments and partnerships, and explore future collaborative efforts with Russia to preserve the vision for a peaceful opening to the Arctic.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Christopher W. Muller

Published: September 2016

President Obama’s December 2014 announcement of the normalizing of relations with Cuba provides a tremendous opportunity for the Department of Defense. Collaboration between the Cuban and U.S. militaries could improve regional stability and increase homeland security by enhancing collaboration in the southern maritime approaches to the United States. The establishment of a new Embassy and Country Team will provide a golden opportunity for DoD to create a new model and finally divest themselves of the old two-sided model consisting of a hodge-podge of small DoD entities centered around a Defense Attaché Office and/or a Security Cooperation Office. Establishing just one DoD organization in Cuba as a test model could eventually lead to an update of the current 2013 DoD Instruction C-5205.75, "Implementing Instructions for DoD Operations at US Embassies." Adopting a single DoD concept would reduce the Department’s overall costs and personnel, reducing redundancy, avoiding unnecessary confusion for our partner nations, and streamlining mission accomplishment.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Matthew R. Nation

Published: September 2016

In 2012, the United States announced its Rebalance to the Pacific, creating a new focus on Asian security for U.S. policy makers. From ensuring universal access to the global commons, to managing China’s responsible growth, Washington requires a long-term strategic partner to share the burden and India is at the top of the list. India, a democratic nuclear power and home to a fifth of the world’s population, is looking east to forge partnerships to further its own economic and security interests. The U.S. and India have a spotty history together that warrants analysis, but since the turn of the century, more areas of convergence than divergence exist between them. With progressive leadership in both nations setting conditions for further meaningful relations, established military ties between the U.S. and India provide an optimal platform to advance mutual interests. With India’s long-standing policy of non-alignment as a backdrop, India must increase its role as a security provider. These former British colonies must work together to compliment each other’s policies to maintain a strategic equilibrium in the Indian Ocean and South East Asia regions.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Colin P. Nikkila

Published: September 2016

As demonstrated by the Boston Bombings, the threat of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) at home and abroad has not reduced since the end of major combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. It's been nearly three years since Boston. The President has published strategic policy to combat the threat, however actions taken by the Department of Defense to respond have been inadequate considering the threat and responsibilities. The DoD’s roles and responsibilities must be more clearly defined while in support of the homeland. Explosive Ordnance Disposal response is needed by the Interagency, but better efficiencies from the explosive enterprise stakeholders must be gathered and embraced. Both federal law and DoD policies must be updated to focus on all threats, and increased cooperation and interoperability within the Interagency must be realized.


Author: Commander Mark O’Connell

Published: September 2016

For 26 years Sri Lanka was embroiled in a brutal civil war to control much of its countryside. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), waged an insurgency against the government’s forces, the majority Sinhalese Sri Lankan Armed Forces (SLAF). LTTE attacked the SLAF with ferocity and ingenuity unmatched by any other terrorist organization. The LTTE were labeled “among the most dangerous and deadly extremists in the world” by the FBI; they revolutionized suicide attacks with the invention of the suicide belt, were the first terrorist organization to employ the use of chemical weapons, and the first to employ a cyber-attack against a state. In the early 2000’s the LTTE included a navy, air force, suicide wing, and an international funding organization that raised millions for the cause, while controlling almost a quarter of the Sri Lankan countryside. And yet in a little over four years, the LTTE was wiped off the map. This paper examines the conflict, its root causes, and the strategies used in order to garner insights.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Gregory O. Olson

Published: September 2016

The United States military has gained a significant amount of experience, knowledge and best practices from conducting Security Force Assistance (SFA) operations in Iraq and Afghanistan over the last decade. The Department of Defense (DOD) must ensure that the lessons learned from conducting SFA will be captured and be able to be regenerated the next time we are faced with conducting SFA on a large scale. This paper provides an overview of SFA and consists of four main sections. The first outlines the role of security force assistance in stability operations; the second is analysis of SFA using the construct of Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leader Development, Personnel and Facilities (DOTMLPF); the third is SFA effectiveness in recent operations and the fourth is SFA regeneration for future needs.


Author: Colonel Mark S. Parker

Published: September 2016

The United States continues to operate in a world that is volatile, unstable, complex, and ambiguous during the second decade of the twenty-first century. One of the more complex and strategically important regions in the world is Asia, where President Obama has refocused U.S. national power in direct support of U.S. national interests. To assist in these interests, the United States should improve strategic relationships with India, a rising regional and world power that would be a significant partner in Asia. India’s geopolitical position, with a democratic government and a rising economy and naval power to assist in regional security and containing the ambitions of China make them a prime partner for the United States. To improve the relationship, the United States is reaching out through key leaders to develop stronger economic and military ties through trade agreements and arms sales. While the United States sees increased partnership in the future, India is hesitant in creating too strong a relationship due to its non-alignment movement that is still prevalent in its government.


Author: Colonel Kimberly A. Peeples

Published: September 2016

To succeed in today’s complex environment, Army leaders must master vision, alignment, and change. Scholars have written a multitude of books on the concepts of visioning and change. However, alignment is more elusive in the research literature. Some leaders relate organizational alignment to nesting methods inherent in large, bureaucratic and hierarchical institutions. But scholars, George Labovitz and Victor Rosansky open the alignment aperture. They posit that the power of alignment occurs when an organization’s key elements – people, strategy, customers and process – remain tightly centered around its central purpose. This paper applies the Labovitz and Rosansky alignment framework to the equally elusive world of Army installation management. It chronicles the evolution of centralized installation management over the past 15 years to compare and contrast traditional nesting with a more comprehensive alignment approach. And it will challenge strategic leaders to think critically about the concept of alignment and its potential to not only improve operational performance but better position the Army to achieve its 2025 vision through targeted and sustainable change.


Author: Colonel David C. Phillips

Published: September 2016

With Congress’s renewed push for acquisition reform in 2016, the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Army must adapt their acquisition strategies to keep pace with the changing environment. Given the growing ends and diminishing budgets, the Army must look for new ways to reduce risk while prioritizing readiness. Acquisition reform is not new, and there is a long history of both success and failure. Recently, the DoD, the Army, and Special Operations Command have all seen that teams empowered with the right institutionalized authorities and culture can provide warfighters with innovative capabilities faster while meeting all the traditional requirements of cost, schedule, and performance. The Army should now seize two opportunities: first, institutionalize and reinforce rapid acquisition processes, authorities, and organizations; and second, use mission command to embed an operationally focused culture of integrity, innovation, and courage to take risk in its acquisition organizations. This will directly and positively impact future warfighters.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Carter L. Price

Published: September 2016

Although every career officer prepares for command, the fact is that very few will do so at the senior level. The vast majority of Senior Service College graduates will spend the remainder of their careers on various staffs as advisors to commanders or civilian leaders. With this in mind, it is important that the services focus institutional education toward building the competencies of senior strategic advisors. Military history is replete with leaders who functioned as strategic advisors during critical periods. One such advisor is Major General Fox Conner. Arguably responsible for the development of a President, Secretary of State and one of the most prolific military leaders of a century, Fox Conner is largely an unknown figure in American history. This paper discusses Conner’s background and the attributes that made him such an effective advisor and leader. This paper will evaluate him against disciplines that James E. Lukaszewski proposes are crucial to maximizing the effect of strategic advice: be trustworthy, be a verbal visionary, develop a management perspective, think strategically, understand the power of patterns, advise constructively and show others how to use your advice.


Author: Colonel Robert L Ralston

Published: September 2016

In the recent past, the Army has found itself woefully underprepared to conduct contingency contracting operations, requiring substantial augmentation from outside Agencies and Services. The Army is directed to add Contingency Contracting Administrative Services (CCAS) to its capabilities, relying on Army Contracting Command to assume full transition of responsibilities in January, 2016. This paper will exhibit that CCAS is essential to future military operations and when failure to ensure sufficient CCAS operations has occurred, astronomical loss has ensued. It will provide an operational framework recommending strategic changes to enhance Army contracting capabilities commensurate with providing adequate, responsible and sustained contracting services for future operations. The time has come that the Army expand its efforts and treat contracting administration services as a core competency by resourcing, training and equipping ACC for future contractor heavy contingency operations.


Author: Colonel Firman H. Ray

Published: September 2016

The U.S. Army is reducing its force to the lowest end-strength since before World War II. Officers will experience directed and involuntary drawdown measures in order to meet targets required for proper Year Group management. Potential costs of involuntary separation include: damage to officer trust, commitment, and general esprit de corps; adverse effects on accessions and the retention of quality officers; and public and Congressional opposition. To the Army’s detriment, and despite their regular occurrence and import, there exists no strategic framework for the comprehensive planning and execution of force reductions or expansions. The Army would benefit from the efficiency and effectiveness provided by an effective, strategic and comprehensive officer drawdown framework that heeds lessons learned, uses a Year Group construct to pin-point excess inventory, develops and employs tailored force shaping measures to meet drawdown requirements, and provides for continuous monitoring and assessment of force reduction measures to keep the drawdown trajectory on path toward desired end states.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Gary R. Reidenbach

Published: September 2016

In an effort to avoid another bitter and costly rivalry like that of the Cold War years, it is of supreme consequence for America to re-examine its relations with Russia and craft an engaged and cooperative approach to the future. The purpose of this paper is to propose that America’s relationship with Russia should strive in all possible contexts to promote and advance integration of Russia into the broader international political, economic, and security system. America’s approach, policies, and actions with regard to Russia, similar to American approaches in relation to other states, should consistently rely on the tenets of cooperative liberalism for inspiration and guidance. This paper briefly discusses the history and current state of American-Russian relations, examines the international relations theories of realism and liberalism and the insights they hold for influencing and shaping America’s approach to Russia, and analyzes key interests from both sides in search of areas for potential long-term liberalist inspired cooperation while identifying issues and interests likely to yield undesirable competitive friction or opposition.


Author: Colonel David E. Ristedt

Published: September 2016

Global Health Diplomacy is an increasingly recognized soft power element in support of the United States National Security Strategy. Multiple United States agencies employ personnel globally to positively affect host nation population health indicators, combat active or prevent emerging disease threats, build partner capacity and increase interoperability with the international community. Interagency coordination is a key element to synchronize medical efforts in support of global health activities. Several identified governance challenges lead to inefficient and desynchronized efforts. Health diplomats lack standardized training and education despite many of the same requirements. Interagency personnel distribution leaves potential gaps in global surveillance and limits effective support to Ambassadors. If the United States is to synchronize health diplomacy across the interagency, formalizing a governance structure with clearly articulated authorities as well as evaluating the attributes and distribution of health diplomats is strategically vital in improving global health effects in support of national security objectives.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Luis Rivera

Published: September 2016

Tactical decisions made by NCOs may have strategic implication, but the Army NCO Education System (NCOES) does not deliberately teach NCOs how to think strategically. To meet this challenge, the Army should educate NCOs how to “think strategically” throughout the NCO Professional Development System (NCOPDS). This paper provides a definition and context for thinking strategically, examines the current deficit in educating and evaluating NCOs to think strategically, examines why the PME is the appropriate venue to most effectively educate Army NCOs to think strategically, analyzes the new NCOPDS, and makes recommendations on how to address this topic with the Army Professional Military Education system.


Author: Commander James Roche

Published: September 2016

The Budget Control Act (BCA) of 2011 mandated reductions to the DoD budget and resulted in less money to support current manning levels, operations, weapons systems, and facilities infrastructure. These lower budgets have forced the Services to underinvest in facility maintenance, accelerating the deterioration of DoD asset portfolios. Moreover, as the Services reduce manning further, many current facilities will become redundant. DoD has long favored the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process to pare down its holdings, but for over a decade Congress has refused to authorize a new BRAC. DoD needs to concentrate its limited funds on preventing deterioration of its core strategic asset portfolios, those critical to core missions which often require a high degree of physical security, for which there is limited or no equivalent commercial capacity, and which cannot be easily recreated. DoD can shed less critical asset portfolios- and many unneeded buildings--by developing new public-private partnerships.


Author: Colonel Karen J. Roe

Published: September 2016

The nature of warfare has undergone revolutionary changes over the past several decades. Battles are no longer conducted solely by combat forces deployed into zones of hostilities. Today, combat takes many forms and is conducted by units fundamentally different from the conventional combat arms, operating in new domains and using ways and means never before considered. The Army's current system of official lineage and honors, however, reflects an outdated approach to capturing modern warfare. The TDA units are "non-deployable” or “strategic" and, as such, do not have official recognition of lineages and a historical record of honors. This creates a system of inequality that fails to recognize the new domains and nature of combat.


Author: Mr. Philip F. Romanelli

Published: September 2016

Talent management of officers in the United States Army is approaching a state of crisis and far-reaching changes are necessary. The impact on the US Army Reserve (USAR) is exacerbated by the fact that it is the smallest component of the Army, is tightly bound to the Active Component, and lacks the dual mission and resulting political strength of the Army National Guard. So to some extent the USAR may be the canary in the coal mine--anything negative may affect the USAR before the other components. This research paper examines four key areas: permeability (movement between components), promotions (who is selected to lead at the next level, when, and how), positions (the structure of the organizations and how they are filled), and proficiencies (how are skills captured and employed). In analyzing these challenges, this paper advocates swift change to selected policies, emphasizes talent management, and identifies needed law and policy updates to enable the Army to better respond to the ever-changing strategic environment.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Marlyce K. Roth

Published: September 2016

With the ever-growing cyber threat from state and non-state actors, U.S. national interests and those of U.S. allies are at a significant risk. Unlike the other domains, the cyber domain grows exponentially on a daily basis, so time is of the utmost importance for building and sustaining a cyber-ready force to protect against threats. The April 2015 DoD Cyber Strategy provides a solid foundation, for developing enterprise-wide programs and plans to build a cyber-ready force to meet the U.S. national military objectives that support the National Security Strategy.


Author: Colonel Philip J. Ryan

Published: September 2016

The 3D (Diplomacy, Development, and Defense) Planning Process is a novel concept meant to fuse together critical aspects of our nation’s whole of government approach to international affairs. Despite a bevy of key strategic documents, U.S. Foreign Policy lacks focus, structure, and accountability across the interagency to make it effective and efficient. From the local through the regional to the national level, issues of poor coordination, boundary confusion, and bureaucratic competition grow worse the higher one gets in the relations between the Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development, and the Department of Defense. American Foreign Policy requires effective synchronization of the different parts of government. This effort would involve national-level leadership and a comprehensive review of interagency collaboration, organization, and policies to address some of the obvious problems with the current approach.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Teresa A. Schlosser

Published: September 2016

When Secretary of Defense, Leon Panetta, rescinded the 1994 direct ground combat definition and assignment rule in January 2014 he set in motion changes that will have sociological impacts across the Army’s combat arms. Therefore, Army leaders need to be aware of sociological theories commonly associated with individual / group acceptance as they integrate females into previously all-male units. Social Learning Theory explains how individuals learn as much, or more, from watching those around them as from their own actions. In-group Bias addresses internal biases groups develop to differentiate themselves from those not in the group and how the group dynamic works to maintain the homogeneity of the original group. Stereotype Threat describes the various ways minority individuals cope with the feeling of being judged by their minority status versus their actual skills and abilities. Each of these theories provide valuable insight to leaders concerning the changing group dynamics within combat arms units, enabling them to tailor their leadership to integrate females successfully.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel James P. Schreffler

Published: September 2016

The United States power grid is a vital piece of the country’s infrastructure. However, due to an increased reliance on computers, the system has become increasingly susceptible to a cyber attack. This paper provides an overview of the power grid and discusses its vulnerability to a cyber attack that would result in a catastrophic blackout. The National Response Framework is examined to include the role of the National Guard in a response to such an attack. The paper finds that the Guard focuses more on its wartime mission and is not structured or equipped to provide effective assistance to state governors during a catastrophic blackout. The author raises several proposals and further research questions to include the establishment of a National Guard pre-positioned stocks program as well as the establishment of separate home defense forces at the state level.


Author: Commander Kristofer Scott

Published: September 2016

The early dismissal of Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Director Lieutenant General (LTG) Michael Flynn in 2014 for allegedly “disruptive” leadership raises a host of concerns for military professionals interested in organizational change. LTG Flynn’s attempt to reorganize DIA to provide better combat force support seemed to flag in the face of cultural resistance. It would appear that LTG Flynn’s forceful, top-down approach to change did not fare well at an established bureaucracy with an entrenched cultural identity due to an insufficient coalition of the willing to reinforce his message. In the end, this crippled his efforts and brought about an early end to his tour, despite his clear vision and tough communication. A more consensus-based style might have brought slower but more sustainable change. Also of note, an examination of resources might have begged the question of whether or not DIA should change at all--a point relevant to military change leaders in the current resource constrained environment.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Patrick E. Simon

Published: September 2016

Ever since independence from the United Kingdom (UK) in 1946, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan found itself immersed in a difficult geopolitical position. Jordan is perpetually surrounded by conflict, yet the country provides a stabilizing role in Middle Eastern affairs. For years, the political survival of Jordan has been attributed to the Kings deft management of international relations and shifting alliances between Jordan’s influential neighbors – Iraq, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and to a lesser extent Israel and Egypt. Jordan has difficulty in generating a sustainable economy, and the survival of the monarchy remains dependent on economic support from regional allies and international donors such as the United States. If Jordan succumbs to the regional war unfolding in Iraq and Syria, the remainder of the Levant and potentially the Arabian Peninsula could unravel changing the Sikes-Picot borders forever. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan’s continuing role as a key stabilizing force in the Middle East, the country’s economic security as a deterrent to political unrest, and a strong U.S. - Jordan strategic relationship is not only vital to Jordan’s survival, but also the survival of a region undergoing transformational changes.


Author: Colonel Jonathan B. Slater

Published: September 2016

The United States will not go to war in the foreseeable future without allies and international partners by its side. It is critical for the Department of Defense (DoD) to continue to pursue International Cooperative programs to promote interoperability, improve logistics efficiencies, harness the best technological capabilities among allies, and reduce costs for systems procurement. This paper will discuss the DoD International Cooperation guidance, national power (Diplomatic, Informational, Military, and Economic) aspects of international cooperative programs, international considerations, DoD acquisition policy, and Congressional actions needed to further support international cooperative programs. There are challenges in all of these areas that need to be considered by a program manager and the requirements owner to ensure that policy directives are balanced with needs of the user. Ultimately, international cooperative acquisition programs pose many benefits to all nations involved, such as reduced costs, better operational interoperability, and stronger alliances that warrant the additional efforts required to execute an international program.


Author: Commander Joseph W. Smotherman

Published: September 2016

As warfare evolves, new technology pushes the limits of acceptability and operations in cyberspace are no different. If attacks in cyberspace are assaults of one state against another, then the framework of Just War theory should still apply and Michael Walzer’s Legalist Paradigm provides a clearer lens on when an armed response to a cyber attack is morally permissible. While some parts of Just War theory directly apply to responses to Cyber Attacks, the others do not, beginning with Just Cause. Walzer describes Just Cause in terms of the natural rights of the citizens of a state, and when a cyber attack interrupts the ability of those citizens to make a life together or the “safe space” they create, then a physical response to a cyber attack could be justified. This paper outlines the relationship between Walzer’s Legalist Paradigm and justification for physical responses to cyber attacks, with the intent of providing senior leaders with a framework for those responses.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Stephen J. Snyder

Published: September 2016

This paper identifies six challenges facing U.S. stability operations. These include issues of policy, leadership, civil affairs force structure, assessment, joint coalition operations and resource scarcity. The identified challenges stem from both the findings of the Special Investigator for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and from personal observations from deployments as a civil affairs operator and planner. These challenges are framed against current U.S. policy, and department of defense, department of state and interagency capabilities. Potential remedies for each of the six challenges is provided, as well as suggestions for the way ahead for U.S. stability operations.


Author: Colonel Theodore M. Thomas II

Published: September 2016

As doctrinally written, developing and acquiring a capability-based force is the basis of the current Joint Capability Integration and Development System (JCIDS). This force is one developed agnostic of a specific threat or enemy, and rather on how a future enemy may fight. The new and current threat of persistent irregular warfare, plus emerging peer global competitors is a credible justification to adopt a threat-based model of capability development. Threat-informed capability development will ensure more relevant capabilities delivered to the combatant commanders to meet global requirements. JCIDS should adopt a hybrid process blending threat and capabilities based development. By using a blended and iterative approach that bases near and mid-term capability needs on current threats that pose a danger to U.S. interests, and long-term needs on a capability-based philosophy, the joint force can rapidly develop relevant systems to counter near-term threats that hold promise for a long service life against future threats. In addition, such a process will encourage the efficient use of limited budgetary resources and discourage technological overreach on immature technologies.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Douglas F. Tippet

Published: September 2016

Today the US faces a new era of uncertainty about where, when, and against whom it will militarily engage. Coupling that reality with A2AD and budget-induced re-posturing leaves America in a strategic predicament regarding force projection similar to the one it faced prior to WWII. Current trends suggest that the U.S. will continue to reduce overseas basing as a way to manage reduced end-strength and rising infrastructure sustainment costs. With fewer pre-positioned forces and a political desire to decrease large main operating base footprints, Combatant Commanders will need to gain quick access to airfields, seaports, and basing at the onset of crises. Complicating this strategic problem is the possibility that diplomatic leverage spent for negotiating use prior to hostilities may not result in actual use of bases during hostilities. To these ends, the historical evidence suggests a potential strategic benefit of using the “Lend-lease” concept to inform future policy formulation for contingency basing negotiations. These realities suggest that the U.S. must balance its goal of stabilizing regions through building partner capacity with the need to retain some type of leverage for future negotiations of airfields and ports during actual crisis.


Author: Ms. Andrea M. Tomann

Published: September 2016

The Defense Innovation Initiative and the Army Operating Concept provide a common vision for the future, and they demand innovation. Congressional and DOD leaders as well as Army’s CASAL survey of leader effectiveness suggest that there is a dramatic need for improvement in Army leader support for innovation. Despite senior leaders’ call to action, leaders can undermine their efforts to support. These conflicts represent lost opportunities to leverage the creativity and expert knowledge within the Army. Individual Army leaders can choose innovation; in fact, they must in order to sustain a competitive advantage against our adversaries. Creativity, critical thinking and collaboration provide the leader tools to cultivate. Leaders can avoid discouraging innovation by not blaming fiscal uncertainty, process or bureaucracy and by mitigating the attention, error and data blindness that interfere with their decision-making. Senior leaders provide a vision for the future of warfare and in doing so articulate the importance of innovation for success. Leaders must inspire creativity and critical thought across their organizations to create value-added solutions to the Army’s complex challenges.


Author: Ms. Sonya M. Tsiros

Published: September 2016

Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) were interagency teams employed in Iraq and Afghanistan to assist in stabilization and reconstruction operations. The experience of PRTs offers lessons for efforts to improve coordination of the activities of the various national security agencies at the strategic level. Many aspects of PRTs, including the physical colocation of different agency representatives and collaborative leadership structures, are necessary ingredients where close interagency coordination is required. Nonetheless, although PRTs provide a useful model, it is one that cannot be entirely duplicated in other environments. The key lesson PRTs offer is the importance of defined roles and mission, cross-agency funding to promote a unified effort, and coordinating structures at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.


Author: Ms. Rebecca R. VanNess

Published: September 2016

Today there exists numerous perspectives on what diversity is, as well as conflicting information about its potential advantages and disadvantages in both the private and public sector workforce. Research on this topic is complex, highlighting the need to refocus on this critical issue in order to see diversity through a much broader aperture and recognize diversity leadership as a key competency for leaders facing unique Twenty-First Century global challenges. This thesis adds to the growing body of knowledge on diversity leadership by examining current scholarship and understanding of diversity, offering arguments to support embracing new beliefs and attitudes about diversity, and providing a recommended framework for diversity education for Department of Defense senior leaders operating at the strategic level. The proposed framework is aligned with the Department of Defense Diversity and Inclusion Strategic Plan 2012-2017, and focuses on the key leadership competencies of Cultural Intelligence, Communication, and Building Cohesive Teams.


Author: Colonel Lance C. Varney

Published: September 2016

The Command and General Staff School (CGSS) plays a vital role in preparing mid-level officers for the demands of the operational environment. CGSS must develop leaders who can, as described in the Army Operating Concept “win” in a complex world. This requires developing leaders to be agile, adaptive, and innovative. The CGSS is adjusting its program to provide the cognitive foundations supporting these attributes but at the risk of other learning objectives. Feedback from various perspectives suggests the need to lengthen the course and increase academic discipline. The problem that CGSS faces is that while educational requirements expand or change the time allocated for CGSS does not. While modifications to the current 44-week program over the years have been helpful, meeting the intent of the AOC requires a change in the CGSS program structure. Expanding the current CGSS program is the best way to prepare majors to meet the needs of the Army in 2025. For many officers, CGSS represents the last formal military education opportunity. The benefits of preparing majors and future lieutenant colonels for success in the operational environment should be worth the cost of a longer CGSS program.


Author: Colonel Dina S. Wandler

Published: September 2016

This research establishes why the U.S. military’s policies barring transgender service members are outdated and out of synch with the values of diversity and inclusiveness. Just as racism is grounded upon incorrect assumptions about racial characteristics, transgender discrimination is based upon false assumptions about sex and gender. This paper specifically examines the policy implications in recruiting individuals who identify as transgender and integrating transgender service members who seek to come out and transition to their true genders. It provides key definitions regarding sex and gender identity in order to better understand the challenges of integration. Finally, it provides recommendations for policy changes affecting Military Equal Opportunity, privacy rights, personnel management, substance abuse detection programs, health care, facilities usage, billeting, and physical fitness and body fat composition programs, to allow for the out service of all members of the LGBT community.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Dalian Antwine Washington Sr.

Published: September 2016

Solving the United States’ 21st century “failed state” problem necessitates modifying the Cold War era national security solution set. Adding “S” to the U.S. Instruments of Power (IOP) paradigm (Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic) elevates social stability to its appropriate position. Doing so reduces the overreliance on the military to build institutional capacity within failed states. Transitioning to “DIMES” broadens the national IOP aperture and operationalizes disperse resources that are aptly suited to solve the failed state dilemma. Shifting to a DIMES paradigm expands the policymakers’ toolbox in the strategy development process. The DIMES acronym is aptly suited for the national security lexicon because it is simple, unexpected, credible, concrete, and emotionally connective, thus helping policymakers tell the U.S. national security strategy story. The DIMES acronym is also easy for policymakers to retain, recall, repeat and research.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Robert S. White

Published: September 2016

Despite tactical dominance and technical battlespace awareness, the Unites States is not achieving the results its overwhelming military capabilities seem to promise. This is indicative of a failure in operational art caused by a misapplication of force and misunderstanding its utility when used for purposes not intended and ultimately ill-suited. The utility of force resides in its ability to achieve, to the appropriate degree, regarding the amount of force required and utilized, a military objective aligned to and nested within the greater political goal. To better engage today’s adversaries, our strategic leaders and military practitioners need to embrace a new paradigm regarding applications of military force as they formulate strategies, plan campaigns, and conduct operations in pursuit of national interests. By challenging the underlying assumptions regarding the utility of force, our leaders can properly address the current cycles of confrontation and conflict. Ultimately, other instruments of national power must be relied upon – and bolstered where necessary. The use of force can create at best a stalemate. Other levers of national power must be applied to achieve the desired endstate or policy objective.


Author: Colonel Dominic J. Wibe

Published: September 2016

Designated as an operational force the Reserve Component is poised to support the Army and the joint force in routine operations. With a continually shrinking force the Army must look to provide capabilities once asked of BCTs and other units on the battlefield. The theater army’s role in protection is discussed along with current force structure in the RC to conduct protection missions. Five recommendations are made to cover the gap in protection: create a theater protection command (TPC); re-designate theater engineer commands as TPCs; re-designate maneuver enhancement brigades (MEB) to expeditionary protection commands (EPC); increase the three Army Reserve MEB/EPCs to five; re-designate existing military police commands as expeditionary Internment/resettlement commands (EI/RC) while creating two additional. The recommended changes in force structure will produce an integrated command structure able to coordinate and provide protection and produce readiness during peace time.


Author: Colonel Ryan Blaine Wolfgram

Published: September 2016

Russia’s strategic approach is complicated and uses an ambiguous form of warfare centered on non-military means to achieve its political ends. This makes it difficult for the U.S. to produce a coherent and synchronized foreign policy that can provide clear direction for actions to counter Russian aggression. During an interview with a member in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) for policy this comment was provided, “Policy is all over the place, coexists, and is sometimes contradictory and more often tangential.” An example is the U.S. effort to counter Vladimir Putin’s continued desire to extend his sphere of interest through the annexation of countries in his national interest. This window for the Baltic States to remain untouched by Russia’s aggression is quickly closing and the U.S. opportunity to enact a policy of action is now.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Mike Zernickow

Published: September 2016

In spring 2013, the world sees the emergence of ISIS as a terrorist organization as they start wreaking havoc in Syria and Iraq. ISIS now controls territory to give them operational capability and to manage logistics. Terrorism is the dominant feature today, and ISIS is now attacking abroad. Based on their radical ideology, destroying ISIS is important to maintaining regional / global order and security. The current United States strategy hinges on destroying ISIS through a comprehensive air campaign and limited advisors operating in Syria and Iraq. The preponderance of the burden to date has been placed on the United States due to a limited coalition not willing to contribute as much military power or resources. The United States needs to take a different approach in U.S. foreign policy and build a stronger coalition through diplomacy. Without effective boots the ground, a coalition of necessity is required to destroy ISIS.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Andrew S. Zieseniss

Published: September 2016

In 2015, the movement of migrants from Africa and the Middle East caught the E.U. completely off guard. As the numbers grew over the year, many people throughout Europe began to see the migration crisis as a major cultural, economic, and physical security threat. Every incident, such as the Cologne New Year’s attacks, adds concern to traditionally homogeneous cultures still feeling the effects of the 2008 financial crisis and subsequent global recession. The influx of migrants has had immediate impacts throughout Europe. These impacts are an increase in discrimination, the growth in political turmoil, and the rise of right wing parties. If the E.U. does not successfully address the migrant crisis soon, there will be long-term consequences for the current structure of the union. The crisis threatens economic and political stability throughout Europe. A weakened E.U. will also lose its diplomatic leverage around the world. Finally, stability on the continent, the very reason the six original members founded the E.U. after WWII, could once again be at risk. As a key ally, a weakened E.U. will have adverse political and economic impacts for the U.S. Assisting the E.U. in resolving the crisis is an important interest for the U.S.


Author: Colonel Eric E. Zimmerman

Published: September 2016

A leader’s deliberate use of adaptive (positive) humor is a very powerful leadership tool. Research strongly suggests that humor can produce tangible benefits in the emotional, cognitive, and social contexts. It also suggests that the positive use of humor in the workplace can increase employee morale, improve communication, relieve tension, reduce stress, and increase team cohesiveness. Despite these benefits, the idea of humor is absent from current Army leadership doctrine and the idea of humor as an element of leadership is frequently dismissed as incompatible with organizational culture, purpose, and productivity and even irresponsible. This paper explores this topic through a literature review, presentation of historic examples, examination of the Army’s long and complex relationship with humor, and a review of previous Army leadership doctrine. This paper concludes with a recommendation to increase leader awareness and foster a deeper understanding of humor as an effective leadership tool.


Author: Dr. Jose de Arimateia da Cruz

Published: September 2016

According to the Organization of American States (OAS) in its report on “Latin American and Caribbean Cyber Security Trends” released in June 2014, Latin America and the Caribbean have the fastest growing Internet population in the world with 147 million users in 2013 and growing each year.1 While having more users and more network connections are great advancements for traditional developing nations, they also represent a potential threat. Audrey Kurth Cronin points out that “insurgents and terrorist groups have effectively used the Internet to support their operations for at least a decade. The tools of the global information age have helped them with administrative tasks, coordination of operations, recruitment of potential members, and communications among adherents.”2 While much of the discussion regarding potential enemy attacks on U.S. cyber critical infrastructure mainly focuses on China,3 Russia,4 and Iran,5 the Americas have been largely ignored in the literature. Why are the Americas important? Why should we be discussing its place within the U.S. national security strategic goals?


Author: Dr Florence Gaub

Published: September 2016

View the Executive Summary

Arab military cooperation has been, over the past century, mostly a history of failures. Whether the Arab League’s Defence Pact or the Middle East Command, ideas for collective security in the region all failed to move beyond the state of declarations. Most of the time, Arab states were either at open war or in cold peace. Since the Arab Spring has toppled not only regimes but also brought insecurity, new momentum has come into regional security. From joint exercises to the announcement of first an Arab and more recently an Islamic military alliance, states begin to move further into cooperation. As this Letort Paper shows, several obstacles will have to be overcome before collective security in the Middle East and North Africa can become a reality.


Published: August 2016

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations, and it provides considerations for military interaction with governmental and nongovernmental agencies, multinational forces, and other interorganizational partners.


Editor: Mister Robert C Browne

Published: August 2016

This issue will focus on articles generated from PKSOI's annual Peace & Stability Training and Education Workshop or PSOTEW. The PKSOI Director COL Greg Dewitt will also brief you on PKSOI's activities over the past three months as well as the upcoming major events and activities.


Author: Dr. W. Andrew Terrill

Published: August 2016

The full story of the July 15-16, 2016, Turkish coup attempt may not be known for some time, but it is clear that a limited number of officers attempted to overthrow the government and either capture or kill elected President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The government has accused these officers of belonging to the Fethullah Gulen movement (Hizmet), which is certainly possible since many of Turkey’s most secular military leaders were removed in earlier purges when Erdogan and Gulen were allies. These secular senior officers were often replaced by individuals associated with either the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) or the Gulenist movement, which the government did not view as a threat prior to 2013.1 Since then, Erdogan has viewed Gulen as an enemy, and the clerical leader has remained in voluntary exile in Saylorsburg, Pennsylvania.2 Erdogan is now seeking Gulen’s extradition to Turkey on charges of masterminding the coup, but his government has produced no clear evidence to back up that request.


Author: Dr William T Johnsen, Dr Richard A Lacquement Jr

Published: August 2016

This course, which is the bedrock of the U.S. Army War College curriculum, introduces students to the theory of war and strategy. Theory, defined as a body of ideas and principles, provides a basis for the study of a particular subject and offers a framework within which professional discussions can occur. Theory generates and defines the common language that facilitates communication. It provides ways to think about issues. Theory also may provide advice on solving problems. Good theory, however, is not dogmatic—it allows, even encourages, debate. When theory no longer seems to explain or fit the situation, new theory emerges to supplement or replace the old. The military officer or national security professional must be well grounded in both the theory of war and the theory of strategy to be effective at the higher levels of the national security hierarchy. Theory is essential to comprehension, and is the basis of the sound thinking that wins wars. In essence, this course prepares students to think critically about strategy and the uses of military force and forces.


Author: Mister Ryan Sean McCannell

Published: August 2016

As the United States winds down its stabilization operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Department of State (DOS) and U.S. Agency for International Development will face bureaucratic and political pressures to abandon their already modest reconstruction and stabilization (R&S) lines of effort in favor of more traditional diplomacy and development assistance priorities. This period of relative peace allow policy makers to reflect on past challenges to creating a “civilian surge” capacity and determining feasible, acceptable, and suitable ways and means to ensure robust civilian participation in future R&S operations.


Author: Dr R Evan Ellis

Published: August 2016

From July 11 to 15, 2015, I had the opportunity to participate in a seminar in Bogota, Colombia, on the topic of transnational organized crime that brought together security sector professionals from 10 countries across Latin America and the Caribbean, co-sponsored by U.S. Army South and the Colombian military. The activity occurred on the heels of the June 23rd announcement by the Colombian Government that a final agreement was in sight with the country’s largest terrorist organization, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), just days after leaders of the 1st and 7th fronts of the FARC announced that they would not participate in the deal.


Author: Dr Richard A Lacquement Jr, Cdr Michelle Daigle Winegardner

Published: August 2016

The Introduction to Strategic Studies (ISS) Course is the first course of the Resident Education Program at the United States Army War College. The course uses a case study to introduce students to the overarching themes of the academic year. The Persian Gulf War provides a fascinating case study of key national security themes that cut across all the major elements of the School of Strategic Landpower’s core resident education program. Strategic leadership, policy, strategy, defense management, and theater strategy and operations play out in interesting and intricate ways that draw attention not just to the use of the military instrument in war to achieve specific national security policy aims, but to an understanding of national security and the wider array of instruments of national power. During ISS and throughout the core curriculum, students have focused on a variety of issues and have taken those issues to a particular depth of discussion and analysis. The Global Security Symposium (GSS) allows the focus to come upwards and expand across the entire core curriculum, thus providing synthesis and analysis for a variety of subjects and learning outcomes. It focuses on contemporary national security issues relevant to students’ future assignments. Through GSS, students will leave the War College with a better appreciation for the challenges every senior leader will face in the future.


Author: Dr M Chris Mason

Published: August 2016

2015 was a bad year for the Afghan National Security Forces. They ended the Western calendar year badly battered, like a punch-drunk prize fighter on the ropes. At least 5,500 of them died in 2015, the worst annual casualty toll since American involvement in Afghanistan’s civil war began in 2001. By the end of Western calendar year 2015, the 215 Corps based in Helmand had virtually disintegrated, with perhaps only 35 percent of its table of organization and equipment strength still present and able to fight.1 For comparison, U.S. Army doctrine considers an infantry unit to be “combat ineffective” if it suffers 30 percent casualties. Continuing the steady 12-year long pattern, about 35 percent of the Afghan Army and the Afghan Police deserted in 2015. “Ghost policemen” and “ghost soldiers” were reported by Afghan officials with credible accounts suggesting as many as 3 policemen out of every 10 now receiving pay (from U.S. taxpayers) do not actually exist, or are no longer alive. The ANA’s 10,000 commandos, who are good solid troops, were literally exhausted from being shuttled from one firefight to another all over Afghanistan, often pausing between battles just long enough to throw some more ammunition onto the helicopters.


Author: Dr Ryan Burke, Dr Sue McNeil

Published: August 2016

View the Executive Summary

Part I of the 2014-2015 Army War College’s Key Strategic Issues List (KSIL)—Army Priorities for Strategic Analysis—asks: “Given the growing importance of homeland defense, what would be the benefits and drawbacks of realigning the [National] Guard under the department of Homeland Security to enhance domestic security and disaster response, while retaining utility for overseas missions in support of the Department of Defense?” (pg. 10). This monograph details our efforts to research and evaluate the perceived benefits and drawbacks of realigning the National Guard under the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). We begin with a brief review of the relevant literature shaping the current policy and doctrinal approach to military civil support (CS) operations, including a summary of laws and strategic guidance relevant to the discussion. We then note the important distinctions between homeland security (HS) and homeland defense (HD) and the military role in each context. The seam between HS and HD provides a conceptual basis for discussing the roles and responsibilities of the National Guard, the DHS, and the Department of Defense (DoD) within domestic security and disaster response operations. After evaluating the National Guard’s role in each of the above contexts, we briefly discuss the realignment of the United States Coast Guard (USCG) within the DHS as a proxy for comparison of a similar realignment of a military-style entity under the DHS. The study concludes by listing and discussing the potential benefits and drawbacks of a National Guard realignment under the DHS and then makes five short recommendations in summary of the research effort.


Author: Dr Douglas Stuart

Published: August 2016

View the Executive Summary

Deciding when, where, and how to prioritize is the essence of strategy. U.S. President Barack Obama’s decision to designate the Indo-Asia-Pacific (IAP) as his top regional priority made good sense, in light of the ongoing shift in economic power from West to East and the rise of China as a potential global and regional peer competitor. The Obama Administration has attempted to use all available instruments of American power—diplomatic, information, military, and economic—to gain the support of regional friends and allies for its “pivot to Asia.” Rather than a “one size fits all” approach, Washington has attempted to adapt its recruitment efforts to the specific interests and concerns of each regional actor. The U.S. campaign has benefitted from the fact that most IAP governments recognize the value of an active American presence in the region at a time of growing Chinese assertiveness. If Obama, and his successor, can sustain the pivot, it can serve as the foundation for U.S. grand strategy in the 21st century.


Editor: Dr Dighton Fiddner, Dr Phil Williams

Published: August 2016

This volume has three parts: the first focuses on cyberspace itself; the second on some of the major forms of malevolence or threats that have become one of its defining characteristics; and the third on possible responses to these threats. One of the most significant features of cyberspace, however, is that it is becoming a risky place for the entire spectrum of users: nation-states, nongovernmental and transnational organizations, commercial enterprises, and individuals. Yet it is a space of opportunities—for benevolent, neutral, and malevolent actors. Moreover, the authors identify and assess the challenges and threats to security that can arise in cyberspace because of its unique nature. In the final section, the authors discuss a variety of responses, with some suggesting that the most favored options being pursued by the United States are poorly conceived and ill-suited to the tasks at hand.


Editor: Mister David A Mosinski

Published: August 2016

This edition covers the following Stabilization and Transition topics: Governance, Security, Economic Stabilization, Infrastructure, Rule of Law, FHA / HADR, and Interagency.  In this issue, our PKSOI Stability sector experts provide their analysis and thoughts on the submitted lessons.  Contact info is provided to continue the dialogue


Author: Glen M Harned

Published: July 2016

This stability operations case study project emerged from a Joint Requirements Oversight Council task to examine how Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) institutions teach operational planning for steady-state peacekeeping and stability operations. The Joint Staff J-7 requested the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI), as the Joint Proponent for Peace and Stability Operations, accomplish a number of tasks to improve JPME curricula. As part of this effort, PKSOI is developing a series of professionally focused, historical case studies of successful joint peacekeeping and stability operations. The purpose of these case studies is to provide balanced analyses of the strategic conditions and guidance underlying each selected operation, and describe how military leaders successfully interpreted and implemented this guidance during the conduct of joint operations.


Author: Dr Larry M Wortzel

Published: July 2016

View the Executive Summary

According to many analysts of China’s military, when an officer of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) suggests new forms of operations, expanded domains of warfare, or new weapons systems, American security planners can dismiss these projections as merely “aspirational” thinking. This assessment of the PLA Academy of Military Science publication Long Distance Operations and other military publications of this genre propose that suggestions for forms of future warfare capture currents of thinking among mid-grade officers and also reflect how the senior political and military leaders in China want the PLA to evolve. Among the trends identified in this Letort Paper is the requirement for a capacity to more effectively attack a distant adversary, such as the United States, and to hold that adversary’s population at risk. This analysis also shows that a number of military analysts in China perceive that the populace is at risk from attacks by stronger, distant states. In the past 5 years, the PLA has exercised to develop force projection and expeditionary capabilities. As described in brief in this analysis, in the past 6 months, the PLA has changed its own force structure and posture in ways that will facilitate expeditionary operations.


Editor: Dr Larry D Miller

Author: Dr Larry D Miller

Published: July 2016

The Army War College Review, a refereed publication of student work, is produced under the purview of the Strategic Studies Institute and the United States Army War College. An electronic quarterly, The AWC Review connects student intellectual work with professionals invested in U.S. national security, Landpower, strategic leadership, global security studies, and the advancement of the profession of arms. All issues are listed in the Army War College Review area.


Editor: Prof John F Troxell

Published: July 2016

The United States faces security challenges within a global context of rapid technological change, significant demographic shifts, an uncertain economy, and geostrategic power dynamics of historic proportions. These conditions intensify the level of uncertainty and the pace of change, and raise the potential for significant interstate conflict to levels higher than at any time since the end of the Cold War. We must continue to focus the efforts of the Army's educational institutions on addressing these seemingly insurmountable challenges. The Key Strategic Issues List (KSIL), developed by the U.S. Army War College, in coordination with Headquarters, Department of the Army and major commands throughout the Army, includes issues we must address to ensure the Army of 2025 and beyond will continue to meet the needs of the Nation. As we build a new future to deal with this growing complexity, the Army will require evolutionary change, and this change begins by changing mindsets. This necessary change must be based on rigorous research and the development of ideas that are invaluable to the Army and to the Nation. With your work and research, our Army will be better prepared for the future and the threats posed against our Nation's interests.


Author: Dr John R Deni

Published: June 2016

The momentous decision of British voters to leave the European Union (EU) is already having major repercussions in both economics and politics. In the former, investors fled uncertainty for more stable opportunities, while in the latter there are already calls for another Scottish independence referendum. In the worlds of defense and security, the implications are less clear, at least in the short run. What appears far more certain though is that the economic and political implications are likely to have profound long-term effects on NATO, U.S. national security, and the U.S. Army’s relationship with one of America’s closest allies. In response, and in order to mitigate the most damaging effects of the Brexit vote, the United States needs to intensify military cooperation with a longstanding UK rival – namely, France.


Author: LTC Thomas R. Matelski

Published: June 2016

In recent months, there has been much discussion in the U.S. Department of Defense and its subordinate components over the conduct of steady state operations, or as defined in the Joint Operation Planning Process (JOPP), Phase Zero (Phase 0) operations.1 While important to military planning, the current construct for Phase 0 is improperly framed. Planning must be re-evaluated and redefined in order to reflect the changing nature of conflict and the myriad hybrid challenges faced by the United States. These challenges exist below the threshold of armed conflict and full spectrum conflict.2 Politically, they do not necessitate full-scale U.S. military responses. Potential adversaries exploit the gap between peace and armed conflict, leaving the United States with limited ability to counteract them.


Published: June 2016

The Collins Center Update is a quarterly newsletter detailing the activities of the Center for Strategic Leadership, United States Army War College. Articles in this double issue include: Facing the Worst Case Scenario: The Military and Law Enforcement in Extreme Crises, C/JFLCC Course 2-16, Strategic Mission Command: "Growing and Enabling Agile Leadership to Advance U.S. National Security.", The U.S. Army War College Strategic Wargame Program, ISIS Crisis: A Matrix Wargame, Talking the Talk at the School of Strategic Landpower: A Post-9/11 Landpower Appraisal, The ISCNE Premiers at the Middlebury Institute for International Studies


Author: LTC Charles R Burnett, COL William J Cain Jr, LTC Christopher D Compton, Mr Nathan P Freier, LTC Sean M Hankard, Prof Robert S Hume, LTC Gary R Kramlich II, COL J Matthew Lissner, LTC Tobin A Magsig, COL Daniel E Mouton, Mr Michael S Muztafago, COL James M Schultze, Prof John F Troxell, LTC Dennis G Wille

Published: June 2016

U.S. competitors pursuing meaningful revision or rejection of the current U.S.-led status quo are employing a host of hybrid methods to advance and secure interests contrary to those of the United States. These challengers employ unique combinations of influence, intimidation, coercion, and aggression to incrementally crowd out effective resistance, establish local or regional advantage, and manipulate risk perceptions in their favor. So far, the United States has not come up with a coherent countervailing approach. It is in this “gray zone”—the awkward and uncomfortable space between traditional conceptions of war and peace—where the United States and its defense enterprise face systemic challenges to U.S. position and authority. Gray zone competition and conflict present fundamental challenges to U.S. and partner security and, consequently, should be important pacers for U.S. defense strategy.


Author: Mr Yogesh Joshi, Dr Frank O'Donnell, Dr Harsh V Pant

Published: June 2016

View the Executive Summary

Since India declared itself a nuclear weapon state in May 1998, its nuclear capabilities have grown significantly. India is now on the verge of acquiring a triad of nuclear delivery systems. Its increasing nuclear profile has also stirred a debate on its stated nuclear doctrine involving principles of no-first use and massive retaliation. This Letort Paper examines changes in India’s nuclear trajectory, the accompanying doctrinal debate, and its nonproliferation policies in the backdrop of the current regional and international context. The implications of this for the United States and its policy in the Asia-Pacific region are also discussed.


Author: Mr Jeffrey L Caton

Published: June 2016

The development of cyberspace defense capabilities for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has been making steady progress since its formal introduction at the North Atlantic Council Prague Summit in 2002. Bolstered by numerous cyber attacks, such as those in Estonia (2007), Alliance priorities were formalized in subsequent NATO cyber defense policies adopted in 2008, 2011, and 2014.

This monograph examines the past and current state of cyberspace defense efforts in NATO to assess the appropriateness and sufficiency to address anticipated threats to member countries, including the United States. The analysis focuses on the recent history of cyberspace defense efforts in NATO and how changes in strategy and policy of NATO writ large embrace the emerging nature of cyberspace for military forces as well as other elements of power. It first examines the recent evolution of strategic foundations of NATO cyber activities, policies, and governance as they evolved over the past 13 years. Next, it outlines the major NATO cyber defense mission areas, which include NATO network protection, shared situational awareness in cyberspace, critical infrastructure protection, counter-terrorism, support to member country cyber capability development, and response to crises related to cyberspace. Finally, it discusses several key issues for the new Enhanced Cyber Defence Policy that affirms the role that NATO cyber defense contributes to the mission of collective defense and embraces the notion that a cyber attack may lead to the invocation of Article 5 actions for the Alliance.

This monograph concludes with a summary of the main findings from the discussion of NATO cyberspace capabilities and a brief examination of the implications for Department of Defense and Army forces in Europe. Topics include the roles and evolution of doctrine, deterrence, training, and exercise programs, cooperation with industry, and legal standards.


Author: Dr R Evan Ellis

Published: June 2016

Since his election in 2013, Honduran President Juan Orlando Hernandez has made significant changes in the strategy and institutions of the country in combating the interrelated scourges of organized crime and violent gangs, which have prejudiced Honduras as well as its neighbors. Principal among these are the creation of a new inter-agency structure, de la Fuerza de Seguridad Interinstitucional Nacional (the National Inter-Agency Security Force [FUSINA]), integrating the military, police, prosecutors, special judges, and other state resources to combat organized crime and delinquency in the country. More controversially, he has created a new police force within the military, the Policía Militar del Orden Público (Military Police of Public Order [PMOP]), which has been deployed both to provide security to the nation’s principal urban areas, Tegucigalpa, Comayagüela and San Pedro Sula, and to participate in operations against organized crime groups. In the fight against narcotrafficking, he has advanced a concept of three interdependent “shields”:

1). An air shield to better control Honduran airspace, enabled by January 2014 enabling the shoot-down of suspected drug flights and the acquisition of three radars from Israel to support intercepts by the Honduran air force;

2). A maritime shield, with new naval bases on the country’s eastern coast, and new shallow-water and riverine assets for intercepting smugglers; and,

3). A land shield, including enhanced control of the border with Guatemala through the Task Force “Maya Chorti.”

Beyond FUSINA, the Hernandez administration has also sought to reform the nation’s national police, albeit with slow progress. It is also reforming the penitentiary system, dominated by the criminal gangs MS-13 and B-18.

The new security policies of the Hernandez administration against transnational organized crime and the gang threat, set forth in its Inter-Agency Security Plan and “OPERATION MORAZÁN,” have produced notable successes. With U.S. assistance, FUSINA and the Honduran government dismantled the leadership of the nation’s two principal family-based drug smuggling organizations, the Cachiros and the Los Valles, and significantly reduced the use of the national territory as a drug transit zone, particularly narco flights. Murders in the country have fallen from 86.5 per 100,000 in 2011, to 64 per 100,000 in 2014.

This monograph focuses on the evolution of the transnational organized crime and gang challenges in Honduras, the strategy and structures of the Hernandez administration in combating them, associated challenges, and provides recommendations for the U.S. military and policymakers to support the country in such efforts.


Editor: Dr Antulio J Echevarria II

Published: June 2016

Special Commentary: Prospects for Peace: The View from Beijing Jacqueline N. Deal Russian Military Power Tor Bukkvoll, Bettina Renz Challenges in Asia Michael A. Spangler, Jin H. Pak War: Theory and Practice Christopher H. Tuck Paul R. Norwood, Benjamin M. Jensen, and Justin Barnes


Editor: Mister David A Mosinski

Published: June 2016

This publication spotlights the criticality of investing in Training for, and during, Peace and Stability Operations – with lessons from Afghanistan, Iraq, Haiti, and other operations and programs.  This product also offers an extensive list of references/documents/links that can serve as a “toolkit” for trainers, planners, and practitioners.


Editor: Mister Robert C Browne

Published: May 2016

PKSOI is honored to be designated as a NATO Partnership Training and Education Center in Brussels Belgium. On 5 April 2016 PKSOI was designated as a NATO PTEC. The new PKSOI Director will brief the past three months of PKSOI's activities and events, the upcoming key events as well as introduce the articles in the journal. Please click on the Director's Corner video to view.


Editor: Mister David A Mosinski

Published: May 2016

This compendium provides a number of lessons learned submitted by U.S. Army War College students while attending elective courses on stability operations. Lessons cover the following topics: Ebola response and Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF); climate change as a driver of instability; Superstorm Sandy relief operations; interagency coordination during Operation Iraqi Freedom, tactical development operations, systems thinking in budgeting, and the Plan of the Alliance for the Prosperity of the Northern Triangle.


Editor: Michelle Hughes, Michael Miklaucic

Published: May 2016

Foreword by Lieutenant General H.R. McMaster (USA) Director, Army Capabilities Integration Center and Deputy Commanding General, Futures, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command The case studies and analyses in this volume make clear that understanding the dynamics associated with illicit power and state weakness is essential to preventing or resolving armed conflict. These case studies also point out that confronting illicit power requires coping with political and human dynamics in complex, uncertain environments. People fight today for the same fundamental reasons the Greek historian Thucydides identified nearly 2,500 years ago: fear, honor and interests.


Author: Dr. Jose de Arimateia da Cruz

Published: May 2016

In his National Security Strategy (February 2015), President Barack Obama stated that, “the threat of catastrophic attacks against our homeland by terrorists has diminished but still persists . . . Our adversaries are not confined to a distinct country or region. Instead, they range from South Asia through the Middle East and into Africa.” However, the President failed to mention that terrorists and sympathizers are already making inroads into the Western Hemisphere as well. An example of this is the nation-island of Trinidad and Tobago. It has been reported that about 100 Trinidadian citizens have gone to Syria to fight along with the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS/ISIL). According to the former commander of the U.S. Southern Command, General John F. Kelly, in his posture statement before the 114th Congressional Senate Armed Services Committee, “when these foreign fighters return, they will possess operational experience, ties to global extremists, and possible intent to harm Western interests.”


Author: Dr Leonard Wong

Published: May 2016

In the preface to the Army’s Operating Concept, General David Perkins, Commanding General of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, counsels that as the Army prepares for the future, “We must not be consumed with focusing solely on avoiding risk, but build[ing] leaders and institutions that recognize and leverage opportunities.”1 Indeed, the complex world in which the future force will operate demands that the junior leaders of today—the Millennials—be developed into tomorrow’s future leaders capable of exercising aggressive, independent, and disciplined initiative. Today’s Millennials, however, are coming out of an American society that has become increasingly uneasy about potential danger and progressively intolerant to risk.


Author: LTC R Reed Anderson, COL Patrick J Ellis, LTC Antonio M Paz, LTC Kyle A Reed, LTC Lendy Renegar, LTC John T Vaughan

Published: May 2016

View the Executive Summary

In support of U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) and U.S. European Command (EUCOM), this monograph explores whether and how the U.S. Army is prepared to respond to the challenges posed by Russia to vital American interests in Europe. The monograph first assesses Moscow's motivations and then offers a critical analysis of U.S. and allied efforts to date. Specifically, the monograph examines Western deterrence efforts, force posture, force structure, security cooperation, and information operations—all in an effort to provide an unvarnished, rigorous analysis. The monograph ends with a series of forward-leaning yet practical recommendations designed to strengthen U.S. efforts without significant escalation.


Author: COL Florian Circiumaru, Colonel Mark V Montesclaros

Published: May 2016

Beginning in 2009, a multinational team of NATO professional military education (PME) experts began providing assistance to the Republic of Moldova's Armed Forces at the Moldovan Military Institute (later Academy (MMA)) in Chisinau. The team's broad purpose was to help the Moldovan military adjust from a Soviet-style military educational system to one that more closely mirrored NATO and Western standards. First was revamping the "Basic Course," followed by the development, from scratch, of a senior officers' course, including a Master's degree (Level II) program, which was completed in a remarkably short time - less than two years between initial brainstorming and course start. That it took a "team effort" goes without saying. While the Moldovans could not have done it alone, MMA was at the epicenter of successful multiple efforts, all designed to modernize its PME to meet the demands of the 21st century operational environment.


Author: LTC Michael A. Adelberg

Published: April 2016

A collection of social and security trends are at play in Europe that may threaten the peace and stability of the continent. The array of challenges, threats, and frictions could converge at such a point that an unintentional spark could ignite a major crisis or even a regional war of some type. The most obvious security threat to Europe is Russia and its evident willingness to employ force, including proxy forces, like it did to reshape national borders in Ukraine. Russia does not, of course, view this operation as expeditionary expansionism, but rather as a necessity to stabilize a crisis on its border. Russia sees the Ukraine annexation as not of its own making, but rather like that of a tornado that drew in Russia against its desires. This narrative conveniently overlooks the fact that Russian economic warfare, to prevent Ukraine from entering into an Association Agreement with the EU, was the catalyst for the eventual Euromaidan protests and subsequent violence.


Author: Prof William G Braun III

Published: April 2016

The United States finds itself in a presidential election year that will certainly result in new priorities and policies. By the time this article is published, the world will know the results of the March madness primary elections and caucuses. Currently, the nation is choosing between two Democrat and three Republican candidates, with a real possibility of having contested conventions in both parties come July. National security policy and the employment of the nation’s Joint Force are perhaps the most sacred responsibilities of the commander in chief, and a central theme in the run-up to the July conventions. Army leaders are interested in the variance among the candidates’ national security policy positions and their potential implications on land forces.


Editor: Dr Antulio J Echevarria II

Published: April 2016

Special Commentary: Making Sense of the “Long Wars” Tami Davis Biddle US Leadership and NATO Luis Simón, Alexander Mattelaer, John R. Deni, Magnus Petersson Is Nation-Building a Myth? Charles J. Sullivan, M. Chris Mason Learning from Today’s Wars Ben Nimmo, Roger N. McDermott, Erik W. Goepner


Author: Dr Conrad C Crane, Dr Michael E Lynch, Dr James D. Scudieri

Published: April 2016

When Gen. Gordon Sullivan was Chief of Staff of the Army, he kept two books on his desk, The Seeds of Disaster: The Development of French Army Doctrine, 1919- 1939 by Col. Robert Doughty, and America’s First Battles, 1776-1965 by Lt. Col. Charles E. Heller and Brig. Gen. William A. Stofft. Sullivan was determined that his Army would be fully prepared for the next war. Other chiefs have echoed Sullivan’s concern, and the lessons learned from studying past battles are not always lost to history, yet they are sometimes forgotten. Landpower is by its nature a complex activity, and military history is replete with examples of unreadiness or unpreparedness for battle. The case studies that follow extend those covered in America’s First Battles. Heller and Stofft determined that the nation and its armed forces routinely arrived on the field of battle unready for the challenges they faced due to lack of adequate and timely training, miserly budgets, and an atrophied force structure. America’s First Battles examined the first battle in each of America’s wars, from the American Revolution to Vietnam, in order to gain insights into how the nation fared in these encounters. Its look at first, often disastrous, encounters presents a sobering reminder of the need for readiness. The following case studies also illustrate how complexity defines operations and affects both readiness and outcomes. The studies illustrate three themes from which insights may be drawn.


Author: Dr Conrad C Crane, Dr Michael E Lynch, Dr James D. Scudieri

Published: April 2016

The potential changes in the operating environment (OE) and the character of war in the next 15-20 years are unknowable and history cannot provide a predictive model or “cookbook” to anticipate future events. The last 250 years, however, have provided many examples of shifts in the character of war caused by emerging technology, political shifts, economic changes and diplomatic crises. This context may prove very useful for senior leaders. There will doubtless be technological advances in the future, and some may be “game changers.” Intellectual development is just as important as technological development. The Army learned during the interwar years between the world wars that maintaining intellectual capital was critical to later success. Technological change is constant, and all armies adapt to it, yet not all technological changes affect the character of war. The machine gun and the computer, for instance, revolutionized tactics, but had little effect beyond the battlefield. The advent of submarines, airplanes, and nuclear weapons, however, fundamentally altered how war is conducted—the character of war. These case studies address periods during which the character of war changed.


Author: LTC Michael J Colarusso, LTC Kenneth G Heckel, COL David S Lyle, LTC William L Skimmyhorn

Published: April 2016

View the Executive Summary

Because the U.S. military's long-held advantage in physical capital and equipment is waning, cutting-edge human capital management is more critical than ever before. The authors of "Starting Strong" argue that by gathering detailed information on the unique talents possessed by each newly commissioned Army officer, as well as on the unique talent demands of each Army basic branch, the Army can create a "talent market" that identifies and liberates the strengths of every officer, aligning each with the career field where they are most likely to be engaged, productive, and satisfied leaders. Strong evidence demonstrates that this talent-based approach better aligns officer talent with occupational requirements while simultaneously increasing individual branch satisfaction.


Author: Dr Antulio J Echevarria II

Published: April 2016

View the Executive Summary

So-called gray zone wars are not new, but they have highlighted shortcomings in the way the West thinks about war and strategy. This monograph proposes an alternative to the U.S. military's current campaign-planning framework, one oriented on achieving positional advantages over rival powers and built around the use of a coercion-deterrence dynamic germane to almost all wars as well as to conflicts short of war.


Author: Dr R Evan Ellis

Published: March 2016

From February 15-23, 2016, I1 had the opportunity to travel to Mexico to conduct interviews with Mexican security experts about the evolution of transnational organized crime in the country and the work of Mexico's current government to combat it. My trip to Mexico coincided with the February 12-17 visit to Mexico by Pope Francis. The Pope also focused on issues related to organized crime during stops in Michoacán2 and Ciudad Juarez.3 This focus briefly highlighted to the world the gravity of Mexico’s struggle, and the importance of prevailing for the future of the country and the region. While I did not have the good fortune to see Pope Francis, the following are some of my preliminary insights regarding Mexico’s struggle against organized crime, based on my interviews and supporting research. In comparing the perspectives of Mexican government officials, the Armed Forces and police to those of academics, journalists, teachers and taxi drivers, the range of perceptions regarding what is happening in the country is stunning. At the popular level, cynicism is profound regarding President Enrique Peña Nieto and his government, the principal political parties, and security and justice institutions at the national, state, and local levels. In the tradition of surreal drama reflected in Mexico’s television art form, the telenovela, allegations abound of criminal connections involving President Peña Nieto, senior government, Army, and intelligence figures, and even the media outlet Televisa, and senior Mexican Clergy.


Editor: Dr Antulio J Echevarria II

Published: March 2016

None


Author: Dr. Erik W. Goepner

Published: March 2016

America’s efforts in the war on terror have been substantial and sustained, with more than four trillion dollars spent, two and a half million military members sent into harm’s way, and nearly 7,000 service members losing their lives over the past 15 years. To date, however, few studies have sought to measure the effectiveness of those efforts. This study empirically assesses the extent to which US efforts in the war on terror have achieved the government’s objectives and concludes those endeavors have been largely ineffective.


Author: Professor Richard Chase Coplen

Published: March 2016

This handbook outlines joint force support to economic development. It addresses conducting a comprehensive economic assessment, employment and business generation, trade, agriculture, financial sector development and regulation, and legal transformation.


Author: Colonel Brian J Hammer

Published: March 2016

This handbook defines services essential to sustain human life during stability operations (water, sanitation, transportation, medical, etc.), the infrastructure needed to deliver such services, and potential joint force responsibilities.


Author: John C Church Jr., Colonel Christopher J Holshek

Published: March 2016

The following CA award winning issues papers clearly illustrate many of the impending challenges for the CA force, and we recognize their innovative concepts and insight. • First Place: Renewed Relevance: CA Develop Human Networks for Effective Engagement, by Maj. Arnel P. David. • Second Place: From Green to Blue: U.S. Army Civil Affairs and International Police Engagement, by Capt. Rob Kobol, and Civil Engagement as a Tool for Conflict Prevention: A Case Study, by Capt. Tammy Sloulin and Lt. Col. Steve Lewis. • Third Place: The Role of Civil Affairs in Counter-Unconventional Warfare, by Maj. Shafi Saiduddin. • Fourth Place: Civil Affairs Forces, U.S. Army Reserve, National Guard, and State Partnership Program: Is There Room for Engagement, by Maj. David E. Leiva and Maj. John Nonnemaker.


Editor: Mister David A Mosinski

Published: March 2016

This publication presents a selection of lessons on “Building Stable Governance” – with examples from Afghanistan, Iraq, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, and other areas.  Lessons discuss local understanding, local ownership, security, conflict resolution, decentralization, public servants, state-citizen relations, and ‘steady state’ sustainment.  This compendium offers an extensive bibliography and several annexes on governance-related topics. 


Author: Dr Robert J Bunker

Published: March 2016

View the Executive Summary

This monograph creates a proposed insurgency typology divided into legacy, contemporary, and emergent and potential insurgency forms, and provides strategic implications for U.S. defense policy as they relate to each of these forms. The typology clusters, insurgency forms identified, and their starting dates are as follows, Legacy: Anarchist (1880s), Separatist—Internal and External (1920s), Maoist Peoples (1930s), and Urban Left (Late-1960s); Contemporary: Radical Islamist (1979), Liberal Democratic (1989), Criminal (Early 2000s), and Plutocratic (2008); and Emergent and Potential: Blood Cultist (Emergent), Chinese Authoritarianism (Potentials; Near to Midterm), and Cyborg and Spiritual Machine (Potentials; Long Term/Science Fiction-like). The most significant strategic implications of these forms for U.S. defense policy are derived from the contemporary Radical Islamist form followed by the contemporary Criminal and emergent Blood Cultist forms. If the potential Chinese Authoritarianism form should come to pass it would also result in significant strategic impacts.


Author: Dr Jean-Loup Samaan

Published: March 2016

View the Executive Summary

The collapse of Israel-Turkey relations over the last decade has led to a reshuffling of the power plays in the East Mediterranean region. Following the dismantlement of the Ankara-Jerusalem axis, Greece has entered the game by becoming the new ally of Israel in the area. As a result, the new strategic triangle that emerges in the region has implications at both the security and economic levels. Its future will shape not only the regional security system but also the prosperity of the area, for instance by defining the governance of energy discoveries. Therefore, it will have direct implications for the U.S. security interests.


Author: Dr Don M Snider

Published: February 2016

Crossing the Plains on an expedition to Utah [in the 1850s], Major Charles A. May searched the wagons in an effort to reduce unnecessary baggage. When he reached the wagons of the light artillery battery, Captain Henry J. Hunt proudly pointed out the box containing the battery library. “Books,” May exclaimed. “You say books? Whoever heard of books being hauled over the Plains? What the hell are you going to do with them?” At that moment Captain Campbell of the Dragoons came up and asked permission to carry a barrel of whiskey. ”Yes, anything in reason Captain, you can take along the whiskey, but damned if these books shall go.” The Army’s new Chief of Staff just published his detailed vision for the Army in the near term. The focus is “to regain combined arms capabilities in tactical formations while improving key aspects of overall strategic readiness.”2 However, “to regain,” means something has been lost. And that something, in General Milley’s view, is nothing less than one of the Army’s core professional competencies—combined arms operations at the tactical level. But, how do military professions lose the ability to perform one of their key professional practices?


Author: Mister Anthony S Lieto

Published: February 2016

The major civilian United States Government (USG), intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that play key roles as donors and implementing partners are discussed in the handbook. Understanding the complexity of the “state reconstruction” environment will assist planners in achieving a more unified effort with major stakeholders. This handbook also includes assessment and evaluation tools, lists of crucial planning considerations, military tasks matrices, and principles of practice. Vignettes and case studies, informed from on-the-ground experiences, illustrate key concepts and best practices. A special topics section discusses the strategic relationships between governance operations and counterinsurgency, political reconciliation, SFA, SSR, and ungoverned areas.


Editor: Doctor Karen J. Finkenbinder

Published: February 2016

This handbook is primarily for commanders and planners, rather than for lawyers. It is a practical guide that provides templates, tools, best practices, and lessons learned for planning and execution at the theater-of-operations level and below. Its primary purpose is to aid US military commanders and planners to more fully understand their roles and tasks in establishing ROL in fragile states during stability operations, in failed states, or in occupied territory in the immediate post-conflict period. Planning and executing ROL efforts to support military missions and giving legal advice to the commander on those missions are two different functions. While legal professionals are critical participants in ROL activities to support joint operations, planning for operations which include tasks to restore or strengthen ROL is a commander and operational planner responsibility.


Editor: Mister David A Mosinski

Published: February 2016

In September 2015, President Obama hosted a Leaders' Summit on UN Peacekeeping after a year-long critical review of gaps in peacekeeping missions culminated in the June 2015 Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations. This review emerged at a fitting moment, as UN Peacekeeping had recently experienced a number of "firsts" - the return of Europe to peacekeeping in Africa after two decades, an increase of intelligence capabilities within a mission, the utilization of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for surveillance, the deployment of a UN 'offensive' combat force, and the opening of UN bases to protect civilians. Additionally, certain UN peacekeeping issues have recently seen notable international censure and praise - from the condemnation of a heinous trend of sexual abuse by peacekeepers to applause for the success of all-female Formed Police Units (FPU). As such, it is now timely to devote a SOLLIMS Sampler to understanding Lessons Learned from the recent Shifts in United Nations Peacekeeping.


Editor: Mister Robert C Browne

Published: January 2016

This issue of the Peace and Stability Journal features articles on the theme of "Enhancing Security Cooperation through Aligned Strategic Planning. In the Director's Corner COL Dan Pinnell will recap PKSOI's engagements over the past three months as well as inform you of upcoming events.


Author: Miss Whitney Grespin

Published: January 2016

The activities of private companies in combat operations and complex environments have traditionally drawn minimal attention when compared to their historic presence in such settings; yet in the last twenty years the services of these companies have grown to become a seemingly indispensable part of the modern western stabilization arsenal, as well as the subject of much media attention.


Author: Dr. W. Andrew Terrill

Published: January 2016

In one of the opening scenes of the 1973 movie, The Exorcist, an older Catholic priest stands among the ruins of the ancient Mesopotamian city of Hatra.1 In the movie, he views an ancient statue of an Assyrian wind demon and stares directly into the stone representation of his enemy’s face. In the background, two extremely vicious dogs are fighting and the sounds of their battle appear to be coming directly from the statue as the camera closes in on its face. Clearly, a horrifying ancient evil has awakened in northern Iraq. And now, we have a modern representation of an awakened and increasingly formidable Middle Eastern evil. The evil of sectarianism. Virulently sectarian bigots, in the Middle East and elsewhere, believe that other religions and sects are not only mistaken, they are also composed of heretics, apostates, and infidels. This outlook is every bit as frightening as the horror movie demon, and it is not to be easily dismissed after two hours of scares in the theater. Like the demon in the movie, sectarianism is not new, but also like the demon it is much stronger and more dangerous than it once was. Sectarianism, particularly between Sunni and Shi’ite Muslims, has grown dramatically in the Middle East in recent decades for a variety of reasons including the post-Saddam Sunni-Shi’ite bloodshed in Iraq, the rise of Iranian power and influence in the region, the Syrian Civil War, the Saudi-led 2011 invasion of Bahrain, the rise of the Islamic State organization often known as ISIS, and the Houthi war in Yemen.2 As the world greets 2016, it now appears that against most previous expectations, the sectarian situation in the Middle East is actually getting dramatically worse. As this drama unfolds, two of the most important players in the Muslim sectarian schism are Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shi’ite Iran, with Iraq, Syria, and Yemen also deeply involved and bearing much of the suffering.


Editor: Dr Larry D Miller

Author: Dr Larry D Miller

Published: January 2016

The Army War College Review, a refereed publication of student work, is produced under the purview of the Strategic Studies Institute and the United States Army War College. An electronic quarterly, The AWC Review connects student intellectual work with professionals invested in U.S. national security, Landpower, strategic leadership, global security studies, and the advancement of the profession of arms.

All issues are listed in the Army War College Review area.


Author: Dr John R Deni

Published: January 2016

Military engagement and forward-based U.S. military forces offer decisionmakers effective and efficient mechanisms for maintaining American influence, deterring aggression, assuring allies, building tomorrow’s coalitions, managing the challenge of disorder in the security environment, mitigating the risk of a major interstate war, and facilitating U.S. and coalition operations should deterrence fail. Unfortunately, significant cuts to overseas permanent presence and continuing pockets of institutional bias against engagement as a force multiplier and readiness enhancer have combined to limit the leverage possible through these two policy tools. Instead, reliance on precision strike stand-off capabilities and a strategy of surging American military might from CONUS after a crisis has already started have become particularly attractive approaches for managing insecurity in a more resource-constrained environment. This approach is short-sighted politically and strategically. Relying on stand-off capabilities and so-called “surge readiness” – instead of placing greater emphasis on forward presence and, when employed selectively, military engagement – will ultimately result in reduced American influence with friends and adversaries alike, encourage adversaries to act hastily and aggressively, and have the effect of reducing, not expanding, options available to any President.


Author: Dr. Jose de Arimateia da Cruz

Published: December 2015

While the rest of the world is concerned about the refugee crisis in Europe, the conflict in Syria, and the potential contenders in the U.S. presidential elections of 2016, there is a brewing dispute between Guyana and Venezuela in Latin America. As a result of this diverted attention, there are few reports regarding the instability of an already fragile region. The dispute between the two nations centers on the lands west of the Essequibo River of Guyana. This stretch of land covers 40 percent of Guyana’s sovereign territory and, according to experts, is rich in gold, bauxite, diamonds, and other natural resources.


Author: Dr Steven Metz

Published: December 2015

Nothing is more important to American security than nuclear weapons. Despite all the fretting over terrorism, hybrid threats, and conventional aggression, only nuclear weapons can threaten the existence of the United States and destroy the global economy. This is certainly not news to American policymakers and military strategists: they have recognized the centrality of nuclear weapons at least since the Soviets detonated their first atomic bomb in 1949. But so far, U.S. strategy has focused almost exclusively on deterring attacks from a hostile nuclear state, preventing unfriendly nations from acquiring nuclear weapons and, after the break up of the Soviet Union, keeping nuclear weapons out of the hands of terrorists.


Editor: Mr Samuel R White Jr

Author: Mr Samuel R White Jr

Published: December 2015

The Academic Year 2015 (AY15) Futures Seminar elective at the U.S. Army War College encouraged students to examine a topic relevant to the development and implementation of Army initiatives in 2025 and beyond. Loosely modeled on a series of "Army After Next" studies conducted by U.S. Army War College students in the late 1990s, the course is designed to leverage student experience, research and thought to provide recommendations to senior Army leaders on key Army futures issues. The pathway for the AY15 Seminar was built upon our exploration of a central idea - a guiding principle. Grounded by the framework provided in the October 2014 Army Operating Concept, the Seminar explored the fundamental question:

"What kind of Army does the nation need in 2025 and beyond?"

This compendium represents 23 students' peek into the Army of 2025+. Some ideas and recommendations are specific and affect narrow slices of the Army; others are broad and span multiple services or components. Some are tactical; others strategic. Some very aspirational; others very practical. Regardless, they are the thoughts of strategic thinkers who have embraced their responsibility to help posture the enterprise for the future by thinking and writing about tough issues. The enterprise is better for their effort.


Editor: Dr Antulio J Echevarria II

Published: December 2015

None


Editor: Mister David A Mosinski

Published: December 2015

This Sampler presents 10 lessons dealing with “concepts, principles and applications” of FHA.  It offers a comprehensive list of references, handbooks, and websites that should benefit all practitioners – as well as 3 annexes with civil-military partnering lessons.  Finally, recommendations & guidelines for senior leaders and planners are captured in the Conclusion section. 


Author: Dr Michael J Mazarr

Published: December 2015

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Discussions of an emerging practice of “gray zone” conflict have become increasingly common throughout the U.S. Army and the wider national security community, but the concept remains ill-defined and poorly understood. This monograph aims to contribute to the emerging dialogue about competition and rivalry in the gray zone by defining the term, comparing and contrasting it with related theories, and offering tentative hypotheses about this increasingly important form of state competition. The idea of operating gradually and somewhat covertly to remain below key thresholds of response is hardly new. Many approaches being used today—such as support for proxy forces and insurgent militias—have been employed for millennia. The monograph argues that the emergence of this more coherent and intentional form of gray zone conflict is best understood as the confluence of three factors. Understood in this context, gray zone strategies can be defined as a form of conflict that pursues political objectives through integrated campaigns; employs mostly nonmilitary or nonkinetic tools; strives to remain under key escalatory or red line thresholds to avoid outright conventional conflict; and moves gradually toward its objectives rather than seeking conclusive results in a relatively limited period of time. Having examined the scope and character of gray zone conflict, the monograph offers seven hypotheses about this emerging form of rivalry. Finally, the monograph offers recommendations for the United States and its friends and allies to deal with this challenge.


Author: Dr Shima D Keene

Published: December 2015

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While supporters claim that drone warfare is not only legal but ethical and wise, others have suggested that drones are prohibited weapons under International Humanitarian Law (IHL) because they cause, or have the effect of causing, indiscriminate killings of civilians, such as those in the vicinity of a targeted person. The main legal justification made by the Barack Obama Administration for the use of armed drones is self-defense. However, there is ambiguity as to whether this argument can justify a number of recent attacks by the United States. In order to determine the legality of armed drone strikes, other factors such as sovereignty, proportionality, the legitimacy of individual targets, and the methods used for the selection of targets must also be considered. One justification for the ethical landscape is the reduced amount of collateral damage relative to other forms of strike. Real time eyes on target allow last-minute decisions and monitoring for unintended victims, and precise tracking of the target through multiple systems allows further refinements of proportionality. However, this is of little benefit if the definition of “targets” is itself flawed and encompasses noncombatants and unconnected civilians. This monograph provides a number of specific recommendations intended to ensure that the benefits of drone warfare are weighed against medium- and long-term second order effects in order to measure whether targeted killings are serving their intended purpose of countering terrorism rather than encouraging and fueling it.


Author: Dr Tami Davis Biddle

Published: December 2015

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In this monograph, Dr. Tami Davis Biddle examines why it is so difficult to devise, implement, and sustain sound strategies and grand strategies. Her analysis begins with an examination of the meaning of the term “strategy” and a history of the ways that political actors have sought to employ strategies and grand strategies to achieve their desired political aims. She examines the reasons why the logic undergirding strategy is often lacking and why challenges of implementation (including bureaucratic politics, unforeseen events, civil-military tensions, and domestic pressures) complicate and undermine desired outcomes. This clear-headed critique, built on a broad base of literature (historical and modern; academic and policy-oriented), will serve as a valuable guide to students and policymakers alike as they seek to navigate their way through the unavoidable challenges—and inevitable twists and turns—inherent in the development and implementation of strategy.


Author: CPT (P) Liam P Walsh

Published: December 2015

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Beginning in 2013, the U.S. Army began an effort to “engage regionally and respond globally.” A central tenant of this strategy, building upon National strategic guidance, is the necessity to build partner capacity. Army units, through the regionally aligned forces concept, may find themselves conducting security force assistance (SFA) missions across the globe as a means to achieve these ways. However, after examining the Army’s SFA mission in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM from 2003-10, it becomes apparent that institutional and organizational shortcomings plagued the Army’s initial efforts in this critical aspect of the campaign. Many of these shortcomings remain in the Army today, particularly within the Army’s core formation—the brigade combat team (BCT). This monograph examines the Army’s role in conducting SFA in Iraq, drawing key lessons for the Army’s experience there, and then provides recommendations as to how the Army can better optimize the BCT to conduct SFA, while still retaining its core mission to fight and win America’s wars.


Author: Dr Richard Weitz

Published: December 2015

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The U.S. defense export system needs further major reforms to reduce inefficiencies and weaknesses. Although the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) do help prevent potential foreign adversaries from using U.S. arms against the United States and its allies, the Regulations, as enforced, can weaken U.S. national security in other important ways. For example, by excessively impeding defense exports, the ITAR makes it more difficult for U.S. firms to sustain core U.S. defense technological and industrial advantages, decreases U.S. military interoperability with allies that purchase ITAR-free weapons from other sources, and generates other undesirable effects for the U.S. Army and U.S. national security.


Author: Dr Christopher Sims

Published: December 2015

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The Human Terrain System embedded civilians primarily in brigade combat teams (BCTs) in Iraq and Afghanistan between 2007 and 2014 to act as a collection and dispersal mechanism for sociocultural comprehension. Set against the backdrop of the program’s evolution, the experiences of these social scientists clarifies the U.S. Army’s decision to integrate social scientists at the tactical level in conflict. Based on interviews, program documents, material from Freedom of Information Act requests, and secondary sources, this book finds a series of limiting factors inhibiting social science research at the tactical level, common to both Iraq and Afghanistan. Complexity in integrating civilians into the military decisionmaking cycle, creating timely research with a high level of fidelity, and making granular research resonate with brigade staff all contributed to inhibiting the overall effect of the Human Terrain System. Yet, while high operational tempo in contested spaces complicates social science research at the tactical level, the author argues that there is a continued requirement for a residual capability to be maintained by the U.S. Army.


Author: Mr Jeffrey L Caton

Published: December 2015

What does the Department of Defense hope to gain from the use of autonomous weapon systems (AWS)? This Letort Paper explores a diverse set of complex issues related to the developmental, operational, legal, and ethical aspects of AWS. It explores the recent history of the development and integration of autonomous and semi-autonomous systems into traditional military operations. It examines anticipated expansion of these roles in the near future as well as outlines international efforts to provide a context for the use of the systems by the United States. As these topics are well-documented in many sources, this Paper serves as a primer for current and future AWS operations to provide senior policymakers, decisionmakers, military leaders, and their respective staffs an overall appreciation of existing capabilities and the challenges, opportunities, and risks associated with the use of AWS across the range of military operations. Emphasis is added to missions and systems that include the use of deadly force.


Author: Mr Henry D Sokolski

Published: December 2015

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With the world focused on the nuclear crisis in Iran, it is tempting to think that addressing this case, North Korea, and the problem of nuclear terrorism is all that matters and is what matters most. Perhaps, but if states become more willing to use their nuclear weapons to achieve military advantage, the problem of proliferation will become much more unwieldy. In this case, U.S. security will be hostage not just to North Korea, Iran, or terrorists, but to nuclear proliferation more generally, diplomatic miscalculations, and wars between a much larger number of possible players. This, in a nutshell, is the premise of Underestimated: Our Not So Peaceful Nuclear Future, which explores what nuclear futures we may face over the next 3 decades and how we currently think about this future. Will nuclear weapons spread in the next 20 years to more nations than just North Korea and possibly Iran? How great will the consequences be? What can be done?


Author: LTC Michael A. Adelberg

Published: November 2015

U.S. foreign policy experts in 1948 would be familiar with modern Russia. George F. Kennan or President Harry Truman would immediately recognize modern Russian behavior. Nationalist rhetoric, economic brinksmanship, the cult of personality, and aggressive shows of force? All old. Therefore, it is worth reviewing some basic foundations of Soviet foreign policy to understand modern Russian foreign policy. On February 9, 1946, Joseph Stalin gave a speech at the Bolshoi Theater in Moscow, Russia. Although the war was over, he called for a level of military production three times higher than in the pre-war years. Stalin “justified the sacrifices this would require” because of “capitalism’s tendency to produce conflict”; pure Marxist rhetoric that initially did not even raise the interest of the Moscow Embassy. “No one familiar with Stalin’s thinking would have found much new in the speech: it reflected what he had long believed and often said.”1 It did, however, get Washington’s attention. The State Department sent a request to the Moscow Embassy for an “interpretive analysis of what we may expect in the way of future implementation of these announced policies.”


Published: November 2015

Shaping the Environment: Combined/Joint Force Land Component Commander Course 3-15 (C/JFLCC 3-15)
ISCNE Program: Continuing to Challenge Participants while Retooling Focus
Army Wargaming Community of Practice Workshop
Electromagnetic Spectrum Maneuver Workshop
Mission Command Network (MCN) Wargame
CSL's Strategic Simulation Division Up and Running
An Experiment in Support of the Gettysburg Battlefield Staff Ride
China Futures II Wargame: Hypothetical Conflict between the United States and People's Republic of China


Author: Dr Mohammed El-Katiri

Published: November 2015

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This monograph focuses on the geopolitical and economic drivers for the renewed Moroccan interest in West Africa and examines how Morocco is conducting its foreign and security policy in a variety of Western African countries. It highlights Morocco’s contribution to counterextremism in West Africa and Sahel regions through the provision of training to the imams and preachers of African Mosques. It concludes with recommendations on how Morocco could be supported by the U.S. defense community to mutual benefit, tackling some of the key security challenges that are facing these sub-regions of Africa. Given the common interest between the United States and Morocco in preserving peace and stability in Morocco’s surrounding region, Rabat’s growing assertiveness in West Africa presents an opportunity, not a challenge, for U.S. interests. Morocco’s geographic location, political stability, and deep and long-standing cultural ties with sub-Saharan states provide a potential bridgehead for U.S. efforts to promote its security objectives in Africa. At a time of severe defense budget constraints, bilateral cooperation with reliable and moderate regional partners can provide an effective multiplier and augment the U.S. reach into otherwise challenging regions.


Author: Mr Gregory Aftandilian

Published: November 2015

This monograph examines the new Arab regional order that has emerged over the past few years and analyzes opportunities and challenges for U.S. strategic interests. The regional order encompasses: 1) an anti-Islamist grouping of countries that came about largely in reaction to Muslim Brotherhood rule in Egypt in 2012-2013; and, 2) an anti-Shia grouping which solidified in the aftermath of the Houthi takeover over much of Yemen, but which includes other areas of Sunni-Shia conflict in the region. Saudi Arabia is a leader in both orders and has important allies in them, like Egypt. Although the United States has extensive ties to a number of the countries in these alliances, and has assisted many of them in recent conflicts, it has tried to avoid getting involved in the larger Sunni-Shia conflict (having equities with both Sunni and Shia countries) and does not share the views of many secularists in the region that all Islamist groups pose a threat to regional stability. The monograph argues that U.S. policymakers should continue to promote inclusivity of all nonviolent political groups in the political systems of these countries, regardless of whether these groups are secularist or Islamist, with the understanding that there are limits to U.S. influence. In addition, U.S. policymakers should continue to avoid taking sides as much as possible in Sunni-Shia conflicts and should use its influence in the area to try to dampen such conflicts, as they are a main source of instability in the region and help extremist groups, like ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) and al-Qaeda, exploit these conflicts. The monograph also recommends that the U.S. Army should assist countries of the region in counter-terrorism training and operations where possible, but Army officers should avoid being drawn into discussions about the Islamist-secularist and Sunni-Shia disputes.


Author: Mr Ivan Benovic, Dr Ariel Cohen

Published: November 2015

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Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, a number of gas disputes between Russia and Central and Eastern European countries have unveiled the strategic dependence of Europe on Russian piped gas. The recent Ukrainian crisis demonstrated that Europe has a desperate need to improve the security of its gas supply. The United States is interested in the economic stability and growth of Europe, because the European Union (EU) is its principal and largest economic partner. The United States and the EU enjoy the largest trade and investment relationship in the world, which should not be jeopardized by disruptive, anti-status-quo powers. Europe’s energy independence is not only an economic interest of America, but also a political and security one. Europe’s dependence on Russian natural gas undermines European unity and weakens the primary U.S. allies in their relations with Russia. U.S. Armed Forces in Europe and the U.S. Army in particular can and should play an important role in promoting energy security. This involvement includes: increased situational awareness; deployment to the sensitive areas; and enhanced training activities, including with the allies of the U.S. military in Central and Eastern Europe.


Author: Mr Keir Giles, Dr Steve Tatham

Published: November 2015

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Experience from Afghanistan and Iraq has demonstrated the vital nature of understanding human terrain, with conclusions relevant far beyond counterinsurgency operations in the Islamic world. Any situation where adversary actions are described as “irrational” demonstrates a fundamental failure in understanding the human dimension of the conflict. It follows that where states and their leaders act in a manner which in the U.S. is perceived as irrational, this too betrays a lack of human knowledge. This monograph offers principles for operating in the human domain which can be extended to consideration of other actors which are adversarial to the United States, and whose decisionmaking calculus sits in a different framework to our own — including such major states as Russia and China. This monograph argues that the human dimension has become more, not less, important in recent conflicts and that for all the rise in technology future conflicts will be as much defined by the participants’ understanding of culture, behavior, and language as by mastery of technology.


Published: October 2015

Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-07.6, Protection of Civilians, replaces Army Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (ATTP) 3-37.31, Civilian Casualty Mitigation, dated 18 July 2012. ATP 3-07.6 is the primary doctrinal publication for the protection of civilians during unified land operations, including the mitigation of civilian casualties and mass atrocity response operations (MARO).


Editor: Mister Robert C Browne

Published: October 2015

This issue of the Peace & Stability Journal features articles generated from the AUSA/PKSOI event, The Future of Stability Operations;


Author: Mr Roman Muzalevsky

Published: October 2015

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India’s impressive economic growth over the last two and a half decades has brought India’s role and interests to the forefront of global politics and statecraft. Importantly, it has put India into a comparative perspective with China, another aspiring Asian great power poised to stiffen competition for resources and influence worldwide. Both are resource-hungry and rapidly emerging powers seeking a new place and role in the global and regional orders. Both are also strategic rivals and consider their immediate neighborhood of Central Asia of growing strategic importance to their grand strategies. For now, China has outperformed India in Central Asia on all counts, securing the region as a key resource base and platform for power projection. India launched the “Connect Central Asia” policy in 2012 to shore up its presence, but the policy has not yet secured for it even a remotely comparable stake in the region due to aspects of India’s strategic culture and geopolitical constraints. Meanwhile, the U.S. strategic presence in the region leaves much to be desired. The United States is withdrawing from Afghanistan without major political or military gains from the conflict that has cost it and its partners a fortune in lives and money. The future of its military infrastructure and relationships with countries in Central-South Asia is a big unknown, with regional partners equating the U.S. military pullout with its waning commitment to support the regional economic and security order. To help unlock their strategic potentials, Delhi and Washington should join forces and cultivate a strategic partnership that makes Central Asia its major pillar. Until then, neither Delhi, nor Washington is likely to succeed.


Author: COL Glenn J Voelz

Published: October 2015

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During a decade of global counterterrorism operations and two extended counterinsurgency campaigns, the United States was confronted with a new kind of adversary. Without uniforms, flags, and formations, the task of identifying and targeting these combatants represented an unprecedented operational challenge for which Cold War era doctrinal methods were largely unsuited. This monograph examines the doctrinal, technical, and bureaucratic innovations that evolved in response to these new operational challenges. It discusses the transition from a conventionally focused, Cold War-era targeting process to one optimized for combating networks and conducting identity-based targeting. It analyzes the policy decisions and strategic choices that were the catalysts of this change and concludes with an in depth examination of emerging technologies that are likely to shape how this mode of warfare will be waged in the future.


Author: Dr John R Deni

Published: October 2015

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American security policy rests on a three-legged stool consisting of defense, diplomacy, and development. As President Obama implied in his May 2014 speech at West Point, the United States is in the midst of a resurgence of diplomacy and development, as it seeks to leverage diplomatic influence, foreign aid, and multilateral institutions to solve the most vexing international security challenges. However, the dramatic rebalance toward diplomacy and development over the last several years has largely has failed. Rhetoric, official strategies, and actual policies have all aimed at rebalancing the three legs of the foreign policy stool. However, several factors point to a continued militarization of U.S. foreign policy, including funding levels, legal authorities, and the growing body of evidence that civilian agencies of the U.S. Government lack the resources, skills, and capabilities to achieve foreign policy objectives. Continued reliance by senior decisionmakers at both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue on the U.S. military in the development, planning, and implementation of U.S. foreign policy has significant implications. Foremost among them is the fact that the military itself must prepare for a future not terribly unlike the very recent past.


Author: COL Curtis D Taylor

Published: October 2015

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In 2014, the National Defense Authorization Act directed the Department of Defense to reconsider the way the Army evaluates and selects leaders. This call for reform came after repeated surveys from the Center for Army Leadership suggested widespread dissatisfaction with the current approach. The Army today is seeking to inculcate a philosophy of mission command across the force based on a culture of mutual trust, clear intent, and decentralized initiative. It is therefore, reasonable to ask if our current performance evaluation system contributes or detracts from such a culture. This paper seeks to answer this question by considering the essential leader attributes required for the exercise of mission command and then considering practical methods for evaluating this behavior. It then reviews the history of the existing Army performance evaluation system and analyzes how well this existing system conforms to the attributes of mission command. Finally, the paper examines other methods of performance evaluation outside of the Army to determine if those methods could provide a better model. This examination includes a variety of best practice models in private business and the public sector and identified alternative approaches to performance evaluation.


Author: Dr W Andrew Terrill

Published: October 2015

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The threat perceptions of many Arab states aligned with the United States have changed significantly as a result of such dramatic events as the 2011 U.S. military withdrawal from Iraq, the emergence and then fading of the Arab Spring, the rise of Iranian power and Tehran’s nuclear agreement with key world powers, the Egyptian revolution and counterrevolution, and the development of civil wars in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Libya. There have also been some notable differences that have developed between the United States and its Arab allies over how to address these issues and most especially Iranian regional ambitions. This report considers ways in which the United States might react to these events with a specific focus on military coordination and support to friendly Arab countries. It notes that a variety of U.S. officials remain intensely committed to a strong effort to work with Arab allies and to convince them that the United States will not abandon them or downgrade the importance of their security concerns.


Editor: Dr Larry D Miller

Author: Dr Larry D Miller

Published: October 2015

The Army War College Review, a refereed publication of student work, is produced under the purview of the Strategic Studies Institute and the United States Army War College. An electronic quarterly, The AWC Review connects student intellectual work with professionals invested in U.S. national security, Landpower, strategic leadership, global security studies, and the advancement of the profession of arms.

All issues are listed in the Army War College Review area.


Editor: Mister David A Mosinski

Published: September 2015

This Sampler explores the complex issues involved in Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA).  It presents a lesson report containing ten lessons from recently conducted FHA operations, an extensive list of references, and three annexes with top observations from operations in Haiti, Japan, and the Philippines.  Additionally, considerations and guidelines for senior military leaders and staffs to take into account during planning and execution of Foreign Humanitarian Assistance / Disaster Relief operations are captured in the Conclusion section.


Author: Ms. Charisse A. Adamson

Published: September 2015

China’s increased presence in Latin America has raised alarm bells in the halls of government, the private sector and the mass media. In the span of one decade Chinese trade to the region has increased exponentially from $29 million in 2003 to $270 billion in 2012. Chinese sales of weapons, military training and cultural centers are steadily increasing in the region. This is causing many pundits to believe China’s engagement in Latin America is part of a broader geopolitical strategy to counterbalance the U.S. pivot to Asia policy by challenging the U.S. in its strategic backyard. The paper will examine this concern by first exploring how self-image, history, and current economic motivations affect U.S. and Chinese policies in Latin America. The second part of the paper will provide an in-depth look at Chinese and U.S. policies in Latin America. The final section will assess the impact of those polices on cooperation between China and the United States. Despite concerns, China currently is not eclipsing U.S. influence in Latin America. China’s presence in the region bears watching. Conflict with China in Latin America could distract the United States from engagement in the Asia Pacific region.


Author: Colonel Joel O. Alexander

Published: September 2015

The founding of the nation saw an inherent distrust of the military as an arm of the government. While this wariness is not uniquely American, it expresses society’s deeper concern with maintaining the delicate balance between protecting individual liberties and maintaining collective security. America’s military was challenged to dispel these concerns and demonstrate its value to the civilian leadership / population. Some challenges remain as a result of external political pressures or shifting societal opinions, while others are “self-inflicted”: e.g., poor communication, sexual assaults or other ethical lapses. Today, the U.S. military is viewed highly by much of the nation and enjoys a reputation as a profession of honor and respect. Yet with this cordial relationship--and overwhelming popular endorsement--the profession of arms is faced with the challenge of sustaining that support and promoting understanding of it as a valuable, civil service profession. This paper analyzes historical lessons and trends in public support of the military from America’s founding to the dawn of the 20th century and offers recommendations on how the profession of arms can best cultivate enduring, positive relationships between it and the society it represents and serves.


Author: Colonel Russell N. Bailey

Published: September 2015

Can the U.S. seize strategic opportunities and achieve its “Rebalance to Asia?” A more tailored implementation of U.S. national security policy and strategy is required if the U.S. is to achieve the desired ends. Building capacity among consequential nations strengthens internal security postures and supports regional stability. The unwise allocation of Security Assistance funds consumes precious resources that could otherwise address other pressing issues. A Pivotal States policy will better discriminate among competing national security objectives. Identifying Pivotal States will allow the U.S. to prioritize security assistance recipients and fund only those nations or programs that represent strategic necessities. Using a principled approach within the framework of the Pivotal States policy and establishing clear criteria for the identification of Pivotal States will facilitate a more successful Security Assistance strategy. Creating an NSC-led Interagency Policy Committee to oversee Foreign/Security Assistance planning and execution is necessary. Overcoming bureaucratic friction and developing common competencies among Foreign Assistance professionals from all agencies is critical.


Author: Colonel Stephen H. Bales

Published: September 2015

The challenge of North Korea’s drive for a nuclear arsenal represents a wicked problem for the United States, its allies, and the international community. Solving this problem requires critical thinking that addresses the interests of all parties, addresses divergent points of view within the context of the history of the Korean peninsula, and correctly assesses the implications of a selected policy and strategies. The current United States policy of complete and verifiable denuclearization of North Korea will not achieve its end. This stalemate requires a new policy approach. After an analysis of the history of conflict on the Korean peninsula and the current five-decade long stalemate, analysis of the Kim regime, and a review of national interests; this paper will propose a new policy. This new policy, a New Détente, will in the short-term achieve stability of North Korea, improve security and stability in the Northeast Asia-Pacific region, and in the long-term provide a path to peaceful denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. This new policy offers the greatest possibility of securing United States’ national interests while supporting the interests of North Korea, China, and United States allies and partners in the Northeast Asia–Pacific region.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Robert Sean Berg

Published: September 2015

Vladimir Putin’s annexation of Crimea in March of 2014 highlighted the Russian Federation’s expansionist actions to the world. The notion that Russian aggression and expansionism is a new threat fails to acknowledge centuries of an imperialist Russia. The 2015 US National Security Strategy calls for a continuous response to current Russian aggression in the wake of Putin’s Crimea and Eastern Ukraine involvement. As a long term counter to Russian actions, U.S. training for a domestically developed and supported, cellular, resilient resistance network to deter and counter the asymmetric intrusion of the Russian Federation into sovereign territory is a viable solution. Resistance networks in the Baltics and other former soviet states may leverage existing state structures and security elements. The intent is to establish an “on order” capacity from within, as a defensive measure, incorporating civil elements not currently involved. This resistance network is a bridging capacity to address an operational gap in a nation’s capacity to thwart Russian aggression which threatens national security but fails, by design, to clearly trigger a NATO Article V requirement.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel John A. Best

Published: September 2015

Adaptive, critical, and creative thinking attributes in today’s environment are essential components for solving complex, ambiguous and rapidly evolving problems. However, friction between Generation X and Y hinders the military’s ability to fully inculcate a training program that embraces the core foundations for building critical and creative thinking leaders. In order to solve this problem, the Army needs to change the culture of thinking in its senior leadership; to understand the fundamentals of learning and their impacts on adaptive training, and to understand the nuances of the rising generation of leaders and consequences of the “old method” of training.


Author: Colonel Mark O. Bilafer

Published: September 2015

Investigating joint and army level policies, field manuals, and theater rules of engagement (ROE) uncovered three main reasons the Army currently must rely on other services to meet joint level targeting requirements: 1) Organizationally the Army is not properly represented at multiple joint decision making forums that approve service effectiveness, training and certification requirements; 2) The Army has doctrine and publication gaps that limits Centers of Excellence ability to include joint requirements into Army publications; and 3) The Army lacks the hardware and software required to connect with joint and interagency targeting and intelligence systems. In this paper I will discuss each of these areas in depth and provide recommendations the Army must adapt to close these gaps.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel William E. Boswell

Published: September 2015

Click here, then enter abstract text. WAIT until AFTER paper is complete before writing the abstract. Abstracts should describe a paper as written, NOT as it will be written. Abstracts must fit this space AND the space on the abstract page (an approximate maximum of 200 words). After entering the abstract text here, double check to make sure the abstract appears in its entirety both here and on the abstract page.


Author: Colonel Jeff A. Bovarnick

Published: September 2015

During World War II, General George Marshall relieved numerous commanders. Rather than separate those officers, he allowed them to remain in the Army and contribute in other areas of demonstrated expertise. Currently, a commander relieved for cause stands little to no chance of being retained in the service. This paper suggests that under certain circumstances, a policy similar to Marshall’s is feasible in today’s Army to retain those officers who can continue to make valuable contributions. When effectively implemented, the principles of mission command foster an environment conducive to such a policy. The elements of trust, prudent risk taking and underwriting honest mistakes enable a senior commander to consider a relieved commander for continued service. Further, those officers who commit illegal, immoral, or unethical acts are not viable candidates where those who make honest mistakes should be considered. As current procedures make it unlikely that an officer could survive a relief from command, the Army would have to consider a policy similar to curtailment to allow a relieved officer to remain on active without the negative consequences that follow a relief for cause.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Scott Brodeur

Published: September 2015

The United States requires a strategic communication strategy to counter ISIL influence, recruiting, and propaganda. President Barack Obama outlined Operation Inherent Resolve, the recent strategy to defeat and ultimately destroy ISIL using a coalition counterterrorism methodology and a critical strategic communications effort. ISIL operates a professional propaganda campaign that leverages the full spectrum of social media, websites, and blogs to distribute their messages and recruit militant followers. After 14 years of conducting strategic communications against terrorists, the U.S. has failed to establish an effective strategy to combat these threats to national security. This study examines U.S. propaganda strategy during World War II in order to distill best practices that are applicable to modern strategic communications to defeat ISIL. A new strategy requires consolidated leadership for the numerous organizations involved in countering ISIL. Additionally, this strategy must geographically disaggregate the enemy to specifically address the at-risk populations and underlying regional factors. Finally, the U.S. strategy must be rooted in the truth. The U.S. must address these shortfalls in strategic communication strategy or the efforts to defeat ISIL will fail.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Bryan M. Brokate

Published: September 2015

The Army is preparing for an uncertain complex future by establishing Force 2025. One area lacking in preparation is Soldier resiliency to face a volatile, fluid environment. The suicide crisis that has plagued the force for 13 years demonstrates the resiliency shortfall. The last two years have seen a drop in fatalities, but the Army still lost 238 Soldiers to suicide in 2014. Suicide prevention must be part of any plan to increase Army resiliency. The current Army Suicide Prevention Program (ASPP) fails to apply a holistic approach to Soldier suicides and contains a gap in its coverage to the Reserve Component (RC), which make up 52 percent of the total Army structure. The bulk of the ASPP for RC personnel is limited to on-line and telephonic resources. The ASPP avoids the use of religious resources despite the fact that over 73 percent of the Soldiers identify a religious preference. Including local religious organizations into the ASPP provides an additional counseling tool for religious adherents across the formation. The recommendation is to establish a voluntary community partnership program between RC units and local religious organizations to provide RC Soldiers with local (face-to-face) resources for suicide prevention.


Author: Colonel Felicia Brokaw

Published: September 2015

United States efforts to bring about regime removal and democracy in Cuba through economic sanctions, travel restrictions and frozen diplomatic relations have not worked in over 55 years. Every President since Dwight D Eisenhower has corresponded through back channels to Cuba with the government, reviewed sanctions, property claimants, established negotiations, and largely left sanctions in place. This research paper reviews the history of U.S.-Cuban relations, analyzes U.S. sanctions against Cuba, and examines the security policy implications after the U.S. has to modify its policies towards Cuba. It examines whether the U.S. should “Spring Forward or Fall Back” in the motivation to drive change in Cuba with renewed U.S.-Cuban relations. Finally, it will determine if it is feasible, acceptable, and suitable to change the U.S. engagement with Cuba by renewing economic and diplomatic relations and remove the remaining travel restrictions and U.S. trade embargo.


Author: Commander Noel J. Cabral III

Published: September 2015

Arctic ice is melting at an accelerating rate, giving way to not only the last great frontier that promises navigable waterways and natural resources, but international attention to emerging geopolitical and economic significance. China has not published an Arctic strategy, nor explicitly described its interests in the Arctic; however it has declared itself a “near-Arctic” state and become the most active observer in the region. This analysis examines China’s rhetoric, investment, and collaborative engagement with the Arctic states. The key findings are that China’s geostrategic interests are to advance its global legitimacy and economic development. As such, China is interested in establishing a diplomatic and economic presence in the Arctic to elevate its global status and ensure China’s access to sea lanes and resources. China’s growing engagement in the arctic could represent another significant driver to a power shift from the U.S. to China.


Author: Commander Arthur M. Castiglia, Jr.

Published: September 2015

Military theorists from Sun Tzu to Clausewitz have warned of the dangers and unique challenges of combat in and around cities. By 2030, 60 percent of the world’s population is expected to live in massive urban areas or megacities. These megacities feature slums and endemic homelessness, uncontrolled expansion/urban sprawl, and lack of basic support structures making operations complex and extremely dangerous. Urban terrain is a powerful advantage for entrenched combatants. It magnifies the power of defense, and diminishes an adversary’s advantages in technology, firepower and mobility. To be effective in this sort of environment, security forces will need to blend police, infantry and military special forces. This research project will examine Special Operations Forces’ role in a future of increased urbanization. It describes the global trends responsible for the emergence of modern megacities. It also scrutinizes the three main considerations when defining the SOF role in megacity warfare: megacity typology variances, future urban threats, and the spectrum of urban combat operations.


Author: Colonel Chris William Chronis

Published: September 2015

Is Turkey under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan slipping out of the West’s orbit, and what are the impacts of the rise of political Islam on Turkey’s relationship with the West? Further, how can the West maintain—and possibly improve—its influence and relations with the Turkish people, the Turkish business community, and the Turkish military in the era of Erdogan? Since coming to power in 2003, President Erdogan and his Islamic Justice and Development Party have altered the political, judicial, military, and social landscapes within Turkey’s traditionally secular Muslim majority society in ways unimaginable since the era of Ataturk and the founding of the republic in 1923. Therefore, the West must make every effort to keep Turkey—a longtime ally and emerging economic power—within the post-war economic and military framework that facilitates free trade, inter-dependence, open markets, collective security, civil liberties, democratic values, and the resultant stability and prosperity that ensures the survival and expansion of a secular, modernized, and pro-western Turkish society, economy, and military.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel James Brandon Conway

Published: September 2015

In response to the territorial disputes in the East China and South China Seas and the ongoing build-up of military power in the Asia-Pacific region, many of the United States’ allies and partners in the region, including Australia and Japan, have demonstrated renewed interest in the development of amphibious forces. China, a potential adversary, is also continuing to expand its capabilities. This paper argues the development of allied amphibious forces provides a wide range of diplomatic, military, budgetary, and economic benefits to the U.S. policy for rebalance in the Pacific. Specifically, it augments U.S. amphibious capability, promotes stability, improves multi-lateral relations, and directly and indirectly contributes to the U.S. economy. As a method of analysis, this paper evaluates the development and potential employment of Japanese and Australian amphibious forces as examples of states that seek the capability, though for different purposes.


Author: Colonel Cory N. Costello

Published: September 2015

Strategic leaders and planners can take advantage of the U.S. military capability—its means—to establish an expeditionary medical system with sixty-minute evacuation response times to pick up wounded at the point of injury. This strategic research project (SRP) argues that our federal government must mandate the sixty-minute standard as national security policy. Furthermore, to export this professionalism, our senior leaders must encourage our allies and partners to adopt our same standard. The policy must be a requirement for this nation’s participation in coalitions or alliances. The range of U.S. military gains attending Secretary Gates’ initiative are a useful case study to highlight the challenges and potential strategic benefits that can result from this achievement.


Author: Ms. Laura M. Crawford

Published: September 2015

Over the last 60 years, the Department of Defense (DoD) has demonstrated a lack of commitment toward achieving financial improvement, accountability, and audit readiness. The DoD has spent billions attempting to meet the Congressional mandate of audit ready financial statements by September 30, 2017. It does not appear the DoD will be able to make this deadline. In these fiscally constrained times, DoD leadership must work toward changing the culture in regards to financial management. One way to do this is to implement a clear concise vision and utilize Kotter’s eight steps for cultural change in conjunction with Schein’s embedding and reinforcing mechanisms to implement a lasting culture change. Now is the time for the DoD to implement change due to the reduction of financial resources in accordance with the Budget Control Act of 2011 and a new Secretary of Defense that actively supports financial improvement. Without changing the cost culture first, the expenditures towards achieving audit readiness will not be worth the cost.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Michael D. Daniels

Published: September 2015

An option to build landpower for the United States Army in the 21st Century, in austere budget environments, is to glean insights from the practices of the Roman Army. During the Republican and early Imperial periods, the Romans used non-citizen soldiers in the Roman Army. Combined with the traditions and legacy of the U.S. Army and its own history of employing non-citizen troops as allies and within its own formations could result in a more affordable approach to providing land forces.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Chad J. Davis

Published: September 2015

The United States stands amid a strategic discontinuity – a period when unpredictable, unforeseen, and rapid changes occur that confound or disrupt previous expectations or estimates. A sudden shift in the external environment challenging status quo world order produces a discontinuity, as does a sudden transition in U.S. domestic interests or public will. Currently, rising powers and non-state actors challenge U.S. hegemony militarily and economically. Domestic fiscal uncertainty threatens critical funding sources for development and execution of the national instruments of power. Two discontinuities in U.S. history surface for their similarity to today’s environment – the post-Vietnam era and the post-Cold War timeframe. Following the Vietnam War, dramatic change occurred, but the U.S. assessed the new strategic environment and ultimately achieved new, prioritized goals. Short of such assessment after the Cold War, the U.S. failed to identify significant changes in the strategic environment, leading to major missteps later. U.S. leadership can apply lessons from these events to determine the best approach for managing the current discontinuity.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Joseph A. DiNonno

Published: September 2015

This paper describes the current and future operating environment for the National Guard and what sequestration might mean for a return of tiered readiness. A proposed hybrid model of force generation is described and a recommendation given for mitigating the deleterious effects it may have on the National Guard. The paper then explores emerging risks and other areas within the Department of Homeland Security that should be addressed by a fundamental shift in thinking about the National Guard. This paper first looks to the emerging importance and associated risk of the cyber domain and argues that the National Guard should play a leading role in Homeland Security’s efforts to address cyber security. Second, this paper makes a case for application of geographically appropriate and lower readiness tiered National Guard units to integrate efforts and resources with the Customs and Border Patrol as a part of Homeland Security. Finally, an argument is articulated advocating better integration of the National Guard in FEMA and state readiness plans with a particular focus on rehearsals and exercises.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Robert G. Dixon

Published: September 2015

Global urbanization has given rise to the megacity: large, densely-packed urban areas with more than ten million people. These cities are becoming increasingly connected, dense and complex, and are becoming non-state actors’ preferred hiding places. It is inevitable that the US military will find the need to operate in this environment, and it is currently unprepared to do so. Gaining and maintaining a comprehensive understanding of the environment is the first challenge to preparing forces for megacity urban operations. The emerging fields of big data, analytics, and data-driven decision-making offer significant potential towards this end. The Army must study this environment and the emerging sets of tools if it wishes to remain relevant in tomorrow’s fight.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Charles B. Dockery

Published: September 2015

The 21st century is the “connected century.” Globalization has created social and economic interconnectedness more broadly and deeply than at any other time in history. At the same time, America has entered this century without a grand strategy around which it will shape the environment to suit its interests. This paper will examine the concept of grand strategy and the lack thereof that led to failed nation-building efforts that bookend the post-Cold War period. It will then describe the current global environment and the constraints and restraints that will impact any American grand strategy for the remainder of the 21st century. Finally, the paper will proffer partnerships with India and Indonesia as two mechanisms for increasing global connectivity by cementing the position of those two nations within the global functioning core.


Author: Commander William G. Dwyer III

Published: September 2015

China has been active in the Arctic for many years conducting climate research and expeditions. Over the last few years, China has made overtures for greater involvement in Arctic affairs and governance seeking full membership status in the Arctic Council and further collaboration with Arctic nations. China's interest in the Arctic is driven by the need to fuel and feed the world's largest population and most powerful economy. This study begins with a review of China's historical activities in the Arctic then argues that its recently intensified interest there is driven by two factors: natural resources and new maritime trade routes. Next, it suggests venues for increased Chinese participation in the governance structures for the Arctic and concludes with recommendations of concrete steps that the United States can take to encourage China's responsible behavior in this dynamic international sphere of cooperation. The United States, as the incumbent chair of the Arctic Council in 2015, will need to work with the Chinese government to ensure both responsible stewardship and activities in the Arctic.


Author: Mr. Stewart C. Eales

Published: September 2015

George Washington asserted that the American people had been entrusted with the preservation of “the sacred fire of liberty and the destiny of the republican model of government.” The character of that “preservation” has evolved and expanded as the nation’s power and reach have grown; reaching new heights when the collapse of the Soviet Union gave American Presidents the mandate to pursue a “new world order” built on a democratic foundation. This paper begins with a contextual analysis of democracy--what was promoted, why it was promoted, and how it was promoted--and provides an allegorical description of democracy promotion as torch bearing, shield bearing, and standard bearing. It then examines how Presidents George H. W. Bush, William J. Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack H. Obama promoted democracy. It offers four broad recommendations for democracy promotion: demonstrate that liberal democratic values are a litmus test for policy decisions, clarify the role of military power in the promotion of democracy, reassert American Exceptionalism, and distinguish between the promotion of liberal values and the nurturing of democratic institutions.


Author: Colonel Willie J. Flucker, Jr.

Published: September 2015

There exists within the Army officer corps an inadvertent system of diversity suppression that consistently produces a senior officer class far less racially diverse than its soldiers and the general public. This system is composed of structural barriers (institutional factors that exclude minorities to a greater extent than majority soldiers) and perceptual barriers (individual perceptions that lead minorities to think that they should not pursue an Army career). For African-Americans, these impediments are pervasive and interrelated. Sociological factors are also in operation, taking (or mistaking) unproven or unexplained institutional impediments to substantiate the consensus opinion in many black communities that pursuing a career as an Army officer means competing on an uneven playing field. Given these diversity suppression mechanics, a sustained, coordinated information and engagement campaign is required to produce an Army senior leader corps as ethnically diverse as its soldiers and the American people.


Author: Colonel Lee P. Gearhart

Published: September 2015

Diversity is key to The U.S. Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World, the Army Vision--Force 2025 and Beyond, and the U.S. Army Human Dimension Operating Concept. The Army Reserve (AR) is a diverse force that represents and serves the American people well. This study examined AR Gender and Race/Ethnic Group representation within the force by leadership opportunity. A leadership diversity gap was found with regard to female and minority opportunities. While Gender and Race/Ethnic Group trends were encouraging, more work remains regarding opportunities and advancement to senior rank. Females were significantly less likely to advance to senior officer rank and serve in key officer or Non-Commissioned Officer positions. Further, Blacks and Hispanics were significantly underrepresented overall in the officer ranks and their numbers contracted as they progressed to more senior ranks, as did their representation in key leadership positions. The inverse is true for Whites who were overrepresented in the officer ranks and their representation strengthened as they progressed to more senior ranks, where their percentages in key leadership positions remained robust.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Roger S. Giraud

Published: September 2015

The Army Medical Department (AMEDD) currently has an opportunity to support the Army Leader Development Strategy, the Army Campaign Plan, and the Army Operating Concept in identifying an integrated model for developing leaders by conducting a system program review of AMEDD leader development. This review is capable of reducing the tension between the provision of quality medicine and quality leadership by establishing leader competencies as the foundation and through the identification and prioritization of other health care competencies. These competencies will enable the objectives, concepts, and resources of an AMEDD leader development strategy through three lines of effort: training, education, and experience and provide competency assessment tools in all three leader-training domains. The review will allow the Army to make an informed decision and assume any appropriate risk regarding its medical department. The health care environment is a volatile, complex system, which requires strong leaders to lead AMEDD organizations in it. Soldiers and beneficiaries deserve great leadership and quality health care. The Army and the AMEDD can provide both through a strong AMEDD leader development system.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel John C. Hafley

Published: September 2015

The United States’ strategic patience in support of a denuclearized North Korea has not stopped the regime from becoming a Nuclear State. After years of failed Six Party Talks and sanctions that have not changed the ideology within the Hermit State, the United States has to take a different whole of government approach in order to achieve security and stability in the region. This paper conducts a review of current U.S. policy towards North Korea and recommends necessary changes in the post-nuclear era.


Author: Colonel Jerry A. Hall

Published: September 2015

The 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance directed the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific and required the Department of Defense to develop “innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches” to achieve security objectives. One Army response to this directive was the innovative and efficient Pacific Pathways 2014 (Pathways) initiative. The Pathways approaches would primarily consist of exercises, rotational presence, and military-to-military engagement. However, the Army struggled to clearly explain Pathways so the program was challenged. Pathways was perceived by challengers to be an Army attempt to remain strategically relevant in competition with the Marine Corps. This paper examines how U.S. Army Pacific leaders and staffs communicated the Pathways program. It demonstrates that, despite challenges, they effectively communicated the Pathways concept. The paper reviews the strategic information environment in the late summer and fall of 2013. Following an overview of the situation, it analyzes the Pathways communication strategy and implementation. It concludes with recommendations on how to communicate future iterations of Pacific Pathways more effectively.


Author: Colonel Jason Halloren

Published: September 2015

Millennials are changing the landscape of how the Army operates. Millennials are less patriotic, adopt individualism or collectivism, and as a result of their increasingly sheltered upbringing, they seemingly lack the mental toughness to deal with tough crisis. These characteristics are in stark contrast to Army values. With nearly 75% of the total military comprised of Millennials it is important to understand the character and motivation of Millennials in order to best prepare them for military service. Changing the way leaders communicate with Millennials by explaining the mission and tasks, breeding a competitive environment, and incorporating adversity training into entry level training will help ensure the Army is prepared for future engagement


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Jerad Harper

Published: September 2015

The formation of an Iraqi National Guard offers significant opportunity for improving Iraq’s short and long-term security capabilities and presents a potential reconciliation tool for improving relations with Iraq’s Sunni minority. Three case studies -- the use of tribal levies in Oman, the Saudi Arabian National Guard, and the U.S. Army National Guard -- provide important examples to inform the development of an effective and professional force. Building the Iraqi National Guard into a competent and professional force will require 1) the commitment of U.S. or western advisors over a long period, 2) a sustained commitment of resources, and 3) significant efforts to synchronize operations between the future Iraqi National Guard and the Iraqi Ministry of Defense. Finally, while this is a positive measure, it must be accompanied by other reconciliation efforts to address the needs of the Sunni minority. Absent these measures, attempts to create an Iraqi National Guard force could be arming participants in a future Iraqi Civil War.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Dennis R. Hawthorne

Published: September 2015

Tomorrow’s global uncertainties will test the capability, capacity, and innovative nature of the United States Army. The U.S. Army Operating Concept provides a set of core competencies to develop such an adept force. This force must act decisively and effectively in complex environments that are further limited by resource constraints. Secondly, innovative concepts are needed to overcome the static institution that emphasizes process over efficiency. The ability of units to sustain readiness is critical in providing the right force mix when and where needed. This paper will analyze U.S. Army Pacific’s execution of an operation named “Pacific Pathways,” and how it embodies those core competencies outlined in the Army Operating Concept. It will also provide recommendations that may enhance utilization of the Total Force in operationalizing the Regionally Aligned Forces initiative across the Army. These include readiness sustainment; use of pre-positioned stock; and greater integration of the Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational efforts in such a dynamic environment.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Lawrence W. Henry

Published: September 2015

The manner in which the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) employs violence and terror on the local populace of the Middle East, coupled with the terrorist group’s ability to leverage social media, places achieving the Obama Administration’s counter-terrorism strategic end state at risk due to the administration’s reliance on a lethal approach-namely an air campaign. This study utilizes case studies and literary reviews to determine appropriate non-lethal approaches to degrade and defeat ISIL. Upon gathering this information, a non-lethal strategy was developed that targeted ISIL’s critical vulnerabilities. Further, this study examined the risk and counterpoints that challenged the employed of a non-lethal strategy to defeat the terrorist group. Upon evaluating the risk, the diplomatic and economic risk associated with employing the strategy outweighed the gain, therefore, the employment of a non-lethal strategy was deemed inappropriate. Acknowledging this reality, this study-while not supporting a lethal approach to defeat ISIL-strongly advocates for the employment of a blended lethal non-lethal approach that leverages a Middle Eastern whole of government approach.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Christopher J. Hickey

Published: September 2015

Strategists and planners can improve the effectiveness of strategy, design, and joint operational planning by integrating game theory into current processes. Integrating game theory into current processes provides strategists an additional perspective that is focused on outcomes and the information and decisions that drive them. It provides a stimulus for thinking deeply about who the critical players and decision-makers are and what their values, interests, and expectations are relevant to the situation. Most importantly, it creates conditions that can lead to creating Courses of Action that are focused on information and decision-making from conception. This has the potential to reduce risks and costs while achieving the best potential outcome.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Matthew W. Higer

Published: September 2015

Senior leaders can significantly enhance the impact of the Department of Defense budget communication strategy by adding macroeconomic context via reference to: defense as a percent of Gross Domestic Product, historical defense expenditures, international defense level-of-effort comparisons, and the relative size of major federal outlays. To enhance the “austerity drives increased risk” message resonance, macroeconomic context should complement, not replace, the threat-informed, strategy-based budget communication paradigm. Budget number magnitudes are often incomprehensible, but tangible level-of-effort comparisons are insightful. The federal budget informs a fiscal environmental assessment, including political risk, as part of a disciplined update to defense budget communication strategy. The ultimate objective of the strategy should be to communicate defense resource requirements using ways meaningful to the U.S. Congress and the American public, thus significantly mitigating fiscal risk to national security.


Author: COL Joseph E Hilbert

Published: September 2015

In 2014 USARPAC began Pacific Pathways describing it as a proof of principle or concept. This paper will examine how well Pacific Pathways functioned as a proof of concept. First, this paper will define specifically how Pacific Pathways was designed to function as a proof of concept. It will then examine how proof of concept and proof of principle experiments are conducted in the private sector and determine what analogies can be made between how those experiments are done and how they are done in the organizational environment. This paper will discuss causal functions and will show how understanding causality is a pre-requisite for learning organizations to actually prove a concept. The paper will then look at Pacific Pathways 14 and examine how well it functioned as a proof of concept and will look at the tools USARPAC and I Corps used to evaluate it. Finally, the paper will conclude with a set of recommendations showing how USARPAC can conduct and evaluate future Pathways using a revised proof of concept model.


Author: Mr. R. Carl Hoehne

Published: September 2015

Russia’s population and demographic dynamics have changed significantly since Soviet times and continue to evolve with strategic consequence for the United States. In the next fifteen to thirty years these changes will profoundly affect Russian society and its ability to reliably field land power of the size it has today. This trend may make Russia even more dangerous to the United States than it is today. The main elements of this analysis will seek to shed light on current and projected demographic trends in Russia, and examine how demographic change could influence the Russian strategic outlook and how it staffs and integrates its armed forces. In question is whether or not current or projected government policies will adequately manage the demographic changes occurring within the borders of the Russian Federation.


Author: Colonel Marc Hoffmeister

Published: September 2015

Combatant Commanders (CCDR) should maximize every opportunity to enhance joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) partnerships and improve strategic alliances. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) operates globally and integrates across the interagency, providing unique regional access, understanding and opportunity. Integrating USACE activities during all phases of planning synchronizes Combatant Command (CCMD) strategic effects with the planning efforts of the Department of State (DoS) and the US Agency for International Development (USAID). Formalizing the relationship of the aligned USACE Divisions with each CCMD enhances this process. Growing the capability of the USACE Liaison teams, improving the integration of engineer assets, and formalizing the USACE Division’s role on the CCDRs staff will enhance the strategic nexus of defense, diplomacy and development. To achieve the full potential for interagency support, the USACE and Army Engineer Regiment should pursue opportunities to refine and expand how engineer effects are integrated into security cooperation activities at all levels of planning from strategic to tactical.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Kelly R. Holbert

Published: September 2015

In today’s complex joint operational environment, American Airmen appear to be absent from commanding “combat-oriented” Joint Task Forces (JTFs). In the future, when considering general officers for command of combat JTFs, the domain background of potential commanders should matter less than their ability to effectively lead, conceptualize, and execute joint combat operations. Thus, American Airmen’s “Air-Mindedness” may need broadening in order to more effectively integrate and lead joint forces at the JTF level. While “Air-Mindedness” will always be a critical element of the joint fight, “Synergy-Mindedness” is increasingly important to the success of JTFs operating in high intensity combat environments.


Author: Colonel H. Warner Holt, II

Published: September 2015

The Budget Control Act of 2011 has driven significant reductions to our military budgets over the last several years. This fact, coupled with the reality that the United States is heavily burdened by more national debt today than at any point in history, will continue to drive budget shortfalls and will no doubt drive a reprioritization of our global strategic objectives. The National Security Strategy has emphasized the importance of building capacity with our partner nations. The State Partnership Program (SPP) is a shining star when it comes to building partnership capacity and security cooperation. The SPP is the only current program that integrates military and civilian capabilities and has proven to be an economical approach with a high return on investment. We must take advantage of this successful program and take it to the next level as we seek the most effective ways to build the security capacities of our partner nations.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Brian S. Horine

Published: September 2015

The primary goals of U.S. support to Latin America are to promote peace and to improve economic stability. Lessons learned from Plan Colombia and the War on Drugs and Narcoterrorism can be applied to the current threat perpetuated by the Sendero Luminoso (SL) in Peru. Using a framework consisting of the elements of National Power as viewed through the lens of Culture (C-DIME), the following paper will illustrate how the United States can support Peru in strengthening its national institutions and defeating the SL and its narco-criminal sponsors. This paper analyzes how the principles behind the success of Plan Colombia, rather than the specified practices employed, can be applied in Peru to defeat SL efforts in order to advance U.S. security interests while concurrently enabling host nation efforts to build legitimacy and expand security. Based upon this framework, the U.S. should continue its support of Peru in its endeavors to deter, defeat and demobilize the Sendero Luminoso.


Author: Colonel James E. Huber

Published: September 2015

Many researchers describe the Millennial Generation as portraying the best traits of previous generations. This paper uses generational theory to examine the characteristics of the three distinct generations currently serving in the Army. It identifies the characteristics unique to Millennials and discusses opportunities to enhance the future of the Army profession. Among other generational characteristics, It examines the collaborative and socially connected nature of the Millennial Generation. It includes a discussion on the Army Profession Campaign and draws a comparison of millennial characteristics and the essential characteristics of the Army Profession defined in Army Doctrine Reference Publication 1, focusing on trust as the principle characteristic. The paper concludes with recommendations for the Army to leverage millennial strengths to improve collaboration and ensure that millennial social connectedness secures a future of improved civil-military relations.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Frank P. Intini III

Published: September 2015

The Army’s currently accepted concept of “broadening” leaders focuses on individual development through a series of experiential opportunities. This paper explores the possibility of expanding the concept of broadening leaders and enhancing their ability to adapt to an increasingly complex world through a re-focus on integrating the systems and processes which were established in an effort to make the Army a learning institution. Specifically, it proposes we consider the benefits afforded by the Army’s Historical Program, potential areas for greater synergy between several post 9-11 institutions which capture experience-based insights, inculcating historical insights into the training development and reporting aspects of the Unit Training Management system, and further emphasis on “historical-mindedness” and the assets available to achieve it in our revised doctrine. This shift in philosophy reflects a logical evolution in empowered leadership rather than a revolution in leader development and, as such, may be possible through the limited reorganization and repurposing of existing assets with no growth in manpower or materiel.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Eric L. Jackson

Published: September 2015

During every past interwar period in our nation’s history there has been a drawdown of forces at conflict termination. However, the current interwar period falls during a time of persistent global conflict. Domestically, the armed forces are challenged by smaller budgets. These foreign threats and domestic political challenges have combined to create a requirement to properly execute a personnel drawdown that must be able to respond to today’s threats and be prepared to defeat tomorrow’s adversaries. As the Army downsizes to 440,000-450,000 active duty Soldiers, key questions remain as the Army marches towards this number. Is the drawdown being done correctly? Are the right people leaving and staying? Post separation board analysis suggests that some population subsets (based on commissioning source, branch, ethnicity, etc.) were more susceptible to involuntary separation than others. This paper offers assessments on whether the right people are staying and leaving. It also offers an assessment if this drawdown is being executed correctly. Lastly, it offers recommendations on how to obtain greater parity across all commissioning sources so that the entire officer corps can be strengthened.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Derek K. Jansen

Published: September 2015

The U.S. Army’s propensity to solve tactical problems through advances in high-technology solutions has created an increased requirement for electricity on the battlefield. For example, the largest portion of fuel used by a Stryker Brigade Combat Team in the tactical environment (36%) is used to generate electrical power in support of technology solutions, which is more fuel than used to supply ground vehicles or aviation. Congress, concerned with the strategic vulnerability of fuel supplies, has mandated the Army and other services reduce fuel requirements through efficiencies and the development of alternative energy sources. The U.S. Army has responded by increasing the energy efficiency of systems and platforms but has not addressed the doctrine or training shortfalls, which contribute to the lack of awareness among leaders and Soldiers of how wasted electricity could affect operations, budgets and lives.


Author: Commander Robert P. Johns

Published: September 2015

Even during a time of reduced budgets, the United States will continue to support worldwide stability efforts as part of its foreign policy and national security strategy. Accordingly, U.S. national interests are best served by partnering with other countries, international agencies, and non-governmental organizations to conduct stability operations effectively. Integral to any stability operation is information sharing to coordinate the efforts of all stakeholders involved. With a myriad of existing information systems and capabilities, the task of effectively sharing information among partners in a rapidly changing stability environment becomes imperative. The advent of “cloud computing” presents a unique opportunity to create information sharing among disparate groups at a relatively low cost. Conceptually, cloud computing offers an innovative means to assist in U.S. stability operations by optimizing and harmonizing the challenges of information sharing. This paper explores the basis for continued U.S. participation in stability operations, the salient challenges with information sharing during stability operations, the innovative solutions offered by cloud computing, and some of the challenges with respect to cloud computing.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Bradley L. Johnson

Published: September 2015

The United States Air Force (AF) maintains approximately 30% surplus infrastructure capacity across its airbase enterprise, but it lacks comprehensive strategic basing guidance to objectively evaluate and manage the excess. The excess infrastructure taxes critical fiscal resources and limits the AF’s ability to effectively maintain and keep its installations relevant. The AF recently published its 30-year strategic path in, “America’s Air Force: A Call to the Future,” and it articulates a strategy to emphasizing capability over capacity. The AF should take the same strategic approach of capability over capacity toward installation management and develop basing guidance framed by this strategy. Such guidance will allow the AF to efficiently manage its installations, objectively assess and articulate its excess capacity to its stakeholders, and strategically shape its future basing efforts. This paper provides recommendations for developing strategic basing guidance to align installation capability and capacity to air, space, and cyber mission generation.


Author: Colonel Wade B. Johnston

Published: September 2015

In conflict areas, a connection between the people and their government is a key aspect of how greater information sharing through social networking programs can enhance civil security efforts during counterterrorism operations. This paper will assess the viability of using an interactive web based program such as CRIMEWATCH to link security services to the population in order to deter, disrupt and defeat extremists. The following analysis uses security efforts in Nigeria as a case study for analyzing the feasibility, suitability and acceptability of employing this approach across political, infrastructure, social and information sectors. At the local level, web based programs can share relevant information between authorities and the public to be value-added in disrupting extremists efforts, thereby providing the government a strategic advantage. This potentially low cost investment would provide a significant payout at the strategic level in countering violent extremists and provide a method which could be replicated in other affected countries or regions.


Author: Mr. Jeffrey R. Jones

Published: September 2015

Cyberspace is a man-made environment created through the evolution of technology. People, institutions, organizations, and governments across the globe use cyberspace as the primary enabler for global communications, shipping, commerce, and finance. Cyberspace is also the newest warfighting domain that supports, yet challenges, traditional modes of warfare and its practitioners. Countless theorists through the centuries, such as Clausewitz, Corbett, and Sun-Tzu, have offered military theories for waging war. However, a theory for fighting from and in cyberspace has yet to be developed. Cyberspace theory would guide and enhance the DoD’s use of cyberspace in support of enterprise and military operations. For cyberspace to be truly used as a warfighting domain, it must be underpinned by theory in order to understand how to fight and win in the virtual space. Without a theoretic baseline, one will never know when to deviate from the norm and why. Evolving theories from classical theorists to create cyberspace theory will enable the DoD to effectively project cyberpower and gain the competitive advantage in cyberspace.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Marcus A. Jones

Published: September 2015

The U.S. National Interests presented by each Presidential Administration are codified in the National Security Strategy and serve as the foundation for U.S. policy formulation and implementation. The 2015 National Security outlines four National Interests – U.S. Security, U.S. Economic Prosperity, A Rules-based International Order, and Respect for Universal Values. Each of the National Interests evokes a different level of relative interest intensity. When compared with the other National Interests, and analyzed against ongoing foreign policy activities, Universal Values promotion is not aligned with other elements of the National Security Strategy. This inconsistency negatively effects U.S. credibility in the international community. In view of this interest conflict, the U.S. should revise the National Interests to remove Universal Values and replace it with Stability. This revision better articulates current policy actions and enhances U.S. credibility.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel K. Scott Katrosh

Published: September 2015

This paper addresses the wicked problem of toxic leadership in the U.S. Army. The paper begins by defining toxic leadership, explaining the scope of the challenge, describing its effects on subordinates and units, and examining current barriers to identification of toxic leaders. The paper explores methods to identify toxic leaders within the U.S. Army. Finally, the paper describes tools available to remove toxic leaders from military service. Taming this wicked problem requires positive and effective leadership at all levels. Leaders must first help establish a military culture that encourages Soldiers to report toxic behavior without fear of reprisal. Leaders must also make the hard choices necessary to document and remove toxic leaders from military service. The Army is moving in the right direction with several new initiatives including revamping the Officer Evaluation Report system and implementing the Commander 360 evaluations. The Army must continue to monitor and expand upon these initiatives to demonstrate its commitment to rid toxic leaders from its ranks and to protect the integrity of the military profession.


Author: Colonel Jason E. Kelly

Published: September 2015

Despite scientific data, tough talk from the White House and development of viable adaptation measures, efforts to increase coastal community resiliency remain stalled. This study investigates sea level changes in a strategically important coastal community and the impact of these changes on U.S. national interests. For many reasons, the country is developing a keen interest in adaptation and resiliency. Norfolk, Virginia is the second-most vulnerable city to sea level rise in the U.S. behind New Orleans. The risks posed to military facilities in this vibrant coastal community demand a response to climate consequences that are already affecting the area. This paper explores the science of rising seas, the significance of American ports, the strategic importance of Norfolk, and the potential role the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers could play in adaptation and resiliency.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Sharon K. E. Kibiloski

Published: September 2015

The idea of violent extremism as a security threat to the United States (U.S.) has evolved over the last 25 years, especially as it pertains to sub-Saharan Africa. Since the U.S. has not had to militarily confront large-scale violent extremism in sub-Saharan Africa, this region now provides the U.S. an exceptional strategic opportunity to move away from a military-dominated reflexive approach and instead fully commit to a more proactive human-focused approach to address the underlying conditions which allow violent extremism to grow and prosper. The U.S. must prioritize and adequately resource long-term development activities in key human-centered development areas focused on setting the conditions for stability in this region over military counterterrorism approaches which only address the immediate symptom of violent extremism. This paper makes three strategy-related recommendations focusing on resources, organizational structure and creativity, and two policy-related recommendations which focus on restraint and risk acceptance.


Author: Colonel Jason A Kirk

Published: September 2015

DoD’s Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs) have the imperative to assess their Theater Campaign Plans in response to DoD’s recent 2014 Climate Change Adaptation Roadmap. As a “case-study” relevant to all GCCs this paper analyzes the risks and opportunities facing U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) in reviewing climate change impacts primarily in the Caribbean region of its Area of Operations. In coordination with and sometimes in support of Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development’s climate change actions, SOUTHCOM has the opportunity to bolster both its “humanitarian assistance/disaster relief” and “partner nation of choice” end-state objectives. SOUTHCOM and its interagency partners can employ leader engagements, technical support and various funding mechanisms to assist select partner nations in improving their climate change resiliency.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Eric Knapp

Published: September 2015

The United States effectively countered enemy attempts to frame the Mexican War as a holy war against Catholicism. An actively engaged and hostile civilian population could have seriously jeopardized U.S. military operations during the invasion of Mexico. President Polk and General Scott planned and executed a strategy of conciliation toward Mexican civilians that sought to keep them on the sidelines of the contest. Negating a holy war narrative put forward by Mexican leaders was central to the U.S. strategy of conciliation. The United States accomplished this by incorporating Catholic priests into its army of invasion, cooperating with Catholic Church leaders, both in Mexico and in the United States, and by respecting Church property and symbols. Both U.S. political and military leaders accomplished this all during a time of strident anti-Catholicism in the United States. Although different in time and circumstance, the United States again finds itself fighting an adversary that seeks to put forward a narrative of holy war in reaction to perceived attacks on its faith. The U.S. experience in Mexico can be used to help shape potential approaches to countering such a narrative.


Author: Colonel David M. Knych

Published: September 2015

Strategy observers and pundits increasingly argue that the current United States grand strategy of maintaining its position of Primacy through an activist foreign policy, robust overseas military presence, and vast network of alliances and security commitments is proving disastrous to American interests. This cohort argues that America is overstretched and in decline, and can no longer afford to maintain its ambitious global reform agenda or meet its security obligations abroad. As such, they advocate for a grand strategy of Restraint, also known as Retrenchment, as way of preserving a narrower, but vital set of security interests by reducing its presence overseas, reducing its security commitments abroad, and shifting burdens to allies and partners. This paper questions ‘Restraint’ as a viable alternative to the current United States approach in grand strategy and refutes the key arguments and assumptions made by ‘Restraint’ advocates. In reality, the United States must remain engaged in the world and provide leadership, as it is the only sure way of securing its vital, national security interests.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Michael A. Konczey

Published: September 2015

Mission command enables the future joint force to successfully navigate the increasingly dynamic and complex operational environment. Trust, and the Army’s ability to foster trust across each echelon, is critical to mission command’s premise of leaders at all levels empowered through trust to execute disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent. As the Army transitions from a decade-plus of persistent conflict to garrison, leaders face challenges in fostering this trust. This research project explores the importance of trust as it relates to the philosophy pillar of mission command and how one builds trust. Next, it defines the garrison environment and the inherent risks to trust. Finally, it makes recommendations on how to encourage and sustain mission command in garrison.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Nelson G. Kraft

Published: September 2015

The 2013 Army Leader Development Strategy (ALDS), coupled with recommendations from the 2013 Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) Leader Development Task Force Final Report, provide an excellent road map to develop leaders for the future. However, there is a challenge in the development of strategic leaders that neither the ALDS, nor the CSA’s task force take into account; the time it will take to develop a strategic leader before the ALDS and CSA’s task force’s recommendations are fully implemented. In essence, a gap of time exists where strategic leaders remain underdeveloped. Bridging this gap is crucial for the Army in order to have strategic leaders in the near term. Additionally, a distinction between senior and strategic leaders and their development is needed to bridge this gap and improve leader development for the Army leadership that will face the challenges of the twenty-first century. This paper offers a strategy to fill the near-term gap in the Army’s development plan for strategic leaders serving at the ranks of Lieutenant Colonel and Colonel and recommends a way ahead to improve the development of officers in the same ranks that have not been earmarked for service as strategic leaders.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Clayton E. Kuetemeyer

Published: September 2015

The National Guard should serve a more active role supporting Combatant Command theater security cooperation requirements. Active Component force structure is decreasing while the demand for globally engaged operations increases. The National Guard has experience in relationship building from the State Partnership Program, and unique experience in Defense Support to Civil Authorities and consequence management. The National Guard needs to foster improvements to Department of Defense processes that more strongly consider National Guard forces for deployment in support of Combatant Commands’ requirements. The National Guard can achieve this through improvements in three areas: alignment mechanisms that enable GCCs to identify available National Guard forces and their capabilities; coordination between the National Guard Bureau and Combatant Commands; and finally, the requirements, reporting, and demonstration of National Guard readiness.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Robert B. Kuth

Published: September 2015

For decades, Iran has disrupted security and stability in the Middle East. Its unlawful pursuit of nuclear weapons and support of terrorist organizations continues to pose a significant threat to U.S. national interests and the international community. The acquisition of nuclear weapons would thrust Iran into a hegemonic status and create an undesirable imbalance of power across the region. The National Security Strategy states that Iran must meet its international responsibilities beginning with a peaceful nuclear program. It must cooperate with the international community, abide by international laws, and comply with the content of the 2013 Joint Plan of Action. While current United States (U.S.) policy is focused on prevention, it lacks the teeth required to compel Iran to comply. The U.S. must develop a broad, comprehensive, consistent, long-range strategy to contain Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons in order to promote stability in the region. This paper reviews current U.S. policy. More importantly, it will discuss additional options the U.S. Government should consider before entertaining the notion of a nuclear-armed Iran.


Author: Colonel Bryan J. Laske

Published: September 2015

Both State Department and Department of Defense leaders have articulated policy and guidance emphasizing the importance of building partner capacity as part of regional security strategies and overall national interests. In addition, the President has set forth policy to strengthen the ability of the United States to help allies and partner nations build their own security capacity. Yet, the ability to bring the instruments of national power to effective use remains a challenge. The United States must pursue a new approach to better meet a complex and interdependent security environment. The cross-functional teams represented in joint-interagency task forces are a model that has proven its effectiveness toward national security goals in multiple regions and for a variety of purposes. Institutionalizing cross-functional teams in the model of the joint-interagency task force and employing them to link geographic combatant command regional strategies with U.S. Embassy country strategies in the security sector will establish an effective mechanism to integrate capabilities, authorities, and resources of all U.S. Government departments and agencies in key regions, sub regions, or high-risk countries.


Author: Mr. Gregory F. Lawless

Published: September 2015

In 1965, the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) took up arms against Thai security forces. The Thai response to the insurgency was uneven. A 1968 article for Foreign Affairs reflected contemporary concerns: “Northeast Thailand: Tomorrow’s Vietnam?” Questions arose whether the Thai government was quelling the uprising or fueling the grievances that supported the insurgency. This case study examines the Royal Thai Government’s successful suppression of the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT), including activities in 1978-1980 and the political policies announced in 1980 that reduced the CPT’s strength and diminished its appeal to the populace. This review will examine the security situation and the political landscape of Thailand from 1965 to 1985 to test the thesis that the political astuteness of the “semi-democratic” military regime in power from 1977 until 1988 bears the greatest responsibility for the successful elimination of the Communist Party of Thailand as a viable threat. The key to the success of this counterinsurgency strategy lay in the political formulae the Thai regime employed for a “political offensive.”


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Matthew W. Lawrence

Published: September 2015

The Army Reserve has experienced difficulty in attracting recruits, missing its recruiting targets every year since 2011. Some in the Army Reserve have discussed establishing a distinct brand for the Army Reserve to improve the image of the component in the public’s mind and alleviate the difficulty in attracting recruits. However, branding an organization is not merely marketing, and the Army Reserve is neither equipped to undertake such an endeavor, nor does it have the characteristics of a valuable brand. A brand has five characteristics that define its position: distinctive, coherent, appropriate, protectable and appealing. The Army Reserve does not have elements at its core identity that meet all of those criteria. In addition, the Army has embarked on a new branding initiative called the Enterprise Army Brand that includes the Army Reserve. Despite the research and effort that has gone into the Enterprise Army Brand, its success is not guaranteed, which calls into question the wisdom of the Army Reserve establishing a separate identity.


Author: Lt Col Christopher T Lay

Published: September 2015

The 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, U.S. policy in the Middle East emphasizes security through collaboration with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. The United States and Saudi Arabia have had a long-standing relationship focused on regional stability and shared security interests. The closeness and strength of the U.S.-Saudi relationship stems from a long relationship based on common interests in oil, strategic regional stability, and Saudi security. The United States Military Training Mission (USMTM) to Saudi Arabia remains a foundational part of this relationship, focusing on “training, advising, and assisting” Saudi Arabian defense services. This military relationship remains intact today because of common interests and strategic objectives; however, it was not born overnight. Rather, the relationship required sixty tumultuous years to mature into what it is today. This is the story of that relationship’s evolution.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Eric D. Little

Published: September 2015

The announced rebalance towards the Pacific by the United States comes with a renewed effort to establish partnerships and adopt a cooperative posture with not just friends and partners in the region, but also with potential adversaries. Despite U.S. policy clearly stressing the importance of expanded partnerships and cooperation with China, there is a continued adversarial posture maintained by the U.S. in the space realm. Failing to cooperate with China will result in a contested and congested space environment that will lead to catastrophic and irreversible consequences. Additionally, the exorbitant cost associated with space acquisition, combined with the very robust inventory of systems providing capabilities to end-users is not sustainable in the current fiscal environment. A U.S. – China space partnership comes with risk, however, these risks do not outweigh the advantages of a positive U.S.-China relationship, nor do they outweigh the consequences of a failure to establish this relationship.


Author: Colonel Joseph G. Lock

Published: September 2015

After nearly fourteen years of continuous combat and a global campaign to defeat al-Qa’ida (AQ), the United States Military is more capable, agile, and lethal than ever before. However, this exceptional capability is insufficient to reverse the expanding threat presented by AQ and other similarly inspired Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs) that exploit fragile governments and thrive in ungoverned spaces. In order to reverse this trend, the U.S. needs to rebalance the current counterterrorism strategy, with much greater emphasis and resources applied toward building partner capacity (BPC) to reduce ungoverned space and eliminate emerging threats before they can take root. Increasing partner nation capacity building efforts requires persistent presence, a more streamlined funding authority, and better Special Operations Forces / Conventional Forces integration to maximize available manpower.


Author: Colonel Clyde Arthur Lynn III

Published: September 2015

The Army is experiencing and increasingly observable “values to virtue” gap. This gap is most evident through the high profile breaches of moral conduct reported in the media. The Army established its seven values, coupled with other programs such as Comprehensive Soldier and Family Fitness (CSF2), to serve as the base for moral development of Army professionals. The CSF2 program states that values reside in the spiritual dimension and psychology informs us that humans have a need to believe in the supernatural. Indeed, more than eighty-four percent of Americans embrace some form of religion. Values are normally transformed into virtue through religious instruction and experience. However, many recent Army and Department of Defense policies and actions have limited the religious liberty of soldiers, undermining the effort to close the values to virtue gap. The Army can emphasize the spiritual dimension by exposing its soldiers to various religious and secular resources without endorsing and religion (or non-religion) over any other and without violating the constitutional rights of its soldiers. Failure to do so will result in the continued widening of the gap and further disconnect the force from the public it serves.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Donald A. MacCuish

Published: September 2015

This paper provided an analysis of leadership development strategies that are applicable to logistics officer education. It concludes that the Logistics Leadership Development Strategy puts the Army on the right track in developing logistics officers through education. Although on the right track, the paper also argued that the LLDS is insular in its view of leadership development. Criteria for analysis was developed from various white papers, futures concepts, and theories of professional education. Additionally, trends in public and private logistics and supply chain education was reviewed. The paper was divided into three sections, first the Framework. In this section the author provided a synopsis of the competencies and skills required of future logistics leaders based on recently published Army and Joint concepts and strategies. The second section offers a critique of the framework laid out in section I, answering the question “can the LLDS develop the future logisticians the criteria call for, and why”? Section III then offers some recommendations on changes that should be made to existing logistics education to better meet the strategy for developing future army logistics officers.


Author: Colonel Silas G. Martinez

Published: September 2015

Given the importance of whole-of-government approaches to solving volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous strategic problems in this era of fiscal austerity, the United States (US) Army owes it to the American people to maximize the effectiveness every employee. The US Army has focused on talent management in its Senior Officer Corps as one way of developing the next generation of leaders to work in that environment. Still, precious little has been written about talent management for the Department of the Army (DA) Civilians who comprise nearly one-third of the US Army, and who provide continuity in the organizations that conduct Army operations around the globe and across the Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic objectives. This paper focuses on talent management of DA Civilians. We start with a review of talent management literature, and then outline the general goals of talent management for any population. We will look at the current state of talent management for the DA Civilians, and make recommendations on how to better employ that talent. We end with a discussion about a lateral entry, a specific business talent management practice that may be suitable for use for DA Civilians.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Pete McAleer

Published: September 2015

The proliferation of advanced anti-access and area denial weapons systems (A2AD) creates a significant threat to U.S. Joint Forces operating in the global commons. Current joint doctrine is insufficient for preparing the Joint Force to operate in an A2AD environment. The military’s Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons (JAM-GC) and The Air-Sea Battle Concept, developed to counter A2AD threats, establishes assumptions about the operating environment but does little to manage the risk inherent with the assumptions. Changes in joint force command and control, training and operations, and interoperability and equipment procurement must be made to fully develop an effective doctrine for countering A2AD threats. Without the recommended changes, the U.S. joint force will not be able to ensure the accomplishment of national objectives.


Author: Dr James C McNaughton

Published: September 2015

In the mid-1950s, the U.S. Army became the world’s first landpower trained and equipped to deliver nuclear fires on the battlefield. Within a decade the Army operated ten different nuclear weapons systems, even though by then their strategic rationale had sharply eroded. For a time, industry’s ability to design ever smaller and more sophisticated weapons outstripped their operational rationale. Yet soldiers and leaders at unit level continued to maintain these complex systems for field artillery, air defense artillery, atomic demolition munitions and intermediate-range ballistic missiles. They devised solutions to the problems of sharing the technology with allies and the Reserve Components and securing the weapons on foreign soil. Soldiers continually innovated as new and improved systems became available and maintained these capabilities through decades of rapid change, including non-nuclear conflicts, the transition to an All-Volunteer Army and racial and gender integration. The Army adapted its personnel management, training, security and maintenance systems at enormous cost. Not until the end of the Cold War did the president finally direct the Army to stand down from this demanding mission.


Author: Colonel Stephen A. Miller

Published: September 2015

The West is in a rut after fighting radical Islamic fundamental terrorists since 2001. We use medical analogical thinking to reset an approach to this complex, challenging problem. The West has been fighting the symptoms, avoiding the root causes. By asking “what?” questions, instead of “who?” questions, we can shift the West’s approach from a mostly military interventionist strategy to adopt the medical analogy of “gateway drugs.” The paradox of the root cause analysis is that America is a guarantor of religious freedom yet it is an extreme form of religious fundamentalism that is the threat. A counter narrative is needed that targets fundamentalists who have not yet turned to violent extremism. To do this, the West’s security apparatuses need to collaborate with social scientists and other experts to develop such counter narratives. The successes of Human Terrain Teams and the Minerva Research Initiative can serve as exemplars to create such strategic narratives.


Author: Colonel Daniel S. Morgan

Published: September 2015

China’s expanding influence into the LAC region along with growing Asia-Pacific and LAC relationships present challenges to the U.S.. The complexity of the relationships between LAC and Asia-Pacific governments, to include China, suggest the U.S. rebalancing to Asia strategy is inadequate to address the cross-regional impacts. This paper explains political, economic, and military impacts and proposes a broader Pacific solution that links LAC into the U.S.’ Asia rebalancing strategy. The political relationships between LAC and Chinese governments can undermine U.S. values of democracy, human rights, rule of law, and international norms. China’s soft power through economic statecraft increases their influence by providing trade and investment alternatives other than U.S. options. Increased cross-regional trade flows are also creating integrated supply chains. Last, Chinese arms sales, training exercises, and military education exchanges provide revenue and support their military modernization in Asia. These factors create one integrated problem, not two separate ones. Without a broader Pacific strategic option, the U.S. regional approach to the Asia-Pacific will result in reduced access to markets and future strategic risk to U.S. influence in both regions.


Author: Colonel Brandon Newton

Published: September 2015

This paper examines flaws in the strategic discourse on cyber power. The current discourse is flawed because it is dominated by hyperbole, misapplies context, and lacks sufficient precision in terms and definitions. There are two critical flaws in the current discourse. The first is descriptions of the existential nature of strategic cyber war, and the Armageddon like environment that would be created by such a war, despite evidence to the contrary. The second flaw is in the understanding of the context of any cyber action potential adversaries, state or non-state. Recommended adjustments to the discourse need to be informed by clear and valid assumptions on what can be done with cyber power, as well as the application of a model for cyber threat prioritization. The final analysis addresses the needed changes in education and training, and the role of humans in understanding the nature of cyber power.


Author: Colonel Constantin E. Nicolet

Published: September 2015

This paper explores the moral implications of the use of Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPAs) to conduct lethal strikes as a tactic in the United States counterterrorism campaign. In doing so, and at the unclassified level, this paper presents a factual overview of RPAs by outlining their capabilities and characteristics. It then provides a synopsis of just war theory, which serves as the basis for the discussion of the moral aspects of RPA use. Following this background material, the paper addresses some of the ethical considerations and challenges of RPAs and their use in principle and in the context of the war against al-Qa’ida. The paper concludes that the U.S. meets the jus ad bellum requirements for fighting al-Qa’ida and that the use of RPAs to conduct lethal strikes, provided it adheres to the published standards, is morally acceptable as a component of the U.S. counterterrorism campaign, meeting jus in bello criteria.


Author: Colonel Heath Niemi

Published: September 2015

As military leaders will soon possess an almost deistic ability to see the battlefield, approaching remote omniscience, omnipotence, and omnipresence (O3); strategic and operational commanders will have a better understanding of the common operational picture. The perception of O3 will potentially cause senior leaders to interfere and centrally control their subordinate leaders and elements prohibiting the effective use of mission command. This paper postulates leadership, in an O3 environment, will preclude the full employment of an empowered force within the definition of mission command. Instead, leaders need to find a middle ground between the ability to centralize control and the capacity to resource empowered leaders and teams. As globalization in a volatile international arena requires every technological tool available to allocate limited resources and project the effective use of leadership, the use of advanced technology can enhance the effectiveness of leadership for a globally dispersed organization. The future capability technology brings to leadership highlights the required doctrine, training and appropriate barriers to enable mission command in an environment of perceived godlike visibility of operations.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Geoffrey A. Norman

Published: September 2015

Mission command represents a significant cultural shift in the leadership philosophy of the U.S. Army, yet recent studies indicate Army leaders and organizations struggle to implement its fundamental principles. Effective mission command relies heavily on teams and team building, but many Army leaders and organizations demonstrate weak team development and team leadership. This paper explores the Army’s shift to mission command as a leadership philosophy; reviews recent leadership survey results to reveal areas of improvement in the exercise of mission command within the force; and considers contemporary civilian organizational behavior models, such as senior team leadership. The paper concludes by providing recommendations on ways to infuse senior team leadership methods by addressing doctrinal and training shortfalls in team building, reduce leader and team member turnover, and improve leadership feedback to harness the talents of leaders at all levels and more fully exercise mission command.


Author: Colonel Paul R. Norwood

Published: September 2015

How does any commander or leader invested with institutional authority make sound judgments related to justice and other command authorities? A commander’s decision to establish accountability through an array of disciplinary tools (ranging from light to severe), directly impacts the perception of organizational justice within the unit. This paper will provide a detailed analysis of an illustrative justice-related decision framework and explore how the Army trains and develops leaders to exercise their command authority and responsibility. It reviews what other ethical decision making models exist that may be of use to commanders, what is being taught to commanders and when it is taught. It considers the impacts of a loss in confidence in commanders to make these decisions and the potential outcome of a loss of authority due to poor command performance. Ultimately, this paper recommends an illustrative decision making framework which commanders may find helpful in developing their sound judgment related to justice matters. Then, training together with senior commanders, they may use their personal framework to practice making sound judgments with an eye better attuned to what makes a decision good.


Author: Colonel William T. Nuckols Jr.

Published: September 2015

The Iraqi Army built by the United States from 2004 to 2012, at a cost of billions of dollars and thousands of service members lives’ lost, has disintegrated under the onslaught of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). ISIS controls much of western Iraq, including its second largest city, Mosul. The Government of Iraq, with assistance from the U.S. and other allies, must build a small and professional Army. To re-establish a resilient and effective organization, the Iraqi Army (IA) must be massively reorganized and trained with an understanding that the effort will take years of persistent U.S. and allied presence. This has been proven to be effective in Columbia. The new IA will require long term U.S. (or NATO) advisors, to live with and train their Iraqi counterparts. Finally, the IA must be professionalized, with greater focus on selfless service and loyalty to the constitutionally appointed and elected leaders of Iraq. This will require a change in culture, which will include a level of accountability and discipline that has been generally absent from many of the members of the IA. This approach will also require a long term commitment from the United States, both in terms of military personnel and money.


Author: Colonel Daniel E. O’Grady

Published: September 2015

The United States Army is downsizing. It is critical that we recruit and retain the best and brightest, ensuring our ability to meet complex, unpredictable missions in more effective and efficient ways. The United States Army relies on an all-volunteer force to execute its assigned missions while simultaneously maintaining its congressionally mandated end-strength. The number of soldiers and their ability to conduct full-spectrum operations directly impacts the Army’s ability to execute the National Military Strategy. As the Army continues to procure and use technologically advanced equipment to help counterbalance reduction in forces, it will need to recruit those individuals that demonstrate the capability to quickly learn and apply new skill sets. This paper will outline a strategy and provide recommendations for ensuring the United States Army Recruiting Command can best compete for and acquire the talent the Army requires between now and 2025.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Derek James O’Malley

Published: September 2015

The rhetoric is heated in the debate over the future of the A-10. The F-35, which has been touted as the replacement for the A-10 and several other legacy fighters, is behind schedule and currently lacks many of the A-10’s capabilities. Critics argue that the F-35 will never match the A-10 and is a leap backwards in CAS capability, while F-35 advocates cite the impressive 5th generation capabilities the F-35 will eventually bring to the fight. Amidst this war of words, where emotions run high, it is difficult to wade through the ensembles of points and counterpoints to discern a productive path. Thus, this paper is not just about the A-10 or the F-35. Rather, it is about making tough choices to forge effective defense strategies in a complex, resource constrained, and rapidly changing environment. To this end, we will explore a series of cases from both the business world and the Department of Defense (DoD). These vignettes will reveal patterns of behavior, which converge to stifle critical thinking in competitive landscapes. This paper will present a balanced discussion on future defense strategies, allowing readers to draw their own conclusions about the future of the A-10.


Author: Colonel Morgan D. O’Rourke

Published: September 2015

The US finds itself in an increasingly unstable and unpredictable world with a shrinking military. Smaller JTFs will have to form on short notice from multiple bases to cover the joint functions. We cannot allow the enemy to control key terrain and use their countermobility systems to pin down and destroy our forces. During the recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, we ceded the countermobility fight to the enemy and lost the initiative. Engineers focused on building protective structures and finding IEDs. After 10 years of overreliance on remote sensor-fires links and aviation we are ill prepared for the fights ahead. In the process we lost our proactive mindset in using countermobilty to support defensive and offensive operations. Our current systems are nearing the end of their lifecycle and are inadequate for supporting future operations. We must engage with all stakeholders and swift action across DOTMLPF to develop scalable, reliable, affordable, and effective lethal and non-lethal countermobility capabilities in support of the joint commander’s intent. The days of legacy landmines are mercifully gone, FASCAM is inadequate, the demands of man-in-the loop systems are tremendous and we must train and equip for the fight ahead.


Author: Colonel Lance Oskey

Published: September 2015

The U.S. Army should adopt Outcomes Based Training and Education (OBTE) as the teaching and training methodology that guides training programs at all levels. The current strategic environment in the Institutional Domain has established conditions for this initiative with the publishing of the Army Learning Concept 2015, and updated Army Training and Leader Development concepts. Many Army organizations have already successfully implemented OBTE within their local training programs. The effort to fully implement OBTE must begin within the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command. Key milestones required for implementation include defining the model, expanding the Army’s Mission Command philosophy to include application in the Institutional Domain with OBTE as one of its principles, and implementing changes across the Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership & Education, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) framework.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel John P. Pantleo

Published: September 2015

The development of long-range weapons is increasing the need for deconfliction within the joint force and challenging the traditional methods of integrating fires. At the same time, the concepts of Mission Command and cross-domain synergy create tensions on how best to manage such assets. In order to quickly and effectively field new weapon systems, simulations that focus on integrating emerging capabilities should be conducted during materiel solution development and acquisition. These simulations should not be service-specific exercises that validate Key Performance Parameters or inform requirements, rather they should focus on how these systems would be used in future conflict with an eye toward gaining enough experience that joint doctrine can be tested and either validated or revised. Current simulations using the Army Tactical Missile System and potential counter-unmanned aerial systems are provided as examples of how early simulation would have allowed for quicker, more effective integration of long range fires into the joint fight.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Carl Lamar Parsons

Published: September 2015

Defending critical infrastructure against attack is vital to the National Security of the United States and is essential to maintaining national economic prosperity. As a symbol and instrument of national power, the U.S. military plays a broad role to protecting and defending the homeland. The military must be prepared and ready to execute homeland defense tasks and provide support to other agencies to protect critical infrastructure. To mitigate the risks to our critical infrastructure, the military, in cooperation and collaboration with other governmental agencies, must maintain a robust defense and protection plan. This paper does not advocate large overt security measures. Instead, it emphasizes the continued importance of defending the Nation’s critical infrastructure by showcasing the layers of complexity and interagency support required to conduct critical infrastructure protection. The paper will make recommendations on how to move forward on defending and protecting our critical infrastructure from a whole of government approach.


Author: Ms. Phala L. Patton-Reed

Published: September 2015

In recent years, a general consensus has developed that employing the instruments of power effectively requires close cooperation between all the parts of government that wield the instruments of national power; Diplomatic, Informational, Military and Economic. In particular, the Department of State (DoS) must be fully integrated with the Department of Defense (DoD). Historically, close cooperation between the DoS and the DoD has presented a challenge as the two organizations have culturally been at odds. In short, the DoD prepares for crises, the DoS aims to avoid them. However, if we look at these goals as two sides of the same coin, it would seem that they are actually ideally suited to work together. The concept of Regionally Aligned Forces presents this opportunity.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Jesse T. Pearson

Published: September 2015

The U.S. Army has established its Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) policy as a way to provide the Combatant Commanders (CCDRs) with tailored, globally responsive, regionally engaged, and consistently available forces. In order to more fully realize the potential of RAF and maximize the utility of Army forces to the CCDRs, the Army must address four issues. First, the Army must conduct an effective information campaign to communicate the value of RAF to internal and external audiences. Second, the Army must establish long-term RAF unit alignment with the Combatant Commands (CCMDs) and reduce RAF unit rotation. Third, the Army should assign active component CONUS-based Army divisions to the Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs) instead of brigade combat teams (BCTs). Fourth, the Army must clarify RAF funding responsibilities. These changes will increase the value of the RAF policy and Army forces to the Nation.


Author: Colonel Isaac J. Peltier

Published: September 2015

This strategic research project begins by examining the history, theory, and doctrine of Mission Command to arrive at an understanding of why changing military culture is important to successfully instilling a new command philosophy. The project then examines the Army’s systems of institutional education, unit-based training and leader development and analyzes these systems using findings from the 2013 Center for Army Leadership Survey of Army Leadership to evaluate the challenges facing the Army and offer recommendations for improvement. Finally, the project examines how Special Operations Forces successfully changed their organizational culture in Iraq and Afghanistan to achieve effectiveness in employing the principles of Mission Command and highlights those best practices that the Army could adopt.


Author: Colonel Celestino Perez, Jr.

Published: September 2015

How can military professionals improve U.S. strategic performance? Prominent policymakers, military professionals, and opinion leaders argue that the United States suffers from repeated bouts of strategic discontent arising from the failure to conjoin strategic intent and actual outcomes. This paper presumes that military professionals share with policymakers the responsibility to improve U.S. strategic performance. Motivated by assessments from top military professionals and Séverine Autessere’s research on the failure of international peacebuilding, I argue that two intellectual errors plague American strategic thinking. The first error, anti-politics, describes the military professional’s tendency to discount the importance of ground-level politics as a military concern. The second error, the macro bias, leads strategists and military professionals to neglect local knowledge and bottom-up dynamics. This error eclipses crucial strategies to mitigate violence. Both anti-politics and the macro bias have strategic consequences, which military leaders and educators can help reverse through educational reforms that integrate cutting-edge social and political science into the military classroom.


Author: Colonel Kris N. Perkins

Published: September 2015

In the realm of WMD-related capability proliferation, the intersection of availability, opportunity and desire has the potential to be the United States’ and our international partner’s most significant nonproliferation challenge for the 21st century. Africa is a continent where availability, opportunity and desire intersect creating a high risk of actors of concern acquiring capabilities to develop, proliferate and eventually employ WMD. To ensure the U.S. achieves the DOD end state of “no new WMD possession,” the U.S. must implement a “whole of government” approach to address the WMD-related capabilities proliferation threat presented within Africa. This approach can begin with an already established National Security Policy and Interagency system that informs diplomacy, development, and defense planning at the regional and country levels.


Author: Colonel Jeffery E. Phillips

Published: September 2015

The U.S. Government has placed significant reliance on Private Security Companies (PSC’s) to provide protection for operational contract support efforts and must improve current processes to provide effective security for future contract execution. Government agencies now routinely contract for private security functions during all types of contingency operations for the purpose of guarding their personnel, facilities, work sites, and contractors. Based on U.S. global commitments and military end-strength, the use of contractors to support contingency operations will be an enduring method for providing support to U.S. Government agencies in future operations, and the U.S. Government must make efforts to improve the utilization of PSCs. This paper proposes six recommendations on providing better government oversight and coordination of PSCs to increase future operational contract support success.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel David S. Pierce

Published: September 2015

The U.S. created and implemented the Marshall Plan out of necessity. Credited for saving Western Europe, the Marshall Plan assisted European Nations in recovering from the aftermath of WWII while preventing the Soviet Union from absorbing the entire continent. Implementation called for new organizations with experts in politics, agriculture, banking and others. Clear strategic objectives enabled unity of effort by DOS and the international community. In 2003, the U.S. invaded Iraq without a coordinated synchronized plan for construction operations. An ad hoc creation of an organization to oversee the program changed 3 times and each time it had new objectives, goals and vision. Reconstruction efforts in Iraq ignored the principles of the Marshall Plan. The Plan’s basic framework allows for the implementation of reconstruction operations in today’s complex environment, just as it did in 1947. The U.S. must consider the creation of a permanent office that follows the Marshall Plan’s structural framework. The office executive serves as the central focal point to address all issues concerning nation building to ensure coordination and synchronization of all resources across the interagency.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Jose L. Polanco

Published: September 2015

The United States continues to face multiple strategic challenges throughout the globe. Complex issues in the Middle East, Europe and a rebalance to the Pacific have monopolized the U.S. foreign policy agenda, resulting in a loss of U.S. influence in the nearby Latin American Caribbean region. State actors outside the Western Hemisphere, such as China, have taken notice of this perceived vacuum and have sought to advance their own interests in the Americas. China’s use of soft power in this developing region is steadily making it the partner of choice over the United States. Today’s fiscal austerity further compounds this challenge as the U.S. seeks to address budgetary limitations. However, the United States does have options and one possible solution is Strategic Landpower. Strategic Landpower, if implemented correctly, as part of a holistic approach can make a difference in restoring U.S. influence in the region. Landpower can shape and influence the strategic environment and promote U.S. national interests in the Western Hemisphere by building enduring relationships through military engagement and security cooperation.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Thomas R. Powers

Published: September 2015

Since 2001, the United States has led a multinational war on terrorism and expended significant blood and treasure replacing corrupt regimes with fragile, democratic institutions. Yet, in just a handful of years, deteriorating conditions in Iraq threatens to erode the hard-won gains achieved in the early days of the military campaign. Towards that end, the United States should renew efforts to resolve the underlying political problems in Iraq and Syria as part of its long-term strategy to degrade and destroy the Islamic State. Military operations should be conducted as part of a whole-of-government approach, but Coalition military action is just a supporting role to the more important diplomatic efforts. Absent new political frameworks, military action is irrelevant. Additionally, U.S. and Coalition efforts must be actively managed below the national policy level. The existing strategy, if nested within a larger diplomatic effort, balances risk and reward over the long-term and offers the greatest opportunity to succeed.


Author: Colonel Michael Trey Rawls

Published: September 2015

The post-Cold War era has proven to be fraught with difficulties created when the idealistic goals of Liberal Hegemony clash with complex international realities. Nowhere is this idea more pronounced than in the rhetoric of the modern Presidency. Presidential rhetoric in the post-Cold War era and its corresponding military operations often present conflicting information and thereby generate unrealistic expectations in the public sphere both at home and abroad. Through an analysis of the rhetoric of modern presidents during times of conflict this paper seeks to better understand the phenomenon and recommend practices to more closely align rhetoric with achievable foreign policy goals.


Author: Mr. Nathan Timothy Ray

Published: September 2015

Public disclosure websites (PDW)—sites like WikiLeaks—constitute a serious security challenge to the United States and other nations. PDW activists are dedicated to exposing sensitive government and commercial information in the belief that they are acting in the public good. As a result, PDWs have revealed hard-to-find, strategic and tactical level information that benefits the resiliency and operations of insurgent, terrorist, and criminal groups. To date, there is no evidence linking PDWs to an attack by violent nonstate groups, but this threat is almost certain to grow as Internet access expands globally. Given the high likelihood of future leaks, the U.S. Government should adopt stronger controls to safeguard information, including new legislation to address leaking, as well as tailoring “need to share” practices. Left unchallenged, PDWs imperil the ability of the United States to counter violent nonstate groups.


Author: Ms. Karan L. Reidenbach

Published: September 2015

Despite the widely different leadership styles of Donald Rumsfeld and Robert Gates, intrusive monitoring actions taken by both Secretaries of Defense have negatively affected civil-military trust relationships in the United States. While many discussions of civil-military relations center on a coup d’état, the direct seizure of political power by the military or overthrow of government by the military, this does not appear to be a realistic threat in the United States today. Rather, the challenge for civil-military relations in the twenty-first century is a growing mistrust between elected civilian leaders and the military. Actions by the military such as leaking information, performing end runs around a policy decision, and foot-dragging in carrying out actions contribute to this growing mistrust. Actions by civilian leaders such as inserting themselves in the military leaders’ day-to-day business, requiring excessive reporting, and conducting invasive investigations or audits also contribute to the growing mistrust. To address the civil-military relations challenge of the twenty-first century, this paper will review the history of civil-military relations, then briefly examine the theories from Huntington and Janowitz before turning to an in-depth analysis of Feaver’s agency theory.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Travis D. Rex

Published: September 2015

The United States Air Force selects its General Officers earlier than any other armed service, with over 90 percent of all O-7s selected on or before 24 years in service--nearly two years earlier than all other service branches. This self-imposed early timeline to General Officer gives the USAF some advantages valued by senior Air Force leaders. However, this early promote dynamic also causes impacts in personnel management and development priorities throughout the entire officer promotion system, many of them deleterious to overall health of the Air Force. Drawbacks of the current paradigm include problems in strategic joint leadership competitiveness, organizational behavior, overall leader development, and retention. By relaxing the 24-year timeline, in addition to other recommended measures, the Air Force active component can make adjustments to the system to better develop both operational and strategic leaders while preserving and promoting an officer talent pool that will ensure current and future success.


Author: Colonel Lori L. Robinson

Published: September 2015

As Americans, we tend to view situations through our own cultural lens with, sometimes, insufficient consideration of the perspectives or interests of others. Although many countries, to include the United States, are facing similar security dynamics in the 21st Century, each represents a range of historical narratives, experiences, backgrounds, and traditions that have direct impact on their policy and decision-making. In the Asia-Pacific region, each country is pursuing their own path to security balancing U.S. security cooperation with trade and investment links to China. To enhance success, U.S. Army Pacific Pathways design should incorporate, fuse, and balance host nation security cooperation priorities and evolving military roles and missions with U.S. strategic and military objectives in the region. This will help ensure that Pacific Pathways garners host nation domestic support and funding, compliments ongoing diplomatic and economic efforts of the United States, and avoids causing any unintentional negative influences on the strategic objectives of all participants.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Monte’ L. Rone

Published: September 2015

Lessons learned from hard fought wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the uncertain character of the anticipated operating environment served as catalysts for change in how the United States Army organizes, trains, and equips Soldiers and units for missions in support of Unified Land Operations. In order to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative from a relative position of advantage, the Army must develop an organizational culture that emphasizes decentralization and inculcates a long-term commitment to leader development and talent management. The Army’s failure to operationalize Mission Command is due to a lack of trust and paralysis cultivated in an organizational culture that values the tradition of centralized command and control. This incongruence in Army culture creates a trust deficit that militates against producing leaders with an entrepreneurial spirit. This disjunction is the heart of the adaptive challenge confronting the Army.


Author: Mr. David T. Roscoe

Published: September 2015

In September 2014, President Obama addressed the United Nations General Assembly on the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS), stating: “The only language understood by killers like this is the language of force.” In one sense, the President is correct, Western efforts to reason with ISIS to halt their brutal campaign are almost certainly futile. However, in another sense, the President’s statement reveals a flawed strategy and a myopic focus on using force at the expense of waging an effective war of ideas. To say ISIS only understands the language of force ignores their effective use of social media to recruit, fundraise, and encourage attacks in Western nations. Meanwhile, U.S. efforts to counter ISIS’s social media campaign fail to neutralize ISIS’s appeal to sympathetic audiences - appearing stiff, unimaginative, and contrived. With military options against ISIS limited by political and economic considerations, the U.S. must re-examine its strategic communications and improve its use of social media. This paper explains why the U.S. must adapt to emerging social media technologies, build culturally resonant messages, and exploit several key weaknesses in ISIS’s strategic messaging.


Author: Colonel Craig Roseberry

Published: September 2015

The United States is facing significant threats to critical space assets due to emerging military technologies such as direct assent anti-satellite weapons and directed energy weapons. The U.S. Space Policy identifies deterrence as a key method to prevent attacks on space systems and proclaims the inherent right to respond to defeat attacks if deterrence fails. The threat of punishment by itself is insufficient to deter either opportunistic states or anonymous actors from employing these technologies to achieve strategic surprise. In light of these challenges, the United States must strengthen its current space deterrence approaches to prevent future attacks on space borne assets. This paper first reviews the relevant strategic documents regarding space deterrence. Second, it identifies the impact anonymity, the lack of international norms and frameworks, and a currently tepid U.S. declaratory policy poses as potential sources of failure to space deterrence. Finally, this strategic research project offers practicable recommendations to overcome limitations that inhibit the implementation of deterrence strengthening mechanisms in line with the National Space Policy in the present strategic environment.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Jason Rueschhoff

Published: September 2015

A unique nexus exists between coalition warfare, its employment of Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS), and Just War Theory (JWT). Understanding the profound moral implications of UASs upon coalition warfare will facilitate successful combined engagements. This paper will examine UAS usage in coalition warfare within the framework of JWT and highlight the results to coalition cohesion, integration, and future relationships. It will then provide several recommendations on the way forward.


Author: Colonel Michael Runey

Published: September 2015

America’s modern All-Volunteer Force (AVF) just celebrated its fortieth anniversary. Yet the last fourteen years of war put unprecedented demands on the AVF, pushing the enlisted force in the Army in particular nearly to the breaking point. As the military faces new global threats, America’s youth head off to college at historically high rates funded in large measure by federal aid. The AVF’s long-term viability as a high-quality, affordable, professional volunteer force is increasingly at risk. Acquiring enlisted talent is increasingly challenging for the services, especially the Army. This research study uses an operational design approach from Joint Doctrine to scan the environment, reframe the strategic problem, and propose an approach to aid law and policy makers in sustaining the long-term viability of the AVF. Accounting for the inherent tensions between the key AVF stakeholders—the military, society—recommendations include fostering a national culture of service, realigning incentives to motivate qualified men and women, developing a talent-vetting system to qualify more people, and continuing to compete for and enlist highly qualified young Americans.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Anthony W. Rush

Published: September 2015

The doctrinal view of risk and its assessment is inadequate for use at the strategic level. The reliance upon models which assign a single-value, such as low, medium, or high, to risk creates an over simplistic view of risk and its consequence. Shifting the definition of risk from the probability and severity of loss calculus in doctrine to a definition that incorporates ends, ways, means, interests, and consequence sharpens the view of risk. This definition demands a new framework to assess risk. A five-step risk assessment process is proposed to broaden the view of risk and how it may be more sufficiently conveyed to strategic leaders by shifting away from an actuarial model of risk assessment to a framework suitable for strategy.


Author: Mr. Shaun J. Ryan

Published: September 2015

This paper establishes that the national security environment requires that we operate together. The imperative to unified action applies across the whole United States national security enterprise, and extends to international and multilateral fora. Leaders can apply insights drawn from theories of social network analysis, organizational culture, and organizational traps to better understand common organizational dynamics which affect cooperation between organizations. Taken together, these tools arm senior leaders with a way to achieve greater impact and effectiveness when they work in the interorganizational space. This will lead, in turn, to outcomes which advance the nation’s interests and security.


Author: Colonel James R. Salome

Published: September 2015

The art of command, how leaders apply judgment shaped by learning and experiencing their environment, has atrophied over the last 14 years of war. The length of the global war on terrorism, the inability to achieve decisive victory, and the return to Iraq in 2014 reveal a lack of artful command. The complex and ambiguous character of future conflict continues to require judgment under pressure and leaders to rely on their training to produce results. Leaders caught astride a transition between the Industrial Age and a new Information Age struggle to adapt to additional complexity. Generational tensions add strain between leaders educated by sequential Industrial Age models and those educated in a rapidly globalizing Information Age. This monograph will describe how Operational Design provides a tool to restore the art of command, reinforced with examples from transformational business practices and change experts. This restoration requires leaders who commit to demonstrate the art of command, operationalize it, and institutionalize its use.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Jocelyn J. Schermerhorn

Published: September 2015

Engaging Russian President Vladimir Putin as a credible world leader, building a stronger economic relationship with Russia, and acknowledging Russia’s regional influence as a coalition partner may be far more successful in influencing Putin than the confrontational approach currently used by Western leaders. Strategic leader competencies contribute to leadership skills that include the ability to determine future requirements and to use integrative thinking techniques to address complex challenges. The four strategic leadership competencies most important for Western leaders to understand and appreciate in order to better interact with and influence Putin’s decision-making are frame of reference development, envisioning the future, systems understanding, and communication. While some may argue that the only way to deal with Russia is through policies that subordinate Russia to the West, this paper identifies three more effective recommendations related to acknowledging Putin as an influential leader in world affairs, building greater economic interdependence between the West and Russia that is mutually beneficial, and bringing Russia into a coalition partnership to comprehensively address global security issues.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Thomas P. Seymour

Published: September 2015

United States air forces have operated under the tenet of Centralized Control/Decentralized Execution for decades. The proliferation of advanced technology, however, has enabled potential adversaries to disrupt the communication systems that Centralized Control requires. To address this challenge, Air Force leaders are developing the concept of Distributed Control in order to enable lower-echelon commanders to continue operations when communication links with higher-headquarters have been broken. While this term may be new, the idea behind it is not. Air commanders have relied upon Distributed Control at other points in history. This work examines how General George C. Kenney, who commanded Allied Air Forces in the Pacific, overcame similar challenges during World War II. Using Kenney’s organization as a model, this paper discusses ways in which future air commanders might organize the air component in preparation for Distributed Control operations. By examining doctrine, this work also considers the specific authorities the Combined Force Commander and Air Component Commander must delegate to their subordinates to continue air operations under the Distributed Control concept.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey R. Sgarlata

Published: September 2015

Throughout its history the United States has faced numerous ideological conflicts. Despite extensive experience in this type of struggle America has failed to develop an effective strategy by which to counter such challenges. This paper examines the nature of ideological movements, the process by which they grow, and critical vulnerabilities in that process which may present strategic opportunity. The author then recommends a framework for counter ideological strategy development in context of the challenge presented by the transnational militant Islamic movement.


Author: Colonel Curt R. Simonson

Published: September 2015

The 21st century security environment is volatile and unpredictable. The United States faces a variety of threats to its national security interests. As the Army grows smaller, it must maintain the ability to regenerate capabilities to meet unforeseen threats. Regeneration of land forces includes actions taken to rapidly develop new capabilities. The creation of the 10th Mountain Division in World War II provides a case study in the force regeneration role played by the National Ski Patrol System (NSPS). Beginning in 1940, the NSPS petitioned President Roosevelt and Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall to create a specialized Army unit capable of operating in cold weather and in mountainous terrain. Once mountain infantry units were created, the War Department took the unprecedented step of contracting the NSPS to recruit qualified men. Military and civilian leaders employed strategic leadership competencies to work across public-private organizational boundaries. The visionary arrangement between the War Department and the NSPS provides an example of how a civilian organization can be leveraged to assist in creating specialized units to address emerging national security threats.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Paul M. Skipworth

Published: September 2015

The gross federal debt now tops $18 trillion, but the outlook appears to be improving as the economy continues to rebound from the Great Recession. In 2014, the nation experienced its fastest economic growth in over ten years, the stock market doubled, the health care inflation rate was at its lowest rate in 50 years, and the deficit had been cut by two-thirds. But much debate remains before the actual debt improves. This paper aims to inform that debate by providing a general description about government debt, reviewing our nation’s history and projections of debt, and describing the impact of debt on national security. Finally, it offers broad recommendations based on this context.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Edward R. Sullivan

Published: September 2015

The Islamic State (IS) should be understood as an Islamist millenarian mass movement possessing broad anti-western appeal. Possessing an ideology distinct from Al-Qaeda, for more than a decade they have deliberately and methodically worked to arrive at their present situation. They ground their message in solid theological roots, utilizing, among other writings, the Salafist ideology of Sayyid Qutb. Their ideology is one of revolution in which Islam is on par with communism and capitalism as a basis of societal organization. The clarity of their utopian social message of equality and brotherhood contrasts sharply with the chaos and cultural confusion of globalization, making IS attractive to those already susceptible to radicalization in and out of the Islamic world. Highly capable in their media enterprises, IS nonetheless remains vulnerable to rogue messages released in its name that run counter to the image it is trying to cultivate. Countering its ideology is more problematic than countering its organization and requires increased international effort. A failure to act now leaves the Arab and Islamic heartland in the hands of a methodical and capable cult-like organization whose continued existence directly threatens the entire Middle East and North Africa.


Author: Colonel Kenneth J. Tauke

Published: September 2015

This paper provides historical overview of confinement during war, examines the genesis and guiding international law of detention operations, and reviews the detention processes utilized during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan, and the detention facility in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. This paper addresses four questions in regards to the future of detention operations. First, when the United States captures a high-value target, what type of prosecution is pursued? Second, where and how will the individuals be detained and what type of review processes should be utilized? Third, what will be the status of the individuals detained? Fourth, should one federal agency remain the executive agent for detention of non- US citizens who wage war against the United States. Finally, the papers offers a strategic Detainee Disposition Process.


Author: Mr. Matthew Taylor

Published: September 2015

Senior Army leaders recognize the Army Civilian workforce as a critical part of the total Army and the need to develop multifaceted civilian leaders similar to military senior leaders. The Army conducted multiple surveys and studies over the last decade and launched a Civilian Workforce Transformation in 2010. Three key structural issues—decentralized management of the Army civilian workforce, lack of civilian employee mobility, and an unbalanced grade structure—will prevent these latest initiatives from achieving the Army’s strategic intent. Analysis of key characteristics of these structural issues and the resulting effects on the Army Civilian Leader development programs, the Civilian Education System (CES) and Senior Enterprise Talent Management (SETM) program, show the futility of the current approach. Recommendations include continuing an evolutionary approach that cannot completely ameliorate the existing structural issues or a revolutionary approach where the Army fundamentally reexamines its Army Civilian leader development approach. Further research is needed on the growth in retired military officers transitioning into civil service at high GS pay grades since significant law changes starting in 1998.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Richard S. Taylor

Published: September 2015

In May 2013, President Barack Obama directed the release of an unclassified whitepaper that outlined “U.S. Policy Standards and Procedures for the Use of Force in Counterterrorism Operations Outside the United States and Areas of Active Hostilities.” The Presidential Policy Guidance sets in place sound standards and procedures to ensure that U.S. decisions to employ lethal force under the policy comply with international and U.S. domestic laws. However, as with any law or policy, there will always be times when guidance is inadequate to the occasion, and choices among competing lawful options are not clear. This is especially true when one must consider whether to take a life or harm another person. In these instances, decisions require heightened ethical scrutiny to ensure the contemplated act is morally just under the prevailing circumstances and the explanatory power of the proffered justification fully resonates. Building an ethical cannon to compliment the U.S. policy ensures policy intricacies are fully understood by Administration officials and military advisors/operators, who must make the best decisions under the most trying of circumstances.


Author: Ms. Elizabeth E. Torres

Published: September 2015

The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) has been plagued by problems with Veterans’ access to benefits and care for decades. Criticism from the media, Congress, and other stakeholders about the growing bureaucracy, constrained resources, and an overburdened system led to ethical failures, and the eventual resignation of Secretary Shinseki amid a crisis that erupted in the Spring of 2014. This paper seeks to understand the underlying causes of the failures and demonstrate how one senior leader’s approach to culture change, specifically, Secretary Robert McDonald, compares to Schein’s theory of organizational culture and its effect on values. It will look at the environmental conditions that played into the crisis, analyze and understand the problem, and evaluate the approach taken by Secretary McDonald in addressing the problem.


Author: Colonel Craig Trebilcock

Published: September 2015

The Army has experienced a dramatic increase in opioid use, misuse, and addiction since 2001, with nearly 14% of soldiers prescribed opioid pain medication as of 2010. These levels adversely impact force readiness, Army death rates, and overall soldier health. The Army response has been uncoordinated, with the medical branch framing widespread opioid use as a medical issue, Army leadership deeming it the result of risk taking soldiers and poor leadership, and the legal branch addressing it as a disciplinary issue. Opioid use is a new threat environment created by changing medical views on pain treatment, unique wartime drivers that render soldiers particularly susceptible to opioid abuse, and military culture. The Army must review this issue anew to develop an effective response. Army policies, using Vietnam era drug enforcement methods, are failing to mitigate the problem. Preventative policies such as medical monitoring of soldiers prescribed opioids, opioid risk training, and removing stigma for those seeking opioid abuse help are needed to reverse the problem. Erroneously framing the threat as primarily a disciplinary issue is perpetuating misuse and harming soldiers, force readiness, and civilian communities.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Clifton Brian Trout

Published: September 2015

The United States (U.S.) military is at an inflection point. Facing an increasingly complex security environment and declining budgets, military leaders must make hard choices in order to build and maintain the joint force the nation needs. With an anachronistic view of risk, a bias to procure the most technologically advanced high-end platforms, and a floundering defense strategy, the U.S. military is struggling to adapt to the current environment. Fundamental changes must be made to the way the military manages risk, allocates resources, and develops strategy. First, we must identify and determine an acceptable level of risk while finding innovative and balanced approaches to risk management. Second, we must adjust our acquisition strategy and resource allocation model to allow for offsetting ways and means. This includes a healthy high-end/low-end platform mix. Third, we must develop a strategy that aligns ends, ways, and means in a realistic and prioritized manner. This may require adjustments of desired ends, innovative use of reduced means, and ways that shares the burden with friends and partners around the globe.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey A. Vandaveer

Published: September 2015

Vietnam re-enters contemporary American military consciousness as a key player in Southeast Asia power dynamics relative to US rebalance to the Pacific. Vietnam’s historical ability to complicate Chinese aspirational calculations is a unique quality that has direct implications for US strategic interests in the Pacific. This paper examines the Socialist Republic of Vietnam’s (SRV) strategic “status quo” in the region and analyzes Hanoi’s ability to respond to perceived security challenges against Chinese ascendancy. Finally, the paper posits opportunities and limits to which US security interests in Southeast Asia may align with Vietnam’s for future potential collaboration.


Author: Colonel Gail Lynn Washington

Published: September 2015

In an austere fiscal environment, Commercial-Off-The-Shelf Acquisition (COTS) offers an acquisition alternative to support a ready and modern force in the twenty-first century. The decision to use COTS is not always an easy choice; but chosen appropriately, COTS reduces developmental time and costs. It is a quick means of acquiring capabilities from a broad commercial base. Its value has been affirmed in rapid acquisition programs designed to support our Warfighters in the current protracted conflicts and it has proven to be a force multiplier that has enhanced both force lethality and force protections. The acquisition process of design-and-integrate must be analyzed thoroughly to consider all other alternatives before selecting COTS as the best options. Greater use of COTS increases competition, innovation and enables the acquisition community to fill gaps in capability. COTS frequently gives program managers the flexibility to control cost, to minimize schedule, and to gain assured performance. Changing the culture of the acquisition community remains the biggest obstacle for making optional use of COTS. Senior leadership oversight can critically support implementation of a COTS-centric acquisition process.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Mitchell O. Watkins

Published: September 2015

In September 2014, the Army deployed a Stryker Brigade Combat Team from Joint Base Lewis McCord to Indonesia and Malaysia, completing exercises in Japan. The exercise, called Pacific Pathways is serving as a new model to project Landpower into the Pacific. Pathways trains better warfighters who understand the people, culture and environments in the AOR. Pathways deployments and exercises prevent conflict by demonstrating a credible U.S. Landpower commitment. Pathways programs shape the security environment by building military capacity within allies and partners. Pathways is effectively supporting the USPACOM Commander’s theater engagement strategy while reassuring friendly nations of the United States commitment to security in the Asia-Pacific Region. The additional Landpower Pathways brings to the AOR provides the USPACOM Commander with a better foundational force; one that can enable the joint force in achieving limited objectives, set the theater for follow on operations, respond to disaster relief or small contingencies, or serve as the foundation for larger operations.


Author: Colonel Walter James Wiggins

Published: September 2015

In order to sustain the Global Special Operations Forces (SOF) Network while waging a generational fight against violent extremist networks, United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) must make a cultural shift toward building the long-term resilience of its most precious asset--highly trained, skilled, and experienced people. Resilience is achieved by adaptation in the face of pressure. Adaptation occurs when people who are screened, assessed and selected for SOF are given time and opportunity to learn, grow and adjust to the demands of volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous environments. It is essential that SOCOM and its components invest in screening and selection processes that test for adaptability, build disciplined systems of time management to maximize black space, and leverage the preservation of the force and families programs to build a sustainable competitive advantage over future adversaries. Good leadership is critical to enabling adaptation and therefore SOCOM must invest in leadership development as the foundation upon which generational resilience is built.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel James D. Willson

Published: September 2015

Electricity is the lifeblood of our economy and the assumption of near continuous flow is taken for granted because the industry has achieved a remarkable level of reliability. But market pressure to find efficiencies coupled with weak government oversight is making the grid and society more vulnerable to the consequences of long-term power failures than they should be. At the direction of Congress, the Department of Defense is taking steps to isolate military installations from the commercial power grid to protect the capability to project military power. But increasing vulnerabilities to blended cyber and physical attacks could force the Department to deal with the consequences of large scale civil unrest and chaos domestically. Just as the Federal Aviation Administration regulates nearly all aspects of the aviation industry to counter the temptation to increase profits at the expense of public safety, the Department of Energy should regulate the power utilities similarly to ensure baseline reliability. However, long-term reliability will be achieved when renewable energy micro-grids are installed in thousands of communities and networked together similar to the internet in terms of scope, scale and reliability.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey D. Witt

Published: September 2015

Institutional education, standardized training, and self-development often supersede leader behavior patterns and social learning as the primary means for Army leader development resulting in missed subordinate leader developmental opportunities. Emerging leaders learn and enhance their skills by observing and emulating successful leaders, and developing leadership styles through experimentation in diverse social settings. A new paradigm for leader development focuses on self-aware and authentic senior leaders enabled by standardized programs of instruction. In realizing this new paradigm for leader development, senior leaders must deliberately and consciously acknowledge their own behavior patterns as the most significant factor in subordinate leader development. This paper applies research on leader prototypes and authentic leadership theory to place greater emphasis on the role that senior leaders in the operational domain fulfill in the context of the Army Leader Development Strategy.


Author: Colonel Kevin P. Wolfla

Published: September 2015

The evolving discussion of Strategic Landpower has tended to build on lessons learned through more than a decade of prolonged stability operations, which crowds out analysis of other common uses of landpower, particularly coercion. Coercive strategies will play an increasingly important role in securing national interests as the U.S. rebalances to the Asia-Pacific, where landpower proved vital to successful U.S. coercion during the Cold War and continues to serve as a deterrent there. Airpower and seapower may have more strategic agility than landpower, but coercion theory would suggest their agility makes them a weaker signal, both to adversaries and allies, of commitment and a willingness to escalate or de-escalate as necessary. As U.S. land forces remain stationed in and operating throughout the Asia-Pacific region, strategists and planners should do more than rhetorically state the deterrent value of force posture, presence, and security cooperation activities, and examine the most effective ways to leverage landpower for both compellence and deterrence.


Published: September 2015

The Collins Center Update is a quarterly newsletter detailing the activities of the Center for Strategic Leadership and Development, The United States Army War College. Articles in this issue include
"Executive Leader Course 15-02"
"Sustaining Professionalism: USAWC Strategic Planning Support to Burkina Faso"
"Strategy Education Conference, May 2015"
"Northwest Africa Wargame Informs AFRICOM Planning"
"The Heritage Foundation on U.S. Military Strength"
"USAWC's Homeland Defense and Security Community of Interest"


Author: Mr Keir Giles, Ms Kim Hartmann

Published: September 2015

An overview of four different national approaches to cyber defense are discussed: those of Norway, Estonia, Germany and Sweden. While providing a useful guide for engagement with the relevant governmental and other organizations in each of these countries, the Paper also compares and contrasts the advantages and drawbacks of each national approach.


Author: Dr Marcus Schulzke, Dr James Igoe Walsh

Published: September 2015

View the Executive Summary

Armed unmanned aerial vehicles—combat drones—have fundamentally altered the ways the United States conducts military operations aimed at countering insurgent and terrorist organizations. Drone technology is on track to become an increasingly important part of the country’s arsenal, as numerous unmanned systems are in development and will likely enter service in the future. Concerned citizens, academics, journalists, nongovernmental organizations, and policymakers have raised questions about the ethical consequences of drones and issued calls for their military use to be strictly regulated. This level of concern is evidence that the future of drone warfare not only hinges on technical innovations, but also on careful analysis of the moral and political dimensions of war. Regardless of whether drones are effective weapons, it would be difficult to sanction their use if they undermine the legitimacy of U.S. military forces or compromise the foundations of democratic government.


Editor: Dr Joseph R Cerami

Author: Dr Joseph R Cerami

Published: September 2015

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The main focus of this monograph is to synthesize the top research on leadership and leader development and to highlight the needs for developing individuals committed to careers of service across the public, private, and nonprofit sectors. The foundation for the research is based on ideas drawn from leadership and management literature, government doctrine and reports, think tank studies, and case studies. The Army has long sought to be innovative in its leader development. Most recently, the Army’s Human Development White Paper supports TRADOC Pamphlet 5250301, The U.S. Army Operating Concept, “Win in a Complex World” document (2014), by emphasizing the Army’s desire to become the nation’s leader in “human development.” In short, the Army Operating Concept requires that emerging leaders must understand the political-social-military environmental context, the defense-diplomatic-development (the 3-Ds) policies of the U.S. Government, and their roles as emerging leaders and followers in a variety of operational settings. Collaboration, not just within the Army, but across government agencies will be crucial to success in this complex operating environment.


Author: Dr Hal Brands

Published: September 2015

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Is offshore balancing the right grand strategy for America? Is it time for Washington to roll back the vast system of overseas security commitments and forward military deployments that have anchored its international posture since World War II? This monograph argues that the answer to these questions is no. Offshore balancing represents the preferred grand strategy among many leading international-relations “realists,” who argue that significant geopolitical retrenchment can actually improve America’s strategic position while slashing the costs of its foreign policy. The reality, however, is rather different. The probable benefits of offshore balancing—both financial and geopolitical—are frequently exaggerated, while the likely disadvantages and dangers are more severe than its proponents acknowledge. In all likelihood, adopting this strategy would not allow America to achieve more security and influence at a lower price. The more plausible results would be to dissipate U.S. influence, to court heightened insecurity and instability, and to expose the nation to greater long-range risks and costs.


Author: COL Michael J Arnold

Published: September 2015

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The dynamic nature of the future security environment necessitates better retention of diversified talent among officers from the Millennial Generational Cohort. Although the U.S. Army has done well to attract a diverse and talented group of junior officers at commissioning, a revision of the Army’s Personnel System, that incorporates a more personalized management approach, could help to motivate and retain millennial officers and better prepare them for senior leadership. Lieutenant colonels and colonels must provide the transformational leadership and innovation needed to create the intrinsic value that millennials seek in their profession. In order to explore what is most appealing to talented millennial officers and what is most effective for the Army, this Carlisle Paper will explore, as its methodology, the salient features of leadership theory, the characteristics of the Millennial Generational Cohort, and what senior leaders must do to improve attraction, motivation, and retention of millennial officers in the U.S. Army.


Published: September 2015

This Manual describes the United Nations (UN) Maritime Task Force, focusing on maritime support to a UN Mission1 and Force Headquarters. Always scalable in size, modular in function and Mission-tailored, the UN Maritime Task Force’s size and composition depend on the size, composition and requirements of the UN Mission it supports and the physical characteristics of the Mission area.


Published: September 2015

This Manual describes the United Nations (UN) Military Engineer Unit, focusing on Military Engineer support to a UN Mission1 and Force Headquarters. Always scalable in size, modular in function and Mission-tailored, the UN Military Engineer Unit’s size and composition depend on the size, composition and requirements of the UN Mission it supports and the physical characteristics of the Mission area.


Author: Colonel Jason A Kirk

Published: September 2015

DoD’s Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs) have the imperative to assess their Theater Campaign Plans in response to DoD’s recent 2014 Climate Change Adaptation Roadmap. As a “case-study” relevant to all GCCs this paper analyzes the risks and opportunities facing U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) in reviewing climate change impacts primarily in the Caribbean region of its Area of Operations.


Editor: Dr Antulio J Echevarria II

Published: August 2015

None


Author: Prof Charles D Allen, Mr Armor Brown II, COL (Ret) Jerry Chastain, Mr Craig Dyer, Prof Edward J Filiberti, Mr Steven Grimes, Dr Jeffrey L Groh, LTC (Ret) Colin Halvorson, MAJ (Ret), Dr Greg Hamlett, Prof Robert S Hume, LTC (Ret) Jerry Kelly, Mr Jim Kennedy, MAJ Jon Lacy, Ms Julie T Manta, Ms Doriot Mascarich, Dr Richard M Meinhart, COL (Ret) Terry Melton, COL Benjamin M Nutt, COL (Ret) Ben Rivera, Mr Charles Scott, LTC Jerome T Sibayan, LTC Cheryl L Smart, Mr Kurt Speed, LTC (Ret) Martha Stewart, Mr Brian Sullivan, MSG Joey Thompson, Prof Douglas E Waters, Prof Louis G Yuengert

Published: August 2015

Since the events of 9/11, the Army has transformed to a modular force, transitioned to regional engagement augmented with a stand-by global response force, and continued as a force trusted to defend America’s citizens and interests at home and abroad. The Army, as the backbone of the Joint Force, requires dynamic change, adaptation to the variables of the Operating Environment, agility to overmatch adversaries, and the staying power to withstand the blows of a convulsive strategic environment. Army Force Management, as a continuum across Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities, and Policy, is the capstone process that enables the Army to manage change, build opportunities, and reduce risk to the Nation, all while meeting statutory requirements. How The Army Runs (HTAR) is the United States Army War College’s Reference Book which serves as a primer and ready reference to officers preparing to assume command, leadership and management positions at the strategic level.


Author: COL Russell N Bailey, LTC Bob Dixon, Ms Laura McAleer, LTC Derek J O'Malley, COL (NZ) Christopher J Parsons, COL Elizabeth R Smith

Published: August 2015

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This strategic assessment seeks to go beyond a traditional comparative analysis of the military, technological, political, cultural, and economic factors governing the relationships and capabilities of the Asia Pacific environment. To make sense of the intrinsic complexities unique to this region, we endeavor to broaden our view and rely on a tool often overlooked in government studies: imagination. Moreover, we aim to offer a strategic document that is readable, instructive, and provocative. Pulling from a well-referenced piece of military teaching, this assessment borrows a learning concept first employed in 1904 by Major General Sir Ernest Dunlop Swinton in "The Defence of Duffer’s Drift." This fictional story describes the plight of young Lieutenant Backsight Forethought as he commands a 50-man platoon tasked to hold a tactically critical piece of land called Duffer’s Drift. The story unfolds in a series of six dreams, where the blunders of the unwitting lieutenant lead to disaster. As the dreams progress, he harnesses the lessons of each of his failures, and by applying these lessons, his platoon ultimately defends Duffer’s Drift.


Author: COL Craig Trebilcock

Published: August 2015

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The Army has an opioid drug problem that is not going away under current personnel policies and medical practices. The survey results recorded here indicate that senior officers attending the U.S. Army War College recognize that the opioid problem is distinct in nature and origin from those of recreational drug abuse. The majority of these future Army leaders see misuse originating out of prescribing practices, a lack of medical monitoring, and a lack of Soldier training and education on the dangers of opioids, rather than from undisciplined Soldiers.


Author: Dr Robert J Bunker

Published: August 2015

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This manuscript focuses on the present threat posed by terrorist and insurgent use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) as well as associated future threat potentials. This work presents a counterintuitive analysis in the sense that armed drones are typically viewed as a component of America’s conventional warfighting prowess—not a technology that would be used against U.S. troops deployed overseas or against civilians back home. The emerging threat of such UAV use against the United States is investigated, and the unique analysis and creative approach related to the threat scenario variants generated are very informative. Hopefully, the larger implications posed by this analysis related to semi-autonomous and autonomous UAV type robotic systems will be of benefit.


Author: Dr Steve Tatham

Published: August 2015

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The author explains how sophisticated social science research and behavioral profiling can be used to warn us of impeding issues and how that information might be used by senior strategy makers as a tool for testing and refining strategy. He makes a compelling case that the science of Target Audience Analysis (TAA) is now so well advanced that it must become a key component of future strategic decisionmaking. The author views social media as just another communication conduit, and sees this as a continuum of wrong activities being undertaken. In Iraq and Afghanistan, he saw how big public relations and marketing companies cost the U.S. taxpayer millions of dollars in ultimately failed communication and propaganda campaigns. Social media, he argues, has become yet another blank checkbook for companies who rely on creative energy rather than empirical understanding to produce communications campaigns. Instead, he argues for far greater resource in TAA and greater understanding by federal agencies of what is and is not possible or desirable in their communication efforts. To this end, he looks in particular at the U.S. Agency for International Development relief work in Pakistan and argues that the communication objectives set at the start of the projects are almost unattainable, even naive in their presumptions.


Editor: Prof John F Troxell

Author: Prof John F Troxell

Published: August 2015

The KSIL is available for online viewing here: 2015-16 KSIL

The recently published National Military Strategy emphasizes the unpredictability of the global security environment. According to General Dempsey, “global disorder has significantly increased while some of our comparative military advantage has begun to erode. We now face multiple, simultaneous security challenges…” General Odierno echoes this concern by pointing to the “increased velocity of instability,” and emboldened potential adversaries that have “magnified the risk to U.S. interests around the world.” Responding to this period of geopolitical uncertainty demands thoughtful and careful analysis of a wide array of strategic issues. The Strategic Studies Institutes’ (SSI) annual Key Strategic Issues List (KSIL) addresses this need by providing a list of high-priority topics organized to support the Army's most important strategic objectives, issues that must be addressed to ensure the Army of 2025 and beyond will continue to meet the needs of the nation. Part I of the KSIL lists the Chief of Staff of the Army’s top five topics, all five of which will be addressed as integrative research projects by the US Army War College. Part II, “Priority Research Areas,” is a compilation of critical topics developed by the Army War College and Commands and organizations throughout the Army. Part III consists of the Army Warfighting Challenges. Students and researchers are encouraged to get in touch with the topic sponsors listed in the document, tackle one of these issues, and contribute to the knowledge base needed to support the future direction of the Army.


Editor: Mister Robert C Browne

Published: July 2015

This issue of the Peace & Stability Journal features articles resulting from the 2015 Peace & Stability Operations Training and Education Workshop (PSOTEW) held at the National Defense University in Washington DC.


Editor: Mister David A Mosinski

Published: July 2015

This special edition SOLLIMS Sampler provides Lessons Learned on the following cross-cutting principles: Host Nation Ownership & Capacity; Political Primacy; Legitimacy; Unity of Effort; Security; Conflict Transformation; and, Regional Engagement.  These principles are outcome-focused; they serve as overarching themes that should guide all actions/efforts toward desired stability outcomes.


Published: July 2015

This Manual describes the United Nations (UN) Military Police Unit, focusing on Military Police support to a UN Mission and Force Headquarters. Always scalable in size, modular in function and Mission-tailored, the UN Military Police unit’s size and composition depend on the size, composition and requirements of the UN Mission it supports and the physical characteristics of the Mission area.


Author: Doctor Thomas G Matyok

Published: July 2015

In this study, Dr. Thomas Matyok dares us, as military planners and conflict analysts, to think more deeply about religion. Since religion can be a major driver of both peace and violence, Dr. Matyok argues that we need to do better at recognizing how religious factors play out in shaping human motivations and aspirations in conflict situations.


Author: Mr Robert E Atkinson, Jr

Published: July 2015

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This monograph offers a neo-classically republican perspective on a perennial problem of civilian/military relations: limitations on military officers’ obligation to obey civilian authorities. All commentators agree that military officers are generally obliged—morally, professionally, and legally—to obey civilian orders, even as they agree that this rule of obedience must admit of exceptions. Commentators tend to differ, however, on the basis and breadth of these exceptions. Following Samuel Huntington’s classic analysis in The Soldier and the State, this monograph shows that disagreement about the breadth of the exceptions tends to assume that their bases—moral, professional, and legal—are incommensurable. It suggests, to the contrary, that all defensible exceptions to the rule of military obedience, like that rule itself, derive from a single neo-classical, Huntingtonian standard, binding on civilian authorities and military officers alike: the common good. This perspective promises significantly to reduce the range of disagreement over the limits of military obedience both in theory and in practice.


Author: Mr Roman Muzalevsky

Published: July 2015

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China’s emergence as a global actor has questioned the position of the United States as the strongest power and the future of the Washington-led global order. To achieve the status of a truly global player wielding influence in all dimensions of power would require China to leverage its regional influence in Central Asia. This region is increasingly representing China’s western leg of economic expansion and development, and is of a growing strategic importance for Beijing. It is also a region that should be of greater strategic importance to Washington, which seeks to preserve its leading position in the international system and ensure China’s peaceful integration in the global political, security, and economic architecture.


Author: Ms Zhulduz Baizakova, Mr Roger N McDermott

Published: July 2015

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Central Asia has been experiencing an increase or activation of radical Islamic movements over the last decade or so. These complex processes include increasing urbanization, institutional and individual corruption, the growing gap between rich and poor, the inability of the state to provide security, corruption in the law enforcement agencies, poor functioning of the state religious bodies, inefficient power structures, limited scope for citizens to influence decisionmaking, all which result in lower trust in the authorities as well as other factors. The authoritarian regimes of Central Asia gave rise to boiling anger and discontent among their populations. For people unable to defend their rights and interests, religion might be seen as a way out of this situation. Kazakhstan, the most stable and safe country in the region, witnessed a series of alleged extremist terrorist acts since 2011. Historic roots and the identity of “Kazakh Islam,” the nature of connection and influence reaching Kazakhstan from neighboring North Caucasus and Afghanistan and how it affects radicalization of the youth, and reasons for misleading assumptions are analyzed so as to identify how Kazakhstan is viewed from the outside world. State structures and the role of the state overseeing issues regarding Islam and its practices, with attention to banned extremist groups, their specifics, and the country’s experience of political violence in 2011-12, as well as the state’s response to the acts of violence, are discussed.


Editor: Mr Gary J Schmitt

Author: Mr Gary J Schmitt

Published: July 2015

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Since World War II, a key element of America’s grand strategy has been its worldwide network of strategic allies and partners. The network has provided the United States an invaluable global presence, enhanced deterrence against adversaries and, when called upon, provided men and materiel to help fight wars. However, following the end of the Cold War, less attention has been paid to America’s allies, especially their “hard power” capabilities, despite the United States and its allies going to war more frequently than before. This volume addresses that gap, providing a holistic account of allied hard power and, in turn, the ability – and, indirectly, the willingness – of those same partners to use force independently or in concert with the United States and other allies.


Editor: Mr Roy Kamphausen, Dr David Lai

Author: Mr Roy Kamphausen, Dr David Lai

Published: July 2015

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This volume is of special relevance in light of the profound changes occurring within the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA). China’s desire to develop a military commensurate with its diverse interests is both legitimate and understandable. The challenge for U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) is to understand how China will employ this growing military capability in support of its interests. The book addresses the uncertainty surrounding the potential direction of the PLA by examining three distinct focus areas: domestic, external, and technological drivers of PLA modernization; alternative futures for the PLA; and, implications for the region, world, and U.S.-China relations. The analysis provides an insightful perspective into the factors shaping and propelling the PLA’s modernization, its potential future orientation ranging from internally focused to globally focused, and how the PLA’s choices may impact China’s relations with its neighbors and the world.


Author: Mr Keir Giles

Published: June 2015

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Russia's actions in Ukraine are not the only challenge to relations with the United States. U.S. plans for ballistic missile defense (BMD) capability in Europe have led to aggressive rhetoric from Moscow, which continues at the time of this writing even though attention in the West is focused almost exclusively on Ukraine. Russia’s strenuous opposition to the U.S. European Phased Adaptive Approach plans is based on claims that this capability is intended to compromise Russia’s nuclear deterrent capability. Most of these claims have been dismissed as groundless. Yet, all discussion of the subject highlights the U.S. current and proposed deployments, and entirely ignores Russia’s own missile interception systems, which are claimed to have comparable capability. Russia protests that U.S. missiles pose a potential threat to strategic stability, and has made belligerent threats of direct military action to prevent their deployment. But no mention at all is made of the strategic implications of Russia’s own systems, despite the fact that if the performance and capabilities claimed for them by Russian sources are accurate, they pose at least as great a threat to deterrence as do those of the United States. This monograph aims to describe Russia’s claims for its missile defense systems, and, where possible, to assess the likelihood that these claims are true. This will form a basis for considering whether discussion of Russian capabilities should be an integral part of future conversations with Russia on the deployment of U.S. and allied BMD assets.


Author: Dr Norman Cigar

Published: June 2015

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As America’s de facto co-belligerents who often share the same battlespace in the fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, the presence and activity of Iraq’s Shia warlords and their militias have an impact on U.S. interests and policies at both the strategic and operational levels. The objective of this monograph is to provide a better understanding of the Shia militia phenomenon and to highlight the factors with which U.S. policymakers and U.S. Army planners and commanders will have to deal with respect to operations in Iraq.


Author: Dr Leif Rosenberger

Published: June 2015

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This Letort Paper analyzes the new global oil market. It shows how the price of oil reflects the confluence of four interrelated factors. First, the Paper explores why the supply of oil has been soaring in the world. Second, it explains why the demand for oil has been relatively weak. Third, it discusses the role that Wall Street plays in moving the price of oil. Fourth, it examines the importance of the U.S. dollar in determining the prices of oil. As a result of these factors, oil prices are relatively low. The Paper also explains how these low oil prices produce winners and losers at home and abroad. In addition, it explores where oil prices are likely to go in 2016 without policy intervention. It also recommends ways to make oil prices less volatile.


Author: Dr R Evan Ellis

Published: June 2015

In many ways, Russia’s expanded engagement in Latin America as a response to escalating tension over the Ukraine was a repetition of its answer to U.S. involvement in the 2008 conflict in the former Soviet Republic of Georgia. In the latter conflict, the U.S. deployed naval forces to the Black Sea in response to Russian support for the breakaway republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Russia countered with a series of actions in Latin America, including sending nuclear-capable Tu-160 bombers to Venezuela, from where they conducted symbolically-charged flights around the Caribbean. A month later, a four-ship Russian naval flotilla deployed to the area to conduct military exercises with the Venezuelan navy before making port calls in Cuba and Nicaragua. In November 2008, Russian President Dmitri Medvedev traveled to Latin America to participate in the leadership summit of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas, then subsequently hosted both Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez and Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega in Moscow. Three months later, Bolivian President Evo Morales also traveled to Russia, followed in November 2009 by Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa. Very little beyond journalistic accounts have been written to examine contemporary Russian activities in Latin America and the Caribbean. As Russia’s reassertion of its global position and associated tensions with the United States proceed, a broad understanding of Russia in the Americas becomes ever more important, both as a question of U.S. national security and as an important dynamic shaping the global geopolitical environment. This monograph focuses on the character of the ongoing Russian re-engagement with Latin America and the Caribbean and its implications for the U.S.


Author: Dr M Chris Mason

Published: June 2015

The wars in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan were lost before they began, not on the battlefields, where the United States won every tactical engagement, but at the strategic level of war. In each case, the U.S. Government attempted to create a Western-style democracy in countries which were decades at least away from being nations with the sociopolitical capital necessary to sustain democracy and, most importantly, accept it as a legitimate source of governance. The expensive indigenous armies created in the image of the U.S. Army lacked both the motivation to fight for illegitimate governments in Saigon, Baghdad, and Kabul and a cause that they believed was worth dying for, while their enemies in the field clearly did not. This book examines the Afghan National Security Forces in historical and political contexts, explains why they will fail at the tactical, operational and strategic levels of war, why they cannot and will not succeed in holding the southern half of the country, and what will happen in Afghanistan year-by-year from 2015 to 2019. Finally, it examines what the critical lessons unlearned of these conflicts are for U.S. military leaders, why these fundamental political lessons seem to remain unlearned, and how the strategic mistakes of the past can be avoided in the future.


Author: LTC Michael J Colarusso, COL Andrew O Hall, COL David S Lyle, Major Michael S Walker, Mr Roy A Wallace

Published: June 2015

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Transforming the U.S. military’s personnel management system is critical to long-run American national security interests, particularly as increasingly capable peer adversaries emerge. Talent management is critical to confronting these threats, particularly in an austere fiscal environment. This transformation cannot take place in a vacuum, however. As an extensive body of labor economics literature makes clear, total compensation management is an integral part of talent management. As the military changes the way it accesses, retains, develops, and employs its people, so, too, must it change the ways in which it compensates them. However, the current compensation system, rooted in industrial-era labor management practices, has outlived its usefulness. It is not linked to defined organizational outcomes, rests upon an ineffectual evaluation system, and does little to incentivize performance. Designed to complement an “up or out” personnel system that treats people as interchangeable parts, it has been rendered obsolete by dramatic changes in the American labor market, fiscal constraints, technological advances, and the changing nature of information age work. Using the Army’s Officer Corps as a case study upon which a wider compensation model can be built, a system is proposed that integrates redesigned basic pays and pensions, “monetizes” nonpay benefits, and provides additional performance incentives in critical positions demanding organizational productivity.


Editor: Dr Larry D Miller

Author: Dr Larry D Miller

Published: June 2015

The Army War College Review, a refereed publication of student work, is produced under the purview of the Strategic Studies Institute and the United States Army War College. An electronic quarterly, The AWC Review connects student intellectual work with professionals invested in U.S. national security, Landpower, strategic leadership, global security studies, and the advancement of the profession of arms.


Author: Doctor Raymond A Millen

Published: June 2015

In this study, Professor Raymond Millen has identified a persistent challenge in U.S. efforts to provide effective security cooperation and capacity building with fragile and failing states – the realm of ministerial advising. From his research and analysis, Professor Millen concludes by recommending the establishment of a professional ministerial corps.


Published: June 2015

This manual describes the United Nations (UN) Military Logistics Unit, a unique entity that comes into existence only when peacekeeping contingencies require a military capability due to time constraints, security, logistical shortfalls, redeployment needs, budgetary constraints, difficult terrain, environment or weather. Under these conditions, the UN Military Logistics Unit offers an alternative capability to accomplish the needed tasks. For example, if the UN’s logistics system needs reinforcement, the Military Logistics Unit can be tasked to deploy its additional capacity in scalable and modular elements.


Editor: Dr John R Deni

Author: COL Gregory K Anderson, LTC Karen LT Briggman, Dr John R Deni, LTC Joseph E Hilbert, COL Gert-Jan Kooij, LTC Christopher T Lay, Dr James C McNaughton

Published: May 2015

Russian aggression in 2014 caught U.S. policy and strategy off guard, forcing reactive measures and reevaluation of the U.S. approach toward Russia. Moscow employed nonlinear methodologies and operated just beneath traditional thresholds of conflict to take full advantage of U.S. and NATO policy and process limitations. In light of this strategic problem, the U.S. Army War College (US - AWC), conducted a wargame that revealed four key considerations for future policy and strategy.


Published: May 2015

This manual describes UN Military Signals Unit operations, focusing on Military Signals support to a UN Mission and its Force Headquarters. Always scalable in size, modular in function and Mission-tailored, the UN Military Signals Unit’s size and composition depend on the size, composition and requirements of the UN Mission it supports and the physical characteristics of the Mission area.


Author: COL Gregory K Anderson, COL Karen L Briggman, COL Joseph E Hilbert, COL Gert-Jan Kooij, Lt Col Christopher T Lay, Dr James C McNaughton

Published: May 2015

With the reemergence of Russian aggression in 2014, a team of six students from the Carlisle Scholars Program (CSP) at the USAWC began a six-month project to assess the driving factors behind Russian foreign and security policy, in order to better anticipate future behavior. The CSP team created a visualization and formal paper describing what it came to term "the Russian System" and later partnered with the Center of Strategic Leadership and Development (CSLD) to conduct a strategic-level wargame on 15-16 April 2015 to test key hypotheses and expand collaborative learning. This report provides some insights into the broader project, but is more focused on the results of the wargame and how those results can inform future thinking about U.S. - Russian relations.


Author: Dr Florence Gaub

Published: May 2015

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This monograph examines the impact that the “Arab Spring” has had on how Arab states relate to each other post-regime change and post-Islamist electoral victory. It shows that the region is undergoing a profound change as some traditional regional policy actors are paralyzed by internal turmoil (such as Syria and Egypt), while others do not have a regional ambition (such as Algeria and Morocco). The region has therefore entered a Gulf moment where key decisions pertaining to the region’s future are now taken in Riyadh, Doha, and Abu Dhabi. From having once been mere bystanders of regional politics, the Gulf States have moved to become players with both the ambition and capability to shape regional dynamics. As the ripple effects of their 2014 rift show, these dynamics will have a wider Arab impact.


Author: Mr James Lacey

Published: May 2015

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This monograph presents a survey of the crucial link between state (national) power and finance from the ancient era through to the present day. Cicero once said that the true sinew of war was “endless streams of money.” His observation remains as accurate today as it was when Rome first began constructing its Empire. Unfortunately, too many historical works leave this crucial underpinning link out of their narratives. Even those that do discuss economic and financial concerns typically miss the fact that the size of a state’s economy often has little to do with its capacity to wield influence on the global stage. Much more crucial, in this regard, is the possession of an administrative system capable of efficiently mobilizing a state’s resources. It was such an administrative apparatus that allowed Britain to punch far above its weight in the international arena for centuries. As a survey, this work is far from comprehensive, but the author hopes it will provide a stepping stone for a much-needed in-depth examination of the topic.


Author: Mr Roman Muzalevsky

Published: May 2015

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The nuclear talks between Iran and P5+1 following the most stringent sanctions against Iran to date have opened new prospects for relaxation of tensions between Tehran and the West and for a U.S.-Iranian détente in the long run. The coming to power of new presidential administrations in both the United States and Iran, the additional sanctions, major geo-economic and geopolitical trends, and U.S.-Iranian economic and security cooperation imperatives all contributed to these dynamics. Some view the talks as a new beginning in U.S.-Iranian ties, which could herald the emergence of a U.S.-Iranian strategic relationship in the next 15 years. This work has developed three such possible strategic relationships: 1) strategic engagement involving a nuclear weapons-capable Iran; 2) comprehensive cooperation following a “Grand Bargain”; and, 3) incremental strategic engagement after a nuclear deal. These relationships deliberately focus on constructive engagement, skipping the status quo and a strike on Iran as two other possible outcomes. If they pull it off by 2030, a U.S.-Iranian détente would advance external integration of the region, aiding the U.S. strategy of fostering global connectivity. It would promote resolution of conflicts and development and reconstruction of countries ravaged by wars and sectarian violence. It would also enable Washington to deploy select military assets to other locales to address other challenges while repurposing remaining forces to face new threats in the Greater Middle East.


Author: Dr. David E. Johnson

Published: May 2015

Abstract: This article argues counterinsurgency wars are not analogous to the challenges presented by the Islamic State. The United States needs to accept the nature of the war it is in, and undertake a clear and comprehensive assessment of the means necessary for strategic success. Such an assessment will make apparent the need to commit US ground combat forces.


Published: April 2015

The Collins Center Update is a quarterly newsletter detailing the activities of the Center for Strategic Leadership and Development, The United States Army War College. Articles in this issue include: "Executive Leader Course", "Visionary Support to Argonne National Laboratory", "Land Component Command in a Complex World", "Support to CENTCOM: Theater Security Cooperation and the UAE", "FDIC Cyber Revelation and Cyber Security", "Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives: Flexibility of the Strategic Leaders Staff Ride Program", "SIMULEX 2014" and "NATO Futures Wargame Examines NATO Challenges."


Editor: Mister Robert C Browne

Published: April 2015

This issue of the Peace & Stability Journal features articles on the topics of Security Sector Reform, Regionally Aligned Forces, and sustainable energy in UN PKO


Published: April 2015

This first edition of the United Nations (UN) Reconnaissance Unit Manual provides field commanders and their staff a guide for planning and conducting UN Reconnaissance Unit operations in support of UN peacekeeping Missions. Field Missions and UN Headquarters planners will also benefit from a common understanding of the employment, capabilities, tasks and organization of UN Reconnaissance Units as they develop the Statement of Unit Requirement (SUR) that is the basis for generating and deploying UN military units.


Author: Dr Richard Weitz

Published: April 2015

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China and Russia have engaged in an increasing number of joint exercises in recent years. These drills aim to help them deter and, if necessary, defeat potential threats, such as Islamist terrorists trying to destabilize a Central Asian government, while at the same time reassuring their allies that Russia and China would protect them from such challenges. Furthermore, the exercises and other joint Russia-China military activities have a mutual reassurance function, informing Moscow and Beijing about the other’s military potential and building mutual confidence about their friendly intentions toward one another. Finally, the joint exercises try to communicate to third parties, especially the United States, that Russia and China have a genuine security partnership and that it extends to cover Central Asia, a region of high priority concern for Moscow and Beijing, and possibly other areas, such as northeast Asia. Although the Sino-Russian partnership is limited in key respects, the United States should continue to monitor their defense relationship since it has the potential to become a more significant international security development.


Author: Mr Jeffrey L Caton

Published: April 2015

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With growing international awareness of energy security challenges, the promise of space-based solar power for clean and unlimited energy for all humankind is certainly appealing. While significant progress continues in the enabling technologies of such systems, is there compelling evidence that space-based solar power systems will provide the best energy solution? How does the Army’s current approach to incorporating a diverse portfolio of renewable energy sources in distributed locations compare to the potential of enterprise ventures that beam energy from solar collectors in space? For over 4 decades, many credible organizations in government and industry have explored the concept of space-based solar power, but their serious studies often conclude that such systems remain on the future horizon, usually at least 10 years away from practical application. While space-based solar power systems may be technically feasible, the author believes there is no compelling evidence that such systems will be economically or operationally competitive with terrestrial power generation systems in use or in development. However, he does find that there may be some utility in the limited application of space-based solar power to enable operations in remote and forward operating locations.


Author: Dr Mary Manjikian

Published: April 2015

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An analysis of weapons-based confidence-building measures shows how academics can work together to self-police their research for national security implications, socialize new members of the academic community into the importance of considering security issues, and develop and disseminate norms regarding what is and is not a moral and ethical use of these technologies. It may be possible for academics and policymakers to come together to work for a ban or build-down on cyber weapons patterned on international efforts to ban chemical and biological weapons and implement export regimes to control the export of code which may form the components of cyber weapons. If we conceptualize cyberspace as territory, we can also learn from the example of territorially-based confidence-building measures such as those implemented along the Indo-Pakistan border. This approach stresses the importance of developing notification procedures to prevent misperceptions and the escalation spiral, as well as communicating regularly to establish trust between all parties. The case studies presented here illustrate the promises and pitfalls of each approach and offer valuable warnings to policymakers seeking to implement such measures in cyberspace. They show what happens when not everyone in a regime is equally committed to a specific outcome by illustrating the difficulties of monitoring compliance in confidence-building regimes, and show the ways in which doctrines and confidence-building measures may not be perfectly aligned.


Author: Dr Colin S Gray

Published: April 2015

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To define future threat is, in a sense, an impossible task, yet it is one that must be done. The only sources of empirical evidence accessible are the past and the present; one cannot obtain understanding about the future from the future. The author draws upon the understanding of strategic history obtainable from Thucydides’ great History of the Peloponnesian War. He advises prudence as the operating light for American definition of future threat, and believes that there are historical parallels between the time of Thucydides and our own that can help us avoid much peril. The future must always be unpredictable to us in any detail, but the many and potent continuities in history’s great stream of time can serve to alert us to what may well happen in kind.