Army War College Publication Repository      Total Publications 603


Author: Colonel D. W. Simons

Published: June 2018

The ex-ante evaluation of German Field Marshal Albert Kesselring’s strategic leadership competencies after the 1942 Allied TORCH landings in Africa depicts the impact of his skills on the successful denial of a swift Allied victory in the Mediterranean theater. The evaluation further illustrates that Kesselring’s failing comprehensiveness of competencies influenced the Axis powers’ ability to regain unity of effort and strategic initiative. Kesselring’s ability to apply his technical leadership competencies enabled a swift response to the crisis and the creation of integrated and synchronized supporting systems. Both aspects allowed the Axis powers to halt the Allied offensive and shaped the conditions for delaying future Allied operations in the Mediterranean. Kesselring’s failing conceptual and interpersonal leadership competencies prevented him to obtain an Axis powers’ unity of effort and to develop a strategic focus. This evaluation of Kesselring’s strategic leadership competencies provides valuable insights for strategic leaders in the necessity of a comprehensive application of the whole scheme of and the human factor within strategic leadership competencies.


Author: Colonel Richard G. Malish

Published: June 2018

When the Washington Post revealed unacceptable living quarters and frustrating administrative process at the Walter Reed Army Medical Center in 2007, the public reacted to support the hospital’s war-wounded patients. The public’s outrage changed Army medicine forever. In seeking to understand these events, this paper posits that outcomes at Walter Reed were connected to a broader evolution of the relationship between the modern All-Volunteer Force (AVF), the government, and the public. Specifically: 1) the public attributes heroic and altruistic characteristics to the AVF, 2) the public perceives the government establishment as a self-serving bureaucracy –resulting in a widened perception gap between it and the AVF, 3) the public demands that the establishment support the AVF, and finally, 4) the public will support upward mobility for the AVF to such a degree that its future use, by the government, will be constrained.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Christopher G. Libertini

Published: June 2018

The United States Army has a deep and enduring admiration for the nineteenth-century Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz. His philosophical approach to war, with its acknowledgement that wars are acts of force used to compel an enemy to do one’s will, has served it well in such major conflicts as the Civil War and World War II. However, since 1945 the United States has made an evident shift away from applying Clausewitzian theory in its numerous post-World War II military operations. The increasing use of drone aircraft to conduct limited strikes against the nation’s adversaries is but the latest manifestation of this trend. The result has been a series of inconclusive or even failed campaigns despite the fact that the U.S. military has enjoyed unrivaled overmatch against every adversary it has fought during this period. To solve this conundrum, the U.S. Army must make fundamental changes to its doctrine, training, and force structure based on a reapplication of Clausewitzian principles. With the reemergence of peer-nation rivals possessing capabilities to challenge U.S. military dominance, these reforms are urgent. Clausewitz, not drones, offers the U.S. Army the more reliable way to approach the uncertain threats of the twenty-first century and beyond.


Author: Colonel Gina E. Adam

Published: June 2018

This paper first addresses the current environmental state of the Arctic, particularly the issue of sea ice extent and global warming. It then reviews the opportunities that the Arctic opening provides and the related economic implications. The paper explores U.S. strategy and expectations regarding the Arctic region, and evaluates DOD and other agency strategies for the region. The paper assesses the key actors in the emerging economic opportunities; with emphasis placed on near-peer (i.e., Russia and China) activities in the Arctic. Their stated strategies are of particular interest and where possible, the status of their equipment and infrastructure will be assessed. The paper then reports the state of U.S. preparedness for Arctic activities, addressing four key capabilities and associated infrastructure. Finally, the paper explores the international response to an opening Arctic and assesses whether this situation will become one of competition or cooperation.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Leo J. Wyszynski

Published: June 2018

In the current operating environment, applying the abstract concept of mission command to attain operational and strategic objectives proves a difficult challenge. In this chaotic environment, military leaders must work at multiple levels of war to identify the times, places, and methods to apply resources to create desired outcomes. The characterization of the contemporary environment as a complex adaptive system (CAS) allows a way forward to help commanders and staffs. The study of complexity offers useful insights to improve existing Joint and Army doctrinal problem-solving processes. A survey of this field suggests five recommendations to augment current procedures that can minimize risk and increase chances for success. Testing them in the context of the case studies of Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Just Cause indicates that there is value in applying them to achieve goals in the immediate aftermath of conflict. Because they can be useful in these highly unstable systems, which can be said to be “on the edge of chaos,” the possibility exists of broader applications where similar conditions apply. Consequently, military leaders should consider augmenting doctrine with these five recommendations to help identity interventions and the “windows of opportunity” to apply them for better prospects for victory.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Michael J. Winter

Published: June 2018

Modern trends in artificial intelligence (AI) indicate a rapidly approaching intellectual revolution, which implies AI will one day extend human cognition and augment human strategy decision-making. Strategic leaders must now contemplate the future of strategy decision-making through three paradigms—human-only, human-machine, and machine-only. The U.S. can obtain a competitive advantage in strategic-level cognitive power—and thus judgement superiority—by leveraging the human-machine paradigm to generate “iStrategies” to complement existing Department of Defense offset proposals. A Department of Defense strategy on AI is required to not only address challenges to the AI-enabled paradigms, but to also meet current national-level guidance and intent on AI.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Anne-Marie R. Wiersgalla

Published: June 2018

Cyberspace is a hyper-integrated borderless domain upon which the United States relies on for everything from providing the basic elements of life to its citizens to ensuring free trade and global commerce. The United States should develop a comprehensive whole of government cyberspace policy not only to elevate cyber power to a recognized instrument of national power, but also to establish a national-level cyber organization to develop and apply a cogent, synchronized cyber strategy to take the lead in safeguarding the cyber commons. This comprehensive approach is necessary in order to align and synchronize government efforts and to secure American interests at home and abroad. In the 21st century national and international stability rely on a safe and secure cyber commons. The United States and other nations require freedom of navigation within the cyber domain in order to maintain stability and to project power to secure national interests and maintain national and international order.


Author: Mr. Matthew D. Way

Published: June 2018

In the strategic environment of the 21st Century, the United States (U.S.) must plan and prepare for potential major conflict against a near peer adversary. Simultaneously, the U.S. must calculate its ability to confront a near peer adversary while also supporting limited conflicts against violent extremist organizations across the globe and defending the homeland. In today’s complex strategic environment, it is imperative to acknowledge that the All-Volunteer Force (AVF) faces significant challenges that represent a foundational strategic risk in the nation’s ability to provide sufficient combat manpower in a protracted major regional conflict. This research analyzes the vulnerabilities in the All-Volunteer Force’s ability to support a protracted near-peer adversary conflict and requirements to expand the force through examination of its inherent characteristics in capacity, affordability, and societal influences. These factors will likely contribute to debate on implementation of the draft forcing the AVF to carry the burden of major conflict to the maximum extent possible, increasing strategic manpower risks. This examination also provides recommendations on actions to consider maximizing the ability of the AVF to support a successful surge toward sustaining mobilization for a protracted major regional conflict until a functional draft is in


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Michael O. Walters

Published: June 2018

The USAF needs to implement fundamental and systematic changes to how it builds, teaches, leads and develops its professional officer corps – starting with Company Grade Officers (CGOs). There needs to be a clear delineation between force management (institutional bureaucracy) and talent development (“commander business” – leading), and an understanding of who is responsible and accountable for these functions. By creating talent management programs focused on junior officers that include professional development, broadening, and mentoring, the USAF will improve its quality and quantity of officers. The same programs will also ensure these officers are more inculcated in the USAF mission, culture, and the profession of arms. This paper addresses the problems of talent management and retention from the perspective of deliberate officer professional development. It also explores why this is such a critical issue for senior leaders as stewards of the profession, and the challenges associated with implementing innovative ways to manage and grow the force’s talented officer corps. Most importantly, it will provide a pragmatic framework for USAF leaders to implement.


Author: Colonel Thomas J. Verell

Published: June 2018

This SRP will examine how the Government of Japan (GOJ) has historically made choices in favor of decreased U.S.–Japan Alliance operational capabilities and readiness for short term political gains that cater to sensitivities in communities hosting facilities and areas, which leads to a decrease in optimal effectiveness. This trend occurs primarily in GOJ-provided facilities and areas and the current realignment initiatives in Japan. It will highlight examples of the GOJ negotiating agreements to appease local communities and support local elections to the detriment of U.S.–Japan Alliance operational capability. The support of local Japanese communities is vital to maintaining a U.S. presence in Japan, which creates tension between operational capability and the U. S.’s strategic access to the region. To mitigate this, the U. S. should conduct a capabilities analysis to identify U.S.-Japan Alliance mission-critical requirements and share these with the GOJ. Shared understanding of the mission critical capabilities will strengthen the U.S.-Japan Alliance and enable the Alliance to maintain strategic access along with the required operational capabilities, force posture, and readiness.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel J. P. Velesky

Published: June 2018

Future Vertical Lift (FVL) platforms will not only look and operate differently from today’s Army Aviation fleet, they will also fundamentally change its operational methodology. To effectively leverage these Joint, future systems, the Army will need a more holistic approach to how it trains and organizes its maintainers, and how it conducts maintenance. To prepare for the arrival of FVL, Army Aviation must proceed incrementally and implement new maintenance practices that can be tested, modified, and practiced on today’s Mission Design Series (MDS) aircraft. Only by doing so, will Army Aviation be ready to field and sustain FVL upon its arrival. Using elements of a DOTMLPF-P framework, this paper explores maintenance concepts that will enable Army Aviation to sustain FVL. It also makes recommendations about how to implement these concepts, in support of FVL’s fielding and operation in a future environment.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Siegfried Ullrich

Published: June 2018

Military use of directed-energy technology has moved beyond the realm of science fiction. In the past two decades, directed-energy technologies have quickly matured from the research laboratory, to the operational force and have become highly effective instruments of war. Directed-energy technologies currently enable and enhance a multitude of weapons platforms. Furthermore, recent developments in directed-energy technology show immense potential for future military systems. The past two decades have also seen a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), driven by an influx of additional new technologies on the battlefield. Currently, there is a debate over which of these new technologies will become the most significant. The following analysis determines that directed-energy will soon be the most consequential and transformative technology of the present RMA.


Author: Colonel Mark L. Tromblee

Published: June 2018

Regardless of their assignment following graduation from Senior Service College, graduates will undoubtedly be called upon to provide strategic advice. As we build competencies toward this end, the use of models and tools prove useful to develop a framework for the development and communication of strategic advice. This paper examines the skills, attributes and background that made Lieutenant General Russel Honore an effective joint task force commander and strategic advisor during a time of domestic national crisis; Hurricane Katrina. This will consider the internal and external factors that affected his cognition and decision-making. Elements of Operational Design along with Steven Corman’s Pragmatic Complexity Model of Strategic Communication are applied to this distinct period of time to evaluate how LTG Honore was a highly acclaimed and effective strategic advisor and communicator during Hurricane Katrina.


Author: Ms. Elizabeth G. Troeder

Published: June 2018

Gray zone warfare, also known as irregular warfare, political warfare, hybrid warfare, asymmetric warfare, and unconventional warfare, is increasingly the norm. Yet the United States is losing this war as will be demonstrated in this Strategy Research Project. The Department of Defense (DOD) has historically led the gray zone war fight with assistance from other federal agencies. But DOD cannot require other agencies to engage; it cannot be aware of all effective tools available across the whole-of-government; nor can it know how its proposed way forward may conflict with approaches made by other agencies. This paper builds the case for requiring U.S. federal agencies to request that the Deputy National Security Advisor convene a National Security Council Deputies Committee meeting whenever any federal agency deems a gray zone approach to an international issue is appropriate. It also recommends development of a standing National Security Council Policy Coordination Committee (NSC/PCC) for Gray Zone Solutions, with sub-NSC/PCCs for each component of the 4+1 so that experts can be quickly assembled in times of crisis. This will assure the President of the United States, Congress, and the American people that all elements of power have duly been employed and are synchronized.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Frederick J. Toti

Published: June 2018

While ballistic missile and nuclear weapons tests are nothing new for North Korea, the frequency of such tests and the aggressiveness of Kim Jong Un’s threats have reached an all-time high. North Korea’s belligerent and provocative behavior towards the United States over the last several years has strained U.S.-China relations. War on the Korean Peninsula would be disastrous and cause instability of epic proportions. The refugee and civil security crises immediately following large-scale conflict would be particularly wicked problems to solve. Such an incredibly unstable environment on the Korean Peninsula would be vulnerable to misunderstanding, miscalculations, misperceptions, and errors in judgment between the United States and China. This could inadvertently spark hostilities or conflict between these two great powers. A post-conflict Korean Peninsula is no place for discovery learning with the Chinese. In order to mitigate such risk, the U.S. Army needs to build trust with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) now to enable cooperation and prevent hostilities with China in a post-conflict Korean Peninsula.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Philip Tennant

Published: June 2018

Current and future veterans will require health care. The Veterans Administration (VA) healthcare system with its problems of wait time, staffing, and budget, requires radical changes to improve the services that the VA provides more cost effectively. The VA has grown to be the second largest employer in federal agency. In 2018 its total budget was $177.5 billion, $69.8 billion covered medical salaries, medical programs, and research. The maintenance budget of VA medical facilities in 2018 equated to $12.6 billion. The VA support two major age demographics, from Vietnam era and the Gulf War era, this presents different demands on a system that is experiencing problems in providing timely care. Understanding the veteran care models of different nations demonstrates others have made the transition from a sole medical care system for the veterans to one that services the community and veterans. By expanding the current VA program of the Veterans Access, Choice, and Accountability Act of 2014, allowing the veteran to use the private healthcare system, will facilitate the closure of the existing VA Hospitals providing for an overall budget savings for the VA.


Author: Colonel Neil Tator

Published: June 2018

Defense budgets are a constant area of scrutiny and debate, as U.S. national security challenges continue to evolve. Military leaders must be innovative and open to finding new ways to manage and operate effectively. Partnerships with local communities provide a way to enhance the relationship between the military and the American people, achieve fiscal efficiencies, and improve Army readiness. Alignment of installation stakeholders and their resources must be achieved to effectively expand on partnership opportunities. This paper applies the Labowitz and Rosansky alignment framework to expand public-private partnerships for Army installation management. It chronicles how installation partnerships have been a fabric of our American history. It outlines current and future partnerships and addresses barriers that must be considered for effective implementation. And it will challenge strategic leaders to think critically about the concept of alignment and its potential to expand partnership opportunities to help lead the Army into the future.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Donald Stewart

Published: June 2018

Since 2001, the Army Reserve has deployed more than 310,000 Soldiers in support of the War on Terror. These deployments have changed the focus of the Army Reserve from a strategic reserve to an operational force. This shift, encapsulated in the Army Total Force Concept, necessitates a greater reliance on the reserve component to meet worldwide operational needs. The Army, as a Total Force, must be ready to mobilize and deploy on short timelines in an austere, decisive action environment against a near-pear competitor. The current training model does not allow RC units the frequency, consistency, and ultimately, the quality, to reach readiness levels commiserate with their AC counterparts. The Army must change the methods and frequency of training if it expects RC forces to be adequately trained to meet a compressed timeline.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Jonathan A. Shine

Published: June 2018

This paper examines the Trump administration’s policy towards India. Given the administration’s repeated assertion that the long-term interests of the two states are aligned, the analysis identifies the major trends that drive the two countries together in the areas of Geopolitics, Security, Culture, and Economics. It then surveys how Indo-U.S. relations have progressed since the Bush administration’s breakthrough agreement in 2008. From there, the examination identifies how the Trump administration policies help to further the positive aspects of these trends. It concludes with an assessment of several “spoilers” that have the greatest potential to derail the deepening of the strategic partnership, as has so often occurred since the founding of the Indian state.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Paul E. Sheets

Published: June 2018

The North American Arctic is a vital region for the United States (U.S.) and the Air Force. Decreasing polar ice has allowed for increased maritime access to the Arctic. Additionally, it has brought a renewed focus by American allies and potential adversaries on the Arctic’s strategic importance. The U.S. national and military strategies are designed for a primarily maritime Arctic region but are under-resourced and reveal many gaps in capabilities regarding security in the Arctic. The U.S. Air Force has the assets and mission experience to provide a joint solution to close three gaps: domain awareness, communications, and rapid response. This paper will examine the Arctic environment and strategic actors with interests in the region, then review current U.S. national and Department of Defense (DoD) strategies for the Arctic to identify the ends, ways, means and risks for each. It concludes with an analysis of existing Air Force Arctic capabilities and a potential framework for an Air Force strategy to adapt to regional changes, support U.S. partner agencies, and secure the Arctic air and space domains.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel David M. Rozelle

Published: June 2018

The Army’s Brigade Combat Team (BCT) is the foundation of force projection and is a strategic asset vital to stability in Asia and Europe. Despite the intransigence to negotiate and provocative pursuit of strategic nuclear weapons by North Korea, during the same period (2003 to 2012), the United States (U.S.) military was under political pressure to draw-down its forces and was faced with dramatically reduced funding under sequestration in 2013. Despite the growing threat, the U.S. forces on Korean peninsula began to shrink as a permanently stationed BCT initially withdrew in 2003, and then 12 years later replaced the forward stationed U.S. Armor BCT in South Korea with a rotational BCT in 2015. The Department of Defense (DoD) must maintain credible force presence and related force projection capabilities to provide “assurance” to allies in East Asia. This paper focuses on a review of the Army’s ability to respond to the complex threat in North Korea, the historical identity of forward stationed units and the unique culture that is interwoven within South Korea’s communities, and provides options for adjusting or reversing current strategy.


Author: Mr. Matthew A. Rose

Published: June 2018

Technological advances in war continue, making once cutting-edge capabilities obsolete. The spy remains an outlier. Historical accounts show the utility of spy networks to military commanders. These accounts also reveal the innate tensions with commanding military spies. The military’s management of strategic Human Intelligence (HUMINT) elements is a vexing issue. To understand the issue, exploring the tensions between the profession of arms and HUMINT is fundamental. From this basic tension of professions, other sub-tensions derive. Sub-tensions in command, authority, levels, and risk tolerance are observable in historical and recent instances. Friction within the tensions routinely reduces the effectiveness of military and intelligence elements. Past great-power conflict accounts highlight the friction points U.S. military elements experienced. Looking forward there are three areas where friction reduction is required. Research into the differences between the professional of arms and HUMINT and other tensions is lacking. Next, strategic HUMINT elements and operations within the Department of Defense is an area lacking in clear definitions. Not defining this area is fraught with risk if inaction continues. Finally, the processes used to develop strategic HUMINT elements should be reconsidered.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Andrew L. Roddan

Published: June 2018

Europe today is challenging the Westphalian system with a supra-state shifting policy-making from sovereign capitals to the European Union (EU). The final step of this evolution is the EU’s alignment of military capacity, policy, and development under the Common Security and Defense Program (CSDP). The U.S. must determine how to interact with a supra-state organization it is not a member of, but cannot ignore to maximize combined strength. While the U.S. has traditionally managed its European security relationships through NATO or bilaterally with sovereign states, it is time to engage with the EU as a security organization. The U.S. must state unequivocal support for the EU’s security aspirations, recognizing the gain in global security, and then establish a military coordination element within the EU Military Staff to synchronize actions with the EU and help build capacity beyond NATO. Additionally, the U.S., NATO, and the EU must define roles for each actor where they possess a competitive advantage to drive requirements-based acquisitions and avoid duplication of capability at a time when U.S. and European resources are constrained.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Brain R. Rauen

Published: June 2018

Today’s officers will address tomorrow’s emerging threats and challenges, but the Army is using yesterday’s structure, processes, and strategies to assess and develop them. Assessment and development of leaders can be greatly improved by considering the interaction of knowledge, skill, and aptitudes; formal structure and processes; and strategy. The Army’s human capital is inherently sub-optimized because strategies adapt faster than the formal structure which results in selection of officers who are not a strong fit for the new strategies while inadvertently selecting against those who would be a good fit. Developing leaders means updating systems and leveraging a strategy to ensure a strategic fit for those officers with the KSAs most important to the Army. The Army can preserve the potential of its human capital by expanding promotion pathways, increasing the diversity of its force, and improving senior leader engagement with subordinates.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Dylan T. Randazzo

Published: June 2018

The U.S. military must evolve beyond Open Source Intelligence’s passive collection of publicly available information and Human Intelligence’s reliance on limited interaction with small numbers of sources by embracing new opportunities afforded by crowdsourcing tools and methods. Crowdsourcing can augment and enhance intelligence collection methods by engaging larger swaths of people that have placement and access to information of intelligence value than permitted by traditional collection practices. Crowdsourced Intelligence (CSI) using common information and communications technology such as cellular telephones and the internet can overcome collection limitations related to lack of placement and access and risks associated with face-to-face interaction between the U.S. military and those abroad. This paper examines two case studies, one involving Ushahidi software and one explaining Pulse technology and methodology, to illustrate how crowdsourcing improved situational awareness and answered information requirements that enabled operations. Lastly, the author provides recommendations for advancing CSI within the U.S. military and explains how crowdsourcing can be applied to other national security problems.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel David Pidone

Published: June 2018

The Army Sustainable Readiness Model (SRM) is the solution for the Army Total Force to prepare itself for tomorrow's decisive action fight. The Army National Guard (ARNG) serves as the operational reserve to the combatant commanders and the Joint Force under SRM, but only has approximately 25% of the training time in comparison to the Active component to achieve SRM Objective T-level readiness standards. In order to make sustainable readiness sustainable for the ARNG, the Army must re-align SRM implementation (ways) to objectives (ends) to accommodate the component's part-time training calendar. This includes: 1) modifying annual ARNG readiness training to accommodate a focused-path SRM implementation approach; and 2) modifying ARNG SRM Objective T-level evaluation criteria to emphasize core METL tasks. These changes will provide the training focus and synergy necessary to enable ARNG units to maximize limited training time per year, and to build readiness through the five-year ARNG SRM progressive readiness cycle toward full operational capability in the mission year.


Author: Colonel Charles H. 0'Neal

Published: June 2018

An amplification of Army values - establishing leadership virtues in leader development at all levels - is the most effective and impactful "futures" strategy for the Army in 2035. The Army and Department of Defense have openly embraced ambiguity as the most defining feature of the future world stage, as described in our new operating concept (Win in a Complex World) and leadership theory (Mission Command). What are the most reliable and enabling tools we can give tomorrow's leaders for success? This paper argues that it is virtue – humility, courage, justice, prudence, magnanimity, and temperance - that will provide the best outcomes in ambiguous situations and enable senior leaders to make appropriate decisions. We can make best guesses about technologies that target overmatch, but we must also shape the thinking and mindsets of the people who will be leading the nation’s response to the world's chaos 20 years from now.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Matthew Olson

Published: June 2018

This paper addresses NATO’s requirement to deter Russian aggression in the Baltic states while reassuring alliance partners. It uses Russia’s Post-Cold War strategic documents and the chronology of Russia’s post-Cold War turn away from the West to promote a more comprehensive understanding of the evolution of Russia’s worldview and strategy. Such an understanding can then be helpful in shaping NATO’s deterrence strategy against Russia in regard to the Baltics. It surveys the evolution of Russia’s increasing antipathy toward the West. It finds that addressing the vulnerability of the Baltic States to Russian aggression presents risks of escalation. More important, without a clear picture of Russian views and intentions, the extent of escalation is compounded. Thus, deterrence in the Baltics must achieve a balance between presenting a credible commitment to the Article 5 requirements to defend the Baltic states while not escalating tensions in a manner that reinforces a security dilemma.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Mike E. Ogden

Published: June 2018

By examining the contemporary and future threats to U.S. national security, this paper recommends the creation of an organization to augment the National Security Council composed of military officers and personnel from interagency departments to facilitate the planning and execution of a national grand strategy. The structural mismatch between the current national security system structure and the demands imposed by an ever-increasing complex security environment requires an organizational change in order to regain the capacity and capability to develop a grand strategic vision for the 21st Century. Revisiting General Wallace Greene’s proposal for a permanently established organization will assist to alleviate an inconsistent approach to strategy development. This paper examines the demands great power competition places on U.S. national strategy, the challenges within the current system which prevents grand strategy formulation, a historical review to achieving grand strategy under the Eisenhower administration, and challenges to implementing a new organization within the national security system.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Ryan P. O’Connor

Published: June 2018

The Army has renewed its focus on its professional military education (PME) system to better address what the current and evolving environments demand of graduates of PME programs, and therefore what to teach. The Army has taken valuable and necessary steps to revitalize its PME system, but now it is time for the Army to turn its attention to the remaining key element: the faculty. The Army must reevaluate who is best qualified to teach its officers, especially in the early phases of their careers. It must then make the necessary changes to properly identify, select, assign, and reward the best possible instructors. This paper examines the Army’s PME improvement efforts to date and offers recommendations to the senior leaders on the next steps to accomplish one of the Army’s stated strategic priorities and better prepare its officers for the future they face, right from the beginning of their careers.


Author: Commander Sean J. O’Brien

Published: June 2018

Is the Homeland Security Enterprise (HSE) well postured to protect the National Capital Region (NCR) from a criminal or hostile Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) attack? Currently, the answer is no. Malicious use of UAS technology represents the emergence of a clear and present danger in a complex landscape containing numerous jurisdictions, interagency partners and national defense. Countering UAS to protect the NCR must be a whole-of-government approach mobilized for collective action by a shared sense of interests where each stakeholder reliably contributes in their appropriate role. Complexity and ambiguity pervade the institutional seams that connect homeland defense, homeland security, and law enforcement authorities. Furthermore, there is a lack of policy and cohesive strategy to counter UAS in the NCR. This paper’s method is to employ the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework, developed by Nobel Laureate Elinor Ostrom, to the collective action problem of countering UAS and finds existing institutions lacking. The findings recommend HSE stakeholders employ this institutional analysis as a starting point towards creating suitable policy and strategy.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Dexter C. Nunnally

Published: June 2018

USCYBERCOM’s elevation to a Functional Combatant Command (COCOM), pending nomination and confirmation of a Commanding General, places operational command of cyberspace operations under a COCOM with service component support. However, the nature of the threat and adversaries’ advancing cyber capabilities may dictate a revolution in military affairs (RMA) for the DOD when it comes to cyberspace operations and the potential establishment of a cyber service. This monograph examines the efficacy of a separate cyber service using Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities, and Policy (DOTMLPF-P) spheres to assess the Department of Defense’s current cyberspace efforts. Based on this analysis, the DOD’s efforts to date appear sufficient to conduct cyberspace operations and a separate cyber service is not required.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Joel D. Newsom

Published: June 2018

The Army has taken great strides to address the negative impacts that 16 years of sustained conflict and high operational tempo have inflicted upon its soldiers and their physical, psychological, social, spiritual and family needs. Maintaining the stamina and endurance to make sound decisions under these conditions necessitates great resilience to buffer the stressors that inevitably result from the pressures faced by senior leaders. Under the umbrellas of the Ready and Resilient Campaign and Senior Leader Sustainment Program, the Army has invested significant resources into strengthening the resiliency of its soldiers and families. However, these programs do not adequately address the unique needs of the Army’s senior leaders. This paper will examine the environment in which strategic leaders are compelled to operate, discuss the desired attributes required of them, analyze the components of the resilience framework most applicable to senior leaders, and identify the strengths and limitations of the current resilience programs given the VUCA environment.


Author: Commander Erik R. Naley

Published: June 2018

After sixteen years of war and a decline in US tools of soft power, the US has to think more creatively about how it uses its resources. Department of Defense leadership has challenged military planners to be proactive in countering competition short of armed conflict. This includes actions to attract allies and partners through soft power, in order to effectively counter America’s threats. One way for the DoD to support soft power is through logistics. This is an opportunity that has been largely missed. By developing military logisticians to consider strategic effects through professional military education, improved talent management, Training with Interagency opportunities, allowing for logistics experimentation funding at the Combatant Commands and the development of a Logistics Strategic Appraisal Tool, logisticians should be able to better develop logistics operations with strategic effects. These steps offer a way to develop and apply logistics as an aspect of American soft power. This effort, when combined with hard power, will lead toward more comprehensive and effective approaches or the use of smart power.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Jeremy S. Mushtare

Published: June 2018

The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is on the verge of having its physical “caliphate” in Iraq and Syria destroyed. However, ISIS’s online activities will likely allow it to persist as a dangerous threat––a virtual caliphate. This paper analyzes U.S. government technical and psychological activities in cyberspace to target ISIS extremists and reduce online radicalization that provides recruits, supporters, and inspires homegrown violent extremists. The U.S. tends to focus on the technical activities, while its psychological activities are largely split between State Department public diplomacy and Department of Defense military information support operations (MISO). Current activities are misaligned between those two departments are misaligned. Also, the Defense Department is overly restrictive in its adherence to the Smith-Mundt Act, lacks organic capabilities to conduct non-attributed messaging, and is overly reliant on contractors for current capabilities. This paper ends by positing prescriptive actions for better synergy and effectiveness against the virtual caliphate.


Author: Chaplain (Lieutenant Colonel) Kurt A. Mueller

Published: June 2018

Religious and cultural factors have been routinely ignored in the development and execution of United States foreign policy, creating diplomats, politicians, and military leaders who are uncomfortable with engaging in religious dialog or with religious leaders. Joint doctrine now reflects the expectation for military chaplains to perform Religious Leader Engagement, external Religious Advisement, and expanded strategic Religious Support to geographic combatant commands. The demand for religious engagement around the world continues to grow, driven by globalization and the communications revolution connecting people instantaneously and transnationally. Without a deliberate effort to engage United States military chaplains in Religious Leader Engagement and Religious Advising at the strategic level, future combatant commanders will be fighting through all phases of operations at a disadvantage. An immediate positive impact can be made by leveraging existing National Guard capacity, to effectively export military chaplain professionalism to allies and partners globally through the State Partnership Program.


Author: Colonel Scott Mower

Published: June 2018

Global climate change is expected to worsen the medical threat landscape both domestically and abroad. The Army’s Preventive Medicine community will play a crucial role in countering those global climate change-linked threats that imperil health within the garrison and contingency operating environments. Unfortunately, organizational, training, resourcing, and posturing shortcomings could undermine the Preventive Medicine community’s abilities to provide essential preventive medicine services to beneficiaries, perform core force health protection functions, and support severe weather event-triggered Defense Support to Civil Authority or Foreign Humanitarian Assistance missions. This research paper evaluates the Preventive Medicine community’s preparedness to address five emerging global climate change-related challenges and offers recommendations to overcome identified shortcomings. The five challenges evaluated relate to preventive medicine workforce staffing processes, vector-borne disease prevention readiness, post-hurricane support postures, medical research mindsets, and medical intelligence production. The time to confront these global climate change challenges is now before public health calamities befall the Total Army family and mission success is jeopardized.


Author: Colonel Oren H. McKnelly

Published: June 2018

Great empires throughout the annals of history rose and fell, in large part, based on their ability to successfully employ the instruments of national power in a unified expression of will. The persistence of the Byzantine Empire over 1100 years serves as a testament to this fundamental proposition. The empire’s Macedonian Dynasty demonstrated the greatest skill in this particular endeavor. During this time, a colorful and talented collection of emperors, military leaders, administrators and diplomats crafted and executed policies that revitalized a flagging empire beset by external threats such as the Bulgars, Rus, and Arabs and internally fractured by court intrigues, iconoclasm, and the economic desires of a land holding elite. The skillful and integrated exercise of diplomatic, informational, military, and economic means resulted in the rapid expansion of the empire east and west, secure borders, robust international engagement, and influence over both friend and foe. As the United States charts its own course in a complex world, the study of the Macedonian Dynasty’s use of national power can be instructive.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Rian G. McKinstry

Published: June 2018

Fear, honor and interest are the strongest motives for a nation to go to war. For New Zealand the maintenance of international peace and security is the key motivation that influences decisions around defense and security. Analyzing New Zealand’s security environment through its geopolitical considerations and security challenges reveals that New Zealand does not maintain a comprehensive unilateral defense capability, and, instead, chooses niche capabilities and relies on its partners and friends for its defense guarantee. New Zealand relies on a rules-based international order and employs niche defense capabilities in conflict zones that support the advancement of the national interest. As New Zealand’s strategists think about the future operating environment, future force structure, and force design, a full understanding of New Zealand’s geopolitical position and strategic challenges leads to six key theoretical principles, which should shape their thinking around needs-based and niche-based employment of the force.


Author: Ms. Deborah M. McGarth

Published: June 2018

Diversity of thought and perspective is paramount in finding smart solutions to tough real-world problems. Research shows positive effects of a diverse workforce to include optimized decision-making, innovation, agility and organizational morale. This kind of problem solving is critical to addressing the nation’s security issues. Women hold 46% of positions in the USG workforce, yet women hold only 14-38% of positions across the defense-intelligence-diplomacy-development continuum of national security. Women hold only 15-28% of leadership positions. Elements of the USG, including the former White House, Director of National Intelligence, and Congress, recognize that the national security apparatus must reflect the nation it serves, and call for immediate attention to the problem. The lack of women in national security stems from social attitudes and ideals of meritocracy, aggravated by unconscious bias and tokenism. Traditional affirmative action programs trigger animosity in the workplace and are not effective in changing cultural attitudes. This study asserts that to correct this problem, leaders in national security must lead by example in mentoring, empowering an innovative and collaborative workplace, and championing diversity.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Tyrell O. Mayfield

Published: June 2018

Stability in the Asia-Pacific will define American security interests for the foreseeable future. Increased cooperation between the United States and regional actors such as Japan and Australia have again raised questions about the status of America’s relationship with India and the potential for a bilateral or quadrilateral alliance. American regional policy in South Asia has long been reactive and shortsighted. The United States must pursue opportunity in its regional strategy and invest heavily in partnering with India to gain a long term strategic advantage in the region. Indian and American interests are once again intersecting at a time of improved relationships between the world’s largest two democracies. Improving relations with India and moving the two countries towards an alliance is in the enduring national interest of both states. India has historically remained non-aligned, but as it establishes itself as a great power and takes a larger role in the international system, its outlook is changing. An improved relationship with India can advance American interests in the Asia-Pacific region by improving the likelihood of a positive outcome in Afghanistan, balancing against Chinese encroachment, and reducing Russian influence.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Landis Maddox

Published: June 2018

In 1973, the Army recognized a need to change and implement AirLand Battle doctrine to defeat the Soviet Union. Today, the U.S. faces a complex world consisting of trans-regional, multi-domain, and multifunctional threats. Similar to the actions taken by the Army in 1973, Army senior leaders recognized the new changing character of war and introduced the Multi-Domain Battle concept. This concept stresses the idea of gaining a position of advantage by creating and exploiting temporary windows of advantage, restoring capability balance, building resilient Joint Force battle formations, and altering force posture to enhance deterrence by challenging the U.S.power projection, entry, and freedom of action capabilities. This concept generates a myriad of sustainment challenges. This paper specifically addresses the challenges posed by the dispersion of sustainment operations resulting in semi-independent sustainment operations across a wider area, the size of sustainment nodes, and the critical transition point from movement to maneuver. To overcome these sustainment challenges, the Army must continue to focus on demand reduction initiatives through the use of increased technology in three areas water, fuel, and operational energy to maintain the competitive advantage and win in the future against great-power


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Kevin M. MacNeil

Published: June 2018

In 2010 the information technology (IT) industry recognized the transition to cloud computing was driving an increased reliance on data centers and the infrastructure that supports them, specifically power distribution, heating, ventilation, air conditioning, and back-up power. Companies began to use the data center infrastructure management (DCIM) framework, software solutions, and engineering staff to maintain and manage building infrastructure critical to their IT operations and revenue streams. This paper identifies data center consolidation, Army Network Command’s responsibility for IT facilities, transition to cloud-based computing, and the fielding of division level Home Station Mission Command Centers as factors driving the Army to the same reliance on data center infrastructure. The analysis describes the DCIM framework and the need for a change in Army culture to one that values IT facility management. It recommends adopting DCIM across the Army IT enterprise. Additional adjustments include adding certified mechanical technicians to the IT facility’s staff to establish a facility management working group and a facility certification process as a component the Defense Information Systems Agency’s Cyber Operational Readiness Inspection.


Author: Colonel Eric Lopez

Published: June 2018

In 1973, the US Army changed from an army of conscripts to an All-Volunteer Force. Over the last forty years, the Army has become the best in the world, but it has grown increasingly regionally focused, rural, militaristic, and it no longer represents that nation it serves. This civil-military gap has grave repercussions for America. To close the civil-military gap, the Army must launch Operation Hometown Resolve led by Recruiting Command. Operation Hometown Resolve is a strategic approach to closing the civil-military gap. This regional concept will connect, synergize, and energize all Army entities in specific regions across America. Then it will empower and enable these entities to communicate proactively with regional communities. Finally, it will deliver the right message to help America understand its Army. If the Army does not address this problem, the civil-military gap will continue to widen. Only by identifying a responsible agency to address this wicked problem will the nation be able to close the gap. The Army must give Recruiting Command the resources and authorities to reach the American public and close the civil-military gap proactively.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Kelly A. Lelito

Published: June 2018

To best support, defend, and protect the vital interests of the nation, it is imperative that the composition of the senior leadership of United States military represents the interests of American society – in all her glorious diversity. This leadership is drawn largely from the pool of graduates from the military’s Senior Service Colleges. These academic institutions imbue a broad, strategic education to develop and mature the nation’s future flag officers – the generals, admirals, and senior executive service members who will lead the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, and Coast Guard. To ensure the diverse populace of the United States is well served, the senior leadership of the armed forces must reflect the subcultures and ethnicities of the American public. Yet historically, the composition of the resident student populations and the faculties of these institutions reflect sub-optimal levels of diversity. Specifically, this paper examines gender diversity at the United States Army War College, and validates the importance of gender diversity for the institution, the military, and the nation.


Author: Colonel Sean H. Kuester

Published: June 2018

Strategic shocks are predictable and the trend for the next defense relevant strategic shocks are extant and discernable. Specifically, gray zone exploitation, enhanced by technological advances, are elevating the probability of confrontation between the US and competitor states, and erosion of the liberal world order. To avoid the next shock the US must assess gray zone competition and contest gray zone actors through a whole of government approach. Rival states are increasingly emboldened to exploit the gray zone and take advantage of outmoded US security policy and legacy defense concepts. The US defense establishment must prioritize efforts to replace these strategy documents with ones that match the reality of the current and projected security environment.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Scott B. Kindberg

Published: June 2018

As the Army postures to grow and modernize, it is critical to rebalance the Active and Reserve components Sustainment Force Structure that is required to meet the demands of the combatant commanders. This study will focus on the reasons behind an imbalance of the Army’s sustainment and logistics force structure between the Active and Reserve components, through a concept called, Accumulation of Degradation (AoD). It identifies four critical contributing factors of AoD; The Total Force Concept (TFC), budget restrictions, Total Army Analysis (TAA) process, and modularization through the creation of Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs). The impact of these elements on Army sustainment operations include: a logistics force that is not aligned to the current and future threat environment, an inability to rapidly mobilize sustainment units, decreased availability of critical sustainment capabilities such as petroleum distribution, and a heavy reliance on contractor support to bridge the gaps. In addition, it will highlight the implications and provide recommendations needed to achieve better balance in sustainment operations and increase readiness during times of fiscal constraint.


Author: Mr. Chad M. Keller

Published: June 2018

The security of America’s space assets – and the sanctuary of space – is being challenged by increasingly credible threats that come from three primary sources. One threat is the potential weaponization of space, for which some advocate despite the realities of physics and strategy. Another threat comes from the rise of adversarial counterspace programs, which can destroy, disable, or disrupt U.S. space assets. The third threat results from the international system of governance which is in decline and unable to adequately preserve peace in space. In order to defeat these threats, the United States must exhibit leadership on the international stage, forging international rules that protect its interests. It must defend its space assets through enhanced and explicit deterrence measures. Finally, it must overhaul its fractured domestic institutions that manage space policy, space strategy, and the space budget. Only by addressing these issues can America rise to meet the space security challenges of tomorrow and continue to enjoy the economic and military benefits that it derives from space.


Author: Mr. Ajit V. Joshi

Published: June 2018

The foundation for readiness is resilience, which aligns with the warrior ethos and is an enduring quality of good leaders. A variety of techniques and practices including yoga, trauma sensitive yoga, systematic relaxation, breathing (pranayama), meditation, yoga nidra, and iRest Yoga Nidra are evidenced based tools with proven efficacy for improving the health and resilience of Joint Force service members and their families. Leading change in the Joint Force to adopt these tools for all service members’ comprehensive physical, mental, and spiritual fitness is vital in a world of greater uncertainty, but barriers exist both at individual and organizational levels. This paper defines relevant terms; reviews the extensive literature on the subject, with particular attention to the conclusions of studies conducted with veteran and military populations; examines the relevance of these tools to the modern warrior ethos and military culture; and makes specific recommendations regarding cultural and institutional change to facilitate program implementation.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel William C. Hummer

Published: June 2018

Current approaches within Professional Military Education (PME) and joint doctrine neglect cutting-edge findings regarding key aspects of civil war interventions. PME’s and joint doctrine’s approaches to civil war dynamics neglect scientifically rich causal stories on violence, insurgent group fragmentation, and third-party intervention used to bring these conflicts to a peaceful conclusion or, at least, reduce the likelihood of violence. After drawing out the principal lessons from current Army War College PME on civil war, I propose a framework for studying civil war that exploits current research and is appropriate for Senior Service College PME. This framework, which outperforms the current Army War College approach, provides one example of blending scholarship and military education on the important topic of civil wars. This paper has implications for PME curriculum and doctrine as it relates to civil wars.


Author: Commander Brett W. Holdiman

Published: June 2018

China’s recent actions in the western Pacific are strategically challenging for the United States. This paper explores how China’s history, specifically the Century of Humiliation, influences and shapes China’s strategies in the East and South China Seas. In addition to excessive maritime claims in the contested Spratly Islands of the South China Sea, China is also at odds with Japan and Taiwan over the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea. Furthermore, China seeks to advance its regional influence through the role of benefactor in the Philippines, pledging infrastructure investment while exploiting the cooling relationship between the United States and the Philippines. The United States Navy and Army, having maintained a continuous presence in the region for over a century, provide American leadership with options for countering Chinese activities in the region. Pragmatic and non-provocative actions will enable the United States to peacefully support its allies and partners while checking the militarist actions of China in the region.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Robert Hilliard

Published: June 2018

The world’s growing water scarcity issue has the attention of governments, global organizations and influential individuals. Many groups and organizations are focused on bringing water access and sanitation to those who are without, but far fewer organizations are focused on transforming water demand and mediating the trans-boundary water-sharing issues that threaten conflict around the globe. Water, by itself, is unlikely to lead directly to conflict, but when combined with other regional tensions or long-standing disputes, could easily become a tipping point for war. The time is right for United States engagement in Northeast Africa water-sharing, specifically in Egypt, Libya, Sudan and Ethiopia. Working through the United Nations and African Union, the United States should assist in developing realistic water-sharing agreements on both the Nubian Sandstone Aquifer System and the Nile River Basin. In the absence of working agreements, developing countries like Ethiopia are moving forward on projects such as the Grand Renaissance Dam that serve their own interests while heightening regional tensions over water rights. As political situations stabilize in Libya and Egypt, it is in the United States’ interests to enhance efforts supporting regional stability while advancing American influence and building long-term allies in the region.


Author: Ms. Dawn A. Hicks

Published: June 2018

This study examines ways to achieve deterrence in the cyber domain by comparing two different deterrence theories--deterrence by fear which is predicated on imposing costs, and deterrence by denial, which suggests denying benefits. It identifies four critical elements needed for denial-based deterrence and three elements required to achieve a fear-based deterrence in cyberspace. The study considers these two theories and their limitations against current cyber trends and the emerging threat landscape to determine which theory is most applicable in the cyber domain. Overall, the study found a one-size fits all cyber deterrence strategy is likely to prove ineffective and that elements of both theories must be customized to deter adversaries with varying cyber capabilities. Furthermore, the U.S. political will is insufficient to establish the credibility required for a fear-based deterrence strategy to be effective.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Jason Hester

Published: June 2018

The Army relies upon Information Technology and its LandWarNet for virtually all operations. This reliance and the designation of cyberspace as a warfighting domain presents the reality that every soldier is an operator in the domain. The result is a unique and dangerous phenomenon, where the domain is not thoroughly understood by soldiers and leaders alike. Failure to effectively manage this critical resource is at best a lost opportunity to leverage LandWarNet for maximum strategic effect. At worst, it leaves this critical infrastructure unnecessarily vulnerable to failure and/or attack. An assessment of Army culture and signal subculture shows that they must be changed to adapt to the unique management and operation requirements of LandWarNet. The Army should create a culture of more candid assessment within the signal community and its dialogue with mission commanders, increase the value placed upon intellectualism, and increase the value placed on signal strategic planning competencies. Left unchanged, the status quo cultural challenges result in frustration, failed expectations, inefficiencies, flawed planning, and critical performance gaps in the operation of LandWarNet in support of Army forces.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Glenn A. Henke

Published: June 2018

This research explores campaign quality and its utility in describing Army forces. This paper will clearly define campaign quality and its linkage to depth. Campaign quality consists of mental characteristics, made up of mental skills and resilience, and physical qualities, made up of unit endurance and physical capabilities. Planning and executing operations in depth is how the Army operationalizes campaign-quality forces. This research first discusses depth as a tenet of unified land operations and its linkages to campaign quality, followed by a discussion of how Army units plan for and execute operations in depth. This paper further describes how depth allows leaders to assess the Army’s overall campaign quality. Finally, this paper proposes a refined definition of depth more consistent with historical definitions, joint doctrine, and actual intended usage. Three conclusions emerge from this discussion. First, the current definition of depth in Army doctrine needs to be revised in line with earlier versions. Second, campaign quality linked to an expanded definition of depth can support more precise readiness reporting. Third, assessing campaign quality linked to depth helps answer whether the Army is prepared to conduct major combat operations.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Travis Habhab

Published: June 2018

The nation is counting on the Army to select and promote the right strategic leaders on active duty, in the Army Reserve, and in the Army National Guard components who effectively employ the mission command principles. The future security environment is more dynamic. Multi-domain and transregional conflicts require leaders at all levels to build cohesive teams through mutual trust, execute in a decentralized manner, lead joint and multinational units, and influence individuals with different cultures. If the Army is serious about employing mission command and really wants the right future leaders who can use it effectively, it should modify some of the existing mission command assessment mechanisms to make them more effective and ensure the Army promotes and selects the right leaders. The Army should improve its utilization of both 360 feedback assessments and command climate surveys by requiring raters to review them when completing evaluations of leaders and standardizing their use in all components. Taking into account true leadership feedback from subordinates, peers, and superiors will avoid shortsighted, results-driven evaluations. Modifying these assessment mechanisms will improve how the Army evaluates mission command and help select the right future leaders.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel C R. Gunst

Published: June 2018

This paper describes the dollar’s role as the foundation for U.S. financial power and the instruments that descend from its central position in the international financial system. The emergence of Bitcoin and decentralized cryptocurrencies is introduced and how they work briefly described. The dilemma these decentralized currencies represent for central banks is explained, how cryptocurrencies will affect U.S. instruments of financial power, and how they may eventually impact the central role of the dollar. The essay concludes by assessing the possible third order effects on U.S. strategy while presenting possible approaches U.S. policymakers may consider for capitalizing on cryptocurrency’s evolution in the international financial system.


Author: Colonel Parker L. Frawley

Published: June 2018

This paper examines the application of traditional deterrence theory, including deterrence by denial and deterrence by punishment, to Russia’s strategy of New Generation Warfare. It considers steps taken by the United States and NATO to deter Russian military threats to Europe and how those are inadequate and should be further augmented. The paper further examines Russia’s conduct of New Generation Warfare and cross-domain coercion to establish an understanding of the types of activity requiring deterrence and the domains in which that deterrent should reside. The paper then discusses recommendations, both concrete and abstract, for employing deterrence in the current paradigm. Finally, the paper briefly examines risks associated with these deterrent steps and methods for risk mitigation.


Author: Colonel Johnathan B. Frasier

Published: June 2018

Future Vertical Lift (FVL) is more than just an aircraft platform; rather, it is an extremely complicated system of systems composed of a diverse collection of enabling technologies. The Department of Defense (DoD) must develop and successfully integrate these enabling technologies to achieve the desired overmatch capability it requires for the Multi-Domain battlefield. In order to do this, the DoD must ensure successful completion of two imperatives. First, DoD must establish Joint Service Integrated Product Teams (IPTs) to develop those capabilities that are necessary to ensure mission success. Second, DoD must ensure parallel funding for both the platform as well as the critical enablers. In accomplishing these two imperatives, the services must avoid the typical service parochialism and competing requirements, which have doomed multiple Joint programs. The DoD must avoid the fate of previous complex Joint programs and field a capability within program cost and on schedule to ensure the future force has the capability to fight and win on the future Multi-Domain battlefield.


Author: Colonel Robert J. Ferry

Published: June 2018

Timely delivery of competent healthcare is a basic human right. Poor governance, armed conflict, and unstable natural environments greatly challenge delivery of effective healthcare. Manmade and natural disasters in contested environments present the wickedest planning problems. This project applies a past–present–future method to describe sustainable, whole-of-society approaches to raise an isolated healthcare system to the 21st Century standard of care, with a focus on the isolated healthcare system of North Korea. Best practices for healthcare stability operations in contested environments include clear strategic vision, competent cultural understanding, and agile coordinated responses. This project considers the lessons encountered by military healthcare professionals during the Occupation of Japan (1945-52), stability operations in Iraq (2003-11), and the Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami (2011-present) among other contested or complex environments.


Author: Colonel Jason A. Evers

Published: June 2018

Contracting for contingency construction requirements is a necessity given the current force structure. The Department of Defense must have the ability to project forces into distant environments if the United States is to maintain its current strategic advantage as a global power. The enduring characteristic of contingency construction is that it is inherently time-sensitive and sometimes difficult to forecast early on during the planning and budget cycle. Currently, provision of engineering and construction services is at the mercy of Continental United States-based and complex United States codes and Service regulations that severely limit flexibility and responsiveness. This research project recommends six changes to improve the system. The recommendations include changes to statutory authorities, funding mechanisms, regulations, planning, Information Technology systems, and most importantly, lesson sharing in order to improve the overall delivery. These changes would provide Theater or Joint Task Force Engineers the tools they need to better support Commanders.


Author: Colonel Rebecca I. Evans

Published: June 2018

Food insecurity contributes to global insecurity, terrorism, and failed states making it a National and Global Security concern. Historical efforts focused on increasing production; however one third of food produced is not consumed due to post-harvest loss and waste. Increasing food safety concerns (intentional and unintentional contamination) limit developing nations’ abilities to profit from international food sales. Landless farm workers account for tens of millions of the world’s most food-insecure people. Instead of increasing food production, efforts in developing countries should focus on reducing food loss and waste and improving food safety. This approach will improve food access, create non-farm related jobs and improve potential income through exportation of foods that meet international safety standards. This Strategy Research Project reviews existing national Food Security programs in order to recommend ways to incorporate minimizing food loss and waste to improve food access in countries of national security interest. Opportunities to incorporate the Department of Defense (US Army Veterinary Services) into the whole-of-government Global Food Security Strategy will be explored.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Johnny A. Evans

Published: June 2018

National Security Strategy 2017 (NSS 2017) establishes the way forward to serve national interests and meet strategic objectives in today’s environment. It characterizes the global environment as one of competition with the great powers of the People’s Republic of China, Russian Federation, and the rogue states of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and Islamic Republic of Iran. As with any national strategy, NSS 2017 must correctly align ends, ways, and means to increase the probability of success in advancing United States (U.S.) interests. Joint doctrine provides a lens to analyze and evaluate NSS 2017. Analysis reveals that this strategy faces a significant problem. NSS 2017 implies that the Army be prepared to simultaneously deter and defeat the great powers and rogue states, but the Army lacks the capacity to accomplish this without incurring a high level of risk. As such, an adjustment is required to bring NSS 2017 into proper strategic alignment, with Army resources, against the demands of U.S. National interests and the objectives which drive it.


Author: Colonel Terri J. Erisman

Published: June 2018

The United States and China are on the road to conflict based on a lack of strategic trust. To avoid this, the United States must gain a more empathetic understanding of China’s world view, based on its history, foreign policy perspective, and current leadership. This paper will provide a brief overview of China’s history, show how its history influences Chinese foreign policy, and close with a synopsis of the current Chinese leadership approach to executing its policies. For those largely unfamiliar with China, this paper will provide an introductory level of understanding to help counter some of the common misperceptions and lay the foundation for further study and examination.


Author: Colonel Gregg A. Engler

Published: June 2018

In classical western theory, war and peace are cognitive shortcuts for the presence or absence of violence. Beyond heuristics, however, the struggle of life endures even in the absence of violence. Contrary to Clausewitz’ limited definition of war as an act of “physical force,” the true nature of war exists beyond violence. In any age, strategic leaders are pressed to counter the threat of violence presented by the ever-changing character of war. Permanence of the underlying struggle, however, provides fundamental strategic guidance no matter the age. There is no endgame other than the perpetual shaping of life’s enduring struggle across a full spectrum of violent and non-violent means. The responsibility of leaders to pursue and defend U.S. interests extends well beyond considerations related to the use of violence. The best manifestation of strategy is the long-term continuous pursuit, support, and defense of a rules-based international order. Complex, adaptive systems theory guides strategic leaders in the use of power and reveals the importance of alliances, monitoring feedback in the use of power, and proactive engagement in the world. Ultimately, strategic use of power is inherently stronger when used in support of an infinite game of survival, rather than a finite game of victory.


Author: Mr. Peter J. Dillon

Published: June 2018

This paper examines the question of how technology in the Fourth Industrial Revolution, specifically Artificial Intelligence (AI), will impact geopolitics and the operational environment that the American military must compete within while protecting U.S. national interests. The nature of war is explained not only as an extension of politics but as an extension of economics. AI’s strategic significance extends beyond current military applications, and AI is an economic engine which will displace labor markets, function as a threat multiplier, and ultimately bring about a neo-bipolar world order aligned under the U.S. and China via technological ententes. The methodology for the paper is described, followed by the treatment of AI as a strategic problem and viewed in terms of a strategic environment. A strategic way forward is provided via incorporation of AI as a threat multiplier in DoD weapon system planning, readiness and resourcing models, strategic guidance, COCOM plans, and strategic dialogue. The paper concludes that the U.S. government and military are currently unprepared to counter and exploit AI as a threat multiplier in a neo-bipolar world order. National security experts and economists are encouraged to continue exploring AI as an economic destabilizer and strategic threat multiplier.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Adam T. Dietrich

Published: June 2018

With the development of nuclear weapons capable of reaching the entire United States (U.S.), the People's Democratic Republic of Korea (DPRK) has significantly elevated the threat it poses to U.S. national security. With a historic summit between the U.S. and the DPRK scheduled for May 2018, this paper examines the disposition of the DPRK's ruling elites and how they impact the DPRK's foreign policy. Viewed through an Orwellian lens as a contextual analogy, a case is made that the ruling elites have created a system of governance that reinforces the status quo over ending the state of war between the two Koreas. As a result, the DPRK may be inclined to see negotiations as just another opportunity to extract concessions and buy more time to perfect the DPRK's nuclear arsenal. The paper recommends that information operations tailor the message the U.S. wants to send the DPRK's ruling elites.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Samuel Deputy

Published: June 2018

The role of the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) to project power in support of U.S. political goals remain constant despite a rapidly changing character of warfare in the twenty first century. The pace of technological development challenges the U.S. force projection, and logistic sustainment paradigm. Although the technological immaturity of unmanned systems creates weaknesses, they represent a disruptive future capability that in time will revolutionize logistics and U.S. force projection. The thesis of this paper is that despite limitations, the integration of unmanned ground and airborne logistics systems increases the diversity, resilience, and flexibility of joint force sustainment, thereby mitigating vulnerabilities and exploiting opportunities within the evolving character of warfare. This paper explores the strengths and weaknesses of unmanned logistics systems (ULS) with a limited scope analysis of three logistic regimes, and proposes an employment concept that blends the current logistic system with the capabilities of ULS.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Jason S. Davis

Published: June 2018

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Author: Colonel John K. Curry

Published: June 2018

The Department of Defense is required to maintain a Defense Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response Force (DCRF) at optimum readiness, capable of integrating into a larger interorganizational domestic response operation if needed within the United States. This study analyzes three significant issues caused by the 2014 decision to source the DCRF regionally. The first challenge was the negation of unity of command amongst sourced FORSCOM units while retained by the Service; this left each corps headquarters largely uninvolved. The second issue was a blurring of lines of responsibility between ARNORTH, JTF-CS, and FORSCOM on roles and responsibilities for training and readiness. The third was an unmet need to recognize the DCRF’s Joint Reception, Staging, and Onward Integration (JRSOI) as a decisive point within a domestic CBRN response operation and to commit resources to practicing it during training. These three issues, if left unresolved, combine to greatly reduce the cohesion between DCRF units prior to mission execution, negatively affect the quality and efficiency of the critical life-saving capabilities they exist to provide, and impede the DCRF’s ability to expeditiously flow in from around the nation and become available to help the larger interorganizational effort.


Author: Commander Curtis A. Culwell

Published: June 2018

The U. S. Navy has provided vital afloat hospitalization capability with purpose-built ships in support of major combat operations since the Civil War. In more recent years, Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief has emerged as a vital and influential secondary role, which not only serves those in desperate need but offers meaningful opportunity for the US to operate in unison with China’s hospital ship, the Peace Ark. The two current U.S. hospital ships, USNS COMFORT and USNS MERCY, have service lives expiring in 2021 and 2035, respectively. This paper reviews the history and merit of the hospital ship platform, presents and analyzes the current platforms in addition to replacement concepts, and offers four courses of action based upon the efficacy of the concepts, balanced with the urgency of the impending expiration date of USNS COMFORT.


Editor: Lieutenant Colonel Robert E. Croft

Author: Lieutenant Colonel Robert E. Croft

Published: June 2018

Strategic leaders make decisions in uncertain environments. Uncertainty has several possible definitions, but does not have a widely accepted definition and has little impact on the military planning or decision-making processes. Assumption-based planning and risk assessment are key components of military planning culture from the tactical to the strategic level. Failure to account for concepts of uncertainty impacts the efficacy of these procedures. This paper examines uncertainty in detail and introduces a taxonomy labeled Analytic Uncertainty. It includes five components that are important for understanding in the context of military estimates. Analytic Uncertainty facilitates both theoretical thinking and analytic thinking about uncertain environments and uncertain quantities. Unifying definitions are provided for uncertainty, risk, opportunity, and measurement. The paper also explores the relationship between uncertainty and risk. Finally, the concepts of Analytic Uncertainty are applied to the Risk Assessment provided by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to determine its limitations.


Author: Mr. Mark R. Crockett

Published: June 2018

Developing effective talent management strategies for Department of Defense (DOD) civilian servants that identify, grow, and retain a premium talent pool is critical to the future of DOD. This paper focuses on growing civilian servant talent for senior General Schedule (GS) civilians, GS-14 and GS-15. Specifically, as a key to the future success of the DOD civilian Defense Senior Leader Development Program (DSLDP), this paper strongly recommends:1) embracing career assignment processes that target the joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) environment; 2) formalizing DSLDP outplacement assignment strategies; and, 3) aligning assignment strategies with a more robust senior leader mentorship program. This paper postulates that effort applied in any of these three areas will create a better prepared DOD talent pool of strategic leader civilian servants at the GS-14 and GS-15 level. Additionally, informed and sustained momentum across these areas is essential to enhancing the success of DOD’s premier civilian senior leader development program and deliberately growing tomorrow’s senior civilian leaders today.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Richard W. Corner

Published: June 2018

To compete in a volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous strategic environment, the United States Army Reserve must change its culture to improve talent management starting at the mid-grade officer level. At present, the status quo is unacceptable since it falls short in providing a predictable and ready force that is capable of competing in the 21st century. For far too long the U.S. Army Reserve performed assignment management and did not truly develop talent across the force. The framework presented in this analysis provides a way for the U.S. Army Reserve to improve officer development. Changing career development through professional military education attendance, developing a broadening program, and developing an effective individual development program greatly improves United States Army Reserve personnel management by identifying and cultivating talent early. This talent management framework provides a starting point to better prepare United States Army Reserve officers for service at the strategic level.


Author: Ms. Janae Cooley

Published: June 2018

In the realm of military theory, there has always been much focus on Clausewitz’ epic On War. In 2015, a new addition to the Clausewitzian canon on war became accessible to English speakers when Clausewitz’ Lectures on Small War were translated from their original German into English. This paper argues that Clausewitz’ ideas on how to successfully wage a small war against a more powerful enemy holds valuable lessons for today’s modern war fighter. Clausewitz broadens our understanding about when and how small war is successfully waged. To demonstrate the modern relevance of Clausewitz’ teachings on the subject, this paper studies Russia’s campaigns against Estonia, Ukraine, and the U.S. as small wars that Russia is fighting to weaken its stronger enemies in an effort to achieve its larger strategic objectives of territorial security and restoration of historical sphere of influence. Based on this analysis, this paper makes recommendations for policy makers and strategists to consider as they continue their discussions about how best to respond to Russia.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Trenton J. Conner

Published: June 2018

This paper proposes a whole-of-government strategy to strengthen the strategic security of the United States. The strategy for building security through global infrastructure development seeks to protect the current international order by ensuring strategic access to the global commons and partner nations, improve capabilities for military force projection, and improve stability in nations of interest by promoting prosperity. The proposed infrastructure development strategy uses construction or upgrades of dual-use economic infrastructure to maintain strategic access for the United States, set theaters of operation, and enhance military-to-military relationships in support of Geographic Combatant Command Theater Campaign Plans. Further, this strategy calls for government and industry partnerships across interagency and intergovernmental boundaries to achieve cooperatively developed goals. Additionally, this strategy provides a creative way to counter growing Chinese and Russian influence. Successful implementation of this strategy for building security through global infrastructure development should lead to greater economic and military power for partner nations while extending U.S. influence, military reach, and opportunities for economic growth.


Author: Colonel Terry L. Clark

Published: June 2018

The primary purpose of this research paper is to offer suggestions that may be useful during the formation of the U.S. Army’s new command. The first part of this paper provides a conceptual framework using Dr. John Kotter’s Eight Step Change Process, to offer a way for cultural and organizational change, a historical view on U.S. Army structure and acquisition organizations, background on acquisition reform and the current defense acquisition system. The second portion of this paper applies the framework, using the historical perspective, research collected and subsequent analysis to offer suggestions with respect to building the U.S. Army’s Futures Command. Recommendations include cultural changes focused on developing a sense of urgency, concentrating on total time reduction, establishing metrics to track performance, analytically prioritize requirements, create a culture of experimentation, adapt personnel management rules, increase Soldier involvement across the testing process, enhance work flow, improve relationships, restructure the test and evaluation process, and facilitate coordination.Acquisition, Organizational Change, Futures Command, Requirements, Reform


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Jonathan M. Chung

Published: June 2018

Trust is the bedrock of the Army Profession. Army leaders highlight the importance of strengthening two types of trust relationships: external trust with the American people and internal trust among the professionals in the institution. The majority of the American public views the U.S. military as an honest, respected, ethical, and trusted profession as indicated by multiple polls and surveys. In contrast, several highlights from the 2015 Center for Army Leadership Annual Survey of Army Leadership (CASAL) along with multiple media reports of misconduct raise concerns about levels of internal trust within the Army. Thus, the focus on the internal trust that resides within Army units remains the focus of this paper. By reviewing the definition and doctrine of trust, as well as examining the 2015 CASAL data and misconduct reports, this paper claims that the current negative indicators that exist across Army formations are an early warning of a looming trust crisis. Additionally, this paper provides recommendations to address and protect units to prevent a crisis.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Kendrick L. Cager

Published: June 2018

The reserve component has deployed Soldiers and Airman on continual basis since the 9/11 attacks on the homeland. Since 9/11, the Army National Guard (ARNG) has been an integral part of the Army’s operational force by augmenting its combat capacity and capabilities. Accordingly, the ARNG struggles to maintain its facilities and infrastructure in the wake of increased training and deployment activities. The increased and training and deployment activities has had negative impacts on both active and reserve components in terms of readiness, modernization, quality of life, and retention. This paper examines the fiscal environment and the negative effects of the Budget Control Act of 2011 and sequestration. This document provides the underlying framework of the problem that currently there are higher expectations for ARNG will maintain the readiness posture that requires an investment strategy to support and sustain its aging facilities and infrastructure. The paper concludes by proposing three investment strategies that incorporates a multifaceted approach to address the challenges associated with investing resources to support ARNG facilities and infrastructure.


Author: Colonel Donald L. Burton

Published: June 2018

To compete in today’s increasingly volatile, uncertain, and complex international security environment with great power competition, the US must maintain its superior technological advantage over its adversaries by remaining the preeminent force. Acquisition reform is critical to achieving this end given the current fiscal state of the US and its increasing deficit. More aggressive use of competitive prototyping, coupled with the use of smart incremental development, is essential to secure the US technological advantage over peer and near-peer competitors by providing more effective, efficient, and timely military capabilities given the fiscally constrained environment. DoD can enhance competitive prototyping by improving communication with industry partnerships. DoD should provide desired capabilities and allow competitive prototyping define the detailed requirements based on a known and mature technology. DoD needs to incorporate more user input and feedback into system design and prototyping, and emphasize incremental development to expedite new capabilities delivered to the warfighter.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Damon K. Burrows

Published: June 2018

The machine gun (MG) changed the character of warfare. Nevertheless, its acceptance and role in combat were not always obvious. Barriers such as social acceptance, obedience to strategies of past wars, and challenges with conceptualizing the future environment hindered the United States’ (U.S.) organizational and doctrinal changes for nearly fifty years after its initial employment in the American Civil War. The Battle of the Somme awakened the U.S. to the full strategic significance of this weapon and catalyze military reform. To foster a more deliberate and forward-thinking approach for conceptualizing warfighting in cyberspace, this research analyzes the lessons and similarities from the MG that are consequential to understanding, employing, and ultimately developing cyber warfare strategies, theories, and doctrine. The vantage of history offers an in-depth analysis on the missed opportunities and vulnerabilities from the MG’s technology disruption without subjecting cyber warfare to the same bromidic and dangerous approach of waiting for a crisis to discover tectonic shifts in the character of warfare. This research reveals that drawing upon past MG gun lessons serves as a vignette for asking the right questions, avoiding the same pitfalls, and for effectively conceptualizing and developing a cyber warfare strategy.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Jason E. Burkett

Published: June 2018

US military might and competitive advantage is built upon space-based technology. However, the space domain is becoming increasingly congested, contested, and competitive. China, of particular concern, has invested heavily in capabilities to deny or degrade the US’s ability to leverage these technologies, and presently has the ability to attack crucial US space platforms resident in all levels of Earth’s orbit. As a result of rising geopolitical tensions, and China’s lacking parity in military might, China views the space domain as presenting opportunity to equalize the strategic battlefield. Further, the US presently lacks the coherent whole of government space strategy, which is necessary to address this issue. This must change. Once developed, the US will need to play an active role in bringing the international community together to develop clearly defined and binding space protections. Failure to do so will result in intensified hostility in space, and increased likelihood of conflict


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Timothy M. Brower

Published: June 2018

North Korea (DPRK) continues to develop and test nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles despite international pressure to cease such activities. This paper argues that the Trump administration should use the Cuban Missile Crisis as a historical analogy to inform its policy and to develop an effective strategy for dealing with the DPRK. It uses Yuen Foong Khong’s Analogical Explanation framework to analyze the Cuban Missile Crisis by conducting six diagnostic tasks useful for political decision making: 1) defining the nature of the North Korean threat, 2) assessing the political stakes involved, and 3) providing policy recommendations by 4) predicting their chances of success, 5) evaluating their moral rightness, and 6) warning about the dangers associated with available options. This paper also uses insights from the Cuban Missile Crisis to recommend a strategy for dealing with the North Korean threat.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Ross E. Brashears

Published: June 2018

Tensions and rhetoric between the U.S. and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea are spiraling to an all-time high and the stakes could not be any more substantial. North Korea’s behavior is extremely provocative and soon the regime will possess an intercontinental nuclear capability. The prevailing opinion of the Trump Administration is that “we are running out of time on North Korea.” The U.S. is not “running out of time” on the Korean Peninsula and must continue and enhance the current policy of strategic accountability to compel the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to denuclearize, but be prepared to meet the challenge of deterring the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s nuclear aggression for the long term until the regime collapses or moderates. The costs associated with a preventive war with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea are unacceptably high. The best of a bad set of strategic options for the U.S. is deterrence with respect to North Korea.


Author: Colonel Michael Bracewell

Published: June 2018

An Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) created by a man-made nuclear device or natural occurring geomagnetic storm would have devastating effects on the highly vulnerable electrical power grid of the United States. The United States is a modern electric-dependent society, relying heavily on just-time logistics and communications to support basic societal functions. An EMP has the potential to shut down this electrical backbone, therefore collapsing the nation’s life sustainment systems. As future potential adversaries of the United States, to include violent extremists groups, have sought the technology and practiced the execution of an EMP attack, it is imperative the United States prepare and defend against such an event. This paper will examine historical examples of the impact of EMP events on American society, the posture of the United States Homeland Security to defend against an EMP attack, and identify possible gaps in the planning and recovery assumed in current doctrine.


Author: Mr. Stephen P. Bickel

Published: June 2018

The future operating environment for the Army is increasingly volatile and uncertain characterized by increasing threats, competition between great powers, rapid technological advances and uncertain resources. Army installations will continue to be a key enabler of Army missions and readiness. Future Army installations will be challenged by increasing urbanization, expanded missions at an increased pace and, with reduced resources. The Army’s current installation management capabilities suffer from deliberate choices to underfund infrastructure, lack of common understanding and guiding principles, ad-hoc career development, and uncertain authorities to streamline installation services. Applying an abbreviated capabilities-based assessment process identifies areas that require better alignment between the Army’s current capabilities and future installation management needs. Once the capability gaps are identified and prioritized by risk, this paper proposes potential solutions to mitigate them across Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities and Policy (DOTMLPF-P). The Army must act now to ensure the installation management enterprise has the correct capabilities to be effective.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Garrett L. Benson

Published: June 2018

Toxic leadership is a term commonly used in the civilian workforce and military services to describe destructive and counterproductive leaders who do more to damage their institutions than ensure their success. Many service members experience this type of leader throughout their career. Some see them as a tough nosed leader with a singular mission focus. However, the fine line between tough and toxic leader is easily crossed. In the United States Marine Corps (USMC), the problem of toxic leadership is known, but there is no established definition to help identify toxicity within our ranks. This paper will attempt to examine the impact of toxic leadership within the USMC and will also provide a clear definition of a toxic leader for use in the USMC as well as some ideas on how to assess toxic leaders. Additionally, it will identify some preventative measures to compliment current training and provide possible remediation efforts to correct toxic tendencies before they impact the larger force, including what the USMC can do when it identifies an Officer as toxic.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Eric D. Beaty

Published: June 2018

The global operational environment has changed dramatically over the last three decades and the United States Army must adapt in order to maintain the capability and capacity to continue achieving strategic goals and securing national interests. While the nature of war transcends time, it’s character has evolved immensely and to maintain not only global military primacy, but relevance, the United States Army must adapt at a pace that outperforms adversaries and competitors. Adaptation is primarily required across three lines of effort – understanding the complex and adaptive environment, United States Army doctrine and training, and leadership changes from the tactical to the strategic levels. Continued adaptation to meet the challenges posed by revanchist, rising, unstable, and extremist threats is paramount to the United States Army’s ability to maintain relevance and dominance.


Author: Colonel Gary W. Beard

Published: June 2018

With the rise of multiple competitors to U.S. influence, the likelihood of military operations within an Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) environment is increasing. The United States and partner nations face an evolving and expanding array of air threats in terms of both capability and capacity. Given the likelihood that U.S. air superiority throughout an operation cannot be guaranteed, the joint force must develop an effective approach to air and missile defense to provide freedom of action to maneuver forces. The U.S. Army should organize maneuver air and missile defense (AMD) forces into Divisional Short Range Air Defense (SHORAD) Battalions to operate effectively with and as a part of maneuver forces to assure success in future operations.


Author: Colonel Edward J. Ballanco

Published: June 2018

Due to recent failures in security force assistance, the U.S. should revise its approach to advising. To gain influence with counterparts, U.S. military doctrine instructs advisers to focus on building relationships and establishing rapport. The idea is to use “commitment” and not “compliance” influencing. However, commitment will only work in certain cases where the right conditions exist. Often, U.S. interests do not fully align with partner states. Advisers need influencing tools that give them compliance-type leverage. These include the power to reward and coerce. Even without formally having these tools, many American advisers report using improvised compliance techniques with on hand resources in Iraq and Afghanistan. The U.S. can learn from the British use of Indian soldiers during the Raj and the U.S. Korean Military Advisory Group during the Korean War. In both these cases, commitment and compliance were used effectively. In the future, U.S. leaders must deliberately establish security force assistance structures that empower advisers with similar leverage.


Author: Colonel Joel D. Babbitt

Published: June 2018

For decades, the United States has stood alone as the world’s sole superpower, leading to a lack of focus on emerging great power threats. As a result, the U.S. military has built exquisite communications systems that are not designed to withstand the dangers of a peer or near-peer conflict. However, with the reemergence of Russian aggression in the Ukraine and China’s militarization of territorial claims in the South China Sea and their reluctant backing of North Korea, the remote possibility of a peer conflict is becoming ever more probable. This increasing possibility requires a readjustment in the U.S. deterrence posture. This is perhaps most apparent in U.S. military communication methods. To remain competitive, communication systems designed for operating in a low-intensity conflict must be retooled, and old paradigms of command and control and network design need to adapt to overcome the demonstrated exploitations of peer adversaries. This paper points out several of these exquisite vulnerabilities and suggests alternate paradigms for addressing them.


Author: Ms. Yong-Hee Andrean

Published: June 2018

The Korean Peninsula remains of strategic importance to the United States and to the security of its Northeast Asian regional allies and partners. Consequently, the United States must prepare strategic policies to provide optimal and viable solutions for long-term regional stability. As the U.S. containment policy toward North Korea is no longer effective, the United States must establish a new sustainable strategy to end North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. This strategic research paper provides an overview of the strategic environment in Northeast Asia, assesses the perspectives of regional powers and their potential influence on the Korean Peninsula, and explores information-based strategies aimed at the Kim regime collapse. It then describes the U.S. role of preparing for and facilitating a peaceful, democratic reunification of the Korean peninsula. Finally, this paper recommends U.S. policies to achieve the desired end state of a democratic unified Korea.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Shanon E. Anderson

Published: June 2018

Strategic war planners at combatant commands often work to develop military advice for national-level strategy on wicked problems with undetermined political objectives. The strategic wicked problems are extremely complex with multiple actors, many strategic variables, and no apparent solution. Political objectives are understandably undetermined as they may depend on the military's assessment of military options. However, traditional military planning doctrine and methodology treat political objectives as prerequisites for planning and as a measure from which to perform course-of-action comparison. Military strategists' assessments of military options for strategic wicked problems require broader strategic thinking, specifically Strategic Art and Design for national-level strategy, with more consideration for all elements of national power. This research proposes examples of doctrinal guidance on Strategic Art and Design for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Planning. The models and methodology facilitate strategists' synthesis of relevant theory on strategy, psychology, international relations, and war. While not overly prescriptive, models and methods assist strategists in asking the right questions to understand the strategic environment and build strategy.


Author: Colonel Jeffery T. Allison

Published: June 2018

In 1994, a three-month long genocide engulfed Rwanda resulting in 800,000 deaths and enduring instability across the Great Lakes region of Africa. The United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda was unable to deter or effectively respond to the violence because the UN Security Council did not adjust to the changing conditions, and the peacekeeping force lacked credibility. Additionally, despite sufficient knowledge of the situation, the United States did not adequately support United Nations’ efforts. As of 2018, the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) shares the same characteristics. According to the principles underpinning U.S. National Security Strategies since the end of the Cold War, the United States should increase its direct support for MONUSCO. Investing manpower and materiel to help the United Nations succeed in the Great Lakes region is consistent with American values and advances America’s long-term strategic interests.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey D. Adkins

Published: June 2018

As policy and decision makers evaluate the global strategic environment they must understand the underlying cultural and historical context in which competitors and allies view the actions taken and statements made by the United States. Kautilya’s “The Arthashastra” provides key insights for evaluating the actions undertaken by other nations and assists in determining the motives behind them. Understanding Kautilya’s writing requires a basic level of background information on Kautilya himself and his intent for writing “The Arthashastra.” Using the disciplines of an effective strategic advisor to evaluate Kautilya’s insights provides a clear categorization of his thoughts and can assist in applying his principles where they are applicable. Finally, applying Kautilya’s theory to modern day actions highlights an alternative method for viewing available information and establishing the context associated with observed actions.


Author: BRIG GEN Azhar Abbasi

Published: October 2017

South Asia is a pivotal region of over 1.5 billion people where the risk of nuclear war may be increasing. After three previous conventional wars, the nuclear armament of both Pakistan and India has served to deter conflict; but also brought about a shift in strategies. In an effort to overcome the current standoff, India has continued to invest billions of dollars to increase its conventional forces, searched for ways in which to capitalize on its conventional military advantage, and circumvent possible Pakistani nuclear response. India’s adoption of the so-called Cold Start Doctrine (CSD) or Pro-Active Strategy is designed to exploit India’s conventional advantage and preclude possible Pakistani first use. The adoption and possible implementation of CSD portends increased regional tension and possible disastrous consequences. CSD presupposes a wide range of spurious assumptions regarding international, domestic and Pakistani reactions. Similar to the German Schlieffen Plan, Indian strategists have settled on what assumptions they need to make their conventional forces relevant vice what they actually expect to occur. This paper examines the regional context, assesses the factors influencing the adoption of CSD, postulates the possible implications of the strategy on regional security and offers a plausible way forward for regional stability


Author: BRIG GEN Ahmad Nasir Abd Rahman

Published: October 2017

Recent development in the South China Sea (SCS) indicated some positive headway or “silver lining” that brings hope back to the peaceful resolution of the disputes. Amidst all of its aggressive actions, China has nevertheless repeatedly made statements for peaceful resolution and offered a two track approach for China and ASEAN nations for joint management and development activities. ASEAN and its claimants should not miss this window of opportunity opened by China. Using the “ASEAN Way” concept, ASEAN claimants should resolve their overlapping EEZ disputes first before engaging China. Proceeding for arbitration under international law as provided by UNCLOS should only be used as a last resort to contain China to overcome negotiations deadlock. Meanwhile, US military presence is still regarded as guarantor to the region’s peace and stability. The “silver lining” is achievable and the Chinese gesture is a positive indicator that will allow cooperation through diplomacy to forge ahead towards the attainment of regional peace and stability.


Author: LTC Jason P. Affolder

Published: October 2017

This paper reviews Department of Defense and U.S. Army policies, strategies and emerging concepts to discern operational energy and logistics implications to determine if it is possible to reduce our logistics footprint while improving mobility and lethality in the future way the Army will fight. The paper explores and recommends energy-related contingency basing and mobility alternatives (ways) for deployed operations supporting the end of accomplishing the mission by making optimal use of available resources with the lowest possible logistics footprint. The paper recommends several doctrinal, training, organizational and material changes to support improved energy efficiency and combat capability. The paper concludes that it is possible to reduce the logistics footprint while improving combat capability and suggests that a robust operational energy effort is vital to supporting our national interests in the anticipated strategic environment of the future. Leaders must understand the paradox that we become more lethal and survivable when we become more fuel efficient and shift funds appropriately; shrinking the tail through efficiency gains in the tooth enables greater spending on the tooth.


Author: LTC Esther J. Aguigui

Published: October 2017

The research provided in this paper examines the Philippines, China and United States interests in the South China Sea. It presents a challenging question: Given the complexities of the Philippines-China maritime tensions in the South China Sea, how can the US maintain its alliance with the Philippines while avoiding a conflict with China in the Philippine-China maritime dispute in the region? It unfolds the longstanding Philippines-China maritime dispute and proposes possible diplomatic and legal settlements. The analysis will show that America can maintain security in the SCS in three ways: by supporting a new Philippines-China relationship, by empowering the Association of Southeast Asian Nations as a collective security body, and by maintaining a productive relationship with China. Finally, it offers recommendations for the US to strengthen its alliance with the Philippines and to build a partnership with China to achieve America’s strategic goals in the region.


Author: COL Stephanie Ahern

Published: October 2017

In Crimea, Donbass, Aleppo, and over the English Channel, Russia is using its still-modernizing military to (re)gain territory, secure geopolitical access and influence, convey geopolitical strength domestically and internationally, and test the political resolve of others. While the Russians pose a real military threat to the United States and many European countries, the U.S. Army should ensure it prepares against Russian – and not Soviet – forces. This paper builds on tactical and operational analyses of how Russians approach war against a competing power to outline strategic implications for the U.S. Army. The paper concludes that understanding how Russians approach war, while keeping Russian successes and problems in context, will allow U.S. leaders to pursue military and political policies that maintain respect for this resurgent Russian power without overestimating Russia’s military capabilities.


Author: COL Scott T. Allen

Published: October 2017

During World War II the U.S. Army developed an initial military training (IMT) System that was responsible for preparing over two and a half million soldiers for service. Within the military element of national power, trained men and women establish the foundation upon which the Army builds and sustains the means of strategy. As such, the process of inducting civilians and training them to a level where they can seamlessly integrate – and meaningfully contribute – to a tactical unit is an issue of strategic import. Examining the doctrine, organization, training methods, material, leadership, personnel, and facilities employed by U.S. Army in WWII to execute initial military training yields several important lessons. Additionally, it exposes tensions that when left unaddressed created turmoil in the system, forcing the U.S. Army to adopt less than optimal measures in individual training and replacement operations. These tensions revolved around decisions concerning course length, training unit organization, and levels of occupational specialization and expertise. However, the Army can avoid many of these tensions by making changes to contemporary policies related to facilities, force design, and personnel actions.


Author: Lt Col Michael F. Arnone

Published: October 2017

The United States must leverage all elements of national power with an emphases on the countries of Vietnam, Indonesia, and Malaysia to blunt Chinese expansion within the South China Sea. Specifically, China must cease their destabilizing actives, be brought into compliance with the international rules based order, and become a partner for stability and continued economic development within the region. To accomplish this, the United States must set conditions through diplomatic efforts, an information campaign, cooperative military engagements, and economic agreements to facilitate the establishment of a cooperative framework that reduces tensions within the South China Sea.


Author: BRIG GEN Nadeem Ashraf

Published: October 2017

Global dynamics have increased the number, variety and lethality of potential adversaries to include enabling powerful non-state entities. A wide range of non-state actors are acting in consonance with and opposition to traditional nation states in disrupting commerce, seizing resources, threatening security and coercing and undermining governments. Correspondingly, traditional nation states are conducting subversive activities, attempting to avoid attribution and potential retribution, while expanding territory and influence through coercion and provocations short of war. This so-called “Hybrid Warfare” context is emerging with on-going conflicts in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, Africa, the South China Sea and South Asia. This paper examines the key aspects of hybrid warfare, assesses the various uses of the term and arrives at a definition applicable to its whole-of-government context. Next, it assesses the projected vision of the future strategic environment using the US Joint Chiefs Staff’s ‘Joint Operating Environment 2035’ that projects the future conditions relevant to the changing character of war. The paper then proposes a conceptual framework for both analyzing “hybrid war” and for formulating effective stratagems to prevail in those conflicts. It concludes by identifying some essential measures needed to successfully implement hybrid war stratagems.


Author: LT COL Artem Avdalyan

Published: October 2017

The dissolution of the former Soviet Union did not result in the long-desired and internationally recognized self-determination and independence for the region and the people of Artsakh. Artsakh formally used the constitution of the Soviet Union to declare its independence and Azerbaijan utilized the same legal framework when it became an independent republic. However, the resulting Nagorno-Karabakh armed conflict involved Artsakh’s Armenian ethnic population, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. This armed conflict has not formally ended and regularly flares up with low intensity border incidents or more serious military incursions (e.g., the April 2016 “four-day war”), with consequent military and civilian losses. Azerbaijan, an oil-rich but autocratically ruled state, has utilized its oil wealth to dramatically increase its defense expenditures and arms purchases without, however, acquiring the capacity to impose a “military solution” to this ongoing crisis. Azerbaijan has also utilized the Nagorno-Karabakh crisis as a justification for its own domestic politics and as an excuse to avoid meaningful settlement negotiations. Because this crisis involves the interests of multiple actors, e.g., Armenia, Azerbaijan, Russia, Turkey, its peaceful and permanent settlement will serve multiple interests especially economic ones. Past international precedent and U.S. involvement can play a constructive role in this regard.


Author: LTC Richard R. Balestri

Published: October 2017

The tumultuous events of 1979, including the Iranian attack on the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, provided an ominous backdrop for President Jimmy Carter’s January 1980 State of the Union Address. A portion of this speech became known as the Carter Doctrine and signaled to the world that America considered the Persian Gulf region a vital interest and if threatened, would employ all instruments of national power to defend it. During the past four decades, the Carter Doctrine and the associated U.S. military presence in the Arabian (Persian) Gulf region have impacted the American enduring interests of security, economic prosperity, values, and international order to varying degrees. Additionally, the implementation of the Carter Doctrine created an environment conducive to the large-scale export of petroleum from the Arabian Gulf to its most oil-dependent customers: China, Japan, India, and South Korea. A significant incongruence exists between America’s role as the Arabian Gulf’s de facto security guarantor and its low level of reliance on oil from this region. A revised Carter Doctrine proposes that security commitments in the Arabian Gulf are proportional to the economic benefit both exporting and importing countries derive from this security.


Author: COL James Bartholomees

Published: October 2017

As the United States and European nations contend with rising Russian aggression, we are faced with a significant Russian information campaign designed to question western liberal values and portray Russia as the saviors of Eurasia. In order to rise above the chatter and create a clear, consistent imperative, the US should insist that Russia respect the sovereignty of its neighbors. Focusing on independent nation states prospering in liberal institutions of their choice, the US should work with its allies to counter the most egregious cases of Russian disinformation, while seeking to allay Russian fears by publicly rejecting any attempt to destabilize their government and domestic society. This paper will outline a renewed US narrative to support diplomatic, military, economic and informational messages for the benefit of joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multi-national execution across all domains. The goal of the US narrative change is to realistically address Russian aggression with a clear, united message while leaving open conditional invitations for Russia to enter existing European economic institutions.


Author: COL John C. Becking

Published: October 2017

This paper examines the conflict of Constitutionally established state sovereignty and disaster response primacy with the broad federal authority to respond proactively to disasters. This paper examines the legal framework and historical examples that undergird this conflict for Title X forces in disaster response. The author suggests a decision-making framework to guide the federal government in determining when to respond proactively to disasters with Title X forces. This framework consists of three principles to inform a proactive federal response and eight disaster characteristics that support a proactive federal response. The author concludes with four additional state implications that the federal government should consider.


Author: COL Leslie D. Begley

Published: October 2017

In today’s environment of budgetary restraints and an eroding technological edge over its enemies and near peer competitors, the Army is in need of capabilities that spawn innovation and gain efficiencies to improve Soldier and unit readiness. Additive manufacturing is an emerging technology that the Army can leverage to enable innovation and address readiness concerns. Due to the wide-range of applications, from strategic-level research and development to tactical level unit-sustainment functions, additive manufacturing stands as a promising technology to produce the greatest overall impact for the Army. This paper will provide a brief introduction of various additive manufacturing technologies, including types, capabilities and resources; examine how additives manufacturing can assist with maintaining a technological dominance through improvements in the acquisition process; provide possible applications for improving Soldier and unit readiness; and finally identify challenges that the Army must address in order to fully implement additive manufacturing technologies and distribute the capabilities throughout the force.


Author: LTC Marc E. Belscamper

Published: October 2017

Senior leaders from the three Army components – Active Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve – continue to engage in ethical misconduct despite years of experience, knowledge, education, and training. Though ethical misconduct occurs at all levels of leadership amid uniformed and civilian members of the Army Total Force, this paper focuses on this unique group of uniformed senior leaders and the prevalent ethical violations, both perceived and substantiated, between the three Army components. The intent is to look at this unacceptable problem with a balanced approach to determine if the unique cultures of the three components influence ethical misconduct or if there is a systemic Army problem among senior leaders. Using Department of the Army Inspector General data, the top three substantiated allegations against colonels and above are identified, the findings analyzed, and recommendations provided to help prevent future senior leader ethical misconduct and potential strategic implications for both the Army Total Force and the nation.


Author: COL Mark J. Berglund

Published: October 2017

This paper justifies the need and proposes a strategy to establish a Trainees, Transients, Holdees, and Students like account within the U.S. Army National Guard (ARNG) and outlines four key measures that would enable its successful implementation. First, the Army needs to identify the ‘critical’ capabilities and related ARNG organizations that are required early in the force flow or are essential for strategic success against the Four Plus One National Security Challenges; i.e., meets the contingency requirements and threats posed by Russia, China, North Korea and Iran, plus those for countering terrorism. Second, the ARNG should focus its management efforts on the identified ‘critical’ organizations and establish balanced ‘unit groupings of excellence’ of state forces, with the appropriate manning priorities, expertly distributed for over-strength/under-strength manning, collective training and state missions. Third, and in conjunction with the Associated Units Pilot Program, the Army should develop a resourcing strategy to apply additional ‘operations tempo’ resources to enable the ‘critical’ units to meet the postulated contingency requirements. Finally, the ARNG needs to rebalance its force structure across the 54 States, Territories and the District of Columbia to address the existing underlying manning challenges.


Author: COL Michael J. Birmingham

Published: October 2017

ISIS and its predecessor, al-Qaeda, have proven difficult to defeat with any finality. Similarly, violent Salafist ideology has also proven to be resilient and increasingly attractive in numerous populations. In order to craft an effective strategy against these adversaries, we must think of them not simply as organizations, but rather as mass social movements. This paper examines the work of Eric Hoffer to gain better insight into the power and dynamics of mass movements. Many of Hoffer’s ideas can be operationalized to increase our chances of defeating ISIS and its confederates. Key elements of a strategy should include continued targeting of key leaders, dissemination of profiles of at risk individuals, the creation of an effective counter-narrative, and the deepening of civil society to provide competition for violent extremist mass movements. It is through a better understanding of mass movements that we can craft a better strategy for a durable victory.


Author: COL Bilbili Bitri

Published: October 2017

The fall of the Berlin Wall marked the beginning of a new era, an era of change for the world and without a doubt for Albania and its armed forces. Transformation via comprehensive reforms is the only way for Albania to keep up with change and embark on the ‘bandwagon’ of democratic countries. The western-oriented civil-military relations reforms are an important dimension of this transformation and, in many ways, have contributed to the Albanian armed forces’ transformation. Though the overall ‘picture’ of civil-military relations in the post-Cold War Albania at first glance looks good, a closer look would shed light on the real state of these relations. The argument is that Albanian civil-military relations today are merely a reflection of Albania’s overall state of democratic development. This paper will discuss the relevance of civil-military relations theory and its very limited tradition in Albania, the awkwardness of these relations in the communist regime, the emerging of a ‘hybrid’ form of civilian control of the military and the ongoing effort to fully democratize Albanian civil-military relations.


Author: COL James C. Bliss

Published: October 2017

The 1959 Antarctic Treaty System constructed on liberal ideals to address superpower tension and sovereignty claims was successful in the 20th Century, promoting global cooperation through scientific research and environmental protection. This system is redundant for the 21st Century geopolitical environment because realist nations, like China, seek to ascend to global leadership and secure resources to meet national objectives and sustain economic growth. China’s thirst for energy, rare earth minerals and marine resources point to future conflict with other treaty nations. Potential triggers to conflict with China in Antarctica include the dissolution of the Antarctic Treaty System; challenges to China’s rise; Chinese support to flagged vessels; militarization of bases; and exploitation of resources. The Antarctic Treaty System, to survive in the 21st Century, must adjust to address historical sovereignty claims, rising power national interests, representative leadership, and ensure robust international governance and norms. The U.S., as the hegemonic Antarctic power, must lead this transformation in order to ensure future security of this commons.


Author: CH (COL) James L. Boggess

Published: October 2017

Computers are becoming an ever-increasing part of the decision-making process. From managing data to help humans make informed decisions to decision support systems that develop and recommend or select courses of action, computer enhanced decision-making is already impacting the way America fights her wars. As computers carry more and more of the decision-making burden, humans are left to wrestle with the ethical and moral issues. The potential for psychological and moral injury remains and may even grow as a result of computer enhanced decision-making. As decision support systems make decision-making seem more like a game, humans will have less time and may be less likely to fully review courses of action for ethical and moral compatibility. In some instances, especially if collateral damage results in civilian casualties, the human “in, on, or over” the decision loop may feel personally responsible for the action and, as a result, find that their ethical and moral core has been violated, leading to psychological or moral injury. As the military continues to pursue artificial intelligence, automated, and autonomous systems, equal care must be taken to ensure these systems operate within approved ethical and moral boundaries and that their operators are properly trained in ethical decision-making.


Author: COL Remus H. Bondor

Published: October 2017

Russia's destabilizing actions and policies noticeably transformed the geopolitical environment in the region, bringing a threatening uncertainty about regional security arrangements. The purpose of this paper is to present Romania’s options in a strategic environment where Russia act more assertive and aggressive. It focuses on three areas. First, it explains what the historical roots of the perception that Russia is a threat for Romanians are. Second, the paper will explore the current European regional strategic environment and possible future evolutions in Southeastern Europe. Finally, it will present some options to enhance Romanian Armed Forces capabilities and increase their interoperability. These options allow the consolidation of national defense capacity and strengthen Romania’s profile within NATO and the EU.


Author: Lt Col Ralph E. Bordner

Published: October 2017

The increased use of small satellites, or smallsats, by both nation-state and non-nation-state actors violates the assumptions that current, internationally accepted space debris mitigation guidelines are based upon. Consequently, smallsats change the character and level of risk of on-orbit collisions. In an effort to preserve critical orbital regimes, this paper posits that the U.S. should define near-term, smallsat design and operational best practices to be used as a basis for U.S. policy, leadership and international cooperation. To establish an initial set of best practices, the U.S. should leverage the histories of naval, air and space international norm and law development, as well as current and near-term technical capabilities. U.S. policy and international involvement is the best way to steer space community practices and eventual international law, and the strongest evidence for this idea is history and precedent.


Author: CH (LTC) David Bowlus

Published: October 2017

The toxic emotion of shame plays a sinister role in senior leader misconduct. It is a strategic issue for the Army as trusted leadership is a vital aspect of military readiness and civilian-military relationships. Unlike other negative emotions, shame is a core belief that one is alone, worthless, and fundamentally flawed. Military leaders are influenced by contemporary culture, which has transformed from a guilt-culture to a shame-culture. Military culture and the demands on senior leaders enable shame in various ways, however, leaders must recognize shame’s impact in their lives, effectively address it, and shape their organization’s culture to mitigate shame’s effects. Leaders should practice shame resiliency in their lives and organizations by developing greater self-awareness, vulnerability, empathy, and engaging in resources that mitigate shame. The Army can mitigate the toxic effects of shame through clearer policy, training, and leveraging capabilities such as the U.S. Army Chaplain Corps. As a result, the Army’s senior leaders will avoid the corrosive effects of shame, embrace the call to character, and retain the vital trust of their subordinates and a grateful nation.


Author: Mr Joseph A. Brooks

Published: October 2017

Time is tacitly understood and often taken for granted; it is a complex multi-faceted construct that must be fully understood for cogent strategy formulation. Through a multidisciplinary survey of the fields of history, anthropology, science, sociology, and psychology, this paper aims to provide strategic leaders with a deeper understanding of time’s many facets. Moreover, this paper enriches the strategic planning process by exposing the assumption of absolute time. Time is not absolute; it is relative to the observer scientifically and culturally. This paper helps strategic leaders grasp with the unexplored frontier of relative time. This paper also identifies the possibility that leaders can make use of national instruments of power to strategically manipulate time to achieve their ends.


Author: LTC john F. Cadran

Published: October 2017

The theft of intellectual property (IP) threatens the United States' economy and national security. This unparalleled theft of IP is damaging our economy and its current trajectory threatens the future economic security of the United States. This paper examines IP theft by first taking a historical look at economic espionage. This paper then highlights the stark inability to deter IP theft in the cyber domain because of the fundamental differences between virtual IP and physical IP. After which, this paper analyzes current efforts to deter IP theft and shape international cyber behavioral norms. Finally, the paper offers two recommendations in order to counter this risk to national economic security. First, the U.S. must increase funding for the Department of Justice to help deter future theft and reinforce emerging international cyber behavioral norms. Additionally, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) must mandate a data exchange standard so that cyber threat information can be exchanged and acted on in near-real time.


Author: Lt Col Charles B. Cain

Published: October 2017

Combining the strategic lessons of the 2,500-year-old Chinese game of Go with artificial intelligence (AI) has the potential to make those lessons more broadly applicable and improve strategic decision making without requiring a cultural background or expertise in the game. It will allow human decision makers to focus on their strengths and overcome their cognitive weaknesses. By creating a model of the world based on a Go framework, an AI algorithm can become an expert in that world, understand a given situation, and then look far into the future, across many possible courses of action to help human decision makers determine which next moves will best meet their objectives. This could be used to create a real-time, forecasting common operating picture that can advise decision makers on the next best move, while predicting the likely moves of an adversary. In the end, by teaming with human decision makers to think faster, deeper, and more accurately, this type of AI will provide a decisive strategic advantage to those most willing to use it.


Author: COL Steven N. Carozza

Published: October 2017

President Eisenhower, in his final days in office and using the farewell address to the nation as a vehicle, communicated a stark warning to the nation. His counsel was that despite the desire to reduce defense spending during periods of relative peace, it was precisely during these periods that investment would be necessary to ensure that our long-term security could endure. In recent years the foresight of President Eisenhower has fallen victim to the challenges of balancing competing priorities and is undermined by a prevailing assumption that the resources necessary to wage war will be there when we need them. That assumption is visible today in our reliance upon aging infrastructure to both produce and deliver the munitions necessary for any future conflict and the expectation that these facilities, many of which have only received minimal capital reinvestment over the decades, can meet the surge capacity needed to support major contingency operations. Despite its criticality to our national interests, the organic industrial base ammunition production facilities are unlikely to meet those requirements without taking a hard look at the resourcing models that limit investment and prioritizing additional resources to address emerging vulnerabilities


Author: LTC Bradley M. Carr

Published: October 2017

The United States Government and Department of Defense (DoD) placed more priority on influence operations from WWII through the Cold War. It appears the US Government has forgotten historical lessons on the importance of dealing with threats in the information environment, especially when current threats are rapidly increasing their sophisticated influence efforts. Even with current emphasis on grey zone conflicts, hybrid warfare, or third offset strategies, it is apparent that the US does not have a construct to re-weaponize the “I” in DIME as part of any strategic vision, policy, or overall strategy. Failure to adequately shape and dominate the information environment places US national security at risk. Using Mintzberg’s organizational design concepts as a guide, this paper proposes a DoD-led influence joint interagency task for creation at the national level to develop, plan, coordinate, synchronize, execute and asses full-spectrum influence activities in the multi-domain environment.


Author: Mr Thomas J. Casker

Published: October 2017

South Sudan—despite a seemingly remote location, limited critical resources, and nearly four years of Civil War—will remain a crucial and complicated foreign policy problem for the Trump Administration. South Sudan’s latest outbreak of fighting has sparked famine, refugee flows, and cross-border fighting that threaten to distract key U.S. regional counterterrorism partners, most notably Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda. Washington can help to contain South Sudan’s instability through supporting a UN-backed Regional Protection Force (RPF) to deter and repel government and rebel attacks against civilians, diplomats, and humanitarian workers. The RPF, however, will require significant U.S. assistance to achieve its mission based on similar peace enforcement missions in sub-Saharan Africa. The RPF will require U.S. diplomatic and military assistance in preventing meddling by the South Sudanese government, in securing troops from regional governments, in equipping the RPF with the capabilities necessary for force projection, and in finding an experienced commander to lead the RPF. The RPF should reduce the spread of fighting and would provide a signal to the belligerents that the U.S. and regional governments are deeply committed to finding a lasting political solution to roots behind the conflict.


Author: LTC Michael F. Charnley

Published: October 2017

The United States, China, and Taiwan have a long and confusing history concerning the “one China” policy. While the United States bears a moral responsibility to recognize Taiwan as a rising democracy it has not done so despite Taiwan being a key economic trading partner and an integral defense partner in the East Asia region. There is a real concern that recognition of Taiwanese independence will result in China engaging in major combat operations to prevent an independent Taiwan from becoming a reality. Arguments will put forth that proper U.S. application of landpower will act as a deterrent and prevent China from exercising a military option in response to formal Taiwanese independence.


Author: COL Bryan J. Chivers

Published: October 2017

It is not surprising that the major factor influencing the career decisions of married soldiers who leave the Army is not salary or lack of opportunities for advancement but rather an inability to balance the demands of work and family. Conceptually, a balanced lifestyle makes sense to most people, but in actuality, balance is an inaccurate and unhealthy paradigm for thinking about and understanding how professional military lives intersect with personal lives. In reality, the too often espoused paradigm or concept of balance is unattainable and contributes to Army service member attrition which affects retention and overall readiness. The evolving character of military families and the military workforce necessitate a change in how the Army, its leaders, and service members and their families approach their respective commitments. This research project asserts that an integrated approach to accomplishing both family and work obligations will better sustain both the individual and his or her family during a rewarding yet challenging military lifestyle, and ultimately yield positive outcomes for military professionals, their organizations, and society.


Author: COL Erik L. Christiansen

Published: October 2017

The 2016 presidential election caused debate over the propriety of retiree endorsements. The debate has occurred every election cycle since at least 1992. The trend toward partisan advocacy in retired senior flag officers threatens the apolitical nature of the U.S. military profession. Past efforts to end retiree endorsements failed due to complacency, key leaders opposing change or remaining silent, and the failure of those seeking change to develop and communicate an effective vision and strategy. Absent a new approach, the increasingly disturbing trend of retiree endorsements will continue. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), as the steward of the military profession, joined by other senior military leaders and key stakeholders beyond the active duty military, must engage in a deliberate, continuous, and holistic effort to change military culture and establish the norm that retired military personnel refrain from partisan campaigning. By developing and communicating an effective vision for change, the CJCS can guide military professionals to promote the military’s apolitical nature, foster healthy civil-military relations, and preserve the military’s trust with civilian leadership and the public.


Author: COL Marc A. Cloutier

Published: October 2017

Colonel is one of the most critical and versatile ranks in the Army. Colonels must be experts at the tactical, operational, and strategic level, and are the bridge between tactical and strategic leader. Surprisingly, the duties, responsibilities, and skill sets associated with this pivotal position are ill defined. So is the way in which colonels are tracked and managed. There is also very little development which occurs once an officer is selected for colonel. Without clear requirements, and a clear view of the colonel population, it is difficult to identify capability gaps in colonel development. If clear gaps are not identified, then the process of building colonels and implementing a leader development program may miss the mark. This paper will explore how the Army can build better colonels.


Author: COL Richard D. Conkle

Published: October 2017

Current Intelligence Warfighting Function training strategies are inadequate to properly prepare Echelon Corps and Below intelligence personnel to provide relevant, timely and predictive analysis to commanders. Iraq and Afghanistan intelligence requirements have focused on network and kinetic targeting. While necessary, this shift has allowed core tasks such as Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield and predictive analysis to atrophy. This paper argues that three concepts influence the success of Echelon Corps and Below intelligence officers: 1) the establishment of a graduated training strategy that culminates in an objective certification for intelligence officers and their sections, 2) the development of an institutional framework that teaches intelligence architecture to officers who likely have little understanding of what it is or what it is supposed to do, and 3) understanding the “intangibles” that can significantly enhance or detract from an intelligence officer’s ability to provide situational understanding at echelon.


Author: Cdr Shannon A. Corey

Published: October 2017

Promoting stability in Sub-Saharan Africa, the least developed Sub-region in the world, presents significant challenges for the U.S. military. Historically, it was not colonial armies, but rather naval supremacy and sea-borne trade routes that have had more of an impact on Africa through the ages. Therefore, it is noteworthy to investigate what landpower capabilities are most useful to a “whole of government” effort to promote stability in Sub-Saharan Africa over the coming decade. This paper analyzes the strategy and policy directives guiding U.S. interests in West Africa, compares and contrast the components of defense, diplomacy, and development that comprise the U.S. strategy, and explores what landpower recommendations are most useful. This analysis reveals that a refinement of military crisis response capabilities, a refinement of military support DoS and USAID activities, and a DoD organizational refocus landpower will be most effective to contribute to a whole of government approach to stability in the coming decade.


Author: COL Susan Coyle

Published: October 2017

The Chief of the Australian Army has set a goal of increasing the female representation rate from 12.1 percent to 15 percent by 2023, with the ultimate goal of 25 percent female representation longer term. This paper will use Meyer and Allen's Three-Component Organizational Commitment Model to analyze how to develop and retain talent in high potential female officers in the Australian Army. This analysis will compare data with other nations attending Army War College, information obtained from Defence reports, and survey data from Australian Army female soldiers and officers. The primary recommendation is that the Australian Army use organizational commitment models to better understand the issue, which is a critical prerequisite to effective action. The paper also recommends analysis on why women leave in greater numbers than men, and recommends the establishment of a Talent Management Strategy focused on retention of high potential female officers within the Australian Army.


Author: COL Cory J. Delger

Published: October 2017

In August 2008 Russia initiated military operations against Georgia to establish domination in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Within five days Russia was able to achieve its strategic objectives with minimal casualties. The swift victory over Georgia was not accidental. Russia thoroughly planned its invasion over the course of several years and formulated a well-balanced strategy that mitigated the risk of violating international norms. Six years later Russia followed a similar design when it illegally annexed Crimea and intervened in eastern Ukraine. Unlike its invasion of Georgia, Russia has been unable to achieve its strategic objectives in Ukraine. This strategy research project argues that Russia’s success in Georgia was a result of a calculated strategic formulation consisting of clearly defined objectives and careful application of its instruments of national power. In Ukraine, however, Russia’s failed to define the ends it sought to achieve before taking armed aggression and has been unsuccessful in gaining a strategic advantage.


Author: COL Michael G. Dhunjishah

Published: October 2017

From 1981 to 1992 the Active Measures Working Group (AMWG) was an interagency group focused on combating Soviet propaganda and disinformation campaigns. The working group successfully executed many counterpropaganda and counter-disinformation campaigns, to include a campaign launched by the Soviets claiming the US Military created the AIDS virus. However, after the Cold War ended the working group was disbanded. Today, the US is seeing a resurgence in Russian propaganda and disinformation campaigns, yet the current efforts to combat these campaigns have not been effective. This paper will establish a baseline for the critical definitions needed to understand the topic, examine how the AMWG was structured in the 1980s, what they were able to accomplish and what made the working group successful. The paper will also examine whether the AMWG structure and functions, updated for today’s environment, provides the right capabilities the U.S. needs to counter disinformation campaigns. Finally, the paper will highlight current challenges facing the US and provide some recommendations for a modern day AMWG.


Author: Lt Col Mark C. Dmytryszyn

Published: October 2017

Interwar years’ airpower and modern-day cyber promised to change the character of war through the application of technology. Both are contemporarily the same age and at roughly the same point on the warfighting maturation curve, a point ripe for growth in developing and codifying doctrine. This paper examines the development of airpower’s High Altitude Daylight Precision Bombing and industrial targeting doctrines through the evaluation of four decision-making models— Rational Actor, Bureaucratic Politics, Organizational Behavior, and Individual Psychological —to warn of their generic application to doctrine development in the cyber domain. The analysis’ review of decision-making found a collection of like-minded innovators falling into common traps; specifically, advancing the shared beliefs of a dominant few, groupthink, exclusion of dissent, and selecting “good enough” solutions. Today’s doctrine developers are destined to be tomorrow’s commanders, and cyber’s application will compel leaders to make guesses about its use before war’s outbreak. These guesses will be complicated by doctrine preceding capability, and a reliance on faith-based theories over experience-backed principles. However, shrewd application of these lessons learned may cyber decision-makers from falling into the same traps, promises, and pitfalls.


Author: COL Robert C. Donnelly

Published: October 2017

This paper illustrates three important reasons why it is imperative that the United States remain Latin America’s military partner of choice in the 21st Century and beyond. After providing a brief background regarding the nearly 70-year history of United States security cooperation efforts in Latin America, the paper uses Colombia as a recent historical example to highlight the success security cooperation efforts can have and the benefits that can be gained as a trusted military partner of choice. Following the background information and historical example, each of the three reasons illustrating why it remains imperative that the United States be Latin America’s military partner of choice are discussed in greater detail. Finally, the paper concludes that remaining Latin America’s military partner of choice into the 21st Century and beyond is the best way to maintain the vital partnerships required to influence and shape the hemispheric environment, assist regional allies and partners with addressing their own internal challenges, and capitalize on the hard work already invested as a low-cost approach to both achieve regional stability and ultimately secure the homeland and protect United States citizens.


Author: COL Jeton Dreshaj

Published: October 2017

After the failed negotiation at Rambouillet, in France between Kosovar Albanian and Serbs early 1999 left NATO no options but to use the force against the Yugoslav regime. For 78 days from March to Jun 1999, the United States and its NATO allies were engaged in the air campaign to bring an end to Serbian atrocities in Kosovo. UN Security Council resolution 1244 of 10 Jun 1999 and Military Technical Agreement achieved in Kumanovo, Macedonia between NATO and Yugoslavian Army open a new chapter for the future of Kosovo. This paper will address some of the biggest challenges, initiatives and unique approaches for Security Sector Reform (SSR) in post-conflict Kosovo. As such, the paper analyzes the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) program for the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), establishment of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), Kosovo Police Service (KPS) and the transitional government. Secondly, the paper addresses relevant SSR issues, such as rule of law and security force reforms in the political and strategic level, as well as enduring SSR challenges for the transformation of Kosovo Security Force into the Kosovo Armed Forces.


Author: COL Jerrett W. Dunlap

Published: October 2017

This essay explores the need for standards to measures the effectiveness of the military justice system. It analyzes three potential methods for measuring the effectiveness of the military justice system: The Trial Court Performance Standards, the Long and Nugent-Borakove proposal, and the Judicial Proceedings Panel. It concludes the three Long and Nugent-Borakove effectiveness measures best allow policymakers to assess the military justice system. These three types of measures are (1) output/outcome, (2) satisfaction and quality, and (3) efficiency and timeliness. Application of these three measures will allow policymakers to evaluate the effectiveness of the military justice system as well as proposed military-justice-reforms.


Author: COL Stephen F. Elder

Published: October 2017

The United States has invested a great deal of money and effort to defeat Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and attack IED networks over the last decade. This paper aims to identify the strategic impacts and subsequent reactions realized as a result of the IED threat in order to capitalize on lessons learned. It will specifically review organizational structure, policy/doctrine and technology development related to the strategic implications. It will also explore potential emerging threats to be considered as the U.S. and coalition forces prepare a continued defense against the IED threat. Finally, the paper will suggest necessary related improvements to maintain Counter IED (CIED) capability.


Author: COL Joseph E. Escandon

Published: October 2017

A critical assessment of the U.S. Army’s corps of general officers attributes performance in Iraq and Afghanistan to a failure to select, educate, and promote officers with the requisite strategic leadership competencies to achieve victory. The Army also recognizes that success in future conflicts will require strategic leaders with a depth of knowledge and skill sets beyond those required for the tactical realm. Several former general officers have proposed the introduction of professional development models to address these strategic leadership shortfalls. Using one of these models, this strategy research project examines the careers of four Army general officers that embody the quality of military genius – Fox Connor, George Patton, William DePuy, and Colin Powell. Each officer was examined within a framework that assesses the importance of background, education, operational assignments, institutional assignments, to include professional military education, self-development, and mentoring by senior officers. Self-development is assessed within the theory of autodidactism, or the ability of an individual to be self-taught. The findings of this study illuminate which traits account for the development of genius and provides the basis for recommendations for generating future senior leaders.


Author: COL Peter P. Feng

Published: October 2017

Global stabilization requirements provide an opportunity to increase and build partnership capacity. Strategic leaders, seeking to enhance stability, build partnership capacity, and achieve other desired end-states, need a comprehensive understanding of the relevant environments. This research provides three ways in which senior leaders can understand the stabilization operational space. The first way details economic theories that describe human behavior. The economic theories of flow, production possibilities frontier, diminishing marginal utility and expectancy are described with respect to infrastructure investment. The second way explores a combined framework that can be used by operational planners to develop effective approaches to support stabilization and infrastructure investment. Finally, a case study of an infrastructure investment is described using a customer satisfaction framework developed by Van Ryzin that combines performance, expectations, and satisfaction. Survey data collected using the Van Ryzin construct reveals that infrastructure investment in one instance in Central America did not result in a measurable gain in citizen satisfaction, highlighting the need for strategic leaders to more fully understand the stabilization operational space.


Author: COL Calondra L. Fortson

Published: October 2017

Cyberspace operations are critical to the success of the Department of Defense’s (DoD) mission in a volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous multilateral world. Just as the United States envisions major armed conflict, cyberspace operations are an existential risk to American core interests and values. To support the Army’s cyberspace strategic goals to combat growing threats from other countries, the Army must focus and strive to produce world-class cyberspace professionals by investing substantial energies into innovative recruiting, talent management and retention endeavors.


Author: LTC Luis G. Fuchu

Published: October 2017

While the role of the U.S. military in the evolving U.S.–Cuba relationship is severely limited in the near term, a broad range of possibilities exist for how the relationship might evolve in the future. Forecasting how the strategic domestic or international environment will act or react to future internal or external stimulus is almost impossible. The purpose of this paper is thus to assess the evolving U.S.–Cuba relationship and provide security cooperation options under a range of different assumptions about the environment that the military will face in the future. To analyze possible options for military engagements, this work employs three planning scenarios—based on current U.S.–Cuba policy—regarding the U.S.–Cuba strategic-political-military environment in the foreseeable future. These scenarios are: 1) a permissive environment where both governments welcome multidimensional engagements; 2) a mixed environment where one nation is more receptive to expanding engagements than the other; and 3) a restricted environment where both countries are reluctant to engage.


Author: LTC Joseph “Clete” Goetz

Published: October 2017

The United States Army, Europe has at its disposal approximately one division worth of combat power on the continent. However, enabling capabilities, like those found in functional support brigades are almost completely absent. The United States Army should rotationally deploy functional support brigades, specifically engineers, artillery, and military police to Europe. These forces will augment existing mission command capability, assist in integrating their function across the alliance, conduct security cooperation activities with their functional counterparts, and assist in setting the theater. It proposes two deployment models to implement this recommendation.


Author: COL George Hackler

Published: October 2017

Given the need for increased Army readiness in the current operational environment, shrinking budgets, and the looming threat of sequestration, the U.S. Army must do all within its power to optimize the use of resources. In Army Directive 2016-16, Changing Management Behavior: Every Dollar Counts acting Secretary of the Army Patrick Murphy reinforced that the Army must achieve the highest levels of readiness while serving as good stewards of taxpayer dollars. Comparing the U.S. Army’s PPBE process and organization to the other service’s shows that the U.S. Army can improve its ability to break organizational silos, build a more efficient and integrated program, and identify the total cost of resourcing key capabilities. Improving its PPBE organization and processes will allow the Army to more effectively use dwindling resources to maintain the combat readiness required to fight and win America’s wars.


Author: COL John Hall

Published: October 2017

Recent actions and comments made by the Philippine president, Rodrigo Duterte, have led many to believe that the longtime ally could be shifting its allegiances away from the United States and more towards China. In an October 2016 visit to China, Mr. Duterte negotiated $24.5 billion in trade deals that included investments in areas such as manufacturing, transportation, infrastructure, telecommunications, and tourism. Considering the increased tensions between the Philippines and China, few would have predicted a radical shift from a long-time relationship between the United States and the Philippines. This paper will seek to determine suitable, feasible and acceptable policy options for the United States to pursue by examining all variables that may have an impact on its relationship with the Philippines. The author believes, based on an otherwise strong U.S.-Philippine relationship and the risk that any direct actions towards the Philippines may encourage new rash behavior from Mr. Duterte, the best approach is for the United States to wait and see.


Author: Mr. Mark Hamilton

Published: October 2017

The Third Offset strategy is the Department of Defense’s effort to develop future technical capabilities to ensure that it maintains its military advantage. However, it may engender two distinct, yet compounding, moral hazards. The first moral hazard considered originates from the Third Offset’s technical focus. The Third Offset aims to reduce risks by increasing the effectiveness of weapons that remove the human warfighter from the battlefield. By distancing the human from conflict, this technology lowers not only the costs and risks associated with fighting, but the political “bar” to initiating hostilities as well. As a result, the U.S. government could inadvertently set conditions for an increase in international conflict. The second moral hazard results from the overt nature of the Third Offset’s development. The unconcealed approach and design of the Third Offset raises the likelihood that American investments in defense modernization will inadvertently subsidize similar foreign efforts through espionage and foreign material exploitation of U.S. technological designs. These moral hazards, taken together could create a situation where U.S. defense efforts will inadvertently decrease global stability and national security.


Author: COL Bernard J. Harrington

Published: October 2017

As the global strategic environment evolves in complexity, volatility, uncertainty and ambiguity, it is critically important to analyze how the U.S. Army’s talent management strategy prepares officers for service in the future strategic environment. Although the Department of Defense (DoD) emphasizes the strategic importance of talent management, transformational reform has met significant resistance by stakeholders, both internal and external to the organization. To better prepare future strategic leaders who are capable of thriving in a complex, multi-domain environment, the U.S. Army must fundamentally change its talent management culture by implementing additional, new embedding and reinforcing change mechanisms. These mechanisms include the dedication of resources, deliberate role modeling, the implementation of an officer broadening strategy, and the refinement of company grade officer evaluation reports and centralized selection board processes.


Author: LTC Ryan Hellerstedt

Published: October 2017

The direct involvement of Russian and U.S. forces into Syria has provided a new flashpoint for U.S.-Russian relations, but more importantly, provided several lessons learned that should inform the new U.S. administration’s policy on Russia. Syria’s civil war is volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous. The conflict has spilled into or drawn in much of the region, including Syria’s Shia-centric Assad Regime allies Iran, Russia, and Lebanese Hezbollah. Opposing them are the Sunni militia and rebel groups supported by much of the Sunni Gulf Arab states, and finally a third party of U.S.-backed Syrian Kurds fighting the self-declared Caliphate of the Islamic State. Using the analysis from observations in Syria, the U.S. should develop a comprehensive national strategy that encompasses all aspects of national power: diplomacy, information, military, and economics, to address the broader U.S. policy on Russia. This new policy should address concerns in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and the increasingly multi-polar world as China develops and exercises new national power.


Author: Lt Col Timothy Hofman

Published: October 2017

The US has committed military force to two significant operations since the withdrawal from Iraq—the 2011 intervention in Libya and the 2014 intervention against ISIS. In both of these cases, the President has broadly interpreted Article II of the US Constitution and the 2001 AUMF to justify his actions. Meanwhile, Congress has not challenged these expansions of presidential war authority, leading to a divergence from the constitutional design of the US government. Congress should use the opportunity of a new session and a fresh presidential administration to repeal the outdated 2001 and 2002 AUMFs and replace them with an AUMF focused on defeating ISIS. This will restore Congress’ role as the branch with constitutional responsibility to authorize the use of military force.


Author: Cdr Kenneth M. Jensen

Published: October 2017

The Navy has noted its current shipboard air platforms are insufficient to project power in a future conflict with near peer competitors. To alleviate this shortfall, the Navy is making a concerted effort to increase its investment in unmanned air system (UAS) technology. Navy strategic leaders must prepare the Naval Aviation community now to ensure UAS are integrated effectively and efficiently into the fleet. Current Navy manned pilot culture might not welcome this major transition and may present significant resistance against UAS playing a larger role in Naval Aviation. The purpose of this paper is to identify the potential cultural challenges created by the strong personalities of Naval Aviators, project the possible impacts these challenges will pose on Naval Aviation’s future, and recommend possible solutions to Navy leadership. This analysis reviews Naval Aviation’s UAS platforms and current Navy pilot culture. It examines cultural challenges in the US Air Force and US Army to seek lessons for the Navy to consider, and offers recommendations based on the organizational change models of John Kotter and Fred Nickols.


Author: LTC Andrew W. Jones

Published: October 2017

Within society and its military, the complexities of 21st century life embroil leaders in ethical and command dilemmas. From the Commander in Chief down to the newest lieutenant, all take an oath to support and defend the Constitution often without knowing the origins of its most fundamental principles. As United States Army leadership continues to stress the tenets of Mission Command, values, and ethics in their professional military education (PME) curriculum, and struggle with how to apply these in their formations, one question resonates in the halls of senior military institutions: why do we overlook the Age of Enlightenment in explaining these concepts? Re-examining the Enlightenment as a means to broaden an understanding of Mission Command, values, and ethical reasoning cannot be underestimated in the future development of the Army officer corps. Reconnecting with the foundational principles of liberty, fraternity, tolerance, trust, and self-awareness, to name a few, through the prism of those who brought these enduring principles into the light will only enhance critical thinking and leadership studies.


Author: CDR Daniel C. Jones

Published: October 2017

The current layered approach of identifying, interdicting, and securing WMD within the maritime transportation system is effective in preventing the importation of WMD along the East, West, and Gulf coasts but fails to effectively address the short notice and localized requirements in the Great Lakes region. Due to trade growth within the Great Lakes region and the complexities along the U.S. and Canadian border, designated federal response forces are unable to respond to a reported threat in time to prevent a hostile vessel from reaching the U.S. shore. To address this threat, the U.S. Government should implement a new joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational framework to train, equip, and coordinate forces capable of countering these threats. By utilizing federal, state and local law enforcement agencies trained in maritime response and Close Quarters Combat / SWAT, the Captain of the Port will gain the tools needed to address any threat posed by non-compliant large commercial vessels.


Author: COL Derek Jones

Published: October 2017

In 1961, French counterinsurgency theorist and practitioner Roger Trinquier wrote that the “master concept” of “modern war”—wars between nation states and insurgents and terrorists—is the destruction of the clandestine insurgent and terrorist organizations. The theory presented in this work, the Simultaneous Attack/Persistent Pursuit (SAPP) theory, achieves Trinquier’s master concept. It is a theory of war following the historical pattern of military theories aimed at the destruction of the enemy forces through maneuver and annihilation, but does so using an element of complexity theory called “emergence.” The theory achieves decisive success by denying two key aspects of insurgent and terrorist warfare—ambiguity and protractedness. It denies ambiguity by applying overwhelming force simultaneously against all known or suspected elements of the clandestine organization to shock the system and force the emergence or exposure of formerly hidden elements. Persistent pursuit is then used to rapidly force the continued emergence of the remaining elements until decisively destroyed to deny protractedness.


Author: Lt Col Matthew E. Jones

Published: October 2017

The current Air Force officer personnel management system has not been significantly updated since the service’s inception in 1947. Driving the need for personnel management improvements are changing military-family dynamics, expectations from today’s millennial generation, and a growing civil-military gap. Keeping the status quo ultimately risks talent retention. The Air Force is aware and already working on overhauling performance reports, officer stratifications, and promotions. This research focuses on areas that are not being overhauled, namely the officer assignment system and professional military education. Through this analysis, opportunities emerge for the system to not only be more responsive to officers’ and their family’s preferences, but to also develop officers who are more cognitively diverse. In doing so, officers will improve their problem-solving skills and ultimately provide better outcomes. The paper first recommends developing a new market based assignment system where the affected members and the gaining commanders have more input than they do today. The second recommendation proposes more opportunities for mid-career officers to attend civilian graduate programs in lieu of Air Command and Staff College. While these recommendations are responsive to the external environment, the ultimate goal is to improve talent retention and produce better outcomes.


Author: COL Mark G. Kappelmann

Published: October 2017

This paper is an exploration into the status of the American Military Profession in the year 2047. It is based upon a fictional letter written by General Howie Herding, the 48th Chief of Staff of the Army, to General (Ret.) Martin Dempsey on his 95th birthday. The letter explores how we define and assess professions. Many present-day ethicists and military historians predict that the profession is in decline. Given this presumption, this paper looks to answer the questions of ‘Why did the American Military Profession cease to exist?’ and ‘How did it cease to exist?’ The strongest argument regarding the assessment of the profession is centered around professional powers. The loss of power or authority, taken by either the executive or legislative branches, is the manifestation of a decline in the profession. The purpose of this paper is to impart this important lesson in order to guide our self-policing professional requirements.


Author: COL Kapeh K. Kazir

Published: October 2017

Historically, people or groups of citizens have risen to the challenge of combatting perceived or genuine threats to the security of their community and carried out actions in that regard without legal authority. Such groups are generally referred to as “vigilantes.” Their rise usually emanates from the seeming inability of constituted authority to enforce law and order, or perceived delays in carrying out justice. This study examines the Anti-Communist Vigilantes in the Philippines, Anti-Taliban Vigilantes in Afghanistan and the Civilian Joint Task Force in Nigeria. The Civilian Joint Task Force in particular has assisted the Nigerian military in its counterinsurgency operations against the Boko Haram terrorist group in the north-eastern part of the country. However, the continued existence of the group and certain actions of the group’s members have raised questions about their legality, control, conduct and the future of the members of the group at the termination of the insurgency, which this paper explores.


Author: LT COL Kemence K. Oyome

Published: October 2017

From their independence until today, West African countries have wrestled with their civil-military relations which often resulted in instability. In the quest to understand the underlying causes of the challenges, this research project links the root causes with the sudden and too early departure of the colonial military institution from the colonies. The embryonic and immature armies of the new born nations were not professionally educated enough to adopt the proper concept of civil-military relations. By staying longer, colonial militaries would have facilitated the adequate transition of West African national militaries from colonial era into the post-independence era. This research project used a controlled comparison case study between Niger and Senegal, two former French colonies in West Africa to substantiate this fact. Senegal, with a permanent French military presence, is the only West African country to maintain proper civil-military relations and has not required military intervention since gaining independence. In contrast, poor civil-military relations throughout the sub-region have triggered civil wars and political violence, creating strategic concerns. West Africa would benefit from mentorship by the world’s leading powers to establish mature and well-functioning civil-military relations to restore peace and stability in the region.


Author: COL Joshua Kennedy

Published: October 2017

The Russian Federation’s use of information as a weapon is not a new phenomenon. Interest in the subject has grown amongst U.S. foreign policy and defense practitioners following Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and especially the attempted manipulation of the 2016 presidential election in the United States. An objective analysis reveals a lack of institutional memory in the United States rather than a significant change in Russian strategy. Russian leaders since the tsars used false information, propaganda, and deception to control their internal population as well as influence external audiences. An understanding of the Soviet system of active measures and the United States countermeasures shed light on the challenges and opportunities in the new information environment. Russia updated its information tools, so must the United States.


Author: Col Robert I. Kinney

Published: October 2017

Service culture shaped by air minded dogma of the last century obstructed Air Force senior leadership views of an emerging paradigm shift that if accepted in absolute, would exponentially increase airpower’s advantage. The Air Force has struggled with fielding Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA), producing and retaining pilots, and satisfying the Joint Warfighter’s insatiable demand. Regardless of the debate surrounding an enlisted RPA program and a Congressional mandate that intends to fix the problem, the Air Force will continue to face sluggish programmatic evolution and political scrutiny unless the RPA program is given due regard as an equal among traditional weapons systems and their communities. This paper contends that Air Force culture, group think, and biases for manned flight stifles new ways of thinking about employing airpower at its fullest potential when confronted with prospective capabilities that break outside of preferred paradigms.


Author: COL Ernest Kisbedo

Published: October 2017

Burkina Faso, like many African countries, has challenges in civil-military relations. There has never been a peaceful transition of power between two elected presidents since the independence of the country to date. In 56 years of independence, the country experienced six military coups, some very bloody, without mentioning the failed ones. In the same period of time, three civilians totaled only seven years as presidents, while the military, as presidents, ruled the country for 49 years; there is a need for change from military domination to military obedience to civilian political leaders. In a contributing effort to solve the issue, I argue that a concerted effort to set mechanisms, educate, and train the military and society on the professional norms of democratic civilian supremacy over the armed forces, will help prevent the Burkina Faso's military from interrupting civilian political rule. The paper discusses the theory of civilian supremacy or control of the military, the issue of civil-military relations in Burkina Faso, and, lastly makes some recommendations for change to establishing enduring civilian supremacy over the military in the country.


Author: LTC Christopher M. Korpela

Published: October 2017

Advances in swarm technology is part of the Department of Defense’s Third Offset Strategy which is a plan for overcoming reduced military force structure and declining technological superiority against potential U.S. adversaries. The components of the Third Offset represent the enabling capabilities of swarm behavior which could be adopted in the future force. Therefore, this paper investigates whether the U.S. military should focus greater research and development efforts on swarm-capable systems that are low-cost, numerous, unmanned, and fast. The first area of discussion includes swarm initiatives that could allow the military to transition away from expensive and heavy weapons platforms. Second, self-driving vehicles, automated logistics, and aerial drones in industry could translate to autonomous supply trains, reduced soldier error, and targeting missions in the military. Third, adversaries are pursuing swarm capabilities. While swarms show great promise, there are some major legal and ethical obstacles to swarm-capable systems. Lastly, recommendations are offered as a way ahead for swarm initiatives.


Author: COL Christopher T. Kuhn

Published: October 2017

The purpose of this study is to show how the United States’ national policy and directives with regards to landmines creates friction points that inhibit the joint forces’ ability to shape and control terrain. This paper describes the current U.S. landmine national policy, the future strategic threat environment, the current U.S. terrain shaping capability, and the impact on the joint land force’s ability to shape terrain. This paper argues that the current strategic environment, with the recent rise of potential near peer competitors, requires reengagement with our allies and development of a new foundational obstacle system. This paper also provides recommendations that will enhance the United States’ ability to shape and dominate terrain to support expeditionary maneuver and joint combined operations.


Author: COL Stephanie A. Kwortnik

Published: October 2017

The Military Health System is challenged with two enduring missions, Soldier and beneficiary care, and deployment healthcare. Primal to the deployment health mission is the readiness and availability of trained trauma teams and a trauma system. The Department of Defense Instruction 6040.47 sets the policy to initiate a Joint Trauma System but fails to identify an enduring realistic training platform. A Sustained Readiness Model with civilian trauma centers is necessary to bridge the interwar gap for training. New hybrid component units may be an opportunity to support a trauma care training platform. In addition, expanding current recruiting and retention programs within the Critical Wartime Skill providers is essential to ensure trauma team availability. Lastly, building the trauma skills of all trauma team members with paramedic programs and advanced practice nurses will broaden and helps offset the capability gap in light of the enduring physician shortage. The effect will be to promote innovation in talent management in platforms for trauma team providers.


Author: COL John D. Laing

Published: October 2017

The United States has an interest in promoting democracy and religious freedom abroad, as articulated in the National Security Strategy (2015) and the wording of HR 2431, The International Religious Freedom Act. Although the State Department has been given primary responsibility for that promotion, it has had difficulty doing so due to resource and personnel constraints, as well as to internal philosophical and ideological objections. By contrast, the Department of Defense has the resources, personnel, and the interest for promoting religious freedom and democracy and therefore, it can contribute to the effort as part of a whole-of-government approach to the issue. Military chaplaincy is uniquely suited for this task because of its history, function, and reach. It can do so through a two-pronged approach including strategic application/management of religious leader engagements and development of chaplaincy programs in foreign militaries. These efforts support one another, but will require significant coordination, planning, and resourcing.


Author: COL David J. Lambrecht

Published: October 2017

This paper argues for the development and use of lethal autonomous weapon systems by the Department of Defense. Despite the appeal of significantly minimizing human loss of life and maintaining a military competitive advantage, U.S. pursuit of this capability has met with considerable consternation and resistance. The analysis suggests that the benefits outweigh the risks; adversaries are pursuing this capability with or without U.S. involvement; and its value as a deterrent should not be wasted. Many of the objections to pursuing autonomous technologies while seemingly convincing are logically flawed. This analysis includes an examination of concerns over human accountability, responsibility, and trust that underpins the legality of using autonomous weapon systems. While there are legal concerns that must be addressed, a human chain of responsibility exists and will continue to provide the requisite accountability. The analysis concludes with recommendations on a way ahead for DoD’s pursuit of lethal autonomous weapons.


Author: Mr Ryan P. Landrum

Published: October 2017

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is a prolonged state of strategic drift somewhere along the middle seam of a full spectrum of 21st century threats. This paper explores the National Security Act of 1947 and the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 as case studies of unity of effort for large, complex organizations. Then, it investigates the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to provide historical context and define the current strategic environment of DHS. Finally, it proposes recommendations that will help the Department fully profit from economy of force by institutionalizing unity of effort and broadening its succession leadership capability. As the threat spectrum continues to evolve, so too must the capacity of the homeland security enterprise to properly protect the American people and the homeland. In order to increase this capacity, Congress should enact comprehensive reform legislation allowing DHS to accomplish its mission.


Author: Mr Franks Lands

Published: October 2017

On average, installation management makes up approximately 15 percent of the Army’s total annual budget. This study focuses on the Army’s performance system known as the Installation Status Report Services (ISR-S) Program. The ISR-S is a performance metric tracking platform intended to evaluate delivery performance (cost, quality, and quantity) for installation support services (logistics, public works, firefighting, law enforcement, and family programs). This study analyzed the performance scores over a three year period (2012-2014) for 70 base operation services with a total annual budget exceeding $12 billion. Research determined that there was no statistical relationship between ISR-S measurements and resource use. ISR-S performance ratings remained stable despite a 14 percent decrease in funding over the three-year study period. There are a variety of possible explanations as to why additional funding and resources do not directly improve base operations performance in the ISR-S system. These include vague and poorly defined measurements and antiquated budgeting processes that do not include ISR-S outputs in budget formulation strategies.


Author: Lt Col John G. Lehane

Published: October 2017

In November 2012, then Secretary of Defense Carter signed Department of Defense Directive 3000.09 Autonomy in Weapons Systems, which stymies the development and fielding of artificially intelligent autonomous lethal weapons systems. While that policy may be appropriate for weapons systems that presently exist, inhibiting their future development will place the United States at a significant tactical, operational, and strategic disadvantage in the future. This paper will examine the current pace of technological development, forecasts on how those trends may continue, the nascent development of automated killing machines, projected development of those machines, objections of governments and non-governmental organizations, and implications of either DoD Directive 3000.09 or future directives which may be even more restrictive.


Author: COL Lars S. Lervik

Published: October 2017

Following a decade of cooperation between East and West, Russia has now reappeared as the most important threat to members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Russia possesses significant military capabilities, including nuclear weapons and this, combined with a demonstrated intent to use military force against its neighbors, makes interaction with Russia a very challenging task for NATO. This paper discusses key security policy theories and terms, analyzes NATO’s current strategy and the Russian threat, and discusses how NATO can best deter Russia while also engaging in dialogue. This paper argues that NATO must combine credible deterrence with active engagement to address a re-emerging Russia with great power ambitions. Thus, NATO must focus on fundamentals such as transatlantic cohesion, unity, deterrence and collective security. Active engagement with Russia must supplement this deterrent approach to reduce the risk of escalation and conflict.


Author: COL Jay Liddick

Published: October 2017

The Army must be prepared to prevail in conflict ranging from high intensity, peer-to peer conventional battle to irregular warfare or a hybrid of the two, which will take place amidst civilian populations and under the ever present eye of personal cell phones and social and news media that capture and immediately report the U.S. military’s effect on civilians. Operational and strategic success will require translating military gains into sustainable political outcomes. Ensuring the U.S. Army has the right doctrine and mix and amounts of capability is difficult, but paramount. The following pages will explore the Army’s evolution of thought on engaging civilian populations and non-military partners and its Civil Affairs (CA) capability. This paper focuses on defining Army Civil Affairs (CA), reviewing the adaptation of Army doctrine and CA capability, examining CA capability gaps, and recommending changes the Army should implement to improve its CA capability and, thus, better prepare itself to conduct unified land operations.


Author: COL John Litz

Published: October 2017

The U.S. Inland Waterways System (IWS), consisting of lock and dam sites along the Nation’s navigable river channels that are owned, operated and maintained by U.S. Army, has become increasingly unreliable and inefficient. Much of the IWS infrastructure has exceeded its design life and requires increased maintenance, repair, or replacement. Inadequate investment in the U.S. Inland Waterways System (IWS) is negatively impacting the national economy. Recent legislative, policy and process changes do not adequately meet the Nation’s need for a reliable inland waterways navigation system. The project defines the problems caused by underinvestment and describes the U.S. Government’s current approach to IWS infrastructure investment. It explores the adequacy and acceptability of options aimed at solving the problems. Lastly, this project indentifies challenges to implementation of options and makes recommendations for action.


Author: COL James Lock

Published: October 2017

The protracted Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains one of the primary sources of tension in the Middle East today. The same intractable issues that have defined the conflict for decades remain unresolved: the acknowledgement of Israel’s right to exist, the status of Jerusalem, freedom of movement in the West Bank, and the disposition of Israeli settlements. As varied and challenging as these issues are, the most critical obstacles to a negotiated peace revolve around the basic issue of security. The United States Security Coordinator (USSC) plays an important role in U.S. policy by partnering with the Palestinian Authority Security Forces (PASF). Assuming U.S. policy remains focused on achieving a two-state solution in resolving the conflict, USSC will continue to play a vital role in coordinating security issues between the IDF and the PASF. This coordination will help to reduce security concerns between the two parties, an important stepping stone for future bilateral negotiations in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.


Author: LTC Derrick C. Long

Published: October 2017

The United States Army has initiated an aggressive campaign to develop operational concepts and force structure to deal with the volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous characteristics of the future strategic operational environment. However, while these concepts and plans are being developed, the human dimension component should also be addressed. The most important component in the Army are its Soldiers, because they are the ones that will be asked to fight and will in this complex world. Therefore, the Army should develop a process to assess and select future Soldiers in challenging and complex MOS career fields. This research was based on using the 35P (Cryptologic-linguist) and 18 series (Special Forces) MOS to determine if the Army should develop a comprehensive assessment and selection process to determine an individual’s cognitive skills, personality and emotional traits at the Military Entrance Processing Station and before Basic Combat Training. Based on the data collection and analysis, the Army should develop and implement a comprehensive process to assess and select 35P initial entry candidates using 10-Core 35P attributes.


Author: COL Ralph Lounsbrough

Published: October 2017

This paper explores the existence and consequences of a ‘warrior caste’ in the U.S. military. The ‘warrior caste’ is explained as a growing sub-culture within the military composed of legacy family members. The paper both proves that this ‘warrior caste’ exists and demonstrates how it contributes to the larger civil-military gap. It explains this in context with the creation and development of the All-Volunteer force and gives examples of both positive and negative aspects. Finally, it explores some of the consequences. These consequences are considered as they relate to the use of the military, and their effect on society as a whole.


Author: COL Francisco Lozano

Published: October 2017

After 30 years of legislated acquisition reform, the defense acquisition system has become lethargic and ineffective in its ability to deliver needed capability to the United States Department of Defense. Much of the governing legislation was rooted in well-intentioned and necessary changes to improve DoD acquisition outcomes. Yet, during implementation of the statutes the resultant size of the defense acquisition bureaucracy and its associated processes stunted the ability for successful outcomes. As a result, DoD acquisition programs grew in cost, schedule, and did not meet performance expectations, which led to their termination. After examining legislation, beginning with the 1985 Packard Commission to the most recent National Defense Authorization Act for 2017 this paper makes several recommendations to reverse the trend of unsuccessful programs. First, legislatively reduce the number of offices at the OSD level providing oversight on acquisition programs. Second, restructure the Acquisition Category (ACAT) levels to minimize those programs requiring OSD oversight. Finally, grant Milestone Decision Authorities greater authority to approve milestone decisions when systems meet only 80% of their threshold capabilities.


Author: COL Matthew D. MacNeilly

Published: October 2017

Fiscal and political constraints have limited the manpower and equipment resources that would enable DHS to better secure the southern border, and the timeline associated with expanding that force would take several additional years before impacting security. Meanwhile, the dramatic decrease in combat deployments of Regular Army Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (SBCT) prevents large percentages of junior leaders from gaining the experiences that are crucial to their professional development and future combat abilities. These skills include the simple acts of deployment preparation and execution, establishing Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) and communications architectures, as well as the more complex tasks of interagency coordination of current operations and integrating outside forces into a formation. Deploying Regular Army units to the border enables units to gain invaluable deployment and COIN training while supporting DHS efforts to secure the border against illegal activity. The associated strategic communications planning and execution, along with partnered operations would have significant impact on the border region.


Author: LT COL Mamadou A. Mahamat

Published: October 2017

Chad’s recent history has been plagued by interminable political violence. Since the country’s independence in 1960, the syndrome of this violence has been shaping Chadian individual and collective conscience. In the 1980s this ex-French colony fell victim to the uncured ills of its very formation: ethnic rife, religious antagonism, political corruption, and weak institutions. Dozens of political-military factions attempted to conquer state power. In 1990, the current regime ultimately triumphed, though violence did not end until 2010. What happened? While the root causes of violence have not waned, the government has used different stratagems to vanquish the rebellious groups. No doubt, the paramount tool at the disposal of the state was sheer military might. But, as recent history has shown time and time again, the military dimension of power is not always sufficient to achieve victory. In the case at hand, diplomacy and economy have also played a decisive role. This paper will show that, while a successful use of DIME may overcome an insurgency, its peculiar use by the Chadian government, though effective in the short run, might well not preserve a lasting peace if appropriate measures are not implemented to fully integrate these ex-rebels into the social fabric.


Author: LTC Joseph J. Malizia

Published: October 2017

The Army’s ill-advised decision to reduce its active component CA capacity had multiple negative impacts on Joint Force readiness, creating gaps and seams in Theater Campaign Strategies and Integrated Country Strategies at Geographic Combatant Commands and U.S diplomatic missions around the world. Additionally, U.S. Forces Command no longer has sufficient capacity to deploy CA forces for early entry operational requirements. Current mitigation strategy calls for increased reliance on reserve component CA. However, given reserve component mobilization restrictions and the differences in accessions, training, and employment, active and reserve component CA are not interchangeable. Reliance on reserve component CA forces negatively impacts Joint Force readiness and increases the risk to mission when compared to an active component CA unit. This paper reviews the strategic significance of CA in bridging military success to enduring victory and argues that much of the predicament the Army finds itself in with respect to CA capacity stems from a systemic lack of strategic leadership in key positions. Moving forward, the Army must assign its active component CA General Officers to strategic positions in the CA Commandant’s Office and on the Army Staff to leverage their experience and expertise as it pertains to CA and Military Support to Governance.


Author: Dr James Mancillas

Published: October 2017

The emergence of artificial intelligence (AI) offers opportunities to overcome cognitive limits when managing “big data” and further leverage informational superiority into battle space superiority. However, these advantages may only materialize if these future technologies are properly integrated into military operations. To understand and facilitate this integration, this paper establishes baseline definitions and descriptions for key terms such as AI, autonomy, and degrees of autonomy, in-the-loop, and decision loops. Applying these terms, this study establishes a framework based on the Boyd cycle, also known as the Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act loop (OODA Loop), to explore how AI systems participate in military decision processes. For each part of the OODA Loop, this study briefly explores the implications of AI systems using the JCIDS DOTMLPF lens.


Author: COL Stephen C. Marr

Published: October 2017

The Arctic states all agree that “peaceful cooperation” is critical to regional stability; however, none reject the possibility of future conflict. The Arctic occupies a central position within Russia's foreign policy, and Russia has become the dominant regional power. Concerned by Russia’s build up, the other Arctic Nations are strengthening their Arctic capabilities. There are three issues poised to become future regional flash points: competition over strategic resources, challenges to maritime control, and antagonistic geopolitical balancing. Growing regional uncertainty threatens the historically cooperative relationships in the North. In response, the United States must shed the title of the ‘reluctant Artic power’ and lead the effort to increase cooperation. Operationalizing the U.S. Arctic strategy will take time and resources, but it is necessary to mitigate the threat of miscalculations that could lead to future conflict. Increased security cooperation is possible by establishing a viable international security forum, increasing transparency, and defining the acceptable range of military actions and arms in the High North.


Author: COL Adrian A. Marsh

Published: October 2017

Stability operations involve a wide range of inherently complex tasks, the planning and monitoring of which are not core competencies of standard military planning and management processes. Consequently, the Army’s tools manage stability operations are inadequate when compared to the accredited, professional program management best practices employed by private firms, non-government organizations, and civilian agency partners. Applying program management processes to the execution of stability operations -- specifically to manage activities along intermediate objectives of various lines of effort -- will enable more systematic synchronization of activities required to transition an operation to civil authorities. Given the many similarities between the management of stability operations and the skills and processes used to manage acquisition programs, the Army should deploy program managers and employ program management processes to improve the execution and management of stability operations.


Author: Ms Wendy Marshall

Published: October 2017

A central tenet of Carl Von Clausewitz theory of war is its inherent unpredictability. There is always the possibility that military action will create unforeseen impacts, some of which may be counter to strategic intent. This possibility is exacerbated when strategic objectives lack clarity or realism; yet the complex nature of contemporary security challenges makes setting clear, achievable objectives difficult. While the joint forces have made great progress in mitigating the potential for operational design, planning, and execution to create impacts that diverge from strategic intent, there are opportunities for further improvement. These center on better preparing emerging leaders to engage in civilian-military dialogue and better integrating non-military dimensions into operational design, planning, execution, and campaign assessment.


Author: COL Andrew J. Maskell

Published: October 2017

On 24 June 2016 an event occurred that irreversibly changed the strategic direction of the European continent and its political identity. Through referendum over 30 million British citizens exercised their democratic right to determine their Nation’s future. The outcome resulted in BREXIT (The British Exit from the European Union). Whilst, the effects of BREXIT span the social, economic, political, demographic and cultural continuum; this paper will focus on the impact on defense and the consequences for the development of a future U.S. National Security Strategy. There is little doubt that this paradigm shift in British political philosophy will alter the U.S.’s strategic stance in some way. A cursory analysis suggests that the effect may simply be limited to the U.S. use of the UK as an interlocutor within Europe. However, Britain’s exit could influence broader security issues. These may include the ongoing UK involvement in support of operations against ISIS; the potential for a ‘UK pivot’ towards South East Asia and the maintenance of a comprehensive and holistic European response towards Russian expansion.


Author: LTC Charles L. Matallana

Published: October 2017

The security landscape had dramatically changed for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as it moved into the 21st Century. Having adapted and evolved since its inception, NATO looked poised to extend its security umbrella to Eastern Europe and points beyond with the demise of the Soviet Union and the emergence of non-state actor threats. However, renewed concerns over the security challenges presented by recent Russian revanchism, emerging cyber threats, and the persistent burden-sharing debates have all contributed to questions about NATO's relevance and credibility. In order to maintain its legitimacy as a security provider with diminished fiscal means, NATO must first focus its deterrence and reassurance efforts by leveraging NATO’s Allied Land Command in building landpower capabilities. Additionally, NATO must mature its cyber defense capacity by investing in key organizations such as the NATO Allied Command Transformation and the Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence. Lastly, NATO must enforce the pledge that members will spend 2 percent of Gross Domestic Product on defense, while finding additional burden offsets such as collaborative technology development from military platforms.


Author: Mr Darrell D. McCarthy

Published: October 2017

Cybersecurity is one of the United States’ most strategic vulnerabilities. Rogue nations, state and non-state actors are using cyber as a strategic weapon against the United States and its allies. To effectively counter this risk, the United States and its allies need to develop a robust cybersecurity posture. This essentially means having the most advanced technology to counter, coerce, and deter aggressive and nefarious cyber activities coupled with an appropriate response should the need arise. Advanced technology also requires highly trained cyber professionals to operate within the cyber space domain. Since the Department of Defense is the organization that has the mission to defend the homeland from cyber-attacks and mitigate the effects thereof, this SRP analyzes the current Department of Defense cyber recruitment efforts, its training and development strategy, whether the strategy supports the requirement to build technically competent capacity quickly, and how to retain the talent necessary to dominate the cyber domain. I also provide recommendations on how the Department of Defense can achieve their strategic goals.


Author: LTC Ryan McCormack

Published: October 2017

The United States security policy decision-making process crosses multiple constituencies in an environment characterized by ambiguity and complexity. There is no formalized decision-making process that ensures a rigorous interagency outcome-oriented risk assessment when making national security policy and strategy. The process of national security policy decision-making is inherently unstructured and, as a result, introduces risk that if left unmanaged can involve the commitment of vast resources and lead to questionable and often disastrous outcomes. This study attempts to identify and overcome the impediments to decision-making methods that introduce risk and ways to promote outcome-oriented risk management in future national security policy and strategy development.


Author: LTC Jeremy T. McGarry

Published: October 2017

The greatest asset of the United States Army is the American Soldier. They are the heart and soul of the most powerful military in the world. Every soldier devotes their time and energy, endures rigorous training, and prepares themselves to protect our nation. They are the fundamental building block of the Army and it cannot succeed without them. Since 9/11, the experience soldiers gained in the fight against terrorism is invaluable. Unfortunately, most soldiers by default end their military career after active duty service and the Army is losing this talent. Released soldiers have years of experience and training with no way to pass on this information. These soldiers have essential knowledge necessary to prepare future soldiers of the Total Army Force. The best way to access this talent is to promote service in the Reserve Component by adjusting policies and procedures to improve and encourage the flow of soldiers among the Active and Reserve components. This paper examines the importance of continued service in the Reserve Component, reviews the current recommendations for continuum of service, analyzes current policies and procedures, and recommends new ways to retain Active Duty talent in the Army Reserve.


Author: COL Kareem P. Montague

Published: October 2017

Transition to a modular structure was a necessary process for the Army to best meet the needs of a modern fighting force, while accounting for the realities of a post-Cold War environment. However, modularity significantly changed the talent management system of the Army, by greatly empowering Brigade Combat Team commanders to assess talent across a large and branch-diverse population of officers. This paper looks at the impact of that empowerment and argues for a correlation between modularity and a reduction in the branch diversity of the General Officer population. It does so by examining primary-zone and below-the-zone promotion data for one of those branches, the Field Artillery, in comparison to another, the Infantry. The results have not been good for the Field Artillery and, from a development of senior leader perspective, might also not be good for the Army overall. The author presents an argument for a more diverse general officer population and makes recommendations to rectify this unintended consequence of the transition to a modular force.


Author: COL Scott W. Mueller

Published: October 2017

America’s All-Volunteer Force (AVF) is a highly-debated concept in the realm of U.S. civil-military relations. While the quality of today’s AVF is rarely disputed, some question whether or not it has led to a too-frequent use of American military force. This paper contends that the American AVF enables the use of military force as a foreign policy instrument, but not for the reasons laid out by the 1973 Gates Commission. With the return to the AVF in 1973, Congress and America’s military leaders took steps to prevent U.S. presidents from embarking on military adventures. However, U.S. presidents’ use of military force to resolve foreign policy disputes that are not necessarily vital to the national interest is enabled by the AVF as a military manpower system, and is an essential instrument to maintaining the liberal international order from which the United States benefits greatly.


Author: LTC Scott A. Myers

Published: October 2017

The United States continues to increase its military commitments to secure national interests at the expense of implementing other instruments of national power, despite protections deliberately embedded into the Constitution by America’s Founding Fathers to fight this outcome. The nation’s growing propensity to use military force as the primary instrument of national power is rooted in three distinct phenomena: the growing civil-military gap, Congress’s failure to exercise its constitutional prerogatives to declare war, and the country’s failure to ensure citizen sacrifice to support its wars. The result is a country with an empowered Executive that frequently employs the armed forces as the primary instrument of national power to protect its interests. If not rectified, America will continue this trend due to the turbulent strategic environment and growing threats from adversaries, which will likely jeopardize the nation’s standing and reputation. This paper will discuss the causes of America’s growing reliance on the military and offer solutions to better balance the nation’s use of all instruments of national power to return the country to a state in closer alignment with the visions of the Founding Fathers.


Author: LTC Martin J. Naranjo

Published: October 2017

As the Army Reserve (AR) has transitioned from a manpower and a strategic reserve to an operational reserve, the Joint Force has become more reliant on its timely and cost-effective capabilities. This reliance is illustrated in the study of AR units forward stationed Outside the Continental United States (OCONUS). The capabilities of this small subset of AR units play a vital role to the commanders of United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) and United States European Command (EUCOM) when needed during shaping and contingency operations. It is unclear if the OCONUS stationed AR units are capable of overcoming the readiness challenges related to the personnel recruiting base, rapid mobilization, and ability to meet necessary training requirements. This study will examine those challenges in order to determine the specific role of forward stationed AR units. It will also provide recommendations that address the challenges of meeting the desired outcomes of the AR and Joint Force.


Author: LTC Brian Nissen

Published: October 2017

The US is pursuing a Third Offset Strategy to maintain a leading edge in the execution of warfare. What effects will this have on the smaller NATO member’s defense policy and options for force development, continued interoperability with US forces and maintaining relevance in NATO or US-led coalition operations? Today threats posed by potential antagonists like China and Russia, but also the spread of high tech, low cost weapon systems in general, drive the need for a Third Offset strategy. The Third Offset requires new technology and new warfighting concepts. Historically new military technology has been expensive to procure and implement for smaller allies. The focus on new and innovative concepts presents opportunities for smaller allies. The small NATO member state Denmark will be used as a case to validate the thesis that smaller NATO countries should focus their defense investments on fundamental warfighting capabilities. These warfighting capabilities must be able to connect to the future network supporting the Third Offset Strategy. The USA must take steps to mitigate risks to interoperability within NATO caused by the Third Offset Strategy.


Author: COL Joao Alberto d. Nunes

Published: October 2017

Brazil will be a global player and one of the world’s largest economies by 2030. However, given globalization, the rise of non-states actors, and demographics issues, trends point to an increase in individualism and the fracturing of national identity with painful consequences to nationalism. This paper examines whether Brazil's grand strategy for 2030 adequately addresses national identity and national will to support the instruments of national power in achieving the country’s interests. Given the strategy formulation framework, Brazil must identify its threats and its place on the global stage to correctly define its interests. The country must balance its defense expenditures with its economy to protect its sovereignty, citizens, and resources, avoiding the Melian trap of the Peloponnesian war. Thucydides’ fear, honor, and interest construct plays a significant role in the scenarios used to assess risks. The paper closes with the recommendation that, using strategic communications and the educational system, Brazil must bolster its national identity and improve the national will of its population to avoid negative trends and adequately support the elements of power in pursuing the country's interests.


Author: COL Benjamin R. Ogden

Published: October 2017

The US Army has mastered the art of developing officers who dominate the tactical and operational levels of war, but it struggles to produce exemplary strategic leaders who excel within the civilian-military framework and under the complex demands of the strategic environment. What this paper carefully unpacks are the ideas that rigid cultural norms, faulty officer management practices, and significant flaws in Professional Military Education (PME) generate damaging gaps in the development of commissioned officers in the active component. In fact, the analysis will indicate that these discrepancies delicately nudge the Army towards sculpting its junior officers into tactically savvy and combat-effective generals instead of expert strategic leaders. The Army needs to recognize these shortfalls and make systematic adjustments within the Army Leader Development Model to reverse the trends. Recommended adjustments include merging Army University efforts with human resources practices, promoting critical thinking opportunities by redefining and enforcing broadening assignment requirements, enhancing the status of academic proficiency, restructuring inefficient segments of PME, and increasing continuing education requirements for General Officers. Doing so ensures all future Army generals emerge as proficient sources of strategic competency.


Author: COL Jaimie Ogilvie

Published: October 2017

The return of Foreign Fighters (FFs) from the Middle East to their countries of origin in the Caribbean, have created concerns about the future security and stability of the region, for policy makers and stakeholders alike. The potential negative impact of these persons, whether integrated into criminal networks or engaging in acts of terror, on the developing but vulnerable tourism-based economies of the region, as well as in such close proximity to the United States of America, is palpable. This paper explores approaches to the reintegration of persons with violent skill sets, and draws on the experiences of other countries facing the same challenge, as well as lessons learned from Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) and criminal deportation programs, to make recommendations appropriate for the Caribbean. These include greater information sharing, enhanced detection and monitoring capabilities, the development of structured reintegration programs (RPs) designed to re-socialize and equip returning FFs to positively contribute to society (whether incarcerated or at liberty), the communication of clear policies by governments, and capacity building in regional institutions by external actors to mitigate the threat. A failure to adequately engage these FFs could have negative effects on the security of the region.


Author: Lt Col Derek S. Ost

Published: October 2017

The rapidly changing operating environment of today suggests that landpower forces will increasingly operate in and among congested urban areas where interaction with indigenous inhabitants is required. To be successful, these operations will require a more thorough understanding of the language, region, and culture(s); referred throughout this paper as language, regional expertise and culture (LREC) competencies. The Marine Corps must adopt additional measures to meet the future challenges associated with an increasingly complex and ambiguous operating environment. First, the Marine Corps must create a full-time, single-track foreign area officer cadre within its intelligence enterprise. Second, intelligence specialists must become specialized by region in order to develop a more robust cross-cultural expertise. Third, the Marine Corps must employ a more effective talent management process that will ensure the placement of the right person in the right job. Throughout the paper, I use John Kotter’s eight-stage process of creating major change to examine the difficulties in implementing these recommendations.


Author: COL Darcy L. Overbey

Published: October 2017

The changing strategic environment places greater emphasis on military leaders and the decisions they make. To prepare the leaders of tomorrow, the Army should consider capitalizing on everyday opportunities to improve leadership skill. Parenthood can offer leaders the opportunity to test and refine strategic leadership skills. The ability to transfer skills between personal and profession life, however, is dependent on the degree of separation between the two. Leaders that create a barrier between family and work may miss this developmental opportunity. Leaders that tightly integrate their roles in the work and family realms may be able to accelerate their leadership development. To capitalize on existing opportunities, the Army must change its organizational culture to permit the transference of lessons learned from experiential learning outside the workplace. The result will positively impact recruiting as well as retention.


Author: COL William M. Parker

Published: October 2017

The German leadership philosophy of Auftragstaktik forms the foundation of the U.S. Army’s Mission Command leadership doctrine. Auftragstaktik loosely translates into English as mission-type orders. This translation, however, fails to encompass the true meaning of a far more nuanced and broader philosophy. Due to such discrepancies, U.S. leaders fail to fully understand the unique Prussian-German circumstances, culture, and individuals surrounding the development and evolution of the Auftragstaktik concept. This misunderstanding causes the U.S. Army to struggle with implementation of the Mission Command doctrine. This paper will conduct a thorough analysis of the unique circumstantial and cultural conditions that led to the development and evolution of the Prussian-German construct of Auftragstaktik. Through the lens of this analysis, the paper will then seek to answer the fundamental question of whether the U.S. Army, within its own unique historic, political and cultural conditions, can fully implement a leadership doctrine founded in Auftragstaktik.


Author: Lt Col Richard H. Pitchford

Published: October 2017

Plan Colombia was a multilayered strategy to bolster the Colombian economy, enhance the armed forces, disrupt drug trade, restore territorial control, and strengthen the rule of law. Dr. Gabriel Marcella, a regional expert and former professor at the U.S. Army War College, described the undertaking as “nothing less than a grand strategy for the remaking of the nation.” Moving forward nearly twenty years, it is possible to evaluate the execution and effectiveness of this strategy. Although the progress in Colombia is undeniable, much of the success is owed to factors beyond the scope of the original strategy. In the end, what occurred in Colombia can be most accurately attributed to the evolution of strategy combined with key contextual factors--including popular support, inspired leadership, technological advantages, and timing--that were beyond the scope of the original plan. Examining the plan along with these key contextual factors reveals the true seeds of progress and valuable insights into the nature of strategic success in counterinsurgencies.


Author: LTC Tracey Poirier

Published: October 2017

Coalitions and partnerships with foreign nations is an increasing reality and interoperability with potentially unknown partners is required. The State Partnership Program provides the design, experience and depth to assist with this endeavor and its natural civilian oversight makes the strategic political connection to military and humanitarian assistance efforts stronger. This paper will explore the power of sustained relationships and idea sharing in relation to the National Guard State Partnership Program with the goal of reaching National Security Strategy end states. It will also make a case for logistical preparation of the battlefield through the program for both infrastructure improvement and economic development as part of a formula for improving nation building potential. Furthermore, it will address, as a first step, the ineffectiveness of the current means of State Partnership Program assessment and provide recommendations for measures of effectiveness based on national strategic outcomes. With a modest expansion of the variety of engagements, the SPP can contribute to success in setting the theater and become an integral piece to regional strategy.


Author: COL Luigi Postiglione

Published: October 2017

The protection of cultural heritage presents a dilemma for every commander. The identification of historic buildings with military objectives has often led to the destruction of works of art, robbing humanity of pieces of its history. Over the last decades, culture has moved to the frontline of war, both as collateral damage and a direct target for belligerents who use the destruction of culture as a means to foster more violence, hatred, and revenge. This destruction strikes at societies over the long term, weakening the foundations for peace, hindering reconciliation when hostilities end. Recent conflicts in Mali, in Libya, Yemen, Iraq or Syria have demonstrated that the protection of heritage is inseparable from the protection of human lives, since the destruction of an artifact has become an integral part of a global strategy of ethnical cleansing, which seeks to eliminate all forms of diversity. In this context, military forces need to adapt and strengthen their tools, behaviors and skills to take into account the protection of heritage as an integral part of sustainable strategies to build peace and security.


Author: COL Pat Proctor

Published: October 2017

The U.S. Army failed to heed warnings from Operation Joint Endeavor in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the mid-1990s that it was ill-prepared for low-intensity conflicts. Instead of altering the trajectory of the ongoing Army transformation, Army transformers continued to prepare for high-intensity conflict, an effort that culminated in the creation of the Interim Brigade Combat Teams. This study is an intellectual history focused on the debate between Army transformers and critics of transformation. It examines contemporary doctrine, opinions expressed in military journals and magazines, studies conducted by Army educational institutions, internal Army documents, and speeches from senior Army leaders. It also includes insights from interviews conducted by the author with key senior Army leaders of the time. This study concludes that Army transformers ignored evidence from Operation Joint Endeavor and the arguments of transformation’s critics because of a prevailing Army culture favoring preparation for high-intensity conflict operations over all other activities.


Author: COL Roman J. Przekwas

Published: October 2017

Russia’s military resurgence and claims of its sphere of influence raised concerns for many neighboring countries who are the members of NATO. Since 2014, NATO is providing security to its most exposed members. Decisions taken at the two last NATO summits enhanced the Alliance’s defensive posture on its eastern and southern flanks. This paper analyses the strategic goals of both NATO and Russia, and provides a brief assessment of how they are being achieved. The research proves that the assurance and deterrence measures applied so far by NATO has contributed to the overall stabilization of the situation in the region. However, those measures did not precluded Russia from continuing of its aggressive policy. The study argues also that NATO should further adapt itself by developing its defensive and offensive capabilities to match Russian threat. This should be pursued by a combination of conventional, nuclear and missile defense capabilities and enhancing the resilience to hybrid warfare. NATO should maintain the opportunity to restart a constructive dialogue with Russia, but should avoid this dialogue from a weaker position. Therefore, the paper also advocates for an urgent need to develop a new NATO security strategy.


Author: Mr Patrick b. Quinn

Published: October 2017

The shift from a relatively stable bi-polar world has increased the need for supplements to the existing instruments of national power. To supplement national power without increasing costs, the U.S. should study and apply strategic deception. Deception is an effort to take active steps to manipulate and distract an opponent in order to shift the strategic picture, creating operating space for political as well as military actors. The returns for a modest investment in deception greatly exceed the initial costs. Examined here are Iraqi strategic deception efforts against Iran and against the Gulf War coalition, and the 1973 Egyptian deception campaign against the Israelis. Deception operations should be codified into policy at the national level, where they can then be mirrored down the chain of command into the agencies and the military. The Defense Intelligence Agency would coordinate, train, and monitor the effectiveness of Deception Planning Cells which are staffed by field grade officers with the Additional Skill Identifier (ASI) of Deception Planner. The military could lead a cultural shift to use deception by incorporating it into its planning and operational cycle. This could in turn pave the way to incorporate it in conjunction with other national instruments of power.


Author: COL Brendan C. Raymond

Published: October 2017

The Russian military operations in Georgia (2008), Crimea and Eastern Ukraine (2014), and Syria (2015) demonstrate that the characteristic of Russian warfare is dynamic. Driven by factors of technological advances, changes in doctrine, and the incorporation of lessons from recent conflicts in the Middle East, Russia revolutionized their methods of conducting warfare artfully integrating lethality, coercion, and disinformation to achieve strategic effects on the modern battlefield. To deter Russia’s aggressive behavior and interventionist agenda in Europe, Eurasia and the Middle East, the U.S. Army must increase the size and capability of its forces committed to Europe, incorporate lessons learned to transform current doctrine and training of decisive action, and develop new material to address challenges with joint force entry operations, joint combined arms maneuver, and the integration and delivery of joint fires. A focus on these improvements will enable the U.S. Army to provide a more credible deterrent in Europe, reassure America’s partners and allies, and prepare the military for future conflict against similar near-peer competitors.


Author: Lt Col Mark R. Reid

Published: October 2017

Technological innovation occurs more rapidly, more frequently, and more diffusely today than ever – a reality many of our adversaries have seized upon. Despite evidence that unique human attributes (e.g., creativity, synthesis, empathy) drive success in a more automated world, the DoD still favors technological breakthroughs over human development to maintain competitive advantage. Rather than trying to outpace technological innovations, this paper suggests the Marine Corps focus on cultural changes that fill its ranks with entrepreneurial-minded individuals. Interestingly, the Corps codified several military entrepreneurship concepts in 1989 through its “maneuver warfare” doctrine. This paper summarizes potential characteristics and inputs to military entrepreneurship. It analyzes challenges to instituting entrepreneurial culture through the Corps’ struggle to fully adopt maneuver warfare doctrine. And it recommends several pathways to fostering entrepreneurial spirit from senior leader engagement to recruiting, to re-imagining our professional military schools.


Author: COL Joseph W. Roberts

Published: October 2017

Ask any Soldier about acquisition and they will say it takes too long. During the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Department of Defense undertook several initiatives to get Soldiers badly needed equipment in a timely manner. Some of these initiatives were effective and should be emulated by Army rapid acquisitions leaders going forward. Leaders in organizations such as the Rapid Equipping Force, the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell, and the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization achieved some notably short turnaround times on requests for materiel solutions. The lessons learned were about how they organized, how they managed requirements, how they obtained funding, and how they managed the acquisition and fielding. Recently the Army established a new Rapid Capabilities Office to expedite the delivery of critical combat materiel capabilities to the Warfighter. To learn from the lessons of those organizations this paper recommends what innovative approaches the Army Generating Force leadership should incorporate into the Rapid Capabilities Office to meet the demand for rapid response with materiel solutions and exploit advantages technology that can give the Soldier a competitive advantage on the battlefield.


Author: COL Araon B. Sander

Published: October 2017

The suicide rate in the Army was below the national average in 2001 but had risen sharply by 2008, more than doubling within the institution, and have remained at that level ever since. This paper explores why differences in Service suicide rates exist, and then uses that analysis to make recommendations for Army policy and future studies that may mitigate the alarming and increasing trend of Soldier suicide. Recommendations include placing suicide prevention with the Army medical community that better understands its causation; reviewing the necessity to enlist convicted criminals into the Army; to review the current policy of promoting Soldiers into leadership positions or separating them; to capture the entire legal history of Soldiers who attempt or complete Soldier suicide to conclude whether or not to continue granting criminal waivers to new recruits; and to more closely examine the phenomenon of trauma, particularly interpersonal trauma, as it relates to suicide. In the final analysis, we cannot presently conclude that Army suicide rates are a function of Army policy because the granularity of data needed does not exist.


Author: LTC Andrew O. Saslav

Published: October 2017

The United States Army has developed a Civil-Military relations model based on Samuel Huntington’s The Soldier and the State. Written in 1957, Huntington’s work is the fundamental theory used to develop the current military profession. The military profession needs to abandon this Civil-Military relations model as defined by Huntington. It must build a new Civil-Military relations model inspired by America’s first and greatest strategic leader, General George Washington. The world of developing America’s national security strategy is as much military as it is political. It is the realm of senior military officers as well as of civilian leaders. Learning to effectively operate inside the environment is necessary for a senior military officer’s career, and critical for the future of the Nation. The challenge of providing military advice in the complex national security environment, informed by political considerations and relevant to the nation’s civilian leadership requires a unique skill set. General George Washington thrived in this complex environment and his experience is an example for senior military leaders.


Author: COL Lucas A. Schreurs

Published: October 2017

Modern social technology based connectivity provides chances to improve strategic decision and organizational output. It can bring a new kind of organizational approach, combining a centralized and decentralized approach, improving mission command through better connectivity throughout the organization. Integrating social technology into workflow optimizes internal and external processes providing additional competitive benefits. New opportunities like staff on demand provide better use of collective intelligence using worldwide talent, creating diversity in thought and output. By using external resources when necessary, an organization creates flexibility and agility within its organization. Routine tasks can be transferred to temporary staff personal on demand, providing “more army out of the army.” Crowd-based communities no longer depend on physical proximity. Revenues can be creative ideas, solutions, and it anchors military organizations in public discourse. Strategic leaders can benefit using social technology by developing their personal “crowd,” based on quality over quantity, which helps them in making and improving strategic decisions. These connections provide access to global networks and knowledge. Not just accelerating processes, but improving quality on understanding and broad approaches to problem solving. Organizations making use of modern social technology have proven to be having an advantage over competitors.


Author: COL Corey L. Seats

Published: October 2017

In response to a natural disaster or other emergency, a governor has many state assets available to respond and provide support. If the state’s disaster response needs exceed the ability to which the state can respond with its own assets, the governor may request additional assistance from the federal government. Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA), or federal military support, is one type of assistance the U.S. government can provide. While DSCA offers many valuable response assets, the differing command and control frameworks of active, reserve, and National Guard forces may impede unity of the response effort. The Dual Status Commander (DSC) construct was created to provide unity of command in DSCA activities when the response includes both active and reserve forces. The DSC construct works well to synchronize DSCA activities in security events or disasters contained within single states and FEMA Regions. However, it is ill-suited to synchronize and coordinate DSCA response in no-notice multi-state catastrophes. This research project will examine the current DSCA and DSC structure, assess the use of DSCs in recent events, evaluate DSC shortcomings in a no-notice multi-state complex catastrophe, and provide recommendations for addressing these shortcomings.


Author: COL Mark B. Sherkey

Published: October 2017

This paper provides a compelling narrative that describes and explains several prevailing currents impacting the Veteran Support landscape and ultimately affecting Army readiness. These are seen in the likes of navigation and aggregation challenges; the absence of strategic narratives to inform the ecosystem; restrictive public policies and regulatory obstacles; a lack of investment in technological advancements within the military transition process; and persistent forms of information asymmetry directly impacting the transitioning service member. It aims to explore these challenges facing the transitioning service member and family; as well as, barriers impeding creators wanting to bring innovative technology solutions to bear within this space. Lastly, informs senior military and civilian leaders to current challenges if left unabated will continue to reduce the readiness of the military and veteran support ecosystem. As a potential way forward, an enhanced public-private and non-profit partnership construct for a readiness campaign is proposed.


Author: Cdr David J. Smith

Published: October 2017

The U.S. policy in dealing with Islamic State of Iraq and Syria is flawed. Destroying a terrorist group requires the elimination of a radical ideology, which is impossible. A radical ideology cannot be seen, and it spreads much like a virus. However, if a radical ideology is treated as an epidemic (in a social sense), then the threat it poses can be contained, treated, and immunized against to reduce and maintain its occurrences at politically and socially acceptable levels. A plausible method of combating the threat of radical Islam/jihadism can be developed by exploring the use of epidemiology and using the epidemiologic triangle of agent, host, and environment to identify how this violent ideology spreads. The analysis contained in this paper results in a solution consisting of inoculation, containment, and elimination. Through inoculation, the linkages that connect agent and environment to the host are severed. Containment isolates the host to an “infected” area, and elimination reduces those infected to the maximum extent possible.


Author: LTC Nicole R. Spears

Published: October 2017

Diversity of the (military) force is a key strategic issue that needs to be addressed if the Army’s desires successful navigation within the strategic environment of the 21st century and beyond. The human dimension as it relates to talent management allows us to leverage diversity in support of Soldiers (and Civilians) as the organization’s most valuable resource. The initial step in opening this discussion involves how we define diversity. Is it just through physical characteristics or can we consider the relevance of diversity of thought, also? Venturing into 2025, the Army can better provide national needs if it acts through its Army Reserve Officer Training Corps to address issues concerning diversity. The areas of focus are a declining number of minority commissions, a lack of geographic representation, and a poor representation of students studying Science, Technology, Engineering, and Math. Advertising the military mission, recruiting the right talent in the form of officer production, and mentoring all play a vital role in developing diverse, strategic leaders of the future.


Author: Lt Col Guy T. Spencer

Published: October 2017

Trust is an element of relationships that affects people and organizations. The trust relationship is fragile and influenced by many factors. The relationship between the American public and the military is no different. While this relationship appears strong to date, lapses in judgement and a growing lack of connection between the military and public threaten the strength of this bond. Leaders must understand the environment and the concept of trust to facilitate change. Trust originates from individuals and builds outward to relationships with people and organizations. This makes trust a central component to the Profession of Arms. The military must adjust its culture and embed mechanisms that develop the profession based on values and heritage. Then, the profession must develop a plan to connect with civilian leaders and the American public, exposing them to the military identity, skill and capabilities resident in the armed forces. The military has an obligation to build a genuine trust with the population it swears to protect.


Author: COL Patrick Sullivan

Published: October 2017

Artificial intelligence (AI) is on a developmental trajectory to be the central force in future society. There will be many benefits from this, but serious challenges as well, particularly for the national security setting. AI’s development virtually guarantees that lethal autonomous weapons will someday be unleashed on the battlefield. Although these weapons could conceivably lower the human cost of war, they carry significant proliferation and collateral damage risk as well, and could make the decision to go to war easier. This would be inherently destabilizing to the Westphalian geopolitical order, which is already under strain due to AI’s democratization of information. As the dominant artificial intelligence company, Google is best positioned to benefit from any decentralization and rebalancing of state power that occurs from AI-related disruption, with Silicon Valley as a whole becoming a political entity unto itself. Whatever the resultant decentralized/rebalanced power construct looks like, all stakeholders – transnational technology companies, nation-states, and what remains of the international system – will have a responsibility to provide collective good governance to ensure that AI’s outcomes stay as positive as possible, especially as relates to privacy concerns, job displacement, and increased socio-economic inequality


Author: COL Brandon R. Tegtmeier

Published: October 2017

Commanders of joint inter-agency special operations task forces make hundreds of judgments every day as they target enemy networks. Many of these judgments lead to critical decisions that have wide reaching implications. Joint inter-agency special operations task force staffs make countless judgments, as well, in order to assist the commander in making these decisions. While commanders have been very effective historically, there is room for improvement. Recent findings from decision science research can improve the accuracy of commanders’ judgments through standardization of probabilistic language and documentation of accuracy for all individual judgments. Being wrong comes with the territory of any decision maker. However, commanders of joint inter-agency special operations task forces can make real adjustments to increase their accuracy, thereby lowering the risk to friendly forces, lowering the risk of strategically negative events, and, most importantly, enhancing effects on the enemy.


Author: COL Derek K. Thomson

Published: October 2017

Over the past several years, the Army has unknowingly distanced itself from the interpersonal element of leadership, creating a significant gap between the intentions of the leader and the perceptions of the led. Through its doctrine and statements, the concept of leader development expanded and therefore diluted fundamental principles such as influence and trust. As a result, the Army has lost the basic essence of leadership. To reverse this course, the Army must adopt a coaching culture. This paper recommends four separate and distinct actions, which impact the operational and institutional domains and strongly reinforce the self-developmental domain. They are: establish a unit-level coaching program, place greater emphasis on the Command Climate Survey, revise the MSAF, and re-establish the Army’s Organizational Effectiveness program. Taking these steps will strengthen the personal connection aspect of leadership and improve the effectiveness of our greatest strategic advantage – our people.


Author: COL Theodore F. Travis

Published: October 2017

America’s Founding Fathers viewed a large standing army as a significant threat to the Republic and codified measures to keep the fledgling military under civilian control. For nearly two centuries, their vision was manifested in a small military which consisted of a nucleus of military professionals who were augmented by citizens mobilized to perform their civic duty for America’s common defense in times of crisis. After the Vietnam War, a conscript army became socially unacceptable and politically untenable. The All-Volunteer Force (AVF) was introduced to provide a professional military manned solely by willing volunteers. Over time the AVF has become physically and psychologically isolated from the society it serves, resulting in a civil-military gap. As fewer Americans elect to serve in the military, the AVF is no longer representative of the nation it serves, disproportionately drawing recruits from the same geographic, social, economic, and educational spheres. The resulting American Warrior Caste (AWC) upholds a distinct set of values which it sees as superior to those of a society it views with contempt. As democratic institutions fail, and the populace and government become more polarized, the AWC potentially poses a risk to the United States


Author: Dr James T. Treharne

Published: October 2017

The Army has two professional communities, the Profession of Arms and the Army Civilian Corps. However, Army-wide survey data shows there is insufficient mutual trust between members of the two communities. Perceived lack of leader inspiration, coaching, and counselling; mentoring, and confidence in the ability to certify Soldiers and Civilians in competence, character, and commitment contribute to the lack of mutual trust. This paper examines mutual trust in mixed organizations in the institutional Army where both communities, Soldiers and Civilians, serve together. The Army has numerous initiatives to enhance Civilian development. These include career program management, acculturation, and training. This paper assesses these initiatives and makes recommendations related to career program management, workplace initiatives, culture, and shared professional experiences.


Author: COL Michael A. True

Published: October 2017

The Army has created a culture out of its training enterprise that inhibits sustainment of unit readiness over time. Instead of units maintaining a continuous high state of readiness, they endure cycles of low readiness followed by ramp-up events in preparation for a major evaluation event, known as a Culminating Training Event (CTE). Today’s strategic environment is too dynamic and uncertain to allow the Army to continue on this path. Although the Army developed a new Sustainable Readiness Model to prevent the readiness cliff, it does not address the CTE Culture problem. This paper explores the problems that the CTE Culture causes for the Army and explores remedial options. Because CTE Culture is an institutionalized practice in the Army, institution theory is the analysis tool for identifying its artifacts and rituals as well as the basis for remedial actions. Finally, this paper will offer recommendations to kill the CTE Culture by building a new Sustainable Readiness Cultural in its place.


Author: LTC Trent D. Upton

Published: October 2017

Accurately assessing and reporting readiness are of great importance to the Army in order to fulfill its responsibilities in defense of the nation. Yet, the Army’s current system for this vital requirement is problematic. The Army’s latest attempt to address this challenge is the new Objective-Task, or Objective-T reporting method. Meanwhile, the Army continues to have challenges with implementing mission command in the force. This paper examines the Army’s new Objective-T training readiness reporting system relative to its promotion of mission command, in order to evaluate how Objective-T reinforces or hinders mission command. Further, it will address the Army’s prioritization of objectively assessing and reporting training versus mission command when these two ideas clash. I argue that in the short term the Army’s implementation of Objective-T is a valid method to improve readiness reporting, while assuming risk in its potential impacts on mission command. However, in the long-term Objective-T and mission command are compatible, and can be employed in a complementary fashion. Carefully crafting and monitoring Objective-T implementation can mitigate conflicts with mission command for the Army’s benefit.


Author: LT COL Darius Vaicikauskas

Published: October 2017

“Founding Act on Mutual relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation” signed in Paris on May 27th 1997 was supposed to be the act of warm, cooperative relations which ensures lasting peace in the Euro-Atlantic region. More importantly, the Founding act included commitments to norms of international behavior in accordance with UN charter and OSCE documents as well as explicit commitments to respect sovereign states and their right to choose the means to ensure their security. However, Russia’s thaw policy lasted until the appearance of the new Russian president Vladimir Putin in 1999. Russia’s new president, exploiting opportunity of economic growth, started to consolidate and centralize political power in his hands. During the period of V.Putin and D.Medvedev’s presidency Russia’s behavior had changed back to almost old soviet rhetoric’s. The current aggressive and assertive Russian behavior and rhetoric was reflected in its National security strategy, Foreign policy, and Military doctrine.


Author: COL Eric J. Van Den Bosch

Published: October 2017

The current Army Leadership Model addresses attributes and competencies of leaders that rightfully centers on human-human relationships. In 2050 and beyond, the implications of the Third Offset Strategy on the Army will challenge leaders with an operational environment transitioning to more human-machine relationships, especially with human-machine collaborative decision making and manned-unmanned teaming. Underpinned by mission command philosophy (centered on trust), leadership attributes (character, presence, intellect), and core leadership competencies (lead, develop, achieve), the Army needs to adapt leader development to enable our leaders to trust, understand, and lead increasingly capable levels of robotics and autonomous systems (RAS) - otherwise known as artificial intelligence (AI).


Author: COL Jeff VanAntwerp

Published: October 2017

Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) are currently confronted with disruptive changes in their operating environment which threaten their ability to provide the value the nation requires in the future. To win the current fight and set the conditions for future success, ARSOF organizations must become more innovative. Through organizational ambidexterity, ARSOF leaders can address the disruptive changes in their operating environment by increasing innovation while maintaining the control required to win the current fight. Like any large organizational change effort, the ARSOF leader is the key to developing an ambidextrous organization. Only the leader can hold the tensions between exploitation and exploration, and lead the strategic renewal necessary for organizational change. This paper proposes innovation leadership priorities for ARSOF leaders, and offers practical ideas on how leaders can lead this change and align their organizations to innovate.


Author: LT COL Nestoras Vargemezis

Published: October 2017

Greece and Turkey share a long history over the centuries. As the followers of the Byzantine and Ottoman Empires their relationship is characterized by tension and conflict. As a result the build-up of military capabilities is very important for both countries. Since the current President Recep Tayyip Erdo?an came to power, Turkey has increased significantly its investment in the military with the goal to become totally independent from international suppliers and produce its equipment domestically. One of the major goals of this project was the production of indigenous UAVs with advanced capabilities and the program has already paid off with the production of vehicles capable of launching anti tank missiles. Greece on the other hand, although it has a long history in the research, development and use of UAVs, has not made significant steps to achieve similar goals. This paper will argue the reasons for the Turkish success, the implications for Greece's security and will recommend how Greece should move forward to build its own capacity and advance in the research for similar systems.


Author: LTC Barry K. Vincent

Published: October 2017

Maintaining a large standing Army is costly. Although historically our Nation has been loath to do so, the U.S.’s increasing global role and exigent threats to our National Security and World Order have compelled its being. The challenge for Congress, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), the Army, and ultimately the American people, is to balance the need to deter antagonists in peace and, if required, prevail against adversaries in war, with the high cost of maintaining the large standing Army required to do so. One way to help reduce the high cost of a large army is through the expeditious reliance on the Reserve Component (RC). This paper explores the key factors that led to the creation of the RC (both the National Guard and federal reserve force), examines the current framework for how different types of forces are assigned to the three components (Regular Army, Army Reserve, and National Guard), and proposes subsuming the federal reserve forces within the National Guard and modifying the current force mix between the Regular Army and a consolidated National Guard/Reserve force for both a cost efficient and effective Total Force.


Author: COL William D. Voorhies

Published: October 2017

This strategy research project will argue that the United States should re-balance its strategy from a focus on a short-term war against ideologically inspired groups, to a long-term strategy that assists Islam with rejecting the ideology that feeds the disease of Islamic terrorism. Likening fighting Jihadi-Salafi terrorism to fighting cancer, the U.S. can improve its collaborative approach by enhancing the Informational instrument of U.S. power. The present strategy has failed to prevent ISIL and other such groups from metastasizing globally. Risk has increased to American citizens at home and abroad. Risk is evident with long-term stability within the Middle-East manifested through the Shia-Sunni civil war and regional geopolitics. The U.S. should rebalance its strategy to better contain and stabilize the ISIL tumor. The U.S. can marginalize ISIL’s social media messaging and its ability to grow regionally, then globally through cyber initiatives. Finally, by resourcing the new Global Engagement Center in the DOS to serve as the soft-power arm of U.S. strategy, the U.S. can enable the Muslim world to reject the cancer of Jihadi-Salafism.


Author: COL Gary Walenda

Published: October 2017

The United States is facing one of the most complex security environments in history, one that it is ill prepared for and poorly structured to address. Threats are increasingly transregional and hybrid, but US efforts remain regionally focused and departmentally aligned. Adversaries increasingly exploit this gap as an offset against overwhelming US might. Initiatives to increase the lethality of the military without better global interagency synchronization will result in a military that is both awesome and largely irrelevant. Cultural, bureaucratic, and societal factors have made progress elusive. Bureaucratic and cultural changes, made within the context of societal realties, are essential to achieve unified action against these threats. This paper is arranged into three parts. The first attempts to understand the nature of these threats, efforts to address them, and remaining gaps and challenges. The second addresses why security reform has been so elusive. The third offers recommendations based on the analysis from the first two parts.


Author: COL Brittian A. Walker

Published: October 2017

Most popularly known as the 8th President of the United States, Martin Van Buren’s greater impact and legacy is best understood through his role as one of his predecessor’s most influential strategic advisors. As Secretary of State, emissary to Britain, Vice President, and a key member of Andrew Jackson’s “kitchen cabinet,” Van Buren’s influence was undeniable. The establishment of the Modern Democratic Party, the Indian Removal Act, the Petticoat Affair and the Nullification Crisis all occurred during Jackson’s two terms in office (1829-1837) and Martin Van Buren played an historic role in shaping key Jacksonian policies that in turn shaped this nation. As another political outsider like Jackson takes office as the 45th President of the United States, Van Buren’s success and influence remain critically relevant for the aspiring strategic advisor today.


Author: LTC John W. Wells

Published: October 2017

This paper argues that the Army Career Intermission Program should be revised to better address the persistent decline in company grade officer retention rates. The departure of mid-career officers represents a strategic risk to the U.S. Code Title 10 responsibility to provide trained and ready land forces. The Career Intermission Program is intended to address the decline in retention rates by allowing select officers to take a sabbatical from active military service to earn a degree, learn a new skill or start a family. The Career Intermission Program represents an opportunity to preserve and protect the Army’s human capital investment from mid-career flight. Providing options in intermission status service would signal a departure from the “military bureaucracy” and more firmly establish the social compact between service member and organization. A revised Career Intermission Exchange Program creates the opportunity to simultaneously enhance its investment in all three components of the Total Force through cross acculturation between the Army National Guard, the Army Reserves and the Regular Army. Historical environment, organizational and individual culture, and the principles of human capital management are elements of the analysis. A comparison of the current Career Intermission Program with the revised Career Intermission Exchange Program completes the presentation of the proposal.


Author: LTC John M. Wilson

Published: October 2017

Many prominent Cold War-era thinkers and practitioners argued that escalation dominance, a condition where a competitor is more willing and capable of discouraging an opponent from taking an unwanted action at all levels of conflict short of nuclear war, is necessary to achieve success in deterrence strategies. The rapid evolution of information systems and networks has connected people and institutions more closely today than during any other point of human history. As such, the contemporary information environment affords weaker states and non-state actors greater opportunities to employ asymmetric stratagems to deny their stronger opponents’ deterrence objectives. This project examines escalation dominance theory in the modern context and concludes that the contemporary information environment has reduced its value in predicting deterrence outcomes. Today, weaker nations and non-state actors are using the ambiguity and relative novelty of cyberspace to create opportunities to advance national interests without causing escalations with stronger nation states.


Author: Mr Romeo Wright

Published: October 2017

The United States Army (US) enjoyed an unprecedented advantage over its adversaries in large-scale, force-on-force engagements in open terrain since the end of the Cold War largely because of the Brigade Combat Team (BCT). However, the US Army is at a critical juncture. After more than 15 years of war in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is undergoing similar challenges as those that occurred after World War II, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and Desert Storm. There is increased downward pressure on the budget, which inevitably leads to reduction in manpower and structure. In addition, Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran spent the past 15 years analyzing the Army’s tactics, training methods, organization, structure, and command and control methods. Moreover, cyber hacking and the cheap proliferation of technology has made advanced military weapons, computers, and commercial electronics widely available in the world. Finally, it is widely believed that future wars will be fought in dense, urban areas. This paper analyzes the vitality of BCTs given the changing future operating environment, fiscal austerity, emerging technology, and increasing capability of adversaries.


Author: Colonel Steven J. Adams

Published: September 2016

Winning in a complex world requires more than highly trained, educated, and experienced individual soldiers and leaders. While our greatest asset is the American Soldier, the Army is a team of teams and winning depends on how effectively Army leaders are able to harness the collective knowledge and power of teams to achieve success. Cohesive and effective teams provide a competitive advantage to the Army as it navigates through a complex and rapidly changing strategic environment. Building winning teams requires growing effective leaders, creating a positive command climate, and placing a greater focus on the team rather than the individual. From a review of academic leadership concepts, effective leaders focus on trust, commitment, purpose, and communication when developing quality teams. To better develop the next generation of Army leaders to build winning teams for a complex world, the Army should mandate command climate surveys at the Brigade and Battalion level; update ADP 6-22, Army Leadership, to reflect a greater emphasis on teams; and mandate that leaders conduct a follow-up personalized assessment with professional coaches as part of the MSAF360 Multi-Source Assessment and Feedback.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Brian Albon

Published: September 2016

Iranian supported Houthi rebels are the primary destabilizing factor in Yemen. Iranian provision of money, training, and lethal aid to this quasi-Shia minority empowered them to oust the internationally recognized government of Yemen and plunge the impoverished nation into civil war. This Houthi-caused strife precipitated a significant humanitarian disaster by creating over one million internally displaced people that greatly exacerbated preexisting food, water, and fuel shortages. The Houthis also expanded the fighting into Saudi Arabia in retaliation for the Saudi-led coalition fighting to return ousted Yemeni President Hadi to power. Iranian armed Houthi fighters could easily threaten global shipping passing through the Bab el-Mandab Strait in which 4.7 million barrels of oil transit daily. Lastly, the Houthi-generated civil war disrupted U.S. counterterrorism operations targeting Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, arguably one of the most dangerous extremist groups attempting to target the U.S. homeland. U.S. intervention through diplomatic dialogue and economic incentives to persuade Iran to abandon their lethal aid and decrease financial support to the Houthi rebels would likely revert the Houthis to a localized danger vice a regional threat.


Author: Colonel Erik Anderson

Published: September 2016

The Army’s professional identity is critically important to maintain its legitimacy with the American people and to operate effectively in today’s morally ambiguous operational environment. In 2010 the Army embarked on a Campaign of Learning to assess the health and understanding of the Army Profession among its members after nearly a decade of conflict. While the renewed emphasis on the Army Profession raised overall awareness, implementation activities to date have failed to reach the audience and echelon most effective at fostering a professional identity and enduring commitment to the Army Ethic among Army Profession practitioners. Rather than continuing to develop more programs and activities at the strategic level the Army needs to focus on the organizational level, specifically the battalion command teams, as the best source to foster the Army Ethic in Army professionals.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel David R. Anzaldúa

Published: September 2016

This paper builds on the Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction manual and the Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments (MPICE) metrics framework. The Guiding Principles manual outlines strategic principles for conducting stability and reconstruction (S&R) operations and serves as a foundation for the development of S&R mission priorities. The manual espouses five major end states and seven cross-cutting principles to guide the execution of S&R missions. The MPICE companion publication provides recommended objectives, goals, indicators and measures for each of the five end states, but does not include measures for the seven cross-cutting principles. Based on the research conducted, the paper proposes outcome-based objectives, goals, indicators and measures for measuring progress for the first four of the seven cross-cutting principles of the stabilization and reconstruction framework. A discussion on why S&R competencies remain important to the U.S. military, the contemporary environment in which these missions are being conducted and the evolution of metrics in the S&R community are also included.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Bethany C. Aragon

Published: September 2016

The information instrument of national power, which has neither a recognized government lead nor a clear strategy for employment, remains the most misunderstood and underutilized element of D-I-M-E (Diplomacy, Information, Military, Economic). However, an examination of the application of information power from the First World War through the Cold War revealed that information has served as a potent instrument of national power. It is most effective when it is directed and supported by the President, guided by strategy that recognizes it as a fundamental component of official policy, coordinated across the whole of government, and implemented across the broadest spectrum of communication. Administrations should first decide whether the application of information power comports with enduring national values, their respective policy and national security objectives. Then, once the decision is made to employ information power, it must be adequately resourced to ensure its application aligns with the four key requirements.


Author: Colonel Brendan Arcuri

Published: September 2016

The forces of globalization are eroding state sovereignty, empowering non-state actors, and increasing the prospect of intra-state conflict. Greater interdependence between states has reduced the prospect of state-on-state conflict between powerful industrial age armed forces. However, the likelihood of intra-state conflict with non-state armed groups and conflict with globally networked non-state actors has increased. The United States lacks a credible deterrence for dissuading undesirable behavior in violent non-state armed groups. Consequently, the United States must consider the policy and strategy implications of the changing global environment and the character of war. The author recommends changing USSOF doctrine, organization and training in order to increase success against violent non-state actors and networked insurgents, who take advantage of asymmetries in power, economy, and technology to challenge state sovereignty and the international order.


Author: Mr. Brent G. Bahl

Published: September 2016

The 2015 National Military Strategy identified strengthening the U.S.' global network of allies and partners as a national military objective. Specifically how to provide security force assistance (SFA) is an Army Warfighting Challenge. However, Geographic Combat Commands (GCC) have conducted security cooperation, including SFA, with varying results. While structural inefficiencies are widely acknowledged, it is unlikely the underlying law will change significantly in the near term. This paper proposes as a practical matter, GCCs should increase cooperation with Ambassadors and better employ the senior defense official/defense attaché (SDO/DATT) to leverage country teams to develop a Common Operating Picture (COP) of the countries receiving the security assistance. This will result in increased and shared situational awareness and unity of effort between the GCC and the Country Team. Security cooperation officers (SCO) should consider adopting a more balanced approach to cooperation and assistance and GCC deploy a Special Operations Command – Forward, if appropriate. These practical measures will result in better implementation of security cooperation.


Author: Colonel John K. Baker

Published: September 2016

Congress has deemed the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) Arctic Strategy inadequate to address the national security significance of the region. Diminishing Arctic ice has increased human access for trade routes and natural resources, including an estimated twenty-five percent of the world’s untapped oil and gas reserves. The geopolitical and environmental impacts, particularly with Russia’s aggressive economic and military posture, threaten the relative stability of the Arctic region and challenge U.S. interests. Budget cuts and a proposed drawdown of U.S. troops in Alaska may have created the perception of a U.S. retreat from the region at a time when the U.S. holds the chairmanship of the Arctic Council and has no better time to lead internationally. As it revises its Arctic Strategy in the next year to comply with Congressional mandate, DOD has the opportunity to develop and articulate a more comprehensive and collaborative approach. This paper proposes recommendations by which DOD can address threats in an uncertain future to help achieve U.S. Arctic policy objectives.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Richard J. Ball

Published: September 2016

This paper advocates that Military Police are the most viable force to “establish police primacy as the military exit strategy” as part of Phase IV operations. The concept of Rule of Law and its importance to the legitimacy of governance and its necessity as part of re-establishing a police force during transition and stability operations is reviewed. Historical case studies will compare where Military Police were used successfully in transition law enforcement tasks as well as instances where they were not at the forefront in assisting with Rule of Law and police operations and the corresponding affects. Alternative forces to Military Police will be assessed for their capabilities and capacity to support Rule of Law and post conflict police units. Lastly, current force structure capabilities, partnering initiatives with local, state and federal law enforcement agencies within the United States and advancements in professionalism and certifications within the Military Police will also be explored. These points will reinforce that Military Police are best qualified to bridge the transition between military forces and post conflict police forces during Stability operations.


Author: Colonel Andre P. Balyoz

Published: September 2016

From 2001 through 2014 the United States spent nearly $165 billion on reconstruction in Afghanistan and Iraq. As a part of these efforts, infrastructure construction programs managed by military engineers during Operations Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Iraqi Freedom (OIF) provided new government facilities, road networks, and utility support infrastructure for the host-nation governments. These efforts reflect the tremendous capabilities of military engineers but they also highlight the importance of aligning work on the ground with national policy and military doctrine. This paper recommends: 1. Department of State taking the lead for stabilization and reconstruction; 2. Defining the scope of reconstruction as an interagency team before beginning; 3. Involving the host-nation in planning, prioritization, and oversight; and 4. Establishing security and legitimacy prior to beginning construction.


Author: Colonel Andrew M. Barr

Published: September 2016

The health of the force is among the most important indicators of Army readiness and is critical to both the present and future readiness of the force. The Army defines individual medical readiness (IMR) as the ability to achieve medical fitness standards within 72 hours of deployment. Future health readiness focuses on Soldier wellness, maximization of holistic health, and prevention of chronic disease and injury. Improvements in future health readiness should increase rates of IMR, improve the health of the force, and decrease DoD and Army healthcare costs. Army doctrine, systems, and programs such as the System for Health, the Performance Triad, and the Army Wellness Centers provide a strong framework for Army health promotion. Improvements in Army doctrine, systems, programs, and policies as well as further alignment with wellness industry best practices will increase future health readiness in the Army and provide cost savings to the Military Health System.


Author: Colonel Richard C. Bell, Jr.

Published: September 2016

Following periods of major conflict, reductions to United States (U.S.) defense budgets and military forces are the norm as the nation reprioritizes resources from international to domestic concerns. The two most recent military drawdowns in U.S. history include the post-Cold War drawdown of the 1990s and the current drawdown that began in 2011. Driven by the contentious Budget Control Act of 2011, however, today's drawdown of Regular Army forces presents a greater risk to national security than the post-Cold War drawdown. While the current drawdown promises to be less significant in terms of total personnel reductions, it is also less consistent with stated U.S. foreign policy goals, it is hampered to a larger extent by domestic political disagreements, and it begins with more internal program risk. Accordingly, the Army should revise its current strategic messaging to better communicate the challenges of the current drawdown to both external and internal audiences.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Jason B. Blevins

Published: September 2016

The U.S. military has experienced tremendous success in winning the conventional combat phases of its wars since World War II, but struggles to win the peace during post-combat hostilities. Informed by the lessons of OIF and the historical success of the U.S. Zone Constabulary in Germany after WWII, the Army should develop conventional units focused on a hybrid combination of stability and limited Irregular Warfare operations. These units, referred to in this paper as U.S. Army Constabulary Brigades, serve as a force modernization effort that supports “the process of improving the Army’s force effectiveness and operational capabilities through force development and integration.” Constabulary brigades balance the efforts of the U.S. military’s unmatched ability to succeed in conventional warfare, and its decade’s long struggle to win the peace during post-conflict stability operations. Several options exist for forming a constabulary force including reassignment of stability operations as service specific roles and converting existing structure to fill this capability gap. This paper recommends the U.S. Army convert selected BCTs to constabulary brigades, who serve as solider-police trained and focused on stability and limited IW operations.


Author: Mr. Douglas A. Boerman

Published: September 2016

The use of Clausewitzian-based limited war strategies have increased the frequency for United States policy makers to use war as a political tool while delivering less effective results. Clausewitz left indications in his writing that suggest he was still deliberating aspects of his theory, in particular the strict reliance upon force-on-force strategies. This paper provides analysis on how successful the United States military has been in delivering desired political results through war both before and after it began its strict adherence to limited war strategies. The results show that the adoption of limited war strategies coincides with increased frequency and decreased effectiveness at applying war as a political tool. The paper then provides an international politics framework that might be applied to enhance the development of grand strategic thinking. Based upon the assessment findings, recommendations are made to expand the strategic options available to military planners. Finally, the ongoing war against radical Islamic terror is used as a case study for the application of the political model


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Chris Marie Briand

Published: September 2016

After years of deployments, the US Army Reserve Components (RC), comprised of both the Army National Guard and Army Reserve, have emerged and been recognized as critical components of the “operational” Army. As the military continues the post OIF/OEF drawdown, the Army needs to reexamine its Total Force concept and revise its current readiness model to capitalize on the capabilities as well as the economies and efficiencies inherent with the reliance on the RC. The RC provides a cost effective solution to help field a balanced and affordable force capable of meeting the full range of mission requirements. Importantly, the USAR provides capabilities that augment, supplement and are unique with those provided by the Active Component (AC). Central to optimizing the AC-RC force mix for the Total Force is the development of a viable force generation model and codification of what has been loosely termed as the “Operational Reserve.” This paper examines and defines the “Operational Reserve,” assesses readiness and resourcing challenges with operationalizing the RC, and recommends a stratified strategic management process to exploit the capabilities and cost effectiveness of the US Army Reserve.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Richard D. Butler

Published: September 2016

The concept of feasibility is a central, but often underappreciated, part of the planning processes and resulting senior leader dialogues that allow civil and military leaders to make difficult choices. Identification of flexible military options demands that political, strategic and operational echelons coordinate to maintain the means-ways-ends balance. Discussions and synchronization of means allows military leaders to know what is within the realm of the possible and enables a discussion of ways with civilian leadership. The narrative of this paper seeks to explain some of the more salient points that allow senior leaders to accomplish good feasibility assessments. The selected historic examples illuminate where many of these points either aligned to provide the civilian-military leadership team with the flexibility to meet the final desired end state, or where non-adherence to feasibility assessments resulted in a less savory end.


Author: Colonel Edwin Callahan

Published: September 2016

The United States (U.S.) Army is a large organization with more than a million soldiers. It is an expensive organization to sustain, and one that is constrained by resources. Uncertainty, complexity, declining resources, and increased demand define the Army’s current strategy. The Army’s strategic leaders are responsible for creating good strategy that solves complex problems and inspires organizational change. They are responsible for reducing uncertainty and complexity while balancing resources and demands. In short, they are responsible for creating good strategy. The Army has a strategy to adapt it towards the future; however, it is difficult to understand because it suffers from the pitfalls of bad strategy. As a result, the Army’s strategy increases uncertainty and a resistance to organizational change. Good strategy provides direction and focus for the organization to follow. It reduces uncertainty, and is necessary for leading organizational change and creating competitive advantages. The purpose of this paper is to describe good and bad strategy, uncertainty and organizational change, and provide recommendations for improving the Army’s current strategy to adapt the Army toward the future.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Kevin S. Capra

Published: September 2016

The Army is currently in the process of cutting the size of its headquarters as well as reducing the grade plate structure within them. Although seen as a method of preserving readiness of combat formations, it may be counterproductive given the current strategic environment. By cutting Army Service Component Commands (ASCCs), Corps and Division headquarters to preserve force structure and readiness at the tactical level, the Army is creating a capability gap and shrinking readiness at the theater-strategic and high operational level. Winning at the strategic level requires the focus and synchronization of the elements of national power and the integration of allies and other partners, which itself requires well-led, senior staffs. In short, the need for more and permanent Joint Task Force (JTF)-capable headquarters with senior personnel in key positions is growing, rather than shrinking. This paper will examine the challenges with reducing headquarters within three critical Army organizations: the Army Service Component Commands (ASCCs), Corps and Divisions based on their requirement to serve as a JTF headquarters and how these cuts have caused a gap between the Army Operating Concept (AOC) and force structure.


Author: Mr. Mark A. Carter

Published: September 2016

On July 20, 2015, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) endorsed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), an international agreement on the nuclear program of the Islamic Republic of Iran, hereafter referred to as Iran. The JCPOA was negotiated between Iran and the five permanent members of the UNSC, plus Germany (P5+1) to eliminate Iran’s path to the development of a nuclear weapon. The signatories to the JCPOA state the agreement puts in place safeguard measures that prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon or weapons-grade nuclear material. The JCPOA is the first agreement to limit fissile material and uranium enrichment capability since the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty entered into force in 1970. As a historic agreement and one that affects the Middle East, and possibly global, security, it is appropriate to analyze its safeguard provisions to determine if deficiencies in coverage exist and the ramifications of such deficiencies. This analysis will demonstrate that P5+1 claim that the JCPOA has completely, and indefinitely, blocked Iranian attempts to develop a nuclear weapon is not verifiable.


Author: Colonel John R. Cavedo Jr.

Published: September 2016

Science and Technology is the “seed corn” for the Army’s Future warfighting systems. As such it must be exceptionally managed if the Army is to be prepared to fight and win in a Volatile, Complex, Uncertain, and Ambiguous environment. The recently released Army Operating Concept (AOC) asserts that innovation is required to ensure the Army is prepared to fight and win in that complex world. Further, the AOC highlights how the Army must be able to “continuously learn, adapt and innovate” and that this ability must not only be mastered by the operational forces, but by the institutional forces as well. Army S&T efforts are managed by bureaucratic institutional “enterprise”, which may be ill-suited in its current construct and policy limitations to meet the demands of the future. The Army S&T enterprise may require a period of punctuated equilibrium, where, as an enterprise, it must be adaptive and innovative lest the Army finds itself at a technological disadvantage in the Future Force 2025 and Beyond (F2025).


Author: Colonel Chad Chasteen

Published: September 2016

Diversity presents a paradox. On one hand, it is a source of creativity and innovation contributing to competitive advantage. On the other hand, diversity can create social divisions which degrade team cohesion, communication, and performance. Increasing diversity, therefore, presents a proverbial Gordian knot, or seemingly unsolvable problem, for many organizations. Fortunately, some have found ways to cut through the cord, untangle the complexity, and achieve positive results, including increased trust, satisfaction, and productivity. With demographic diversity rising, the U.S. Army needs to better understand the potential challenges in order to align policies and programs to improve organizational effectiveness in the future force. The purpose of this research project is to discuss the benefits and burdens of diversity on team outcomes, evaluate the effectiveness of diversity training, assess the alignment of current DoD diversity initiatives, and offer recommendations to improve the diversity-performance relationship in the Army.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Jung W. Choi

Published: September 2016

The thesis of this paper is that the current U.S. policy toward North Korea has created an imbalance between the objectives and concepts at the strategic level. As a result, the U.S. has not been able to achieve its stated policy objective of denuclearized North Korea. In an effort to secure effectively U.S. national interests, the Obama administration forthwith should reevaluate the policy of “strategic patience” and consider approaches that could ameliorate the imbalance. The strategic environment has changed significantly since Obama took office in 2009. Significant changes in the strategic environment require significant modifications to the current policy. President Nixon in 1972 proactively took steps to seek rapprochement with the communist China—then, and still, a nuclear weapons state—against the Cold War policy of containment. Recently, President Obama made a historic visit to Cuba, once a nuclear weapons proxy state, and made a historic deal with Iran, a member of the axis of evil and once an aspiring nuclear weapons state. The strategic environment is now conducive to a new engagement approach that is proactive, principled, pragmatic, and persistent with a hint of realism.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Andrew M. Clark

Published: September 2016

United States civilian law enforcement agencies (LEAs) are largely ignorant of the capabilities and limitations inherent to our nation's armed forces. Specifically, they are unaware what assistance Active Duty (Title 10) forces can and can't offer when they approach capability or capacity limits. Consequently, there is a certain amount of friction between the military and the interagency communities, as well as a lack of adequate contingency planning on the part of both. This is due in no small part to the very limited exposure that most LEAs have to military operations. This research project explores the military-civilian relations problem and attempts to identify a means of bridging the knowledge gap. The ultimate goal of this work is increased exposure and a baseline of common understanding at the federal, state, tribal, and local levels.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Corey Collier

Published: September 2016

The collaboration of technology and weapons development occasionally yields strategic advantages, dramatically changing the way war is waged and significantly shifting power projection and great power alignment. Many believe lethal autonomous weapons (LAWs) to be in that category. Others, however, contend that removing human oversight from the offensive targeting process violates the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC), specifically the principles of discrimination and proportionality. In order to stop their development, numerous organizations are calling for an international ban on the development of LAWs, claiming their use violates the basic human code of morality derived from Just War Theory. Conversely, developers are pursuing programmable, human-like intelligence, capable of the autonomous application of International Humanitarian Law and the LOAC. Regardless of the opposition, technology continues to advance. The author addresses both sides of this issue for consideration and offers recommendations on a possible compromise for the way ahead.


Author: Colonel Rob Connell

Published: September 2016

This paper states that emerging nations are not an existential threat to the U.S. Instead, the primary threat to U.S. power and influence is dual natured and revolves around the nation’s massive debt and inability to adapt to the changing world. To address these threats and maintain its position as a global leader, the U.S. must adopt a strategy focused on becoming more economically competitive via a smart power approach designed to contain emerging powers economically by dominating global market shares. To ensure effectiveness, the executive branch must develop, sponsor and maintain this strategy in the same manner that the U.S. government managed the containment of the USSR under NSC-68.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Patrick M. Costello

Published: September 2016

The current strategic environment and threat pose an immense challenge for outnumbered Air and Missile Defense forces. It is not possible for U.S. forces to deter and defeat current ballistic missile threats alone. Building partner capacity and seeking opportunities to work together with partners and allies are mandates in current defense strategic guidance. Critical to meeting the evolving and expanding threat that ballistic missiles pose, is establishing an interoperable and Integrated Air and Missile Defense capability with partners that have purchased U.S. defense systems through Foreign Military Sales. However, current policy constraints limit the ways in which integration can be achieved, rendering the current strategy inept. Updating policy guidance and ensuring process synchronization offer a possible solution to attain synergy and enable burden sharing to partially mitigate the risk currently imposed by the supply versus demand imbalance.


Author: Colonel Eric S. Crider

Published: September 2016

Creating adaptability in Soldiers is an Army Chief of Staff strategic priority and a critical requirement for the future Army. The purpose of this paper is to make a recommendation to create adaptability in the current Army training system through initial research of behavior performance measures and then embed the results into the training system. Arguably, the Army training system produces some level of adaptability as a byproduct of producing ready units. However, adaptability performance behaviors are too critical to leave to chance creation. To address this imbalance, the Army needs to be deliberate in its goal to increase adaptability through the existing training system. Defining adaptability’s trainable aspects and understanding how the Army trains are the first steps in determining how to change current mechanisms to create a system that fosters purpose-driven adaptability. The tasks trained in the system are the key to driving adaptability behavior change in the Soldiers tasked to win in a complex world.


Author: Colonel Rory A. Crooks

Published: September 2016

In the words of author Robert D. Kaplan, “the South China Sea is the future of conflict.” With vital national interests at stake and frequent military activities occurring in close proximity, parties involved in the South China Sea must develop ways of managing tensions that inevitably accompany sensitive interactions. While all military confidence building measures (CBM) generate a degree of improved communication, transparency of intent, and predictability, the magnitude of beneficial outcomes beyond these becomes a function of how well interests align between the parties. To achieve sustainable success, CBM activities must meet a short list of prerequisites and must trend toward inclusivity by building on small successes. Norms established through multiple successful CBM iterations between a small number of partner militaries serve as a baseline for incrementally including other militaries. Deliberately including key militaries in this process ultimately contributes to stability in this volatile region.


Author: Mr. Elver Sherrell Crow

Published: September 2016

The President and the Secretary of Defense recognize global climate change as a national security risk in the 2015 National Security Strategy and a Department of Defense report to Congress. Two significant implications for the United States are sea-level rise affecting coastal areas (particularly during severe storms) and drought-induced wild land fires in the western part of the country. The National Guard provides significant defense support to civil authorities during emergency response to events in these categories. This paper measures the Guard’s “Essential 10” mission capabilities against the emergency support functions used by the Federal Emergency Management Agency as a framework to evaluate adequacy of the distribution of National Guard units to respond to coastal flooding and wild land fires. It proposes a number of force structure changes across the Army National Guard to better align “Essential 10” capabilities against these two climate-related threats. Finally, the author offers an assessment of the risk these changes might pose to future global National Guard combat missions.


Author: Colonel Robert A. Culp II

Published: September 2016

This paper outlines the Kremlin’s hybrid warfare strategy, operational design and associated tactics. Included are how Moscow integrates unconventional warfare, information operations and cyber operations along with diplomatic and economic coercion to achieve political and military objectives. Understanding the Kremlin’s hybrid warfare strategy offers the United States and its allies opportunities for exploiting vulnerabilities embedded in the ways and means of Russian hybrid warfare. Recommended are actions, all of which fit into a Political Warfare strategic construct, to exploit vulnerabilities associated with Russian hybrid warfare. Implementing them aligns the ways and means necessary to successfully counter future Russian hybrid warfare and achieve our political objectives. Recommendations include changing personnel policies to better enable Strategic Landpower by making long-term investments in human capital to successfully engage in the human domain. Additional recommendations include organizational and policy changes to better organize the US Army, Cyber Command and our information operations enterprise across the Interagency to conduct Irregular Warfare and counter hybrid threats. Also recommended are changes to our intellectual culture and the professional military educational that underpins it.


Author: Colonel Samuel W. Curtis

Published: September 2016

This paper proposes that national security decision makers consider using special operation forces (SOF) forward in contested security environments outside of theaters of war to enable partner forces to combat violent extremist threats. Assumption of low-risk presence early buys down risk later as U.S. forces gain needed situational understanding. To the degree that SOF enablement activities are successful, the United States can achieve positive effects for U.S. national security interests in an acceptable time horizon. Additionally, time is gained for long-term institution building and governance activities to achieve sustainable results. First, this paper addresses key concepts and assumptions concerning the strategic indirect approach in terms of security cooperation and shaping operations. Second, we discuss the strategic environment and threat in North and West Africa. The paper then addresses the USSOF enablement model of select regional partner forces. By analyzing SOF supporting actions in North and West Africa, we present four specific insights for future potential enablement operations outside of areas of declared combat operations.


Author: Colonel Peter E. Dargle

Published: September 2016

Installations play a vital role in power projection capability and contribute to overarching unit, Soldier, and Family readiness during the force generation process. Given current realities result in reductions to force structure, the Army can still provide military professionals with the training, education, and experiences to enhance installation leadership. In a resource-constrained, complex operating environment, Garrisons require strategic leaders to maintain the foundation of Army readiness, navigate the challenges of community partnership, and ensure preparedness to serve as joint power-projection platforms. Garrisons can better accomplish the myriad of complex strategic tasks by creating a military career path specifically aligned to Installation Management. Deftly applying resources to develop a core of military leaders, knowledgeable in the complexities of installation management programs and policies, allows the Army to lead, sustain, and guide installations through assured challenges in a volatile future.


Author: Colonel Robert A. Davel

Published: September 2016

US forces remain increasingly engaged in stability operations throughout the world. Achieving the level of operational adaptability needed to perform these operations requires the Army to complement its traditional lethal capabilities with Non-Lethal Weapons (NLW). NLW enable U.S. forces to achieve strategic objectives while minimizing collateral damage both inside and out of mega-populated urban centers – such as harming non-combatants, destroying critical infrastructure, and poisoning the environment. The use of NLW is essential to stability operations. Accordingly, the DoD should develop NLW capabilities to enhance full spectrum operations. In an era of austere budgets, NLW must be affordable, effective, and suitable. NLW must provide feasible support to all services, regardless of the service’s mission set and personnel. The DoD must incorporate NLW and synchronize efforts to meet our strategic and operational challenges for all forces 2025 and beyond. This SRP describes tactical, operational, and strategic applications of non-lethal weapons. It concludes with recommendations for the military’s employment of non-lethal weapons in full spectrum operations.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel John L. Dawber

Published: September 2016

The most recent and highly publicized major defense policy evolution the United States has pursued is the rebalance to the Pacific. Essential to stability and security of the greater Asia-Pacific is ensuring the stability of Northeast Asia, where maintaining a tenuous armistice on the Korean peninsula is vital. U.S. defense policy for the peninsula over the last half century has been remarkably resolute in maintaining this fragile peace. Although this policy has failed to deny North Korea the acquisition of nuclear weapons, it has ensured security and stability in a complex geopolitical environment where military options risk escalation, immense devastation, and de-stabilization of the region. The question is not whether the United States should maintain a forward presence on the peninsula; rather, how better can it maintain this defense posture within the U.S.-ROK alliance. Pre-occupation with events in Southeast Asia must not risk diminishing the strategic priority of the U.S. commitment to Korea.


Author: Commander Michael R. Dolbec

Published: September 2016

Over the past three decades, the Department of Defense (DOD) has developed and fielded a fleet of unmanned drones without a Joint coordinated strategy. Contrary to service interoperability encouraged by the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the military deferred unifying drone programs and development in 1988. This has resulted in years of wasteful duplication and a drone fleet in which interoperability is an afterthought. Conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan created significant demand for drone capabilities, and nearly unconstrained military budgets fueled service-specific drone development. Drones are the largest growth market in the aerospace industry, and the DOD is predicted to spend $93 billion on them in the next decade. Attempting to coordinate service-specific drone development, the DOD has published many unmanned vehicle roadmaps and established several advisory task forces. However, without a truly Joint strategy to consolidate efforts and resources, as well as an organization with the authority to enforce it, little change has occurred. The wasted effort and resources of service-specific drone capability development weakens the U.S. military and is not sustainable in a fiscally constrained environment.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Sean Duvall

Published: September 2016

Defending the United States Homeland, allies, and interests against attacks of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is a vital national interest. As America wrestles with the best way to deter or respond to a WMD attack, the National policy and National strategy to counter WMD has undergone a subtle but significant evolution since the terrorist attacks in America on 9/11. Defending the U.S. from WMD attack evolution can be categorized into two frameworks: Combating WMD (2002-2009) and Countering WMD (2010-Present). These frameworks for national strategy and policy can be traced all of the way through multiple levels of national documents to Army doctrine. The change to countering WMD policy and strategic guidance is generally consistent from National and Department of Defense (DoD) documents. The Joint doctrine and service doctrine is also generally consistent with the National and DoD guidance. Army strategic guidance and doctrine does not reflect some of the changes from the combating to countering WMD framework and should be updated to avoid confusion in the Joint Force and Army leadership.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Brian P. Elliott

Published: September 2016

The Army Reserve has shifted from a strategic to an operational reserve since 9/11. An effective way for the Army to achieve national defense and national military end states is for Combatant Command (COCOM) to assign United States Army Reserve (USAR) forces to Combatant Commanders. While the concept of regionally aligned Army forces begins to address this pursuit, a formal relationship, such as assignment, has not been established. Legislation, such as Goldwater-Nichols, Total Force and Total Army policies, and both Army and Joint doctrine support COCOM assignment while granting Operational Control to the Army Service Component Command. Evidence of successfully executing a proper formal relationship is the assignment of the 351st Civil Affairs Command (CACOM) to US Pacific Command. Assignment of the remaining CACOMs should happen at the earliest opportunity. Foregoing the Army Reserve Engagement Team concept at the Geographic COCOM and focusing efforts on the Army Reserve Engagement Cells will better integrate assigned USAR forces into Joint, theater activities. Assignment of additional USAR commands gives Combatant Commanders the tools they need when they need them.


Author: Colonel Peter H. Fechtel

Published: September 2016

Germany’s rise in the last five years as a regional and global leader has caused domestic and international elites to question its traditional reticence for foreign engagements. Correspondingly, the German government has begun work on a new security policy, also known as a “White Paper.” This study posits that Germany must align its new security policy to enhance its relevance as an ally and partner for regional and global stability. It examines Germany’s evolving security policy by: 1) analyzing relevant statements from German and other international leaders on the topic; 2) reviewing German security engagement over the last five years; 3) exploring the foundational components of German security thinking; 4) analyzing the current process of developing the new White Paper; and 5) considering what policy changes may be contained within the document, and the associated implications for United States policy makers. This paper concludes that Germany’s proclivity for engagement within international organizations will increasingly make it impossible for Germany to remain a reluctant power. It also concludes that stability operations may be a domestically palatable way for German security engagement.


Author: Colonel Kyle E. Feger

Published: September 2016

Donald Rumsfeld’s desire to transform the Department of Defense into a lean, flexible, and expeditionary organization in 2001 was not a bad initiative. However, in applying the transformation based on three strategic influencers to the plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom, the result was a failed strategy. The first was a wrongheaded application of the lessons learned in Operation Desert Storm. Second, an emerging Revolution in Military Affairs predicated on network centric and rapid decisive operations underestimated the amount of military power required on the ground in Iraq. Finally, a “New American Way of War” focused on small numbers of special operations forces supported by airpower that initially saw success in Afghanistan reinforced Rumsfeld’s concept for regime change in Iraq. The combination of these factors in the decade between Operation Desert Storm and the 9/11 attacks resulted in flawed assumptions and a failed strategy for Operation Iraqi Freedom.


Author: Colonel Sean N. Fisher

Published: September 2016

The purpose of this research project is to examine the challenges and opportunities inherent in the practice of mission command in a multinational environment. The research paper begins with an analysis of past and recent multinational operations to emphasize the relevance of mission command in this context. The paper then transitions to an examination of three of the six mission command principles; building cohesive teams through mutual trust, creating shared understanding, and accepting prudent risks. These three principles prove particularly challenging primarily due to disparities in training proficiency, combat capabilities, and importantly cultural differences among partner nations. In examining and analyzing these challenges, this research paper advocates the importance of cross-cultural competence, places emphasis on the need to focus on capabilities as opposed to limitations among partners and allies, and addresses the importance of common doctrinal language. Addressing these three important factors through education, experience, and training better prepares leaders to apply mission command during multinational operations.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Kristofer W. Gifford

Published: September 2016

The current strategy against ISIL is best described as containment plus with a lead from behind approach. There is a gap between the rhetoric and reality of the proposed endstate to defeat ISIL. The strategy employs ill suited proxy forces that are committing atrocities against the people they liberate. The strategy also attempts to win slowly and avoid stability operations. Though an effective degrade strategy, it cannot achieve the desired end state of destroying ISIL because of a weak Iraqi Security Force and limited U.S. means and resources. Current strategy also fails to address the root causes of the conflict, offer lasting political solutions, or win the information war. To correct these deficiencies, U.S. leaders should reframe the problem set and better align ends, ways, and means with the following strategic adjustments. Utterly defeat ISIL using rapid, decisive, kinetic and non-kinetic means. The Coalition must embrace a U.N. led Arab ground force, strike at ISIL’s ability to govern, and attack ISIL’s ideology more aggressively. To win the peace a new political order should be established, granting semi-autonomy to Sunnis and Kurds, and stabilized by the U.N. led Arab forces. It is also crucial to achieve similar objectives in Syria through diplomacy with Russia and Iran, similar to the P5+1 negotiations.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Kennon S. Gilliam

Published: September 2016

With shrinking budgets and force structure, the Department of Defense (DoD) has requested congressional authority to conduct another round of base realignment and closures (BRAC) in fiscal year 2019. Multiple stakeholders, both inside and outside the DoD, influenced by BRAC history and representing competing objectives, are critical players in an already complex environment. Developing the appropriate organizational structure armed with the proper analytical guidance is essential to a successful BRAC analysis. Instead of building upon historical BRAC examples or currently existing organizational structures, the three frames of operational design can assist the DoD in exploring alternative structures for the next BRAC. Framing the operational environment allows the Department of Defense to understand the current and desired environments. Accurately defining the problem provides insights on how to achieve the desired endstates. Developing operational approaches for organizing the BRAC analytical groups can produce structures that are noticeably different from previous BRAC efforts.


Author: Colonel Ricardo Gonzalez

Published: September 2016

Transnational Organized Crime in Latin America has expanded in the last decade and is responsible for most of the illicit trafficking of drugs, contraband goods and humans in the Western Hemisphere. These criminal activities take place along well-established and resourced networks, which lack effective government control measures. This sophisticated grid with access into U.S. territory could conceivably be used by extremist terrorist organizations to inflict harm inside the United States. Yet ironically, if Transnational Crime Organizations allow the use of illicit networks by extremist organizations, it could bring about adverse consequences for their own lucrative international operations. This Strategic Research Project examines these networks and potential links to terrorism that could be manipulated by religious extremist terrorist organizations. It also assesses the possible U.S. response to a significant terrorist event borne out of this convergence. The study concludes by providing recommendations for U.S. policymakers.


Author: Ms. Alice Y. Goodson

Published: September 2016

The use of cyberspace capabilities during peacetime by state and non-state actors is having a disruptive effect on the international system and the community has varying views on how to deal with these issues. The lack of technical and legal limitations threaten key cyberspace terrain and offers state actors with the political will and technical capability a way to achieve the strategic advantage against an adversary. Cyber operations conducted against a state’s critical infrastructure could lead to misinterpretations that result in conflict escalation from the cyberspace domain to traditional air, land, or sea. This paper recommends the international community collaborate to define international characteristics for key cyberspace terrain; develop standards that ensure states provide timely technical attribution to states accused of cyberwarfare; and create guidelines to verify state intentions in order to increase understanding, promote fairness, and decrease the chances of conflict escalation.


Author: Colonel Gary R. Graves

Published: September 2016

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) remains not only relevant, but an essential component for the protection and advancement of U.S. national interests in Europe, with ancillary effects globally. By maintaining a strong collaborative transatlantic security approach between the United States and its closest and strongest allies, the member nations of NATO, the United States can advance U.S. national interests while supporting the international order of the 21st century. However, the United State must assist NATO in increasing its overall capabilities (Means), to respond to a multitude of threats, by applying interoperable resources across all of the warfighting domains (Ways), to achieve the desired political end states – i.e. deter, and if required, defeat regional sources of instability, while promoting political integration and economic interdependence (Ends). NATO effects not only U.S. policies, but also influences a variety of U.S. national interests. By accepting this, and continuing to invest in the growth and strength of the alliance, the United States will direct its own diplomatic and economic destiny, and guarantee continued access and influence not only in Europe, but also around the world.


Author: Commander Jeff Guerrero

Published: September 2016

2013 National Strategy for the Arctic Region establishes the line of effort, “advance United States Security interests in the Arctic”, and stipulates that we must "enable our vessels and aircraft to operate through, under, and over the airspace and waters of the Arctic." While U.S. submarines have a proven track record of under-ice capability, U.S. surface force has limited capability to operate in the Arctic region except for a few weeks in mid to late summer. Expanding U.S. surface force capability to support Joint, Coalition or Interagency operations for longer durations will require additional resources in order to increase maritime capability in the Arctic. This paper will explore U.S. National Objectives in the Arctic, Strategic Concepts and National Power, available through current surface force capabilities, and project whether future maritime force capabilities require adjustment or alignment to support the overall Arctic Strategy.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Andreas S. Hau

Published: September 2016

This paper examines the reasoning behind Vladimir Putin’s intervention in the Syrian civil war within the historical context of Russian strategic needs and objectives in Europe and the Middle East. There are three main reasons for Russia’s intervention in Syria. The first reason is to protect Russia’s long-standing Syrian ally and Russia’s Mediterranean naval base located there. A second reason -- both evolving and opportunistic -- is to intensify the Syrian civil war in order to increase refugee migration to Europe and thereby destabilize the European Union (EU) and NATO. The final driver for Putin’s Syrian intervention is his desire to become a major stakeholder in the Syrian peace process. Three recommendations for overcoming Putin’s strategy are also presented. These include fully funding the United Nations request for Syrian refugees, increasing the participation rate of Gulf States in the mitigation of the refugee crisis, and finally pursuing diplomatic efforts to reach a peace deal inside Syria.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel (P) David R. Hibner

Published: September 2016

The United States and other nations have struggled to find a widely accepted strategy to defeat the Islamic State because they oversimplify understanding the operational environment by focusing on what can be seen by an outsider as a reflection of their own biases and experiences. The resulting lack of understanding of the deeper culturally and religiously oriented values and assumptions that provide the strength and purpose to ISIS and its corresponding strategic objectives is perpetuated throughout the strategic planning process. In order to develop effective strategies and policies to solve these problems, the Islamic State's culture, objectives, and strategy must be clearly understood from the perspective of those doing the fighting. By analyzing and understanding Islamic State operations from the deeper aspects of values and underlying assumptions of the organization, strategists and policy makers will have a better understanding of the unique strategic implications of the Islamic State, which is a necessary foundation for defining and following an effective, widely accepted strategy to contain or defeat them.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Christopher W. Hoffman

Published: September 2016

The Army's approach to Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) is not properly synchronized to adequately support National and Defense security objectives. The Army stakeholder groups and processes for CWMD are varied, complex, and not properly nested. There are three non-medical proponents that provide the bulk of the expertise for CWMD efforts; this, combined with the Army Medical Department's efforts, the responsibilities the Army holds in the Chemical Biological Defense Program, and its associated RDT&E infrastructure, challenge the Army's ability to produce a coherent and consistent CWMD strategy that can be understood by all stakeholders and leveraged in pursuit of resources in defense processes. The absence of one single synchronized Army CMWD strategy prevents the development of appropriate capability and capacity in ground forces to achieve strategic CWMD goals. Proper designation of a general/flag officer on staff as the CWMD synchronizer, appropriately enabled with existing staff, combined with streamlining of non-medical proponency under one authority, would go a long way to correcting this shortcoming and deliver ground forces capable of countering dynamic threats.


Author: Colonel Brant D. Hoskins

Published: September 2016

Beginning in the late 1990s, the U.S. government began to demonstrate a growing appreciation for the threats posed by Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). In near continuous efforts since that time, strategic leaders have developed policy, multiple iterations of strategy, and Joint doctrine to counter WMD (CWMD). At the same time, various proponents throughout the Army developed or enhanced operational, tactical, and technical capabilities to CWMD. While these developments are encouraging, they do not address the Army’s most significant CWMD challenge which is the lack of an effective CWMD program. Specifically, the Army Staff is not optimally organized for this task, the Army lacks a unifying CWMD vision and strategy to guide and synchronize CWMD programs and, operational doctrine lacks the clarity required for the entire force to plan, prepare and execute CWMD. In order for the Army to, “lead CWMD in the land domain” as declared in the 2014 Army Strategic Planning Guidance, the Army should consider establishing the office of Chief, CWMD at the two star level on the Army staff and him/her with the authorities required to develop, unify and enable a new CWMD program for the Army.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Keith Richard Jarolimek

Published: September 2016

Current Army doctrine for character development falls short of what the Army needs to develop leaders of character. This paper demonstrates an approach to improve character development for junior leaders. Impressions gained by junior leaders in their first operational assignment are formative for the rest of their service in the profession of arms. Battalion commanders and Command Sergeants Major play the most important role in character development as they are the moral exemplars and developers of junior officers and non-commissioned officers during this influential time. The character development portion of a battalion’s leader development program should include five components: an understanding of Army character attributes; appreciation of the origins and content of the Army Ethic; individual character assessment and feedback; training and feedback in moral dilemmas; and modeling of moral, ethical behavior. To support this character development strategy, the Army needs to adopt or develop a character assessment tool and update leader development doctrine.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Jason J. Jones

Published: September 2016

The Army must develop strategic leaders who can excel in a future operating environment marked by complexity and uncertainty. The questions becomes, is the Army developing officers that are prepared to serve as future strategic leaders? Unfortunately, operational demands placed on the military since 2001 created a culture that precludes this from happening. This culture rewards tactical experiences over the pursuit of broadening assignments and shaped a cohort of senior leaders that mentor subordinates to maximize time at the tactical level. These issues, combined with limited opportunities in an officer’s career timeline to pursue broadening assignments, created a miss-alignment between the Army Officer Professional Development Program and career management system. This research paper highlights those issues that led to this misalignment, offer recommendations that will alter the Army’s culture, change mentors attitudes, and increase time in an officer’s career timeline to pursue broadening opportunities. The application of these recommendations will realign these programs and lead to the development of diverse strategic leaders able to lead the Army into the twenty-first century.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Benjamin R. Jonsson

Published: September 2016

This strategy research project examines the relationship between the rhetoric of the Islamic State and their actions on the ground. This research effort aims to examine how the Islamic State's framing of its own role in the struggle for Syria explains the group's actions, provides insights on what to expect in the future, and analyzes areas of strategic vulnerability. The paper focuses on provincial Twitter posts from January 2016, drawing out the following key themes of the Islamic State’s narrative: battling God’s enemies, military strength, piety, and the caliphate as a prosperous place. Finally, the paper discusses implications for U.S. policy: Namely, that the United States urgently needs a robust information campaign, that it must address the increasingly sectarian nature of the Syrian conflict that will impact regional dynamics for decades, and that any strategy must be informed by the deeply religious appeal and claims of the Islamic State.


Author: Colonel Ernest J. Karlberg

Published: September 2016

The Army faces a challenge today similar to the one faced following the Vietnam War. The past decade of war created a generation of agile and adaptive leaders focused on the current fight. Army leadership of the 1970s developed concepts that generated the most tactically and technically proficient army in the world exhibited in the tactical success of Desert Storm. The Army leadership of today must prepare the force for the future while engaged in the challenges of today. General Milley’s initiative to make Readiness priority #1 and the recently published Army Directive 2016-05 set the conditions to create an Army prepared to train to win in a complex world. This strategic research project examines the training revolution following Vietnam, the effects of ARFORGEN on how the Army trains, and the initiatives outlined in Army Directive 2016-05. It goes on to examine the change effort of GEN Dempsey to engrain Mission Command in Army culture and compares that effort to GEN Milley’s effort to make readiness priority #1. Highlighting the critical challenge: failing to educate and train those required to execute the requirements and enable them to monitor and correctly report readiness status per the EXORDs puts the entire effort at risk.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Joshua Keisler

Published: September 2016

The cyber revolution is changing the characteristics of warfare. The land, sea, and air domains each have their own theorists who have attempted to provide the principals of warfare. Cyber does not have its own defining grand theorist, but perhaps it does not need one. Sun Tzu outlined an enduring framework for tactics. Kautilya provided a theory on statecraft. Clausewitz, Jomini, Mahan, Douhet and countless other theorists have provided characteristics of warfare that cross domain boundaries. Cyber does not need its own theorist. Existing theory sufficiently provides principals of warfare within the cyber domain. More so than theory, the cyber domain needs definition and behavioral norms. In order to maintain freedom within cyberspace, while also securing public, commercial, and governmental access, a framework for governance is needed. The U.S. should take an active role in leading the international community in developing a set of cyber norms.


Author: Colonel Jason Knight

Published: September 2016

The Secretary of Defense’s ‘Force of the Future’ initiative has yet to reform the up-or-out promotion system. This may be because senior leaders do not believe the case for change has merit or they may have difficulty visualizing an alternative. Valid concerns sufficient for driving change include a shift from an industrial to an information era, competition for talent, poor talent management, and a history of criticisms. Any alternative promotion system must account for the philosophies associated with the windows and ceilings that regulate officer flow through and out of the military. The three philosophies driving the current system are timelines, promotability, and generalization. However, relevant literature identifies the three philosophies that should be paramount: competencies, employability, and specialization. A viable alternative to the up-or-out promotion system uses competencies to determine promotion eligibility, focuses on employability to retain valuable members, and facilitates specialization. Implementing such a system will not be simple; however, the benefits will be worth the effort. If senior leaders become down and out about the up-or-out system, there is a viable alternative.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Bob Krumm

Published: September 2016

The U.S. military has proven itself adept at creating a decentralized culture that produces innovation during long periods of conflict, as in World War II and more recently during the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. However, the military has been less successful at being able to maintain that type of culture in peacetime. This paper analyzes the concepts of entrepreneurship, competition, and knowledge through the filter of the lessons of the “Austrian school of economics” and applies them to the current U.S. military. This analysis concludes that the military retains vestigial conscription-era controls that inhibit a culture that encourages disruptive innovation. This paper proposes that DoD move to a post-conscription professional model, redefine and make greater use of mission command, add bottom-up experimental units, and create an internal, competitive marketplace by giving greater requirements validation and funding authorities to the regional combatant commanders instead of to the service chiefs.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Joseph P. Kuchan

Published: September 2016

Russia seized Crimea by force, intervened militarily in Eastern Ukraine, and has shown no sign of stopping its aggression. The U.S. wants to deter Russian aggression but has been unable to find the right formula, especially when faced with fiscal constraints and other demands. Imperial Roman systems of deterrence, conventional deterrence theory, and examples of U.S. deterrence during the Cold War all provide insight into the current U.S. predicament in Europe. The U.S. must deter against both Russian conventional attacks and its so-called hybrid war. In order to do so, the U.S. should station a Joint Task Force-capable division headquarters, additional enablers, two additional armored brigade combat teams, and additional equipment in Europe to deter Russia through denial. Combined with effective diplomacy and deliberate communication, clear when required, vague when necessary, the U.S. will deter Russian aggression while maintaining a free and friendly Europe in furtherance of U.S. interests.


Author: Colonel Michael B. Lalor

Published: September 2016

Often the largest force in a joint area of operations, the Army owns the majority of the tasks and responsibilities required to set the theater. With finite resources and the preponderance of its sustainment units in the Reserve Component, the Army’s recent operational experiences in Afghanistan (2001-2002), Haiti (2010), and Liberia (2014) offer recurring and actionable lessons for planners, staffs, and commanders. The Army is often challenged to set the theater due to an inadequate logistics command and control structure, an inability to rapidly build logistics capacity to meet sustainment requirements, and incomplete planning and resourcing that routinely results in capability gaps during the opening phases of operations. The Army should improve the employment of its logistics force structure through a combination of different initiatives sponsored across the Army and the joint force. These initiatives will improve logistics command and control, provide more responsive support during contingency operations, and mitigate recurring capability gaps.


Author: Colonel Nicholas F. Lancaster

Published: September 2016

Combatant and Joint Force Commanders are comfortable weighing operational risk, however they must also weigh legal risk when operating in cyberspace. Four areas of legal risk for cyber operations include avoiding inadvertent armed attacks, complying with the law of armed conflict, following the intelligence oversight rules, and ensuring operations do not qualify as covert action. An armed attack under international law is the trigger for a response in self-defense, so commanders must conduct their cyber activities below this threshold and conduct their operations in accordance with the law of armed conflict. On the domestic side, commanders must carefully plan and supervise their operations to ensure they comply with intelligence oversight rules designed to protect U.S. persons. Finally, because cyber operations are innately devoid of attribution, commanders must be vigilant to ensure their operations do not qualify as covert action that the President must independently authorize and report to Congress.


Author: Captain Scott E. Langum

Published: September 2016

The Arctic is changing. U.S. policies and resource allocation must also change. On September 3, 2015, President Barak Obama became the first sitting President to travel above the Arctic Circle. The purpose of his trip was to raise awareness of regional issues created by climate change. This administration has advanced U.S. Arctic interests compared to its predecessors. However, there is still a long road ahead fraught with political and logistic challenges that must be resolved. As environmental conditions and technological advances have increased man’s ability to operate in the Arctic, the need for persistent presence has increased proportionally. Operational implications of these emerging missions have affected not only the USCG, but the Department of Defense and a plethora of other governmental agencies as well. As a nation, the U.S. currently does not have the physical nor the political resources to support national security objectives. However, by focusing on the four greatest areas of strategic interest economic expansion, international diplomacy, national security strategy, and the projection of power across the full range of military operations, one can begin to prioritize areas within the national strategy for resource allocation increases.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Paul Larson

Published: September 2016

This paper explores the dynamics of an emerging grand strategic competition between the United States and China over the future of the norms and institutions underpinning the liberal world order as we know it. By comparing China’s behavior in the South China Sea and Africa, we can begin to see the elements of a political-military “encirclement” strategy, designed to gradually advance China’s aims without resorting to direct armed conflict. It concludes with policy recommendations for the United States to begin countering China’s encirclement strategy.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Shawn Leonard

Published: September 2016

Despite being engaged in the region for over 15 years, the United States Army War College does not offer a perspective on Middle Eastern thought regarding warfare. Yet the War College’s students—senior officers—continue to receive a Western-based foundation of strategic thought centered on the writings of Clausewitz and Jomini. This short survey seeks to explore the writings of the Islamic social scientist, Ibn Khaldun, who described the world’s first social cycle and the tribal phenomenon which fuels it, known as “asabiyyah.” Next, the paper focuses on two of Islam’s foremost commanders, Khalid Bin al-Waleed and Saladin, who demonstrate the innate Arab-turn-Muslim reliance on mobility and surprise to consistently defeat numerically and technically superior opponents. Finally, the paper offers a pedagogical recommendations section to further discuss the rationale for introducing these topics into the AWC curriculum. There are clear linkages between the concept of “asabiyyah” and the strategic acumen of Bin al-Waleed and Saladin to America’s contemporary adversaries throughout the Middle East, sub-Saharan Africa, and Central and South Asia.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Sherri LeVan

Published: September 2016

Chinese provocative actions in the South China Sea (SCS) have intensified U.S. and Chinese military interactions and any corresponding miscalculation could bring the two nations into direct conflict. This paper examines the tensions in this region that stem from China's rapid and large-scale land reclamation projects in the SCS and overlapping claims with U.S. allies on islands in the region. It analyzes U.S. national interests that are directly opposed to China's "Core Interests" in the SCS and that are driving diplomatic, economic and military relations. Conflicting national interests coupled with China's escalatory actions against U.S. allies and partners contributes to the current military tension between the two nations. The paper concludes that China's continued provocative actions in the SCS will be a recurring source of friction. Thus, the U.S. should maintain its presence to preserve regional security and stability. More important, the U.S. can dictate how and when to respond to Chinese provocations and the paper argues that now is the time for the U.S. to draw the proverbial line in China's man-made sand.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Andrew Liffring

Published: September 2016

Energy security, defined as having assured access to reliable supplies of energy and the ability to protect and deliver sufficient energy to meet mission essential requirements, is a strategic issue for the United States. The U.S. Army is the DoD’s greatest energy user, consuming 36 percent of the DoD’s total in 2014, and therefore has a vested interest in increasing its energy security posture. However, the Army faces a critical energy security threat in the form of domestic utility disruptions due to the service’s dependence on commercial power grids, especially due to enemy action such as cyber-attack. However, the Army is only funded to meet current energy demands, receiving very little to invest in renewable energy projects. Currently, the Army must rely on third party financing and prioritize projects based on economic variables to increase energy security on Army installations. This strategy fails to increase readiness and allocate the Army’s limited means efficiently. By using the Energy Security framework proposed in this paper, the Army can better manage energy security projects in a risk-informed way.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Christopher G. Lindner

Published: September 2016

In January 2013, the Chief of Staff of the Army directed the Army Medical Department (AMEDD) to conduct a study aimed at improving development of its officers for leadership and command positions. The AMEDD determined that many officers inadequately develop as leaders through professional military education, training, and assignment experiences. The purpose of this research paper is to evaluate current AMEDD strategies to develop and employ talent in its active duty officer corps. Additionally, the paper identifies evidence-based courses of action derived from both military and private sector best practices to improve AMEDD’s talent management. Developing talent in the AMEDD requires an overhaul of competency identification and building, as well as performance management to meet current and future leader-development demands. The AMEDD must also adapt its practices of employing talent through matching talents to the right jobs, supported by more quantifiable talent management systems. Improving development and employment of talent in the AMEDD fosters an organization ready to meet future readiness demands, decrease costs, and improve beneficiary satisfaction.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Craig Maceri

Published: September 2016

There are multiple players in the global community - governmental, non-governmental, and private sector, who focus their efforts on economic development in post-conflict, fragile, or failed states. In 2006, a new player emerged from the Department of Defense, known as the Task Force for Business and Stability Operations, focused on promoting economic development in Iraq. This novel task force consisted mainly of civilian business personnel who leveraged their private sector expertise to help revitalize Iraq’s industrial economy. After eight years of operating in both Iraq and Afghanistan, the TFBSO shut down operations and transferred its open projects to United States Agency for International Development (USAID). This paper seeks to answer how successful the Task Force was in helping to promote a sustainable economy in Iraq and Afghanistan and what role the Department of Defense should play in economic development activities. It also provides recommendations on what actions should occur to regenerate a more effective capability for future contingencies.


Author: Colonel Robert E. Lee Magee

Published: September 2016

NATO is required to protect each Alliance member. Based on current political and military conditions in the Baltic States, NATO can no longer successfully deter Russian aggression as revealed by recent open source war games conducted by RAND. NATO would be left with nothing with bad options if Russia pursued a campaign similar to its efforts in Ukraine. Therefore, NATO must continue to adapt to the 21st Century and a resurgent Russia. This adaptation would include a military force capable of deterring Russia’s Western Military District, broadening its exercise program, and a earmarking a force capable of relieving the deterrent force. These military options would be supported by a NATO information campaign and political commitments. NATO must consider Russian interests and how best to work with and around President Vladimir Putin’s current administration.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Frank A. Makoski

Published: September 2016

The Asia-Pacific has the most natural disasters than any other region in the world. It is also an area of increasing economic growth and urbanization. The devastating costs associated with natural disasters have direct and indirect implications, not only for the region, but also for the United States. As the U.S. shifts its focus to Asia, it is essential to understand and mitigate the effects natural disasters have in the Asia-Pacific in order to promote stability and protect U.S. interests. This paper will examine the causes of natural disasters in the Asia-Pacific, assess the costs associated with these events, and link how environmental catastrophes in the region affect the United States and its interests in the region. In addition, it will provide recommendations on how the U.S. government can better support endeavours to build resilience against the effects of natural disasters with the goal of maintaining stability and security in the Asia-Pacific, and ultimately in the United States.


Author: Colonel Robert W. Marshall

Published: September 2016

The Army has made mission command the cornerstone of its operations and leadership doctrine. Despite its inclusion in doctrine for more than 10 years, the Army still struggles to fully enact mission command. There are significant cultural barriers that drive this inability to realize the full potential of mission command. This paper uses Kotter’s organizational change model and Schein’s methods of cultural change to analyze current Army culture and its level of misalignment with the precepts of mission command. From this analysis, it identifies cultural embedding and reinforcing mechanisms to enable senior leaders to create and sustain needed change to fully embrace mission command. Army senior leaders, at multiple levels, must make mission command a focus area and provide role-modeling and coaching to their subordinates. The Army must incorporate mission command principles into its philosophies and creeds and continue to tell the story of why mission command is necessary for future success. Army systems, including performance evaluation, education, training and assignments must be modified to create culture change to better align leader development with mission command.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Earl G. Matthews

Published: September 2016

Al-Shabaab is Al-Qaeda’s East African franchise and is in the midst of a diffuse ten-year insurgency against the United Nations-backed Federal Government of Somalia and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Consistent with its ultra-violent expansionist jihadist vision of an Islamic caliphate, al-Shabaab has in recent years grown into a transnational actor determined and able to orchestrate sensational and horrific terrorist incidents outside of the contours of Somalia. Al-Shabaab has been characterized as fiscal-military state. It has adapted an innovative and resilient funding model which has allowed the organization to sustain itself over the long haul, despite the loss of significant territory or the removal of key leadership figures. The United States has devoted significant resources to training and equipping AMISOM troop contributing nations and to identifying and directly targeting key leaders within Al-Shabaab. This paper argues that a necessary component of any successful effort to permanently cripple and ultimately defeat the organization will require a concerted whole-of-government effort to uncover and comprehend the al-Shabaab financial apparatus and to dismantle that operation. Cutting off al-Shabaab’s money flow will not alone achieve victory over the organization, however, without doing so, victory is unobtainable.


Author: Colonel Kevin A. McAninch

Published: September 2016

To be successful in the dynamic global security environment of the 21st century the United States Army must retain and develop its talent: its people. The Army places a premium on leadership and developing leaders through the best possible education, training and experiences. The Army’s 360-degree assessment tool, the Multisource Assessment and Feedback (MSAF), provides feedback to leaders on how well they are leading and gives leaders an opportunity to engage in self-development. However, the MSAF is not currently seen or utilized as a catalyst for the learning and development of leaders, and analysis shows there are negative trends with the program. Additionally, the leader competency of developing others is consistently rated as poor. Negative perceptions by the force regarding the MSAF’s utility have given rise to a high percentage of officers initiating an MSAF event only to fulfill the regulatory requirement of including a date on their officer evaluation report. In light of this, the Army has an opportunity to stop lying to itself and add needed structure to ensure the learning sticks, and that the organization doesn’t fall victim to the creation of a leadership gap in the formation.


Author: Mister Ryan Sean McCannell

Published: September 2016

As the United States winds down its stabilization operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development will face bureaucratic and political pressures to abandon their already modest reconstruction and stabilization (R&S) lines of effort in favor of more traditional diplomacy and development assistance priorities. Yet this period of relative peace allow policy makers to reflect on past challenges to creating a “civilian surge” capacity and determine feasible, acceptable, and suitable ways and means to ensure robust civilian participation in future R&S operations. The author recommends expanding the work of a recently created interagency task force on fragile states to include leading a new generation of civil-military planning tied explicitly to resources, since past planning efforts have not always done so effectively. Civilian agencies should work with the Department of Defense (DOD) to conduct formal interagency after action reviews on R&S activities outside of Iraq and Afghanistan, track and respond to congressional efforts at DOD reform, and encourage R&S knowledge centers to take stock of existing capabilities and reinvigorate their relationships with policy makers.


Author: Colonel J. Frank Melgarejo Jr.

Published: September 2016

This strategic research project (SRP) analyzes the challenge of combating transnational organized crime in Central America’s Northern Triangle. It then describes DoD programs and authorities which best support U.S. and partner nation CTOC efforts on the land domain. To determine the combination of DoD programs and authorities that could best support CTOC efforts, the SRP defines TOC; describes the Northern Triangle and its environment; reviews U.S. CTOC policies and supporting strategies; analyzes current DoD CTOC authorities and offers examples of how such authorities can be leveraged; and finally recommends how DoD can best support CTOC on the land domain in Central America’s Northern Triangle.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Michael D. Mierau, Jr.

Published: September 2016

Professions require rules for the conduct of its members, and a system to enforce those rules through discipline if necessary. The Army’s Judge Advocate General’s (JAG) Corps, which governs the profession of law within the Army and the Army’s courts, is no exception. Although the Army JAG Corps has both rules that govern the ethical conduct of lawyers and a system to investigate and discipline lawyers that violate those rules, an analysis of the studies done at the national level with regard to lawyer discipline demonstrates that the Army has room to improve its system of lawyer discipline. This paper proposes that the Army should designate a specific duty position for the role of disciplinary investigator and then train lawyers in that duty position in the specialized area of the law governing lawyer discipline. Additionally this paper proposes that the Army should change the standard of proof in lawyer disciplinary investigations to that of clear and convincing evidence. These changes will bring the Army system into greater compliance with the national standards for lawyer discipline established by the American Bar Association, and will afford greater consistency and fairness in the Army’s disciplinary system for lawyers.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Joseph C. Miller

Published: September 2016

The United States became an Arctic Nation in 1867 when it purchased the territory of Alaska and has demonstrated varying levels of interest, commitment, and concern for the region since that time. Rapidly changing climate conditions in the Arctic have resulted in melting ice and with it increased possibilities of commercial transit and an associated increase to security threats. These climatological realities, coupled with the increased attention the Arctic is garnering across the globe, has forced a relook at strategy. The United States has begun responding to the dynamic regional situation with an updated national policy and implementation plan, however, more should be done to lead change and in response to the actions of other Arctic nations. The current implementation of U.S. strategy falls short in forcing action in several key areas. The U.S. should ratify the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, formally appoint the State Department’s U.S. Special Representative for the Arctic to the rank of Ambassador, begin procuring icebreakers for the U.S. Coast Guard, incentivize civilian investments and partnerships, and explore future collaborative efforts with Russia to preserve the vision for a peaceful opening to the Arctic.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Christopher W. Muller

Published: September 2016

President Obama’s December 2014 announcement of the normalizing of relations with Cuba provides a tremendous opportunity for the Department of Defense. Collaboration between the Cuban and U.S. militaries could improve regional stability and increase homeland security by enhancing collaboration in the southern maritime approaches to the United States. The establishment of a new Embassy and Country Team will provide a golden opportunity for DoD to create a new model and finally divest themselves of the old two-sided model consisting of a hodge-podge of small DoD entities centered around a Defense Attaché Office and/or a Security Cooperation Office. Establishing just one DoD organization in Cuba as a test model could eventually lead to an update of the current 2013 DoD Instruction C-5205.75, "Implementing Instructions for DoD Operations at US Embassies." Adopting a single DoD concept would reduce the Department’s overall costs and personnel, reducing redundancy, avoiding unnecessary confusion for our partner nations, and streamlining mission accomplishment.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Matthew R. Nation

Published: September 2016

In 2012, the United States announced its Rebalance to the Pacific, creating a new focus on Asian security for U.S. policy makers. From ensuring universal access to the global commons, to managing China’s responsible growth, Washington requires a long-term strategic partner to share the burden and India is at the top of the list. India, a democratic nuclear power and home to a fifth of the world’s population, is looking east to forge partnerships to further its own economic and security interests. The U.S. and India have a spotty history together that warrants analysis, but since the turn of the century, more areas of convergence than divergence exist between them. With progressive leadership in both nations setting conditions for further meaningful relations, established military ties between the U.S. and India provide an optimal platform to advance mutual interests. With India’s long-standing policy of non-alignment as a backdrop, India must increase its role as a security provider. These former British colonies must work together to compliment each other’s policies to maintain a strategic equilibrium in the Indian Ocean and South East Asia regions.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Colin P. Nikkila

Published: September 2016

As demonstrated by the Boston Bombings, the threat of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) at home and abroad has not reduced since the end of major combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. It's been nearly three years since Boston. The President has published strategic policy to combat the threat, however actions taken by the Department of Defense to respond have been inadequate considering the threat and responsibilities. The DoD’s roles and responsibilities must be more clearly defined while in support of the homeland. Explosive Ordnance Disposal response is needed by the Interagency, but better efficiencies from the explosive enterprise stakeholders must be gathered and embraced. Both federal law and DoD policies must be updated to focus on all threats, and increased cooperation and interoperability within the Interagency must be realized.


Author: Commander Mark O’Connell

Published: September 2016

For 26 years Sri Lanka was embroiled in a brutal civil war to control much of its countryside. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), waged an insurgency against the government’s forces, the majority Sinhalese Sri Lankan Armed Forces (SLAF). LTTE attacked the SLAF with ferocity and ingenuity unmatched by any other terrorist organization. The LTTE were labeled “among the most dangerous and deadly extremists in the world” by the FBI; they revolutionized suicide attacks with the invention of the suicide belt, were the first terrorist organization to employ the use of chemical weapons, and the first to employ a cyber-attack against a state. In the early 2000’s the LTTE included a navy, air force, suicide wing, and an international funding organization that raised millions for the cause, while controlling almost a quarter of the Sri Lankan countryside. And yet in a little over four years, the LTTE was wiped off the map. This paper examines the conflict, its root causes, and the strategies used in order to garner insights.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Gregory O. Olson

Published: September 2016

The United States military has gained a significant amount of experience, knowledge and best practices from conducting Security Force Assistance (SFA) operations in Iraq and Afghanistan over the last decade. The Department of Defense (DOD) must ensure that the lessons learned from conducting SFA will be captured and be able to be regenerated the next time we are faced with conducting SFA on a large scale. This paper provides an overview of SFA and consists of four main sections. The first outlines the role of security force assistance in stability operations; the second is analysis of SFA using the construct of Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leader Development, Personnel and Facilities (DOTMLPF); the third is SFA effectiveness in recent operations and the fourth is SFA regeneration for future needs.


Author: Colonel Mark S. Parker

Published: September 2016

The United States continues to operate in a world that is volatile, unstable, complex, and ambiguous during the second decade of the twenty-first century. One of the more complex and strategically important regions in the world is Asia, where President Obama has refocused U.S. national power in direct support of U.S. national interests. To assist in these interests, the United States should improve strategic relationships with India, a rising regional and world power that would be a significant partner in Asia. India’s geopolitical position, with a democratic government and a rising economy and naval power to assist in regional security and containing the ambitions of China make them a prime partner for the United States. To improve the relationship, the United States is reaching out through key leaders to develop stronger economic and military ties through trade agreements and arms sales. While the United States sees increased partnership in the future, India is hesitant in creating too strong a relationship due to its non-alignment movement that is still prevalent in its government.


Author: Colonel Kimberly A. Peeples

Published: September 2016

To succeed in today’s complex environment, Army leaders must master vision, alignment, and change. Scholars have written a multitude of books on the concepts of visioning and change. However, alignment is more elusive in the research literature. Some leaders relate organizational alignment to nesting methods inherent in large, bureaucratic and hierarchical institutions. But scholars, George Labovitz and Victor Rosansky open the alignment aperture. They posit that the power of alignment occurs when an organization’s key elements – people, strategy, customers and process – remain tightly centered around its central purpose. This paper applies the Labovitz and Rosansky alignment framework to the equally elusive world of Army installation management. It chronicles the evolution of centralized installation management over the past 15 years to compare and contrast traditional nesting with a more comprehensive alignment approach. And it will challenge strategic leaders to think critically about the concept of alignment and its potential to not only improve operational performance but better position the Army to achieve its 2025 vision through targeted and sustainable change.


Author: Colonel David C. Phillips

Published: September 2016

With Congress’s renewed push for acquisition reform in 2016, the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Army must adapt their acquisition strategies to keep pace with the changing environment. Given the growing ends and diminishing budgets, the Army must look for new ways to reduce risk while prioritizing readiness. Acquisition reform is not new, and there is a long history of both success and failure. Recently, the DoD, the Army, and Special Operations Command have all seen that teams empowered with the right institutionalized authorities and culture can provide warfighters with innovative capabilities faster while meeting all the traditional requirements of cost, schedule, and performance. The Army should now seize two opportunities: first, institutionalize and reinforce rapid acquisition processes, authorities, and organizations; and second, use mission command to embed an operationally focused culture of integrity, innovation, and courage to take risk in its acquisition organizations. This will directly and positively impact future warfighters.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Carter L. Price

Published: September 2016

Although every career officer prepares for command, the fact is that very few will do so at the senior level. The vast majority of Senior Service College graduates will spend the remainder of their careers on various staffs as advisors to commanders or civilian leaders. With this in mind, it is important that the services focus institutional education toward building the competencies of senior strategic advisors. Military history is replete with leaders who functioned as strategic advisors during critical periods. One such advisor is Major General Fox Conner. Arguably responsible for the development of a President, Secretary of State and one of the most prolific military leaders of a century, Fox Conner is largely an unknown figure in American history. This paper discusses Conner’s background and the attributes that made him such an effective advisor and leader. This paper will evaluate him against disciplines that James E. Lukaszewski proposes are crucial to maximizing the effect of strategic advice: be trustworthy, be a verbal visionary, develop a management perspective, think strategically, understand the power of patterns, advise constructively and show others how to use your advice.


Author: Colonel Robert L Ralston

Published: September 2016

In the recent past, the Army has found itself woefully underprepared to conduct contingency contracting operations, requiring substantial augmentation from outside Agencies and Services. The Army is directed to add Contingency Contracting Administrative Services (CCAS) to its capabilities, relying on Army Contracting Command to assume full transition of responsibilities in January, 2016. This paper will exhibit that CCAS is essential to future military operations and when failure to ensure sufficient CCAS operations has occurred, astronomical loss has ensued. It will provide an operational framework recommending strategic changes to enhance Army contracting capabilities commensurate with providing adequate, responsible and sustained contracting services for future operations. The time has come that the Army expand its efforts and treat contracting administration services as a core competency by resourcing, training and equipping ACC for future contractor heavy contingency operations.


Author: Colonel Firman H. Ray

Published: September 2016

The U.S. Army is reducing its force to the lowest end-strength since before World War II. Officers will experience directed and involuntary drawdown measures in order to meet targets required for proper Year Group management. Potential costs of involuntary separation include: damage to officer trust, commitment, and general esprit de corps; adverse effects on accessions and the retention of quality officers; and public and Congressional opposition. To the Army’s detriment, and despite their regular occurrence and import, there exists no strategic framework for the comprehensive planning and execution of force reductions or expansions. The Army would benefit from the efficiency and effectiveness provided by an effective, strategic and comprehensive officer drawdown framework that heeds lessons learned, uses a Year Group construct to pin-point excess inventory, develops and employs tailored force shaping measures to meet drawdown requirements, and provides for continuous monitoring and assessment of force reduction measures to keep the drawdown trajectory on path toward desired end states.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Gary R. Reidenbach

Published: September 2016

In an effort to avoid another bitter and costly rivalry like that of the Cold War years, it is of supreme consequence for America to re-examine its relations with Russia and craft an engaged and cooperative approach to the future. The purpose of this paper is to propose that America’s relationship with Russia should strive in all possible contexts to promote and advance integration of Russia into the broader international political, economic, and security system. America’s approach, policies, and actions with regard to Russia, similar to American approaches in relation to other states, should consistently rely on the tenets of cooperative liberalism for inspiration and guidance. This paper briefly discusses the history and current state of American-Russian relations, examines the international relations theories of realism and liberalism and the insights they hold for influencing and shaping America’s approach to Russia, and analyzes key interests from both sides in search of areas for potential long-term liberalist inspired cooperation while identifying issues and interests likely to yield undesirable competitive friction or opposition.


Author: Colonel David E. Ristedt

Published: September 2016

Global Health Diplomacy is an increasingly recognized soft power element in support of the United States National Security Strategy. Multiple United States agencies employ personnel globally to positively affect host nation population health indicators, combat active or prevent emerging disease threats, build partner capacity and increase interoperability with the international community. Interagency coordination is a key element to synchronize medical efforts in support of global health activities. Several identified governance challenges lead to inefficient and desynchronized efforts. Health diplomats lack standardized training and education despite many of the same requirements. Interagency personnel distribution leaves potential gaps in global surveillance and limits effective support to Ambassadors. If the United States is to synchronize health diplomacy across the interagency, formalizing a governance structure with clearly articulated authorities as well as evaluating the attributes and distribution of health diplomats is strategically vital in improving global health effects in support of national security objectives.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Luis Rivera

Published: September 2016

Tactical decisions made by NCOs may have strategic implication, but the Army NCO Education System (NCOES) does not deliberately teach NCOs how to think strategically. To meet this challenge, the Army should educate NCOs how to “think strategically” throughout the NCO Professional Development System (NCOPDS). This paper provides a definition and context for thinking strategically, examines the current deficit in educating and evaluating NCOs to think strategically, examines why the PME is the appropriate venue to most effectively educate Army NCOs to think strategically, analyzes the new NCOPDS, and makes recommendations on how to address this topic with the Army Professional Military Education system.


Author: Commander James Roche

Published: September 2016

The Budget Control Act (BCA) of 2011 mandated reductions to the DoD budget and resulted in less money to support current manning levels, operations, weapons systems, and facilities infrastructure. These lower budgets have forced the Services to underinvest in facility maintenance, accelerating the deterioration of DoD asset portfolios. Moreover, as the Services reduce manning further, many current facilities will become redundant. DoD has long favored the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process to pare down its holdings, but for over a decade Congress has refused to authorize a new BRAC. DoD needs to concentrate its limited funds on preventing deterioration of its core strategic asset portfolios, those critical to core missions which often require a high degree of physical security, for which there is limited or no equivalent commercial capacity, and which cannot be easily recreated. DoD can shed less critical asset portfolios- and many unneeded buildings--by developing new public-private partnerships.


Author: Colonel Karen J. Roe

Published: September 2016

The nature of warfare has undergone revolutionary changes over the past several decades. Battles are no longer conducted solely by combat forces deployed into zones of hostilities. Today, combat takes many forms and is conducted by units fundamentally different from the conventional combat arms, operating in new domains and using ways and means never before considered. The Army's current system of official lineage and honors, however, reflects an outdated approach to capturing modern warfare. The TDA units are "non-deployable” or “strategic" and, as such, do not have official recognition of lineages and a historical record of honors. This creates a system of inequality that fails to recognize the new domains and nature of combat.


Author: Mr. Philip F. Romanelli

Published: September 2016

Talent management of officers in the United States Army is approaching a state of crisis and far-reaching changes are necessary. The impact on the US Army Reserve (USAR) is exacerbated by the fact that it is the smallest component of the Army, is tightly bound to the Active Component, and lacks the dual mission and resulting political strength of the Army National Guard. So to some extent the USAR may be the canary in the coal mine--anything negative may affect the USAR before the other components. This research paper examines four key areas: permeability (movement between components), promotions (who is selected to lead at the next level, when, and how), positions (the structure of the organizations and how they are filled), and proficiencies (how are skills captured and employed). In analyzing these challenges, this paper advocates swift change to selected policies, emphasizes talent management, and identifies needed law and policy updates to enable the Army to better respond to the ever-changing strategic environment.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Marlyce K. Roth

Published: September 2016

With the ever-growing cyber threat from state and non-state actors, U.S. national interests and those of U.S. allies are at a significant risk. Unlike the other domains, the cyber domain grows exponentially on a daily basis, so time is of the utmost importance for building and sustaining a cyber-ready force to protect against threats. The April 2015 DoD Cyber Strategy provides a solid foundation, for developing enterprise-wide programs and plans to build a cyber-ready force to meet the U.S. national military objectives that support the National Security Strategy.


Author: Colonel Philip J. Ryan

Published: September 2016

The 3D (Diplomacy, Development, and Defense) Planning Process is a novel concept meant to fuse together critical aspects of our nation’s whole of government approach to international affairs. Despite a bevy of key strategic documents, U.S. Foreign Policy lacks focus, structure, and accountability across the interagency to make it effective and efficient. From the local through the regional to the national level, issues of poor coordination, boundary confusion, and bureaucratic competition grow worse the higher one gets in the relations between the Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development, and the Department of Defense. American Foreign Policy requires effective synchronization of the different parts of government. This effort would involve national-level leadership and a comprehensive review of interagency collaboration, organization, and policies to address some of the obvious problems with the current approach.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Teresa A. Schlosser

Published: September 2016

When Secretary of Defense, Leon Panetta, rescinded the 1994 direct ground combat definition and assignment rule in January 2014 he set in motion changes that will have sociological impacts across the Army’s combat arms. Therefore, Army leaders need to be aware of sociological theories commonly associated with individual / group acceptance as they integrate females into previously all-male units. Social Learning Theory explains how individuals learn as much, or more, from watching those around them as from their own actions. In-group Bias addresses internal biases groups develop to differentiate themselves from those not in the group and how the group dynamic works to maintain the homogeneity of the original group. Stereotype Threat describes the various ways minority individuals cope with the feeling of being judged by their minority status versus their actual skills and abilities. Each of these theories provide valuable insight to leaders concerning the changing group dynamics within combat arms units, enabling them to tailor their leadership to integrate females successfully.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel James P. Schreffler

Published: September 2016

The United States power grid is a vital piece of the country’s infrastructure. However, due to an increased reliance on computers, the system has become increasingly susceptible to a cyber attack. This paper provides an overview of the power grid and discusses its vulnerability to a cyber attack that would result in a catastrophic blackout. The National Response Framework is examined to include the role of the National Guard in a response to such an attack. The paper finds that the Guard focuses more on its wartime mission and is not structured or equipped to provide effective assistance to state governors during a catastrophic blackout. The author raises several proposals and further research questions to include the establishment of a National Guard pre-positioned stocks program as well as the establishment of separate home defense forces at the state level.


Author: Commander Kristofer Scott

Published: September 2016

The early dismissal of Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Director Lieutenant General (LTG) Michael Flynn in 2014 for allegedly “disruptive” leadership raises a host of concerns for military professionals interested in organizational change. LTG Flynn’s attempt to reorganize DIA to provide better combat force support seemed to flag in the face of cultural resistance. It would appear that LTG Flynn’s forceful, top-down approach to change did not fare well at an established bureaucracy with an entrenched cultural identity due to an insufficient coalition of the willing to reinforce his message. In the end, this crippled his efforts and brought about an early end to his tour, despite his clear vision and tough communication. A more consensus-based style might have brought slower but more sustainable change. Also of note, an examination of resources might have begged the question of whether or not DIA should change at all--a point relevant to military change leaders in the current resource constrained environment.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Patrick E. Simon

Published: September 2016

Ever since independence from the United Kingdom (UK) in 1946, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan found itself immersed in a difficult geopolitical position. Jordan is perpetually surrounded by conflict, yet the country provides a stabilizing role in Middle Eastern affairs. For years, the political survival of Jordan has been attributed to the Kings deft management of international relations and shifting alliances between Jordan’s influential neighbors – Iraq, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and to a lesser extent Israel and Egypt. Jordan has difficulty in generating a sustainable economy, and the survival of the monarchy remains dependent on economic support from regional allies and international donors such as the United States. If Jordan succumbs to the regional war unfolding in Iraq and Syria, the remainder of the Levant and potentially the Arabian Peninsula could unravel changing the Sikes-Picot borders forever. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan’s continuing role as a key stabilizing force in the Middle East, the country’s economic security as a deterrent to political unrest, and a strong U.S. - Jordan strategic relationship is not only vital to Jordan’s survival, but also the survival of a region undergoing transformational changes.


Author: Colonel Jonathan B. Slater

Published: September 2016

The United States will not go to war in the foreseeable future without allies and international partners by its side. It is critical for the Department of Defense (DoD) to continue to pursue International Cooperative programs to promote interoperability, improve logistics efficiencies, harness the best technological capabilities among allies, and reduce costs for systems procurement. This paper will discuss the DoD International Cooperation guidance, national power (Diplomatic, Informational, Military, and Economic) aspects of international cooperative programs, international considerations, DoD acquisition policy, and Congressional actions needed to further support international cooperative programs. There are challenges in all of these areas that need to be considered by a program manager and the requirements owner to ensure that policy directives are balanced with needs of the user. Ultimately, international cooperative acquisition programs pose many benefits to all nations involved, such as reduced costs, better operational interoperability, and stronger alliances that warrant the additional efforts required to execute an international program.


Author: Commander Joseph W. Smotherman

Published: September 2016

As warfare evolves, new technology pushes the limits of acceptability and operations in cyberspace are no different. If attacks in cyberspace are assaults of one state against another, then the framework of Just War theory should still apply and Michael Walzer’s Legalist Paradigm provides a clearer lens on when an armed response to a cyber attack is morally permissible. While some parts of Just War theory directly apply to responses to Cyber Attacks, the others do not, beginning with Just Cause. Walzer describes Just Cause in terms of the natural rights of the citizens of a state, and when a cyber attack interrupts the ability of those citizens to make a life together or the “safe space” they create, then a physical response to a cyber attack could be justified. This paper outlines the relationship between Walzer’s Legalist Paradigm and justification for physical responses to cyber attacks, with the intent of providing senior leaders with a framework for those responses.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Stephen J. Snyder

Published: September 2016

This paper identifies six challenges facing U.S. stability operations. These include issues of policy, leadership, civil affairs force structure, assessment, joint coalition operations and resource scarcity. The identified challenges stem from both the findings of the Special Investigator for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and from personal observations from deployments as a civil affairs operator and planner. These challenges are framed against current U.S. policy, and department of defense, department of state and interagency capabilities. Potential remedies for each of the six challenges is provided, as well as suggestions for the way ahead for U.S. stability operations.


Author: Colonel Theodore M. Thomas II

Published: September 2016

As doctrinally written, developing and acquiring a capability-based force is the basis of the current Joint Capability Integration and Development System (JCIDS). This force is one developed agnostic of a specific threat or enemy, and rather on how a future enemy may fight. The new and current threat of persistent irregular warfare, plus emerging peer global competitors is a credible justification to adopt a threat-based model of capability development. Threat-informed capability development will ensure more relevant capabilities delivered to the combatant commanders to meet global requirements. JCIDS should adopt a hybrid process blending threat and capabilities based development. By using a blended and iterative approach that bases near and mid-term capability needs on current threats that pose a danger to U.S. interests, and long-term needs on a capability-based philosophy, the joint force can rapidly develop relevant systems to counter near-term threats that hold promise for a long service life against future threats. In addition, such a process will encourage the efficient use of limited budgetary resources and discourage technological overreach on immature technologies.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Douglas F. Tippet

Published: September 2016

Today the US faces a new era of uncertainty about where, when, and against whom it will militarily engage. Coupling that reality with A2AD and budget-induced re-posturing leaves America in a strategic predicament regarding force projection similar to the one it faced prior to WWII. Current trends suggest that the U.S. will continue to reduce overseas basing as a way to manage reduced end-strength and rising infrastructure sustainment costs. With fewer pre-positioned forces and a political desire to decrease large main operating base footprints, Combatant Commanders will need to gain quick access to airfields, seaports, and basing at the onset of crises. Complicating this strategic problem is the possibility that diplomatic leverage spent for negotiating use prior to hostilities may not result in actual use of bases during hostilities. To these ends, the historical evidence suggests a potential strategic benefit of using the “Lend-lease” concept to inform future policy formulation for contingency basing negotiations. These realities suggest that the U.S. must balance its goal of stabilizing regions through building partner capacity with the need to retain some type of leverage for future negotiations of airfields and ports during actual crisis.


Author: Ms. Andrea M. Tomann

Published: September 2016

The Defense Innovation Initiative and the Army Operating Concept provide a common vision for the future, and they demand innovation. Congressional and DOD leaders as well as Army’s CASAL survey of leader effectiveness suggest that there is a dramatic need for improvement in Army leader support for innovation. Despite senior leaders’ call to action, leaders can undermine their efforts to support. These conflicts represent lost opportunities to leverage the creativity and expert knowledge within the Army. Individual Army leaders can choose innovation; in fact, they must in order to sustain a competitive advantage against our adversaries. Creativity, critical thinking and collaboration provide the leader tools to cultivate. Leaders can avoid discouraging innovation by not blaming fiscal uncertainty, process or bureaucracy and by mitigating the attention, error and data blindness that interfere with their decision-making. Senior leaders provide a vision for the future of warfare and in doing so articulate the importance of innovation for success. Leaders must inspire creativity and critical thought across their organizations to create value-added solutions to the Army’s complex challenges.


Author: Ms. Sonya M. Tsiros

Published: September 2016

Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) were interagency teams employed in Iraq and Afghanistan to assist in stabilization and reconstruction operations. The experience of PRTs offers lessons for efforts to improve coordination of the activities of the various national security agencies at the strategic level. Many aspects of PRTs, including the physical colocation of different agency representatives and collaborative leadership structures, are necessary ingredients where close interagency coordination is required. Nonetheless, although PRTs provide a useful model, it is one that cannot be entirely duplicated in other environments. The key lesson PRTs offer is the importance of defined roles and mission, cross-agency funding to promote a unified effort, and coordinating structures at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.


Author: Ms. Rebecca R. VanNess

Published: September 2016

Today there exists numerous perspectives on what diversity is, as well as conflicting information about its potential advantages and disadvantages in both the private and public sector workforce. Research on this topic is complex, highlighting the need to refocus on this critical issue in order to see diversity through a much broader aperture and recognize diversity leadership as a key competency for leaders facing unique Twenty-First Century global challenges. This thesis adds to the growing body of knowledge on diversity leadership by examining current scholarship and understanding of diversity, offering arguments to support embracing new beliefs and attitudes about diversity, and providing a recommended framework for diversity education for Department of Defense senior leaders operating at the strategic level. The proposed framework is aligned with the Department of Defense Diversity and Inclusion Strategic Plan 2012-2017, and focuses on the key leadership competencies of Cultural Intelligence, Communication, and Building Cohesive Teams.


Author: Colonel Lance C. Varney

Published: September 2016

The Command and General Staff School (CGSS) plays a vital role in preparing mid-level officers for the demands of the operational environment. CGSS must develop leaders who can, as described in the Army Operating Concept “win” in a complex world. This requires developing leaders to be agile, adaptive, and innovative. The CGSS is adjusting its program to provide the cognitive foundations supporting these attributes but at the risk of other learning objectives. Feedback from various perspectives suggests the need to lengthen the course and increase academic discipline. The problem that CGSS faces is that while educational requirements expand or change the time allocated for CGSS does not. While modifications to the current 44-week program over the years have been helpful, meeting the intent of the AOC requires a change in the CGSS program structure. Expanding the current CGSS program is the best way to prepare majors to meet the needs of the Army in 2025. For many officers, CGSS represents the last formal military education opportunity. The benefits of preparing majors and future lieutenant colonels for success in the operational environment should be worth the cost of a longer CGSS program.


Author: Colonel Dina S. Wandler

Published: September 2016

This research establishes why the U.S. military’s policies barring transgender service members are outdated and out of synch with the values of diversity and inclusiveness. Just as racism is grounded upon incorrect assumptions about racial characteristics, transgender discrimination is based upon false assumptions about sex and gender. This paper specifically examines the policy implications in recruiting individuals who identify as transgender and integrating transgender service members who seek to come out and transition to their true genders. It provides key definitions regarding sex and gender identity in order to better understand the challenges of integration. Finally, it provides recommendations for policy changes affecting Military Equal Opportunity, privacy rights, personnel management, substance abuse detection programs, health care, facilities usage, billeting, and physical fitness and body fat composition programs, to allow for the out service of all members of the LGBT community.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Dalian Antwine Washington Sr.

Published: September 2016

Solving the United States’ 21st century “failed state” problem necessitates modifying the Cold War era national security solution set. Adding “S” to the U.S. Instruments of Power (IOP) paradigm (Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic) elevates social stability to its appropriate position. Doing so reduces the overreliance on the military to build institutional capacity within failed states. Transitioning to “DIMES” broadens the national IOP aperture and operationalizes disperse resources that are aptly suited to solve the failed state dilemma. Shifting to a DIMES paradigm expands the policymakers’ toolbox in the strategy development process. The DIMES acronym is aptly suited for the national security lexicon because it is simple, unexpected, credible, concrete, and emotionally connective, thus helping policymakers tell the U.S. national security strategy story. The DIMES acronym is also easy for policymakers to retain, recall, repeat and research.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Robert S. White

Published: September 2016

Despite tactical dominance and technical battlespace awareness, the Unites States is not achieving the results its overwhelming military capabilities seem to promise. This is indicative of a failure in operational art caused by a misapplication of force and misunderstanding its utility when used for purposes not intended and ultimately ill-suited. The utility of force resides in its ability to achieve, to the appropriate degree, regarding the amount of force required and utilized, a military objective aligned to and nested within the greater political goal. To better engage today’s adversaries, our strategic leaders and military practitioners need to embrace a new paradigm regarding applications of military force as they formulate strategies, plan campaigns, and conduct operations in pursuit of national interests. By challenging the underlying assumptions regarding the utility of force, our leaders can properly address the current cycles of confrontation and conflict. Ultimately, other instruments of national power must be relied upon – and bolstered where necessary. The use of force can create at best a stalemate. Other levers of national power must be applied to achieve the desired endstate or policy objective.


Author: Colonel Dominic J. Wibe

Published: September 2016

Designated as an operational force the Reserve Component is poised to support the Army and the joint force in routine operations. With a continually shrinking force the Army must look to provide capabilities once asked of BCTs and other units on the battlefield. The theater army’s role in protection is discussed along with current force structure in the RC to conduct protection missions. Five recommendations are made to cover the gap in protection: create a theater protection command (TPC); re-designate theater engineer commands as TPCs; re-designate maneuver enhancement brigades (MEB) to expeditionary protection commands (EPC); increase the three Army Reserve MEB/EPCs to five; re-designate existing military police commands as expeditionary Internment/resettlement commands (EI/RC) while creating two additional. The recommended changes in force structure will produce an integrated command structure able to coordinate and provide protection and produce readiness during peace time.


Author: Colonel Ryan Blaine Wolfgram

Published: September 2016

Russia’s strategic approach is complicated and uses an ambiguous form of warfare centered on non-military means to achieve its political ends. This makes it difficult for the U.S. to produce a coherent and synchronized foreign policy that can provide clear direction for actions to counter Russian aggression. During an interview with a member in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) for policy this comment was provided, “Policy is all over the place, coexists, and is sometimes contradictory and more often tangential.” An example is the U.S. effort to counter Vladimir Putin’s continued desire to extend his sphere of interest through the annexation of countries in his national interest. This window for the Baltic States to remain untouched by Russia’s aggression is quickly closing and the U.S. opportunity to enact a policy of action is now.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Mike Zernickow

Published: September 2016

In spring 2013, the world sees the emergence of ISIS as a terrorist organization as they start wreaking havoc in Syria and Iraq. ISIS now controls territory to give them operational capability and to manage logistics. Terrorism is the dominant feature today, and ISIS is now attacking abroad. Based on their radical ideology, destroying ISIS is important to maintaining regional / global order and security. The current United States strategy hinges on destroying ISIS through a comprehensive air campaign and limited advisors operating in Syria and Iraq. The preponderance of the burden to date has been placed on the United States due to a limited coalition not willing to contribute as much military power or resources. The United States needs to take a different approach in U.S. foreign policy and build a stronger coalition through diplomacy. Without effective boots the ground, a coalition of necessity is required to destroy ISIS.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Andrew S. Zieseniss

Published: September 2016

In 2015, the movement of migrants from Africa and the Middle East caught the E.U. completely off guard. As the numbers grew over the year, many people throughout Europe began to see the migration crisis as a major cultural, economic, and physical security threat. Every incident, such as the Cologne New Year’s attacks, adds concern to traditionally homogeneous cultures still feeling the effects of the 2008 financial crisis and subsequent global recession. The influx of migrants has had immediate impacts throughout Europe. These impacts are an increase in discrimination, the growth in political turmoil, and the rise of right wing parties. If the E.U. does not successfully address the migrant crisis soon, there will be long-term consequences for the current structure of the union. The crisis threatens economic and political stability throughout Europe. A weakened E.U. will also lose its diplomatic leverage around the world. Finally, stability on the continent, the very reason the six original members founded the E.U. after WWII, could once again be at risk. As a key ally, a weakened E.U. will have adverse political and economic impacts for the U.S. Assisting the E.U. in resolving the crisis is an important interest for the U.S.


Author: Colonel Eric E. Zimmerman

Published: September 2016

A leader’s deliberate use of adaptive (positive) humor is a very powerful leadership tool. Research strongly suggests that humor can produce tangible benefits in the emotional, cognitive, and social contexts. It also suggests that the positive use of humor in the workplace can increase employee morale, improve communication, relieve tension, reduce stress, and increase team cohesiveness. Despite these benefits, the idea of humor is absent from current Army leadership doctrine and the idea of humor as an element of leadership is frequently dismissed as incompatible with organizational culture, purpose, and productivity and even irresponsible. This paper explores this topic through a literature review, presentation of historic examples, examination of the Army’s long and complex relationship with humor, and a review of previous Army leadership doctrine. This paper concludes with a recommendation to increase leader awareness and foster a deeper understanding of humor as an effective leadership tool.


Author: Ms. Charisse A. Adamson

Published: September 2015

China’s increased presence in Latin America has raised alarm bells in the halls of government, the private sector and the mass media. In the span of one decade Chinese trade to the region has increased exponentially from $29 million in 2003 to $270 billion in 2012. Chinese sales of weapons, military training and cultural centers are steadily increasing in the region. This is causing many pundits to believe China’s engagement in Latin America is part of a broader geopolitical strategy to counterbalance the U.S. pivot to Asia policy by challenging the U.S. in its strategic backyard. The paper will examine this concern by first exploring how self-image, history, and current economic motivations affect U.S. and Chinese policies in Latin America. The second part of the paper will provide an in-depth look at Chinese and U.S. policies in Latin America. The final section will assess the impact of those polices on cooperation between China and the United States. Despite concerns, China currently is not eclipsing U.S. influence in Latin America. China’s presence in the region bears watching. Conflict with China in Latin America could distract the United States from engagement in the Asia Pacific region.


Author: Colonel Joel O. Alexander

Published: September 2015

The founding of the nation saw an inherent distrust of the military as an arm of the government. While this wariness is not uniquely American, it expresses society’s deeper concern with maintaining the delicate balance between protecting individual liberties and maintaining collective security. America’s military was challenged to dispel these concerns and demonstrate its value to the civilian leadership / population. Some challenges remain as a result of external political pressures or shifting societal opinions, while others are “self-inflicted”: e.g., poor communication, sexual assaults or other ethical lapses. Today, the U.S. military is viewed highly by much of the nation and enjoys a reputation as a profession of honor and respect. Yet with this cordial relationship--and overwhelming popular endorsement--the profession of arms is faced with the challenge of sustaining that support and promoting understanding of it as a valuable, civil service profession. This paper analyzes historical lessons and trends in public support of the military from America’s founding to the dawn of the 20th century and offers recommendations on how the profession of arms can best cultivate enduring, positive relationships between it and the society it represents and serves.


Author: Colonel Russell N. Bailey

Published: September 2015

Can the U.S. seize strategic opportunities and achieve its “Rebalance to Asia?” A more tailored implementation of U.S. national security policy and strategy is required if the U.S. is to achieve the desired ends. Building capacity among consequential nations strengthens internal security postures and supports regional stability. The unwise allocation of Security Assistance funds consumes precious resources that could otherwise address other pressing issues. A Pivotal States policy will better discriminate among competing national security objectives. Identifying Pivotal States will allow the U.S. to prioritize security assistance recipients and fund only those nations or programs that represent strategic necessities. Using a principled approach within the framework of the Pivotal States policy and establishing clear criteria for the identification of Pivotal States will facilitate a more successful Security Assistance strategy. Creating an NSC-led Interagency Policy Committee to oversee Foreign/Security Assistance planning and execution is necessary. Overcoming bureaucratic friction and developing common competencies among Foreign Assistance professionals from all agencies is critical.


Author: Colonel Stephen H. Bales

Published: September 2015

The challenge of North Korea’s drive for a nuclear arsenal represents a wicked problem for the United States, its allies, and the international community. Solving this problem requires critical thinking that addresses the interests of all parties, addresses divergent points of view within the context of the history of the Korean peninsula, and correctly assesses the implications of a selected policy and strategies. The current United States policy of complete and verifiable denuclearization of North Korea will not achieve its end. This stalemate requires a new policy approach. After an analysis of the history of conflict on the Korean peninsula and the current five-decade long stalemate, analysis of the Kim regime, and a review of national interests; this paper will propose a new policy. This new policy, a New Détente, will in the short-term achieve stability of North Korea, improve security and stability in the Northeast Asia-Pacific region, and in the long-term provide a path to peaceful denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. This new policy offers the greatest possibility of securing United States’ national interests while supporting the interests of North Korea, China, and United States allies and partners in the Northeast Asia–Pacific region.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Robert Sean Berg

Published: September 2015

Vladimir Putin’s annexation of Crimea in March of 2014 highlighted the Russian Federation’s expansionist actions to the world. The notion that Russian aggression and expansionism is a new threat fails to acknowledge centuries of an imperialist Russia. The 2015 US National Security Strategy calls for a continuous response to current Russian aggression in the wake of Putin’s Crimea and Eastern Ukraine involvement. As a long term counter to Russian actions, U.S. training for a domestically developed and supported, cellular, resilient resistance network to deter and counter the asymmetric intrusion of the Russian Federation into sovereign territory is a viable solution. Resistance networks in the Baltics and other former soviet states may leverage existing state structures and security elements. The intent is to establish an “on order” capacity from within, as a defensive measure, incorporating civil elements not currently involved. This resistance network is a bridging capacity to address an operational gap in a nation’s capacity to thwart Russian aggression which threatens national security but fails, by design, to clearly trigger a NATO Article V requirement.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel John A. Best

Published: September 2015

Adaptive, critical, and creative thinking attributes in today’s environment are essential components for solving complex, ambiguous and rapidly evolving problems. However, friction between Generation X and Y hinders the military’s ability to fully inculcate a training program that embraces the core foundations for building critical and creative thinking leaders. In order to solve this problem, the Army needs to change the culture of thinking in its senior leadership; to understand the fundamentals of learning and their impacts on adaptive training, and to understand the nuances of the rising generation of leaders and consequences of the “old method” of training.


Author: Colonel Mark O. Bilafer

Published: September 2015

Investigating joint and army level policies, field manuals, and theater rules of engagement (ROE) uncovered three main reasons the Army currently must rely on other services to meet joint level targeting requirements: 1) Organizationally the Army is not properly represented at multiple joint decision making forums that approve service effectiveness, training and certification requirements; 2) The Army has doctrine and publication gaps that limits Centers of Excellence ability to include joint requirements into Army publications; and 3) The Army lacks the hardware and software required to connect with joint and interagency targeting and intelligence systems. In this paper I will discuss each of these areas in depth and provide recommendations the Army must adapt to close these gaps.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel William E. Boswell

Published: September 2015

Click here, then enter abstract text. WAIT until AFTER paper is complete before writing the abstract. Abstracts should describe a paper as written, NOT as it will be written. Abstracts must fit this space AND the space on the abstract page (an approximate maximum of 200 words). After entering the abstract text here, double check to make sure the abstract appears in its entirety both here and on the abstract page.


Author: Colonel Jeff A. Bovarnick

Published: September 2015

During World War II, General George Marshall relieved numerous commanders. Rather than separate those officers, he allowed them to remain in the Army and contribute in other areas of demonstrated expertise. Currently, a commander relieved for cause stands little to no chance of being retained in the service. This paper suggests that under certain circumstances, a policy similar to Marshall’s is feasible in today’s Army to retain those officers who can continue to make valuable contributions. When effectively implemented, the principles of mission command foster an environment conducive to such a policy. The elements of trust, prudent risk taking and underwriting honest mistakes enable a senior commander to consider a relieved commander for continued service. Further, those officers who commit illegal, immoral, or unethical acts are not viable candidates where those who make honest mistakes should be considered. As current procedures make it unlikely that an officer could survive a relief from command, the Army would have to consider a policy similar to curtailment to allow a relieved officer to remain on active without the negative consequences that follow a relief for cause.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Scott Brodeur

Published: September 2015

The United States requires a strategic communication strategy to counter ISIL influence, recruiting, and propaganda. President Barack Obama outlined Operation Inherent Resolve, the recent strategy to defeat and ultimately destroy ISIL using a coalition counterterrorism methodology and a critical strategic communications effort. ISIL operates a professional propaganda campaign that leverages the full spectrum of social media, websites, and blogs to distribute their messages and recruit militant followers. After 14 years of conducting strategic communications against terrorists, the U.S. has failed to establish an effective strategy to combat these threats to national security. This study examines U.S. propaganda strategy during World War II in order to distill best practices that are applicable to modern strategic communications to defeat ISIL. A new strategy requires consolidated leadership for the numerous organizations involved in countering ISIL. Additionally, this strategy must geographically disaggregate the enemy to specifically address the at-risk populations and underlying regional factors. Finally, the U.S. strategy must be rooted in the truth. The U.S. must address these shortfalls in strategic communication strategy or the efforts to defeat ISIL will fail.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Bryan M. Brokate

Published: September 2015

The Army is preparing for an uncertain complex future by establishing Force 2025. One area lacking in preparation is Soldier resiliency to face a volatile, fluid environment. The suicide crisis that has plagued the force for 13 years demonstrates the resiliency shortfall. The last two years have seen a drop in fatalities, but the Army still lost 238 Soldiers to suicide in 2014. Suicide prevention must be part of any plan to increase Army resiliency. The current Army Suicide Prevention Program (ASPP) fails to apply a holistic approach to Soldier suicides and contains a gap in its coverage to the Reserve Component (RC), which make up 52 percent of the total Army structure. The bulk of the ASPP for RC personnel is limited to on-line and telephonic resources. The ASPP avoids the use of religious resources despite the fact that over 73 percent of the Soldiers identify a religious preference. Including local religious organizations into the ASPP provides an additional counseling tool for religious adherents across the formation. The recommendation is to establish a voluntary community partnership program between RC units and local religious organizations to provide RC Soldiers with local (face-to-face) resources for suicide prevention.


Author: Colonel Felicia Brokaw

Published: September 2015

United States efforts to bring about regime removal and democracy in Cuba through economic sanctions, travel restrictions and frozen diplomatic relations have not worked in over 55 years. Every President since Dwight D Eisenhower has corresponded through back channels to Cuba with the government, reviewed sanctions, property claimants, established negotiations, and largely left sanctions in place. This research paper reviews the history of U.S.-Cuban relations, analyzes U.S. sanctions against Cuba, and examines the security policy implications after the U.S. has to modify its policies towards Cuba. It examines whether the U.S. should “Spring Forward or Fall Back” in the motivation to drive change in Cuba with renewed U.S.-Cuban relations. Finally, it will determine if it is feasible, acceptable, and suitable to change the U.S. engagement with Cuba by renewing economic and diplomatic relations and remove the remaining travel restrictions and U.S. trade embargo.


Author: Commander Noel J. Cabral III

Published: September 2015

Arctic ice is melting at an accelerating rate, giving way to not only the last great frontier that promises navigable waterways and natural resources, but international attention to emerging geopolitical and economic significance. China has not published an Arctic strategy, nor explicitly described its interests in the Arctic; however it has declared itself a “near-Arctic” state and become the most active observer in the region. This analysis examines China’s rhetoric, investment, and collaborative engagement with the Arctic states. The key findings are that China’s geostrategic interests are to advance its global legitimacy and economic development. As such, China is interested in establishing a diplomatic and economic presence in the Arctic to elevate its global status and ensure China’s access to sea lanes and resources. China’s growing engagement in the arctic could represent another significant driver to a power shift from the U.S. to China.


Author: Commander Arthur M. Castiglia, Jr.

Published: September 2015

Military theorists from Sun Tzu to Clausewitz have warned of the dangers and unique challenges of combat in and around cities. By 2030, 60 percent of the world’s population is expected to live in massive urban areas or megacities. These megacities feature slums and endemic homelessness, uncontrolled expansion/urban sprawl, and lack of basic support structures making operations complex and extremely dangerous. Urban terrain is a powerful advantage for entrenched combatants. It magnifies the power of defense, and diminishes an adversary’s advantages in technology, firepower and mobility. To be effective in this sort of environment, security forces will need to blend police, infantry and military special forces. This research project will examine Special Operations Forces’ role in a future of increased urbanization. It describes the global trends responsible for the emergence of modern megacities. It also scrutinizes the three main considerations when defining the SOF role in megacity warfare: megacity typology variances, future urban threats, and the spectrum of urban combat operations.


Author: Colonel Chris William Chronis

Published: September 2015

Is Turkey under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan slipping out of the West’s orbit, and what are the impacts of the rise of political Islam on Turkey’s relationship with the West? Further, how can the West maintain—and possibly improve—its influence and relations with the Turkish people, the Turkish business community, and the Turkish military in the era of Erdogan? Since coming to power in 2003, President Erdogan and his Islamic Justice and Development Party have altered the political, judicial, military, and social landscapes within Turkey’s traditionally secular Muslim majority society in ways unimaginable since the era of Ataturk and the founding of the republic in 1923. Therefore, the West must make every effort to keep Turkey—a longtime ally and emerging economic power—within the post-war economic and military framework that facilitates free trade, inter-dependence, open markets, collective security, civil liberties, democratic values, and the resultant stability and prosperity that ensures the survival and expansion of a secular, modernized, and pro-western Turkish society, economy, and military.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel James Brandon Conway

Published: September 2015

In response to the territorial disputes in the East China and South China Seas and the ongoing build-up of military power in the Asia-Pacific region, many of the United States’ allies and partners in the region, including Australia and Japan, have demonstrated renewed interest in the development of amphibious forces. China, a potential adversary, is also continuing to expand its capabilities. This paper argues the development of allied amphibious forces provides a wide range of diplomatic, military, budgetary, and economic benefits to the U.S. policy for rebalance in the Pacific. Specifically, it augments U.S. amphibious capability, promotes stability, improves multi-lateral relations, and directly and indirectly contributes to the U.S. economy. As a method of analysis, this paper evaluates the development and potential employment of Japanese and Australian amphibious forces as examples of states that seek the capability, though for different purposes.


Author: Colonel Cory N. Costello

Published: September 2015

Strategic leaders and planners can take advantage of the U.S. military capability—its means—to establish an expeditionary medical system with sixty-minute evacuation response times to pick up wounded at the point of injury. This strategic research project (SRP) argues that our federal government must mandate the sixty-minute standard as national security policy. Furthermore, to export this professionalism, our senior leaders must encourage our allies and partners to adopt our same standard. The policy must be a requirement for this nation’s participation in coalitions or alliances. The range of U.S. military gains attending Secretary Gates’ initiative are a useful case study to highlight the challenges and potential strategic benefits that can result from this achievement.


Author: Ms. Laura M. Crawford

Published: September 2015

Over the last 60 years, the Department of Defense (DoD) has demonstrated a lack of commitment toward achieving financial improvement, accountability, and audit readiness. The DoD has spent billions attempting to meet the Congressional mandate of audit ready financial statements by September 30, 2017. It does not appear the DoD will be able to make this deadline. In these fiscally constrained times, DoD leadership must work toward changing the culture in regards to financial management. One way to do this is to implement a clear concise vision and utilize Kotter’s eight steps for cultural change in conjunction with Schein’s embedding and reinforcing mechanisms to implement a lasting culture change. Now is the time for the DoD to implement change due to the reduction of financial resources in accordance with the Budget Control Act of 2011 and a new Secretary of Defense that actively supports financial improvement. Without changing the cost culture first, the expenditures towards achieving audit readiness will not be worth the cost.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Michael D. Daniels

Published: September 2015

An option to build landpower for the United States Army in the 21st Century, in austere budget environments, is to glean insights from the practices of the Roman Army. During the Republican and early Imperial periods, the Romans used non-citizen soldiers in the Roman Army. Combined with the traditions and legacy of the U.S. Army and its own history of employing non-citizen troops as allies and within its own formations could result in a more affordable approach to providing land forces.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Chad J. Davis

Published: September 2015

The United States stands amid a strategic discontinuity – a period when unpredictable, unforeseen, and rapid changes occur that confound or disrupt previous expectations or estimates. A sudden shift in the external environment challenging status quo world order produces a discontinuity, as does a sudden transition in U.S. domestic interests or public will. Currently, rising powers and non-state actors challenge U.S. hegemony militarily and economically. Domestic fiscal uncertainty threatens critical funding sources for development and execution of the national instruments of power. Two discontinuities in U.S. history surface for their similarity to today’s environment – the post-Vietnam era and the post-Cold War timeframe. Following the Vietnam War, dramatic change occurred, but the U.S. assessed the new strategic environment and ultimately achieved new, prioritized goals. Short of such assessment after the Cold War, the U.S. failed to identify significant changes in the strategic environment, leading to major missteps later. U.S. leadership can apply lessons from these events to determine the best approach for managing the current discontinuity.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Joseph A. DiNonno

Published: September 2015

This paper describes the current and future operating environment for the National Guard and what sequestration might mean for a return of tiered readiness. A proposed hybrid model of force generation is described and a recommendation given for mitigating the deleterious effects it may have on the National Guard. The paper then explores emerging risks and other areas within the Department of Homeland Security that should be addressed by a fundamental shift in thinking about the National Guard. This paper first looks to the emerging importance and associated risk of the cyber domain and argues that the National Guard should play a leading role in Homeland Security’s efforts to address cyber security. Second, this paper makes a case for application of geographically appropriate and lower readiness tiered National Guard units to integrate efforts and resources with the Customs and Border Patrol as a part of Homeland Security. Finally, an argument is articulated advocating better integration of the National Guard in FEMA and state readiness plans with a particular focus on rehearsals and exercises.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Robert G. Dixon

Published: September 2015

Global urbanization has given rise to the megacity: large, densely-packed urban areas with more than ten million people. These cities are becoming increasingly connected, dense and complex, and are becoming non-state actors’ preferred hiding places. It is inevitable that the US military will find the need to operate in this environment, and it is currently unprepared to do so. Gaining and maintaining a comprehensive understanding of the environment is the first challenge to preparing forces for megacity urban operations. The emerging fields of big data, analytics, and data-driven decision-making offer significant potential towards this end. The Army must study this environment and the emerging sets of tools if it wishes to remain relevant in tomorrow’s fight.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Charles B. Dockery

Published: September 2015

The 21st century is the “connected century.” Globalization has created social and economic interconnectedness more broadly and deeply than at any other time in history. At the same time, America has entered this century without a grand strategy around which it will shape the environment to suit its interests. This paper will examine the concept of grand strategy and the lack thereof that led to failed nation-building efforts that bookend the post-Cold War period. It will then describe the current global environment and the constraints and restraints that will impact any American grand strategy for the remainder of the 21st century. Finally, the paper will proffer partnerships with India and Indonesia as two mechanisms for increasing global connectivity by cementing the position of those two nations within the global functioning core.


Author: Commander William G. Dwyer III

Published: September 2015

China has been active in the Arctic for many years conducting climate research and expeditions. Over the last few years, China has made overtures for greater involvement in Arctic affairs and governance seeking full membership status in the Arctic Council and further collaboration with Arctic nations. China's interest in the Arctic is driven by the need to fuel and feed the world's largest population and most powerful economy. This study begins with a review of China's historical activities in the Arctic then argues that its recently intensified interest there is driven by two factors: natural resources and new maritime trade routes. Next, it suggests venues for increased Chinese participation in the governance structures for the Arctic and concludes with recommendations of concrete steps that the United States can take to encourage China's responsible behavior in this dynamic international sphere of cooperation. The United States, as the incumbent chair of the Arctic Council in 2015, will need to work with the Chinese government to ensure both responsible stewardship and activities in the Arctic.


Author: Mr. Stewart C. Eales

Published: September 2015

George Washington asserted that the American people had been entrusted with the preservation of “the sacred fire of liberty and the destiny of the republican model of government.” The character of that “preservation” has evolved and expanded as the nation’s power and reach have grown; reaching new heights when the collapse of the Soviet Union gave American Presidents the mandate to pursue a “new world order” built on a democratic foundation. This paper begins with a contextual analysis of democracy--what was promoted, why it was promoted, and how it was promoted--and provides an allegorical description of democracy promotion as torch bearing, shield bearing, and standard bearing. It then examines how Presidents George H. W. Bush, William J. Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack H. Obama promoted democracy. It offers four broad recommendations for democracy promotion: demonstrate that liberal democratic values are a litmus test for policy decisions, clarify the role of military power in the promotion of democracy, reassert American Exceptionalism, and distinguish between the promotion of liberal values and the nurturing of democratic institutions.


Author: Colonel Willie J. Flucker, Jr.

Published: September 2015

There exists within the Army officer corps an inadvertent system of diversity suppression that consistently produces a senior officer class far less racially diverse than its soldiers and the general public. This system is composed of structural barriers (institutional factors that exclude minorities to a greater extent than majority soldiers) and perceptual barriers (individual perceptions that lead minorities to think that they should not pursue an Army career). For African-Americans, these impediments are pervasive and interrelated. Sociological factors are also in operation, taking (or mistaking) unproven or unexplained institutional impediments to substantiate the consensus opinion in many black communities that pursuing a career as an Army officer means competing on an uneven playing field. Given these diversity suppression mechanics, a sustained, coordinated information and engagement campaign is required to produce an Army senior leader corps as ethnically diverse as its soldiers and the American people.


Author: Colonel Lee P. Gearhart

Published: September 2015

Diversity is key to The U.S. Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World, the Army Vision--Force 2025 and Beyond, and the U.S. Army Human Dimension Operating Concept. The Army Reserve (AR) is a diverse force that represents and serves the American people well. This study examined AR Gender and Race/Ethnic Group representation within the force by leadership opportunity. A leadership diversity gap was found with regard to female and minority opportunities. While Gender and Race/Ethnic Group trends were encouraging, more work remains regarding opportunities and advancement to senior rank. Females were significantly less likely to advance to senior officer rank and serve in key officer or Non-Commissioned Officer positions. Further, Blacks and Hispanics were significantly underrepresented overall in the officer ranks and their numbers contracted as they progressed to more senior ranks, as did their representation in key leadership positions. The inverse is true for Whites who were overrepresented in the officer ranks and their representation strengthened as they progressed to more senior ranks, where their percentages in key leadership positions remained robust.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Roger S. Giraud

Published: September 2015

The Army Medical Department (AMEDD) currently has an opportunity to support the Army Leader Development Strategy, the Army Campaign Plan, and the Army Operating Concept in identifying an integrated model for developing leaders by conducting a system program review of AMEDD leader development. This review is capable of reducing the tension between the provision of quality medicine and quality leadership by establishing leader competencies as the foundation and through the identification and prioritization of other health care competencies. These competencies will enable the objectives, concepts, and resources of an AMEDD leader development strategy through three lines of effort: training, education, and experience and provide competency assessment tools in all three leader-training domains. The review will allow the Army to make an informed decision and assume any appropriate risk regarding its medical department. The health care environment is a volatile, complex system, which requires strong leaders to lead AMEDD organizations in it. Soldiers and beneficiaries deserve great leadership and quality health care. The Army and the AMEDD can provide both through a strong AMEDD leader development system.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel John C. Hafley

Published: September 2015

The United States’ strategic patience in support of a denuclearized North Korea has not stopped the regime from becoming a Nuclear State. After years of failed Six Party Talks and sanctions that have not changed the ideology within the Hermit State, the United States has to take a different whole of government approach in order to achieve security and stability in the region. This paper conducts a review of current U.S. policy towards North Korea and recommends necessary changes in the post-nuclear era.


Author: Colonel Jerry A. Hall

Published: September 2015

The 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance directed the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific and required the Department of Defense to develop “innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches” to achieve security objectives. One Army response to this directive was the innovative and efficient Pacific Pathways 2014 (Pathways) initiative. The Pathways approaches would primarily consist of exercises, rotational presence, and military-to-military engagement. However, the Army struggled to clearly explain Pathways so the program was challenged. Pathways was perceived by challengers to be an Army attempt to remain strategically relevant in competition with the Marine Corps. This paper examines how U.S. Army Pacific leaders and staffs communicated the Pathways program. It demonstrates that, despite challenges, they effectively communicated the Pathways concept. The paper reviews the strategic information environment in the late summer and fall of 2013. Following an overview of the situation, it analyzes the Pathways communication strategy and implementation. It concludes with recommendations on how to communicate future iterations of Pacific Pathways more effectively.


Author: Colonel Jason Halloren

Published: September 2015

Millennials are changing the landscape of how the Army operates. Millennials are less patriotic, adopt individualism or collectivism, and as a result of their increasingly sheltered upbringing, they seemingly lack the mental toughness to deal with tough crisis. These characteristics are in stark contrast to Army values. With nearly 75% of the total military comprised of Millennials it is important to understand the character and motivation of Millennials in order to best prepare them for military service. Changing the way leaders communicate with Millennials by explaining the mission and tasks, breeding a competitive environment, and incorporating adversity training into entry level training will help ensure the Army is prepared for future engagement


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Jerad Harper

Published: September 2015

The formation of an Iraqi National Guard offers significant opportunity for improving Iraq’s short and long-term security capabilities and presents a potential reconciliation tool for improving relations with Iraq’s Sunni minority. Three case studies -- the use of tribal levies in Oman, the Saudi Arabian National Guard, and the U.S. Army National Guard -- provide important examples to inform the development of an effective and professional force. Building the Iraqi National Guard into a competent and professional force will require 1) the commitment of U.S. or western advisors over a long period, 2) a sustained commitment of resources, and 3) significant efforts to synchronize operations between the future Iraqi National Guard and the Iraqi Ministry of Defense. Finally, while this is a positive measure, it must be accompanied by other reconciliation efforts to address the needs of the Sunni minority. Absent these measures, attempts to create an Iraqi National Guard force could be arming participants in a future Iraqi Civil War.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Dennis R. Hawthorne

Published: September 2015

Tomorrow’s global uncertainties will test the capability, capacity, and innovative nature of the United States Army. The U.S. Army Operating Concept provides a set of core competencies to develop such an adept force. This force must act decisively and effectively in complex environments that are further limited by resource constraints. Secondly, innovative concepts are needed to overcome the static institution that emphasizes process over efficiency. The ability of units to sustain readiness is critical in providing the right force mix when and where needed. This paper will analyze U.S. Army Pacific’s execution of an operation named “Pacific Pathways,” and how it embodies those core competencies outlined in the Army Operating Concept. It will also provide recommendations that may enhance utilization of the Total Force in operationalizing the Regionally Aligned Forces initiative across the Army. These include readiness sustainment; use of pre-positioned stock; and greater integration of the Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational efforts in such a dynamic environment.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Lawrence W. Henry

Published: September 2015

The manner in which the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) employs violence and terror on the local populace of the Middle East, coupled with the terrorist group’s ability to leverage social media, places achieving the Obama Administration’s counter-terrorism strategic end state at risk due to the administration’s reliance on a lethal approach-namely an air campaign. This study utilizes case studies and literary reviews to determine appropriate non-lethal approaches to degrade and defeat ISIL. Upon gathering this information, a non-lethal strategy was developed that targeted ISIL’s critical vulnerabilities. Further, this study examined the risk and counterpoints that challenged the employed of a non-lethal strategy to defeat the terrorist group. Upon evaluating the risk, the diplomatic and economic risk associated with employing the strategy outweighed the gain, therefore, the employment of a non-lethal strategy was deemed inappropriate. Acknowledging this reality, this study-while not supporting a lethal approach to defeat ISIL-strongly advocates for the employment of a blended lethal non-lethal approach that leverages a Middle Eastern whole of government approach.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Christopher J. Hickey

Published: September 2015

Strategists and planners can improve the effectiveness of strategy, design, and joint operational planning by integrating game theory into current processes. Integrating game theory into current processes provides strategists an additional perspective that is focused on outcomes and the information and decisions that drive them. It provides a stimulus for thinking deeply about who the critical players and decision-makers are and what their values, interests, and expectations are relevant to the situation. Most importantly, it creates conditions that can lead to creating Courses of Action that are focused on information and decision-making from conception. This has the potential to reduce risks and costs while achieving the best potential outcome.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Matthew W. Higer

Published: September 2015

Senior leaders can significantly enhance the impact of the Department of Defense budget communication strategy by adding macroeconomic context via reference to: defense as a percent of Gross Domestic Product, historical defense expenditures, international defense level-of-effort comparisons, and the relative size of major federal outlays. To enhance the “austerity drives increased risk” message resonance, macroeconomic context should complement, not replace, the threat-informed, strategy-based budget communication paradigm. Budget number magnitudes are often incomprehensible, but tangible level-of-effort comparisons are insightful. The federal budget informs a fiscal environmental assessment, including political risk, as part of a disciplined update to defense budget communication strategy. The ultimate objective of the strategy should be to communicate defense resource requirements using ways meaningful to the U.S. Congress and the American public, thus significantly mitigating fiscal risk to national security.


Author: COL Joseph E Hilbert

Published: September 2015

In 2014 USARPAC began Pacific Pathways describing it as a proof of principle or concept. This paper will examine how well Pacific Pathways functioned as a proof of concept. First, this paper will define specifically how Pacific Pathways was designed to function as a proof of concept. It will then examine how proof of concept and proof of principle experiments are conducted in the private sector and determine what analogies can be made between how those experiments are done and how they are done in the organizational environment. This paper will discuss causal functions and will show how understanding causality is a pre-requisite for learning organizations to actually prove a concept. The paper will then look at Pacific Pathways 14 and examine how well it functioned as a proof of concept and will look at the tools USARPAC and I Corps used to evaluate it. Finally, the paper will conclude with a set of recommendations showing how USARPAC can conduct and evaluate future Pathways using a revised proof of concept model.


Author: Mr. R. Carl Hoehne

Published: September 2015

Russia’s population and demographic dynamics have changed significantly since Soviet times and continue to evolve with strategic consequence for the United States. In the next fifteen to thirty years these changes will profoundly affect Russian society and its ability to reliably field land power of the size it has today. This trend may make Russia even more dangerous to the United States than it is today. The main elements of this analysis will seek to shed light on current and projected demographic trends in Russia, and examine how demographic change could influence the Russian strategic outlook and how it staffs and integrates its armed forces. In question is whether or not current or projected government policies will adequately manage the demographic changes occurring within the borders of the Russian Federation.


Author: Colonel Marc Hoffmeister

Published: September 2015

Combatant Commanders (CCDR) should maximize every opportunity to enhance joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) partnerships and improve strategic alliances. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) operates globally and integrates across the interagency, providing unique regional access, understanding and opportunity. Integrating USACE activities during all phases of planning synchronizes Combatant Command (CCMD) strategic effects with the planning efforts of the Department of State (DoS) and the US Agency for International Development (USAID). Formalizing the relationship of the aligned USACE Divisions with each CCMD enhances this process. Growing the capability of the USACE Liaison teams, improving the integration of engineer assets, and formalizing the USACE Division’s role on the CCDRs staff will enhance the strategic nexus of defense, diplomacy and development. To achieve the full potential for interagency support, the USACE and Army Engineer Regiment should pursue opportunities to refine and expand how engineer effects are integrated into security cooperation activities at all levels of planning from strategic to tactical.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Kelly R. Holbert

Published: September 2015

In today’s complex joint operational environment, American Airmen appear to be absent from commanding “combat-oriented” Joint Task Forces (JTFs). In the future, when considering general officers for command of combat JTFs, the domain background of potential commanders should matter less than their ability to effectively lead, conceptualize, and execute joint combat operations. Thus, American Airmen’s “Air-Mindedness” may need broadening in order to more effectively integrate and lead joint forces at the JTF level. While “Air-Mindedness” will always be a critical element of the joint fight, “Synergy-Mindedness” is increasingly important to the success of JTFs operating in high intensity combat environments.


Author: Colonel H. Warner Holt, II

Published: September 2015

The Budget Control Act of 2011 has driven significant reductions to our military budgets over the last several years. This fact, coupled with the reality that the United States is heavily burdened by more national debt today than at any point in history, will continue to drive budget shortfalls and will no doubt drive a reprioritization of our global strategic objectives. The National Security Strategy has emphasized the importance of building capacity with our partner nations. The State Partnership Program (SPP) is a shining star when it comes to building partnership capacity and security cooperation. The SPP is the only current program that integrates military and civilian capabilities and has proven to be an economical approach with a high return on investment. We must take advantage of this successful program and take it to the next level as we seek the most effective ways to build the security capacities of our partner nations.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Brian S. Horine

Published: September 2015

The primary goals of U.S. support to Latin America are to promote peace and to improve economic stability. Lessons learned from Plan Colombia and the War on Drugs and Narcoterrorism can be applied to the current threat perpetuated by the Sendero Luminoso (SL) in Peru. Using a framework consisting of the elements of National Power as viewed through the lens of Culture (C-DIME), the following paper will illustrate how the United States can support Peru in strengthening its national institutions and defeating the SL and its narco-criminal sponsors. This paper analyzes how the principles behind the success of Plan Colombia, rather than the specified practices employed, can be applied in Peru to defeat SL efforts in order to advance U.S. security interests while concurrently enabling host nation efforts to build legitimacy and expand security. Based upon this framework, the U.S. should continue its support of Peru in its endeavors to deter, defeat and demobilize the Sendero Luminoso.


Author: Colonel James E. Huber

Published: September 2015

Many researchers describe the Millennial Generation as portraying the best traits of previous generations. This paper uses generational theory to examine the characteristics of the three distinct generations currently serving in the Army. It identifies the characteristics unique to Millennials and discusses opportunities to enhance the future of the Army profession. Among other generational characteristics, It examines the collaborative and socially connected nature of the Millennial Generation. It includes a discussion on the Army Profession Campaign and draws a comparison of millennial characteristics and the essential characteristics of the Army Profession defined in Army Doctrine Reference Publication 1, focusing on trust as the principle characteristic. The paper concludes with recommendations for the Army to leverage millennial strengths to improve collaboration and ensure that millennial social connectedness secures a future of improved civil-military relations.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Frank P. Intini III

Published: September 2015

The Army’s currently accepted concept of “broadening” leaders focuses on individual development through a series of experiential opportunities. This paper explores the possibility of expanding the concept of broadening leaders and enhancing their ability to adapt to an increasingly complex world through a re-focus on integrating the systems and processes which were established in an effort to make the Army a learning institution. Specifically, it proposes we consider the benefits afforded by the Army’s Historical Program, potential areas for greater synergy between several post 9-11 institutions which capture experience-based insights, inculcating historical insights into the training development and reporting aspects of the Unit Training Management system, and further emphasis on “historical-mindedness” and the assets available to achieve it in our revised doctrine. This shift in philosophy reflects a logical evolution in empowered leadership rather than a revolution in leader development and, as such, may be possible through the limited reorganization and repurposing of existing assets with no growth in manpower or materiel.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Eric L. Jackson

Published: September 2015

During every past interwar period in our nation’s history there has been a drawdown of forces at conflict termination. However, the current interwar period falls during a time of persistent global conflict. Domestically, the armed forces are challenged by smaller budgets. These foreign threats and domestic political challenges have combined to create a requirement to properly execute a personnel drawdown that must be able to respond to today’s threats and be prepared to defeat tomorrow’s adversaries. As the Army downsizes to 440,000-450,000 active duty Soldiers, key questions remain as the Army marches towards this number. Is the drawdown being done correctly? Are the right people leaving and staying? Post separation board analysis suggests that some population subsets (based on commissioning source, branch, ethnicity, etc.) were more susceptible to involuntary separation than others. This paper offers assessments on whether the right people are staying and leaving. It also offers an assessment if this drawdown is being executed correctly. Lastly, it offers recommendations on how to obtain greater parity across all commissioning sources so that the entire officer corps can be strengthened.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Derek K. Jansen

Published: September 2015

The U.S. Army’s propensity to solve tactical problems through advances in high-technology solutions has created an increased requirement for electricity on the battlefield. For example, the largest portion of fuel used by a Stryker Brigade Combat Team in the tactical environment (36%) is used to generate electrical power in support of technology solutions, which is more fuel than used to supply ground vehicles or aviation. Congress, concerned with the strategic vulnerability of fuel supplies, has mandated the Army and other services reduce fuel requirements through efficiencies and the development of alternative energy sources. The U.S. Army has responded by increasing the energy efficiency of systems and platforms but has not addressed the doctrine or training shortfalls, which contribute to the lack of awareness among leaders and Soldiers of how wasted electricity could affect operations, budgets and lives.


Author: Commander Robert P. Johns

Published: September 2015

Even during a time of reduced budgets, the United States will continue to support worldwide stability efforts as part of its foreign policy and national security strategy. Accordingly, U.S. national interests are best served by partnering with other countries, international agencies, and non-governmental organizations to conduct stability operations effectively. Integral to any stability operation is information sharing to coordinate the efforts of all stakeholders involved. With a myriad of existing information systems and capabilities, the task of effectively sharing information among partners in a rapidly changing stability environment becomes imperative. The advent of “cloud computing” presents a unique opportunity to create information sharing among disparate groups at a relatively low cost. Conceptually, cloud computing offers an innovative means to assist in U.S. stability operations by optimizing and harmonizing the challenges of information sharing. This paper explores the basis for continued U.S. participation in stability operations, the salient challenges with information sharing during stability operations, the innovative solutions offered by cloud computing, and some of the challenges with respect to cloud computing.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Bradley L. Johnson

Published: September 2015

The United States Air Force (AF) maintains approximately 30% surplus infrastructure capacity across its airbase enterprise, but it lacks comprehensive strategic basing guidance to objectively evaluate and manage the excess. The excess infrastructure taxes critical fiscal resources and limits the AF’s ability to effectively maintain and keep its installations relevant. The AF recently published its 30-year strategic path in, “America’s Air Force: A Call to the Future,” and it articulates a strategy to emphasizing capability over capacity. The AF should take the same strategic approach of capability over capacity toward installation management and develop basing guidance framed by this strategy. Such guidance will allow the AF to efficiently manage its installations, objectively assess and articulate its excess capacity to its stakeholders, and strategically shape its future basing efforts. This paper provides recommendations for developing strategic basing guidance to align installation capability and capacity to air, space, and cyber mission generation.


Author: Colonel Wade B. Johnston

Published: September 2015

In conflict areas, a connection between the people and their government is a key aspect of how greater information sharing through social networking programs can enhance civil security efforts during counterterrorism operations. This paper will assess the viability of using an interactive web based program such as CRIMEWATCH to link security services to the population in order to deter, disrupt and defeat extremists. The following analysis uses security efforts in Nigeria as a case study for analyzing the feasibility, suitability and acceptability of employing this approach across political, infrastructure, social and information sectors. At the local level, web based programs can share relevant information between authorities and the public to be value-added in disrupting extremists efforts, thereby providing the government a strategic advantage. This potentially low cost investment would provide a significant payout at the strategic level in countering violent extremists and provide a method which could be replicated in other affected countries or regions.


Author: Mr. Jeffrey R. Jones

Published: September 2015

Cyberspace is a man-made environment created through the evolution of technology. People, institutions, organizations, and governments across the globe use cyberspace as the primary enabler for global communications, shipping, commerce, and finance. Cyberspace is also the newest warfighting domain that supports, yet challenges, traditional modes of warfare and its practitioners. Countless theorists through the centuries, such as Clausewitz, Corbett, and Sun-Tzu, have offered military theories for waging war. However, a theory for fighting from and in cyberspace has yet to be developed. Cyberspace theory would guide and enhance the DoD’s use of cyberspace in support of enterprise and military operations. For cyberspace to be truly used as a warfighting domain, it must be underpinned by theory in order to understand how to fight and win in the virtual space. Without a theoretic baseline, one will never know when to deviate from the norm and why. Evolving theories from classical theorists to create cyberspace theory will enable the DoD to effectively project cyberpower and gain the competitive advantage in cyberspace.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Marcus A. Jones

Published: September 2015

The U.S. National Interests presented by each Presidential Administration are codified in the National Security Strategy and serve as the foundation for U.S. policy formulation and implementation. The 2015 National Security outlines four National Interests – U.S. Security, U.S. Economic Prosperity, A Rules-based International Order, and Respect for Universal Values. Each of the National Interests evokes a different level of relative interest intensity. When compared with the other National Interests, and analyzed against ongoing foreign policy activities, Universal Values promotion is not aligned with other elements of the National Security Strategy. This inconsistency negatively effects U.S. credibility in the international community. In view of this interest conflict, the U.S. should revise the National Interests to remove Universal Values and replace it with Stability. This revision better articulates current policy actions and enhances U.S. credibility.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel K. Scott Katrosh

Published: September 2015

This paper addresses the wicked problem of toxic leadership in the U.S. Army. The paper begins by defining toxic leadership, explaining the scope of the challenge, describing its effects on subordinates and units, and examining current barriers to identification of toxic leaders. The paper explores methods to identify toxic leaders within the U.S. Army. Finally, the paper describes tools available to remove toxic leaders from military service. Taming this wicked problem requires positive and effective leadership at all levels. Leaders must first help establish a military culture that encourages Soldiers to report toxic behavior without fear of reprisal. Leaders must also make the hard choices necessary to document and remove toxic leaders from military service. The Army is moving in the right direction with several new initiatives including revamping the Officer Evaluation Report system and implementing the Commander 360 evaluations. The Army must continue to monitor and expand upon these initiatives to demonstrate its commitment to rid toxic leaders from its ranks and to protect the integrity of the military profession.


Author: Colonel Jason E. Kelly

Published: September 2015

Despite scientific data, tough talk from the White House and development of viable adaptation measures, efforts to increase coastal community resiliency remain stalled. This study investigates sea level changes in a strategically important coastal community and the impact of these changes on U.S. national interests. For many reasons, the country is developing a keen interest in adaptation and resiliency. Norfolk, Virginia is the second-most vulnerable city to sea level rise in the U.S. behind New Orleans. The risks posed to military facilities in this vibrant coastal community demand a response to climate consequences that are already affecting the area. This paper explores the science of rising seas, the significance of American ports, the strategic importance of Norfolk, and the potential role the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers could play in adaptation and resiliency.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Sharon K. E. Kibiloski

Published: September 2015

The idea of violent extremism as a security threat to the United States (U.S.) has evolved over the last 25 years, especially as it pertains to sub-Saharan Africa. Since the U.S. has not had to militarily confront large-scale violent extremism in sub-Saharan Africa, this region now provides the U.S. an exceptional strategic opportunity to move away from a military-dominated reflexive approach and instead fully commit to a more proactive human-focused approach to address the underlying conditions which allow violent extremism to grow and prosper. The U.S. must prioritize and adequately resource long-term development activities in key human-centered development areas focused on setting the conditions for stability in this region over military counterterrorism approaches which only address the immediate symptom of violent extremism. This paper makes three strategy-related recommendations focusing on resources, organizational structure and creativity, and two policy-related recommendations which focus on restraint and risk acceptance.


Author: Colonel Jason A Kirk

Published: September 2015

DoD’s Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs) have the imperative to assess their Theater Campaign Plans in response to DoD’s recent 2014 Climate Change Adaptation Roadmap. As a “case-study” relevant to all GCCs this paper analyzes the risks and opportunities facing U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) in reviewing climate change impacts primarily in the Caribbean region of its Area of Operations. In coordination with and sometimes in support of Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development’s climate change actions, SOUTHCOM has the opportunity to bolster both its “humanitarian assistance/disaster relief” and “partner nation of choice” end-state objectives. SOUTHCOM and its interagency partners can employ leader engagements, technical support and various funding mechanisms to assist select partner nations in improving their climate change resiliency.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Eric Knapp

Published: September 2015

The United States effectively countered enemy attempts to frame the Mexican War as a holy war against Catholicism. An actively engaged and hostile civilian population could have seriously jeopardized U.S. military operations during the invasion of Mexico. President Polk and General Scott planned and executed a strategy of conciliation toward Mexican civilians that sought to keep them on the sidelines of the contest. Negating a holy war narrative put forward by Mexican leaders was central to the U.S. strategy of conciliation. The United States accomplished this by incorporating Catholic priests into its army of invasion, cooperating with Catholic Church leaders, both in Mexico and in the United States, and by respecting Church property and symbols. Both U.S. political and military leaders accomplished this all during a time of strident anti-Catholicism in the United States. Although different in time and circumstance, the United States again finds itself fighting an adversary that seeks to put forward a narrative of holy war in reaction to perceived attacks on its faith. The U.S. experience in Mexico can be used to help shape potential approaches to countering such a narrative.


Author: Colonel David M. Knych

Published: September 2015

Strategy observers and pundits increasingly argue that the current United States grand strategy of maintaining its position of Primacy through an activist foreign policy, robust overseas military presence, and vast network of alliances and security commitments is proving disastrous to American interests. This cohort argues that America is overstretched and in decline, and can no longer afford to maintain its ambitious global reform agenda or meet its security obligations abroad. As such, they advocate for a grand strategy of Restraint, also known as Retrenchment, as way of preserving a narrower, but vital set of security interests by reducing its presence overseas, reducing its security commitments abroad, and shifting burdens to allies and partners. This paper questions ‘Restraint’ as a viable alternative to the current United States approach in grand strategy and refutes the key arguments and assumptions made by ‘Restraint’ advocates. In reality, the United States must remain engaged in the world and provide leadership, as it is the only sure way of securing its vital, national security interests.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Michael A. Konczey

Published: September 2015

Mission command enables the future joint force to successfully navigate the increasingly dynamic and complex operational environment. Trust, and the Army’s ability to foster trust across each echelon, is critical to mission command’s premise of leaders at all levels empowered through trust to execute disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent. As the Army transitions from a decade-plus of persistent conflict to garrison, leaders face challenges in fostering this trust. This research project explores the importance of trust as it relates to the philosophy pillar of mission command and how one builds trust. Next, it defines the garrison environment and the inherent risks to trust. Finally, it makes recommendations on how to encourage and sustain mission command in garrison.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Nelson G. Kraft

Published: September 2015

The 2013 Army Leader Development Strategy (ALDS), coupled with recommendations from the 2013 Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) Leader Development Task Force Final Report, provide an excellent road map to develop leaders for the future. However, there is a challenge in the development of strategic leaders that neither the ALDS, nor the CSA’s task force take into account; the time it will take to develop a strategic leader before the ALDS and CSA’s task force’s recommendations are fully implemented. In essence, a gap of time exists where strategic leaders remain underdeveloped. Bridging this gap is crucial for the Army in order to have strategic leaders in the near term. Additionally, a distinction between senior and strategic leaders and their development is needed to bridge this gap and improve leader development for the Army leadership that will face the challenges of the twenty-first century. This paper offers a strategy to fill the near-term gap in the Army’s development plan for strategic leaders serving at the ranks of Lieutenant Colonel and Colonel and recommends a way ahead to improve the development of officers in the same ranks that have not been earmarked for service as strategic leaders.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Clayton E. Kuetemeyer

Published: September 2015

The National Guard should serve a more active role supporting Combatant Command theater security cooperation requirements. Active Component force structure is decreasing while the demand for globally engaged operations increases. The National Guard has experience in relationship building from the State Partnership Program, and unique experience in Defense Support to Civil Authorities and consequence management. The National Guard needs to foster improvements to Department of Defense processes that more strongly consider National Guard forces for deployment in support of Combatant Commands’ requirements. The National Guard can achieve this through improvements in three areas: alignment mechanisms that enable GCCs to identify available National Guard forces and their capabilities; coordination between the National Guard Bureau and Combatant Commands; and finally, the requirements, reporting, and demonstration of National Guard readiness.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Robert B. Kuth

Published: September 2015

For decades, Iran has disrupted security and stability in the Middle East. Its unlawful pursuit of nuclear weapons and support of terrorist organizations continues to pose a significant threat to U.S. national interests and the international community. The acquisition of nuclear weapons would thrust Iran into a hegemonic status and create an undesirable imbalance of power across the region. The National Security Strategy states that Iran must meet its international responsibilities beginning with a peaceful nuclear program. It must cooperate with the international community, abide by international laws, and comply with the content of the 2013 Joint Plan of Action. While current United States (U.S.) policy is focused on prevention, it lacks the teeth required to compel Iran to comply. The U.S. must develop a broad, comprehensive, consistent, long-range strategy to contain Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons in order to promote stability in the region. This paper reviews current U.S. policy. More importantly, it will discuss additional options the U.S. Government should consider before entertaining the notion of a nuclear-armed Iran.


Author: Colonel Bryan J. Laske

Published: September 2015

Both State Department and Department of Defense leaders have articulated policy and guidance emphasizing the importance of building partner capacity as part of regional security strategies and overall national interests. In addition, the President has set forth policy to strengthen the ability of the United States to help allies and partner nations build their own security capacity. Yet, the ability to bring the instruments of national power to effective use remains a challenge. The United States must pursue a new approach to better meet a complex and interdependent security environment. The cross-functional teams represented in joint-interagency task forces are a model that has proven its effectiveness toward national security goals in multiple regions and for a variety of purposes. Institutionalizing cross-functional teams in the model of the joint-interagency task force and employing them to link geographic combatant command regional strategies with U.S. Embassy country strategies in the security sector will establish an effective mechanism to integrate capabilities, authorities, and resources of all U.S. Government departments and agencies in key regions, sub regions, or high-risk countries.


Author: Mr. Gregory F. Lawless

Published: September 2015

In 1965, the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) took up arms against Thai security forces. The Thai response to the insurgency was uneven. A 1968 article for Foreign Affairs reflected contemporary concerns: “Northeast Thailand: Tomorrow’s Vietnam?” Questions arose whether the Thai government was quelling the uprising or fueling the grievances that supported the insurgency. This case study examines the Royal Thai Government’s successful suppression of the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT), including activities in 1978-1980 and the political policies announced in 1980 that reduced the CPT’s strength and diminished its appeal to the populace. This review will examine the security situation and the political landscape of Thailand from 1965 to 1985 to test the thesis that the political astuteness of the “semi-democratic” military regime in power from 1977 until 1988 bears the greatest responsibility for the successful elimination of the Communist Party of Thailand as a viable threat. The key to the success of this counterinsurgency strategy lay in the political formulae the Thai regime employed for a “political offensive.”


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Matthew W. Lawrence

Published: September 2015

The Army Reserve has experienced difficulty in attracting recruits, missing its recruiting targets every year since 2011. Some in the Army Reserve have discussed establishing a distinct brand for the Army Reserve to improve the image of the component in the public’s mind and alleviate the difficulty in attracting recruits. However, branding an organization is not merely marketing, and the Army Reserve is neither equipped to undertake such an endeavor, nor does it have the characteristics of a valuable brand. A brand has five characteristics that define its position: distinctive, coherent, appropriate, protectable and appealing. The Army Reserve does not have elements at its core identity that meet all of those criteria. In addition, the Army has embarked on a new branding initiative called the Enterprise Army Brand that includes the Army Reserve. Despite the research and effort that has gone into the Enterprise Army Brand, its success is not guaranteed, which calls into question the wisdom of the Army Reserve establishing a separate identity.


Author: Lt Col Christopher T Lay

Published: September 2015

The 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, U.S. policy in the Middle East emphasizes security through collaboration with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. The United States and Saudi Arabia have had a long-standing relationship focused on regional stability and shared security interests. The closeness and strength of the U.S.-Saudi relationship stems from a long relationship based on common interests in oil, strategic regional stability, and Saudi security. The United States Military Training Mission (USMTM) to Saudi Arabia remains a foundational part of this relationship, focusing on “training, advising, and assisting” Saudi Arabian defense services. This military relationship remains intact today because of common interests and strategic objectives; however, it was not born overnight. Rather, the relationship required sixty tumultuous years to mature into what it is today. This is the story of that relationship’s evolution.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Eric D. Little

Published: September 2015

The announced rebalance towards the Pacific by the United States comes with a renewed effort to establish partnerships and adopt a cooperative posture with not just friends and partners in the region, but also with potential adversaries. Despite U.S. policy clearly stressing the importance of expanded partnerships and cooperation with China, there is a continued adversarial posture maintained by the U.S. in the space realm. Failing to cooperate with China will result in a contested and congested space environment that will lead to catastrophic and irreversible consequences. Additionally, the exorbitant cost associated with space acquisition, combined with the very robust inventory of systems providing capabilities to end-users is not sustainable in the current fiscal environment. A U.S. – China space partnership comes with risk, however, these risks do not outweigh the advantages of a positive U.S.-China relationship, nor do they outweigh the consequences of a failure to establish this relationship.


Author: Colonel Joseph G. Lock

Published: September 2015

After nearly fourteen years of continuous combat and a global campaign to defeat al-Qa’ida (AQ), the United States Military is more capable, agile, and lethal than ever before. However, this exceptional capability is insufficient to reverse the expanding threat presented by AQ and other similarly inspired Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs) that exploit fragile governments and thrive in ungoverned spaces. In order to reverse this trend, the U.S. needs to rebalance the current counterterrorism strategy, with much greater emphasis and resources applied toward building partner capacity (BPC) to reduce ungoverned space and eliminate emerging threats before they can take root. Increasing partner nation capacity building efforts requires persistent presence, a more streamlined funding authority, and better Special Operations Forces / Conventional Forces integration to maximize available manpower.


Author: Colonel Clyde Arthur Lynn III

Published: September 2015

The Army is experiencing and increasingly observable “values to virtue” gap. This gap is most evident through the high profile breaches of moral conduct reported in the media. The Army established its seven values, coupled with other programs such as Comprehensive Soldier and Family Fitness (CSF2), to serve as the base for moral development of Army professionals. The CSF2 program states that values reside in the spiritual dimension and psychology informs us that humans have a need to believe in the supernatural. Indeed, more than eighty-four percent of Americans embrace some form of religion. Values are normally transformed into virtue through religious instruction and experience. However, many recent Army and Department of Defense policies and actions have limited the religious liberty of soldiers, undermining the effort to close the values to virtue gap. The Army can emphasize the spiritual dimension by exposing its soldiers to various religious and secular resources without endorsing and religion (or non-religion) over any other and without violating the constitutional rights of its soldiers. Failure to do so will result in the continued widening of the gap and further disconnect the force from the public it serves.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Donald A. MacCuish

Published: September 2015

This paper provided an analysis of leadership development strategies that are applicable to logistics officer education. It concludes that the Logistics Leadership Development Strategy puts the Army on the right track in developing logistics officers through education. Although on the right track, the paper also argued that the LLDS is insular in its view of leadership development. Criteria for analysis was developed from various white papers, futures concepts, and theories of professional education. Additionally, trends in public and private logistics and supply chain education was reviewed. The paper was divided into three sections, first the Framework. In this section the author provided a synopsis of the competencies and skills required of future logistics leaders based on recently published Army and Joint concepts and strategies. The second section offers a critique of the framework laid out in section I, answering the question “can the LLDS develop the future logisticians the criteria call for, and why”? Section III then offers some recommendations on changes that should be made to existing logistics education to better meet the strategy for developing future army logistics officers.


Author: Colonel Silas G. Martinez

Published: September 2015

Given the importance of whole-of-government approaches to solving volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous strategic problems in this era of fiscal austerity, the United States (US) Army owes it to the American people to maximize the effectiveness every employee. The US Army has focused on talent management in its Senior Officer Corps as one way of developing the next generation of leaders to work in that environment. Still, precious little has been written about talent management for the Department of the Army (DA) Civilians who comprise nearly one-third of the US Army, and who provide continuity in the organizations that conduct Army operations around the globe and across the Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic objectives. This paper focuses on talent management of DA Civilians. We start with a review of talent management literature, and then outline the general goals of talent management for any population. We will look at the current state of talent management for the DA Civilians, and make recommendations on how to better employ that talent. We end with a discussion about a lateral entry, a specific business talent management practice that may be suitable for use for DA Civilians.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Pete McAleer

Published: September 2015

The proliferation of advanced anti-access and area denial weapons systems (A2AD) creates a significant threat to U.S. Joint Forces operating in the global commons. Current joint doctrine is insufficient for preparing the Joint Force to operate in an A2AD environment. The military’s Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons (JAM-GC) and The Air-Sea Battle Concept, developed to counter A2AD threats, establishes assumptions about the operating environment but does little to manage the risk inherent with the assumptions. Changes in joint force command and control, training and operations, and interoperability and equipment procurement must be made to fully develop an effective doctrine for countering A2AD threats. Without the recommended changes, the U.S. joint force will not be able to ensure the accomplishment of national objectives.


Author: Dr James C McNaughton

Published: September 2015

In the mid-1950s, the U.S. Army became the world’s first landpower trained and equipped to deliver nuclear fires on the battlefield. Within a decade the Army operated ten different nuclear weapons systems, even though by then their strategic rationale had sharply eroded. For a time, industry’s ability to design ever smaller and more sophisticated weapons outstripped their operational rationale. Yet soldiers and leaders at unit level continued to maintain these complex systems for field artillery, air defense artillery, atomic demolition munitions and intermediate-range ballistic missiles. They devised solutions to the problems of sharing the technology with allies and the Reserve Components and securing the weapons on foreign soil. Soldiers continually innovated as new and improved systems became available and maintained these capabilities through decades of rapid change, including non-nuclear conflicts, the transition to an All-Volunteer Army and racial and gender integration. The Army adapted its personnel management, training, security and maintenance systems at enormous cost. Not until the end of the Cold War did the president finally direct the Army to stand down from this demanding mission.


Author: Colonel Stephen A. Miller

Published: September 2015

The West is in a rut after fighting radical Islamic fundamental terrorists since 2001. We use medical analogical thinking to reset an approach to this complex, challenging problem. The West has been fighting the symptoms, avoiding the root causes. By asking “what?” questions, instead of “who?” questions, we can shift the West’s approach from a mostly military interventionist strategy to adopt the medical analogy of “gateway drugs.” The paradox of the root cause analysis is that America is a guarantor of religious freedom yet it is an extreme form of religious fundamentalism that is the threat. A counter narrative is needed that targets fundamentalists who have not yet turned to violent extremism. To do this, the West’s security apparatuses need to collaborate with social scientists and other experts to develop such counter narratives. The successes of Human Terrain Teams and the Minerva Research Initiative can serve as exemplars to create such strategic narratives.


Author: Colonel Daniel S. Morgan

Published: September 2015

China’s expanding influence into the LAC region along with growing Asia-Pacific and LAC relationships present challenges to the U.S.. The complexity of the relationships between LAC and Asia-Pacific governments, to include China, suggest the U.S. rebalancing to Asia strategy is inadequate to address the cross-regional impacts. This paper explains political, economic, and military impacts and proposes a broader Pacific solution that links LAC into the U.S.’ Asia rebalancing strategy. The political relationships between LAC and Chinese governments can undermine U.S. values of democracy, human rights, rule of law, and international norms. China’s soft power through economic statecraft increases their influence by providing trade and investment alternatives other than U.S. options. Increased cross-regional trade flows are also creating integrated supply chains. Last, Chinese arms sales, training exercises, and military education exchanges provide revenue and support their military modernization in Asia. These factors create one integrated problem, not two separate ones. Without a broader Pacific strategic option, the U.S. regional approach to the Asia-Pacific will result in reduced access to markets and future strategic risk to U.S. influence in both regions.


Author: Colonel Brandon Newton

Published: September 2015

This paper examines flaws in the strategic discourse on cyber power. The current discourse is flawed because it is dominated by hyperbole, misapplies context, and lacks sufficient precision in terms and definitions. There are two critical flaws in the current discourse. The first is descriptions of the existential nature of strategic cyber war, and the Armageddon like environment that would be created by such a war, despite evidence to the contrary. The second flaw is in the understanding of the context of any cyber action potential adversaries, state or non-state. Recommended adjustments to the discourse need to be informed by clear and valid assumptions on what can be done with cyber power, as well as the application of a model for cyber threat prioritization. The final analysis addresses the needed changes in education and training, and the role of humans in understanding the nature of cyber power.


Author: Colonel Constantin E. Nicolet

Published: September 2015

This paper explores the moral implications of the use of Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPAs) to conduct lethal strikes as a tactic in the United States counterterrorism campaign. In doing so, and at the unclassified level, this paper presents a factual overview of RPAs by outlining their capabilities and characteristics. It then provides a synopsis of just war theory, which serves as the basis for the discussion of the moral aspects of RPA use. Following this background material, the paper addresses some of the ethical considerations and challenges of RPAs and their use in principle and in the context of the war against al-Qa’ida. The paper concludes that the U.S. meets the jus ad bellum requirements for fighting al-Qa’ida and that the use of RPAs to conduct lethal strikes, provided it adheres to the published standards, is morally acceptable as a component of the U.S. counterterrorism campaign, meeting jus in bello criteria.


Author: Colonel Heath Niemi

Published: September 2015

As military leaders will soon possess an almost deistic ability to see the battlefield, approaching remote omniscience, omnipotence, and omnipresence (O3); strategic and operational commanders will have a better understanding of the common operational picture. The perception of O3 will potentially cause senior leaders to interfere and centrally control their subordinate leaders and elements prohibiting the effective use of mission command. This paper postulates leadership, in an O3 environment, will preclude the full employment of an empowered force within the definition of mission command. Instead, leaders need to find a middle ground between the ability to centralize control and the capacity to resource empowered leaders and teams. As globalization in a volatile international arena requires every technological tool available to allocate limited resources and project the effective use of leadership, the use of advanced technology can enhance the effectiveness of leadership for a globally dispersed organization. The future capability technology brings to leadership highlights the required doctrine, training and appropriate barriers to enable mission command in an environment of perceived godlike visibility of operations.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Geoffrey A. Norman

Published: September 2015

Mission command represents a significant cultural shift in the leadership philosophy of the U.S. Army, yet recent studies indicate Army leaders and organizations struggle to implement its fundamental principles. Effective mission command relies heavily on teams and team building, but many Army leaders and organizations demonstrate weak team development and team leadership. This paper explores the Army’s shift to mission command as a leadership philosophy; reviews recent leadership survey results to reveal areas of improvement in the exercise of mission command within the force; and considers contemporary civilian organizational behavior models, such as senior team leadership. The paper concludes by providing recommendations on ways to infuse senior team leadership methods by addressing doctrinal and training shortfalls in team building, reduce leader and team member turnover, and improve leadership feedback to harness the talents of leaders at all levels and more fully exercise mission command.


Author: Colonel Paul R. Norwood

Published: September 2015

How does any commander or leader invested with institutional authority make sound judgments related to justice and other command authorities? A commander’s decision to establish accountability through an array of disciplinary tools (ranging from light to severe), directly impacts the perception of organizational justice within the unit. This paper will provide a detailed analysis of an illustrative justice-related decision framework and explore how the Army trains and develops leaders to exercise their command authority and responsibility. It reviews what other ethical decision making models exist that may be of use to commanders, what is being taught to commanders and when it is taught. It considers the impacts of a loss in confidence in commanders to make these decisions and the potential outcome of a loss of authority due to poor command performance. Ultimately, this paper recommends an illustrative decision making framework which commanders may find helpful in developing their sound judgment related to justice matters. Then, training together with senior commanders, they may use their personal framework to practice making sound judgments with an eye better attuned to what makes a decision good.


Author: Colonel William T. Nuckols Jr.

Published: September 2015

The Iraqi Army built by the United States from 2004 to 2012, at a cost of billions of dollars and thousands of service members lives’ lost, has disintegrated under the onslaught of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). ISIS controls much of western Iraq, including its second largest city, Mosul. The Government of Iraq, with assistance from the U.S. and other allies, must build a small and professional Army. To re-establish a resilient and effective organization, the Iraqi Army (IA) must be massively reorganized and trained with an understanding that the effort will take years of persistent U.S. and allied presence. This has been proven to be effective in Columbia. The new IA will require long term U.S. (or NATO) advisors, to live with and train their Iraqi counterparts. Finally, the IA must be professionalized, with greater focus on selfless service and loyalty to the constitutionally appointed and elected leaders of Iraq. This will require a change in culture, which will include a level of accountability and discipline that has been generally absent from many of the members of the IA. This approach will also require a long term commitment from the United States, both in terms of military personnel and money.


Author: Colonel Daniel E. O’Grady

Published: September 2015

The United States Army is downsizing. It is critical that we recruit and retain the best and brightest, ensuring our ability to meet complex, unpredictable missions in more effective and efficient ways. The United States Army relies on an all-volunteer force to execute its assigned missions while simultaneously maintaining its congressionally mandated end-strength. The number of soldiers and their ability to conduct full-spectrum operations directly impacts the Army’s ability to execute the National Military Strategy. As the Army continues to procure and use technologically advanced equipment to help counterbalance reduction in forces, it will need to recruit those individuals that demonstrate the capability to quickly learn and apply new skill sets. This paper will outline a strategy and provide recommendations for ensuring the United States Army Recruiting Command can best compete for and acquire the talent the Army requires between now and 2025.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Derek James O’Malley

Published: September 2015

The rhetoric is heated in the debate over the future of the A-10. The F-35, which has been touted as the replacement for the A-10 and several other legacy fighters, is behind schedule and currently lacks many of the A-10’s capabilities. Critics argue that the F-35 will never match the A-10 and is a leap backwards in CAS capability, while F-35 advocates cite the impressive 5th generation capabilities the F-35 will eventually bring to the fight. Amidst this war of words, where emotions run high, it is difficult to wade through the ensembles of points and counterpoints to discern a productive path. Thus, this paper is not just about the A-10 or the F-35. Rather, it is about making tough choices to forge effective defense strategies in a complex, resource constrained, and rapidly changing environment. To this end, we will explore a series of cases from both the business world and the Department of Defense (DoD). These vignettes will reveal patterns of behavior, which converge to stifle critical thinking in competitive landscapes. This paper will present a balanced discussion on future defense strategies, allowing readers to draw their own conclusions about the future of the A-10.


Author: Colonel Morgan D. O’Rourke

Published: September 2015

The US finds itself in an increasingly unstable and unpredictable world with a shrinking military. Smaller JTFs will have to form on short notice from multiple bases to cover the joint functions. We cannot allow the enemy to control key terrain and use their countermobility systems to pin down and destroy our forces. During the recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, we ceded the countermobility fight to the enemy and lost the initiative. Engineers focused on building protective structures and finding IEDs. After 10 years of overreliance on remote sensor-fires links and aviation we are ill prepared for the fights ahead. In the process we lost our proactive mindset in using countermobilty to support defensive and offensive operations. Our current systems are nearing the end of their lifecycle and are inadequate for supporting future operations. We must engage with all stakeholders and swift action across DOTMLPF to develop scalable, reliable, affordable, and effective lethal and non-lethal countermobility capabilities in support of the joint commander’s intent. The days of legacy landmines are mercifully gone, FASCAM is inadequate, the demands of man-in-the loop systems are tremendous and we must train and equip for the fight ahead.


Author: Colonel Lance Oskey

Published: September 2015

The U.S. Army should adopt Outcomes Based Training and Education (OBTE) as the teaching and training methodology that guides training programs at all levels. The current strategic environment in the Institutional Domain has established conditions for this initiative with the publishing of the Army Learning Concept 2015, and updated Army Training and Leader Development concepts. Many Army organizations have already successfully implemented OBTE within their local training programs. The effort to fully implement OBTE must begin within the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command. Key milestones required for implementation include defining the model, expanding the Army’s Mission Command philosophy to include application in the Institutional Domain with OBTE as one of its principles, and implementing changes across the Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership & Education, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) framework.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel John P. Pantleo

Published: September 2015

The development of long-range weapons is increasing the need for deconfliction within the joint force and challenging the traditional methods of integrating fires. At the same time, the concepts of Mission Command and cross-domain synergy create tensions on how best to manage such assets. In order to quickly and effectively field new weapon systems, simulations that focus on integrating emerging capabilities should be conducted during materiel solution development and acquisition. These simulations should not be service-specific exercises that validate Key Performance Parameters or inform requirements, rather they should focus on how these systems would be used in future conflict with an eye toward gaining enough experience that joint doctrine can be tested and either validated or revised. Current simulations using the Army Tactical Missile System and potential counter-unmanned aerial systems are provided as examples of how early simulation would have allowed for quicker, more effective integration of long range fires into the joint fight.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Carl Lamar Parsons

Published: September 2015

Defending critical infrastructure against attack is vital to the National Security of the United States and is essential to maintaining national economic prosperity. As a symbol and instrument of national power, the U.S. military plays a broad role to protecting and defending the homeland. The military must be prepared and ready to execute homeland defense tasks and provide support to other agencies to protect critical infrastructure. To mitigate the risks to our critical infrastructure, the military, in cooperation and collaboration with other governmental agencies, must maintain a robust defense and protection plan. This paper does not advocate large overt security measures. Instead, it emphasizes the continued importance of defending the Nation’s critical infrastructure by showcasing the layers of complexity and interagency support required to conduct critical infrastructure protection. The paper will make recommendations on how to move forward on defending and protecting our critical infrastructure from a whole of government approach.


Author: Ms. Phala L. Patton-Reed

Published: September 2015

In recent years, a general consensus has developed that employing the instruments of power effectively requires close cooperation between all the parts of government that wield the instruments of national power; Diplomatic, Informational, Military and Economic. In particular, the Department of State (DoS) must be fully integrated with the Department of Defense (DoD). Historically, close cooperation between the DoS and the DoD has presented a challenge as the two organizations have culturally been at odds. In short, the DoD prepares for crises, the DoS aims to avoid them. However, if we look at these goals as two sides of the same coin, it would seem that they are actually ideally suited to work together. The concept of Regionally Aligned Forces presents this opportunity.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Jesse T. Pearson

Published: September 2015

The U.S. Army has established its Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) policy as a way to provide the Combatant Commanders (CCDRs) with tailored, globally responsive, regionally engaged, and consistently available forces. In order to more fully realize the potential of RAF and maximize the utility of Army forces to the CCDRs, the Army must address four issues. First, the Army must conduct an effective information campaign to communicate the value of RAF to internal and external audiences. Second, the Army must establish long-term RAF unit alignment with the Combatant Commands (CCMDs) and reduce RAF unit rotation. Third, the Army should assign active component CONUS-based Army divisions to the Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs) instead of brigade combat teams (BCTs). Fourth, the Army must clarify RAF funding responsibilities. These changes will increase the value of the RAF policy and Army forces to the Nation.


Author: Colonel Isaac J. Peltier

Published: September 2015

This strategic research project begins by examining the history, theory, and doctrine of Mission Command to arrive at an understanding of why changing military culture is important to successfully instilling a new command philosophy. The project then examines the Army’s systems of institutional education, unit-based training and leader development and analyzes these systems using findings from the 2013 Center for Army Leadership Survey of Army Leadership to evaluate the challenges facing the Army and offer recommendations for improvement. Finally, the project examines how Special Operations Forces successfully changed their organizational culture in Iraq and Afghanistan to achieve effectiveness in employing the principles of Mission Command and highlights those best practices that the Army could adopt.


Author: Colonel Celestino Perez, Jr.

Published: September 2015

How can military professionals improve U.S. strategic performance? Prominent policymakers, military professionals, and opinion leaders argue that the United States suffers from repeated bouts of strategic discontent arising from the failure to conjoin strategic intent and actual outcomes. This paper presumes that military professionals share with policymakers the responsibility to improve U.S. strategic performance. Motivated by assessments from top military professionals and Séverine Autessere’s research on the failure of international peacebuilding, I argue that two intellectual errors plague American strategic thinking. The first error, anti-politics, describes the military professional’s tendency to discount the importance of ground-level politics as a military concern. The second error, the macro bias, leads strategists and military professionals to neglect local knowledge and bottom-up dynamics. This error eclipses crucial strategies to mitigate violence. Both anti-politics and the macro bias have strategic consequences, which military leaders and educators can help reverse through educational reforms that integrate cutting-edge social and political science into the military classroom.


Author: Colonel Kris N. Perkins

Published: September 2015

In the realm of WMD-related capability proliferation, the intersection of availability, opportunity and desire has the potential to be the United States’ and our international partner’s most significant nonproliferation challenge for the 21st century. Africa is a continent where availability, opportunity and desire intersect creating a high risk of actors of concern acquiring capabilities to develop, proliferate and eventually employ WMD. To ensure the U.S. achieves the DOD end state of “no new WMD possession,” the U.S. must implement a “whole of government” approach to address the WMD-related capabilities proliferation threat presented within Africa. This approach can begin with an already established National Security Policy and Interagency system that informs diplomacy, development, and defense planning at the regional and country levels.


Author: Colonel Jeffery E. Phillips

Published: September 2015

The U.S. Government has placed significant reliance on Private Security Companies (PSC’s) to provide protection for operational contract support efforts and must improve current processes to provide effective security for future contract execution. Government agencies now routinely contract for private security functions during all types of contingency operations for the purpose of guarding their personnel, facilities, work sites, and contractors. Based on U.S. global commitments and military end-strength, the use of contractors to support contingency operations will be an enduring method for providing support to U.S. Government agencies in future operations, and the U.S. Government must make efforts to improve the utilization of PSCs. This paper proposes six recommendations on providing better government oversight and coordination of PSCs to increase future operational contract support success.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel David S. Pierce

Published: September 2015

The U.S. created and implemented the Marshall Plan out of necessity. Credited for saving Western Europe, the Marshall Plan assisted European Nations in recovering from the aftermath of WWII while preventing the Soviet Union from absorbing the entire continent. Implementation called for new organizations with experts in politics, agriculture, banking and others. Clear strategic objectives enabled unity of effort by DOS and the international community. In 2003, the U.S. invaded Iraq without a coordinated synchronized plan for construction operations. An ad hoc creation of an organization to oversee the program changed 3 times and each time it had new objectives, goals and vision. Reconstruction efforts in Iraq ignored the principles of the Marshall Plan. The Plan’s basic framework allows for the implementation of reconstruction operations in today’s complex environment, just as it did in 1947. The U.S. must consider the creation of a permanent office that follows the Marshall Plan’s structural framework. The office executive serves as the central focal point to address all issues concerning nation building to ensure coordination and synchronization of all resources across the interagency.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Jose L. Polanco

Published: September 2015

The United States continues to face multiple strategic challenges throughout the globe. Complex issues in the Middle East, Europe and a rebalance to the Pacific have monopolized the U.S. foreign policy agenda, resulting in a loss of U.S. influence in the nearby Latin American Caribbean region. State actors outside the Western Hemisphere, such as China, have taken notice of this perceived vacuum and have sought to advance their own interests in the Americas. China’s use of soft power in this developing region is steadily making it the partner of choice over the United States. Today’s fiscal austerity further compounds this challenge as the U.S. seeks to address budgetary limitations. However, the United States does have options and one possible solution is Strategic Landpower. Strategic Landpower, if implemented correctly, as part of a holistic approach can make a difference in restoring U.S. influence in the region. Landpower can shape and influence the strategic environment and promote U.S. national interests in the Western Hemisphere by building enduring relationships through military engagement and security cooperation.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Thomas R. Powers

Published: September 2015

Since 2001, the United States has led a multinational war on terrorism and expended significant blood and treasure replacing corrupt regimes with fragile, democratic institutions. Yet, in just a handful of years, deteriorating conditions in Iraq threatens to erode the hard-won gains achieved in the early days of the military campaign. Towards that end, the United States should renew efforts to resolve the underlying political problems in Iraq and Syria as part of its long-term strategy to degrade and destroy the Islamic State. Military operations should be conducted as part of a whole-of-government approach, but Coalition military action is just a supporting role to the more important diplomatic efforts. Absent new political frameworks, military action is irrelevant. Additionally, U.S. and Coalition efforts must be actively managed below the national policy level. The existing strategy, if nested within a larger diplomatic effort, balances risk and reward over the long-term and offers the greatest opportunity to succeed.


Author: Colonel Michael Trey Rawls

Published: September 2015

The post-Cold War era has proven to be fraught with difficulties created when the idealistic goals of Liberal Hegemony clash with complex international realities. Nowhere is this idea more pronounced than in the rhetoric of the modern Presidency. Presidential rhetoric in the post-Cold War era and its corresponding military operations often present conflicting information and thereby generate unrealistic expectations in the public sphere both at home and abroad. Through an analysis of the rhetoric of modern presidents during times of conflict this paper seeks to better understand the phenomenon and recommend practices to more closely align rhetoric with achievable foreign policy goals.


Author: Mr. Nathan Timothy Ray

Published: September 2015

Public disclosure websites (PDW)—sites like WikiLeaks—constitute a serious security challenge to the United States and other nations. PDW activists are dedicated to exposing sensitive government and commercial information in the belief that they are acting in the public good. As a result, PDWs have revealed hard-to-find, strategic and tactical level information that benefits the resiliency and operations of insurgent, terrorist, and criminal groups. To date, there is no evidence linking PDWs to an attack by violent nonstate groups, but this threat is almost certain to grow as Internet access expands globally. Given the high likelihood of future leaks, the U.S. Government should adopt stronger controls to safeguard information, including new legislation to address leaking, as well as tailoring “need to share” practices. Left unchallenged, PDWs imperil the ability of the United States to counter violent nonstate groups.


Author: Ms. Karan L. Reidenbach

Published: September 2015

Despite the widely different leadership styles of Donald Rumsfeld and Robert Gates, intrusive monitoring actions taken by both Secretaries of Defense have negatively affected civil-military trust relationships in the United States. While many discussions of civil-military relations center on a coup d’état, the direct seizure of political power by the military or overthrow of government by the military, this does not appear to be a realistic threat in the United States today. Rather, the challenge for civil-military relations in the twenty-first century is a growing mistrust between elected civilian leaders and the military. Actions by the military such as leaking information, performing end runs around a policy decision, and foot-dragging in carrying out actions contribute to this growing mistrust. Actions by civilian leaders such as inserting themselves in the military leaders’ day-to-day business, requiring excessive reporting, and conducting invasive investigations or audits also contribute to the growing mistrust. To address the civil-military relations challenge of the twenty-first century, this paper will review the history of civil-military relations, then briefly examine the theories from Huntington and Janowitz before turning to an in-depth analysis of Feaver’s agency theory.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Travis D. Rex

Published: September 2015

The United States Air Force selects its General Officers earlier than any other armed service, with over 90 percent of all O-7s selected on or before 24 years in service--nearly two years earlier than all other service branches. This self-imposed early timeline to General Officer gives the USAF some advantages valued by senior Air Force leaders. However, this early promote dynamic also causes impacts in personnel management and development priorities throughout the entire officer promotion system, many of them deleterious to overall health of the Air Force. Drawbacks of the current paradigm include problems in strategic joint leadership competitiveness, organizational behavior, overall leader development, and retention. By relaxing the 24-year timeline, in addition to other recommended measures, the Air Force active component can make adjustments to the system to better develop both operational and strategic leaders while preserving and promoting an officer talent pool that will ensure current and future success.


Author: Colonel Lori L. Robinson

Published: September 2015

As Americans, we tend to view situations through our own cultural lens with, sometimes, insufficient consideration of the perspectives or interests of others. Although many countries, to include the United States, are facing similar security dynamics in the 21st Century, each represents a range of historical narratives, experiences, backgrounds, and traditions that have direct impact on their policy and decision-making. In the Asia-Pacific region, each country is pursuing their own path to security balancing U.S. security cooperation with trade and investment links to China. To enhance success, U.S. Army Pacific Pathways design should incorporate, fuse, and balance host nation security cooperation priorities and evolving military roles and missions with U.S. strategic and military objectives in the region. This will help ensure that Pacific Pathways garners host nation domestic support and funding, compliments ongoing diplomatic and economic efforts of the United States, and avoids causing any unintentional negative influences on the strategic objectives of all participants.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Monte’ L. Rone

Published: September 2015

Lessons learned from hard fought wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the uncertain character of the anticipated operating environment served as catalysts for change in how the United States Army organizes, trains, and equips Soldiers and units for missions in support of Unified Land Operations. In order to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative from a relative position of advantage, the Army must develop an organizational culture that emphasizes decentralization and inculcates a long-term commitment to leader development and talent management. The Army’s failure to operationalize Mission Command is due to a lack of trust and paralysis cultivated in an organizational culture that values the tradition of centralized command and control. This incongruence in Army culture creates a trust deficit that militates against producing leaders with an entrepreneurial spirit. This disjunction is the heart of the adaptive challenge confronting the Army.


Author: Mr. David T. Roscoe

Published: September 2015

In September 2014, President Obama addressed the United Nations General Assembly on the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS), stating: “The only language understood by killers like this is the language of force.” In one sense, the President is correct, Western efforts to reason with ISIS to halt their brutal campaign are almost certainly futile. However, in another sense, the President’s statement reveals a flawed strategy and a myopic focus on using force at the expense of waging an effective war of ideas. To say ISIS only understands the language of force ignores their effective use of social media to recruit, fundraise, and encourage attacks in Western nations. Meanwhile, U.S. efforts to counter ISIS’s social media campaign fail to neutralize ISIS’s appeal to sympathetic audiences - appearing stiff, unimaginative, and contrived. With military options against ISIS limited by political and economic considerations, the U.S. must re-examine its strategic communications and improve its use of social media. This paper explains why the U.S. must adapt to emerging social media technologies, build culturally resonant messages, and exploit several key weaknesses in ISIS’s strategic messaging.


Author: Colonel Craig Roseberry

Published: September 2015

The United States is facing significant threats to critical space assets due to emerging military technologies such as direct assent anti-satellite weapons and directed energy weapons. The U.S. Space Policy identifies deterrence as a key method to prevent attacks on space systems and proclaims the inherent right to respond to defeat attacks if deterrence fails. The threat of punishment by itself is insufficient to deter either opportunistic states or anonymous actors from employing these technologies to achieve strategic surprise. In light of these challenges, the United States must strengthen its current space deterrence approaches to prevent future attacks on space borne assets. This paper first reviews the relevant strategic documents regarding space deterrence. Second, it identifies the impact anonymity, the lack of international norms and frameworks, and a currently tepid U.S. declaratory policy poses as potential sources of failure to space deterrence. Finally, this strategic research project offers practicable recommendations to overcome limitations that inhibit the implementation of deterrence strengthening mechanisms in line with the National Space Policy in the present strategic environment.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Jason Rueschhoff

Published: September 2015

A unique nexus exists between coalition warfare, its employment of Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS), and Just War Theory (JWT). Understanding the profound moral implications of UASs upon coalition warfare will facilitate successful combined engagements. This paper will examine UAS usage in coalition warfare within the framework of JWT and highlight the results to coalition cohesion, integration, and future relationships. It will then provide several recommendations on the way forward.


Author: Colonel Michael Runey

Published: September 2015

America’s modern All-Volunteer Force (AVF) just celebrated its fortieth anniversary. Yet the last fourteen years of war put unprecedented demands on the AVF, pushing the enlisted force in the Army in particular nearly to the breaking point. As the military faces new global threats, America’s youth head off to college at historically high rates funded in large measure by federal aid. The AVF’s long-term viability as a high-quality, affordable, professional volunteer force is increasingly at risk. Acquiring enlisted talent is increasingly challenging for the services, especially the Army. This research study uses an operational design approach from Joint Doctrine to scan the environment, reframe the strategic problem, and propose an approach to aid law and policy makers in sustaining the long-term viability of the AVF. Accounting for the inherent tensions between the key AVF stakeholders—the military, society—recommendations include fostering a national culture of service, realigning incentives to motivate qualified men and women, developing a talent-vetting system to qualify more people, and continuing to compete for and enlist highly qualified young Americans.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Anthony W. Rush

Published: September 2015

The doctrinal view of risk and its assessment is inadequate for use at the strategic level. The reliance upon models which assign a single-value, such as low, medium, or high, to risk creates an over simplistic view of risk and its consequence. Shifting the definition of risk from the probability and severity of loss calculus in doctrine to a definition that incorporates ends, ways, means, interests, and consequence sharpens the view of risk. This definition demands a new framework to assess risk. A five-step risk assessment process is proposed to broaden the view of risk and how it may be more sufficiently conveyed to strategic leaders by shifting away from an actuarial model of risk assessment to a framework suitable for strategy.


Author: Mr. Shaun J. Ryan

Published: September 2015

This paper establishes that the national security environment requires that we operate together. The imperative to unified action applies across the whole United States national security enterprise, and extends to international and multilateral fora. Leaders can apply insights drawn from theories of social network analysis, organizational culture, and organizational traps to better understand common organizational dynamics which affect cooperation between organizations. Taken together, these tools arm senior leaders with a way to achieve greater impact and effectiveness when they work in the interorganizational space. This will lead, in turn, to outcomes which advance the nation’s interests and security.


Author: Colonel James R. Salome

Published: September 2015

The art of command, how leaders apply judgment shaped by learning and experiencing their environment, has atrophied over the last 14 years of war. The length of the global war on terrorism, the inability to achieve decisive victory, and the return to Iraq in 2014 reveal a lack of artful command. The complex and ambiguous character of future conflict continues to require judgment under pressure and leaders to rely on their training to produce results. Leaders caught astride a transition between the Industrial Age and a new Information Age struggle to adapt to additional complexity. Generational tensions add strain between leaders educated by sequential Industrial Age models and those educated in a rapidly globalizing Information Age. This monograph will describe how Operational Design provides a tool to restore the art of command, reinforced with examples from transformational business practices and change experts. This restoration requires leaders who commit to demonstrate the art of command, operationalize it, and institutionalize its use.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Jocelyn J. Schermerhorn

Published: September 2015

Engaging Russian President Vladimir Putin as a credible world leader, building a stronger economic relationship with Russia, and acknowledging Russia’s regional influence as a coalition partner may be far more successful in influencing Putin than the confrontational approach currently used by Western leaders. Strategic leader competencies contribute to leadership skills that include the ability to determine future requirements and to use integrative thinking techniques to address complex challenges. The four strategic leadership competencies most important for Western leaders to understand and appreciate in order to better interact with and influence Putin’s decision-making are frame of reference development, envisioning the future, systems understanding, and communication. While some may argue that the only way to deal with Russia is through policies that subordinate Russia to the West, this paper identifies three more effective recommendations related to acknowledging Putin as an influential leader in world affairs, building greater economic interdependence between the West and Russia that is mutually beneficial, and bringing Russia into a coalition partnership to comprehensively address global security issues.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Thomas P. Seymour

Published: September 2015

United States air forces have operated under the tenet of Centralized Control/Decentralized Execution for decades. The proliferation of advanced technology, however, has enabled potential adversaries to disrupt the communication systems that Centralized Control requires. To address this challenge, Air Force leaders are developing the concept of Distributed Control in order to enable lower-echelon commanders to continue operations when communication links with higher-headquarters have been broken. While this term may be new, the idea behind it is not. Air commanders have relied upon Distributed Control at other points in history. This work examines how General George C. Kenney, who commanded Allied Air Forces in the Pacific, overcame similar challenges during World War II. Using Kenney’s organization as a model, this paper discusses ways in which future air commanders might organize the air component in preparation for Distributed Control operations. By examining doctrine, this work also considers the specific authorities the Combined Force Commander and Air Component Commander must delegate to their subordinates to continue air operations under the Distributed Control concept.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey R. Sgarlata

Published: September 2015

Throughout its history the United States has faced numerous ideological conflicts. Despite extensive experience in this type of struggle America has failed to develop an effective strategy by which to counter such challenges. This paper examines the nature of ideological movements, the process by which they grow, and critical vulnerabilities in that process which may present strategic opportunity. The author then recommends a framework for counter ideological strategy development in context of the challenge presented by the transnational militant Islamic movement.


Author: Colonel Curt R. Simonson

Published: September 2015

The 21st century security environment is volatile and unpredictable. The United States faces a variety of threats to its national security interests. As the Army grows smaller, it must maintain the ability to regenerate capabilities to meet unforeseen threats. Regeneration of land forces includes actions taken to rapidly develop new capabilities. The creation of the 10th Mountain Division in World War II provides a case study in the force regeneration role played by the National Ski Patrol System (NSPS). Beginning in 1940, the NSPS petitioned President Roosevelt and Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall to create a specialized Army unit capable of operating in cold weather and in mountainous terrain. Once mountain infantry units were created, the War Department took the unprecedented step of contracting the NSPS to recruit qualified men. Military and civilian leaders employed strategic leadership competencies to work across public-private organizational boundaries. The visionary arrangement between the War Department and the NSPS provides an example of how a civilian organization can be leveraged to assist in creating specialized units to address emerging national security threats.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Paul M. Skipworth

Published: September 2015

The gross federal debt now tops $18 trillion, but the outlook appears to be improving as the economy continues to rebound from the Great Recession. In 2014, the nation experienced its fastest economic growth in over ten years, the stock market doubled, the health care inflation rate was at its lowest rate in 50 years, and the deficit had been cut by two-thirds. But much debate remains before the actual debt improves. This paper aims to inform that debate by providing a general description about government debt, reviewing our nation’s history and projections of debt, and describing the impact of debt on national security. Finally, it offers broad recommendations based on this context.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Edward R. Sullivan

Published: September 2015

The Islamic State (IS) should be understood as an Islamist millenarian mass movement possessing broad anti-western appeal. Possessing an ideology distinct from Al-Qaeda, for more than a decade they have deliberately and methodically worked to arrive at their present situation. They ground their message in solid theological roots, utilizing, among other writings, the Salafist ideology of Sayyid Qutb. Their ideology is one of revolution in which Islam is on par with communism and capitalism as a basis of societal organization. The clarity of their utopian social message of equality and brotherhood contrasts sharply with the chaos and cultural confusion of globalization, making IS attractive to those already susceptible to radicalization in and out of the Islamic world. Highly capable in their media enterprises, IS nonetheless remains vulnerable to rogue messages released in its name that run counter to the image it is trying to cultivate. Countering its ideology is more problematic than countering its organization and requires increased international effort. A failure to act now leaves the Arab and Islamic heartland in the hands of a methodical and capable cult-like organization whose continued existence directly threatens the entire Middle East and North Africa.


Author: Colonel Kenneth J. Tauke

Published: September 2015

This paper provides historical overview of confinement during war, examines the genesis and guiding international law of detention operations, and reviews the detention processes utilized during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan, and the detention facility in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. This paper addresses four questions in regards to the future of detention operations. First, when the United States captures a high-value target, what type of prosecution is pursued? Second, where and how will the individuals be detained and what type of review processes should be utilized? Third, what will be the status of the individuals detained? Fourth, should one federal agency remain the executive agent for detention of non- US citizens who wage war against the United States. Finally, the papers offers a strategic Detainee Disposition Process.


Author: Mr. Matthew Taylor

Published: September 2015

Senior Army leaders recognize the Army Civilian workforce as a critical part of the total Army and the need to develop multifaceted civilian leaders similar to military senior leaders. The Army conducted multiple surveys and studies over the last decade and launched a Civilian Workforce Transformation in 2010. Three key structural issues—decentralized management of the Army civilian workforce, lack of civilian employee mobility, and an unbalanced grade structure—will prevent these latest initiatives from achieving the Army’s strategic intent. Analysis of key characteristics of these structural issues and the resulting effects on the Army Civilian Leader development programs, the Civilian Education System (CES) and Senior Enterprise Talent Management (SETM) program, show the futility of the current approach. Recommendations include continuing an evolutionary approach that cannot completely ameliorate the existing structural issues or a revolutionary approach where the Army fundamentally reexamines its Army Civilian leader development approach. Further research is needed on the growth in retired military officers transitioning into civil service at high GS pay grades since significant law changes starting in 1998.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Richard S. Taylor

Published: September 2015

In May 2013, President Barack Obama directed the release of an unclassified whitepaper that outlined “U.S. Policy Standards and Procedures for the Use of Force in Counterterrorism Operations Outside the United States and Areas of Active Hostilities.” The Presidential Policy Guidance sets in place sound standards and procedures to ensure that U.S. decisions to employ lethal force under the policy comply with international and U.S. domestic laws. However, as with any law or policy, there will always be times when guidance is inadequate to the occasion, and choices among competing lawful options are not clear. This is especially true when one must consider whether to take a life or harm another person. In these instances, decisions require heightened ethical scrutiny to ensure the contemplated act is morally just under the prevailing circumstances and the explanatory power of the proffered justification fully resonates. Building an ethical cannon to compliment the U.S. policy ensures policy intricacies are fully understood by Administration officials and military advisors/operators, who must make the best decisions under the most trying of circumstances.


Author: Ms. Elizabeth E. Torres

Published: September 2015

The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) has been plagued by problems with Veterans’ access to benefits and care for decades. Criticism from the media, Congress, and other stakeholders about the growing bureaucracy, constrained resources, and an overburdened system led to ethical failures, and the eventual resignation of Secretary Shinseki amid a crisis that erupted in the Spring of 2014. This paper seeks to understand the underlying causes of the failures and demonstrate how one senior leader’s approach to culture change, specifically, Secretary Robert McDonald, compares to Schein’s theory of organizational culture and its effect on values. It will look at the environmental conditions that played into the crisis, analyze and understand the problem, and evaluate the approach taken by Secretary McDonald in addressing the problem.


Author: Colonel Craig Trebilcock

Published: September 2015

The Army has experienced a dramatic increase in opioid use, misuse, and addiction since 2001, with nearly 14% of soldiers prescribed opioid pain medication as of 2010. These levels adversely impact force readiness, Army death rates, and overall soldier health. The Army response has been uncoordinated, with the medical branch framing widespread opioid use as a medical issue, Army leadership deeming it the result of risk taking soldiers and poor leadership, and the legal branch addressing it as a disciplinary issue. Opioid use is a new threat environment created by changing medical views on pain treatment, unique wartime drivers that render soldiers particularly susceptible to opioid abuse, and military culture. The Army must review this issue anew to develop an effective response. Army policies, using Vietnam era drug enforcement methods, are failing to mitigate the problem. Preventative policies such as medical monitoring of soldiers prescribed opioids, opioid risk training, and removing stigma for those seeking opioid abuse help are needed to reverse the problem. Erroneously framing the threat as primarily a disciplinary issue is perpetuating misuse and harming soldiers, force readiness, and civilian communities.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Clifton Brian Trout

Published: September 2015

The United States (U.S.) military is at an inflection point. Facing an increasingly complex security environment and declining budgets, military leaders must make hard choices in order to build and maintain the joint force the nation needs. With an anachronistic view of risk, a bias to procure the most technologically advanced high-end platforms, and a floundering defense strategy, the U.S. military is struggling to adapt to the current environment. Fundamental changes must be made to the way the military manages risk, allocates resources, and develops strategy. First, we must identify and determine an acceptable level of risk while finding innovative and balanced approaches to risk management. Second, we must adjust our acquisition strategy and resource allocation model to allow for offsetting ways and means. This includes a healthy high-end/low-end platform mix. Third, we must develop a strategy that aligns ends, ways, and means in a realistic and prioritized manner. This may require adjustments of desired ends, innovative use of reduced means, and ways that shares the burden with friends and partners around the globe.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey A. Vandaveer

Published: September 2015

Vietnam re-enters contemporary American military consciousness as a key player in Southeast Asia power dynamics relative to US rebalance to the Pacific. Vietnam’s historical ability to complicate Chinese aspirational calculations is a unique quality that has direct implications for US strategic interests in the Pacific. This paper examines the Socialist Republic of Vietnam’s (SRV) strategic “status quo” in the region and analyzes Hanoi’s ability to respond to perceived security challenges against Chinese ascendancy. Finally, the paper posits opportunities and limits to which US security interests in Southeast Asia may align with Vietnam’s for future potential collaboration.


Author: Colonel Gail Lynn Washington

Published: September 2015

In an austere fiscal environment, Commercial-Off-The-Shelf Acquisition (COTS) offers an acquisition alternative to support a ready and modern force in the twenty-first century. The decision to use COTS is not always an easy choice; but chosen appropriately, COTS reduces developmental time and costs. It is a quick means of acquiring capabilities from a broad commercial base. Its value has been affirmed in rapid acquisition programs designed to support our Warfighters in the current protracted conflicts and it has proven to be a force multiplier that has enhanced both force lethality and force protections. The acquisition process of design-and-integrate must be analyzed thoroughly to consider all other alternatives before selecting COTS as the best options. Greater use of COTS increases competition, innovation and enables the acquisition community to fill gaps in capability. COTS frequently gives program managers the flexibility to control cost, to minimize schedule, and to gain assured performance. Changing the culture of the acquisition community remains the biggest obstacle for making optional use of COTS. Senior leadership oversight can critically support implementation of a COTS-centric acquisition process.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Mitchell O. Watkins

Published: September 2015

In September 2014, the Army deployed a Stryker Brigade Combat Team from Joint Base Lewis McCord to Indonesia and Malaysia, completing exercises in Japan. The exercise, called Pacific Pathways is serving as a new model to project Landpower into the Pacific. Pathways trains better warfighters who understand the people, culture and environments in the AOR. Pathways deployments and exercises prevent conflict by demonstrating a credible U.S. Landpower commitment. Pathways programs shape the security environment by building military capacity within allies and partners. Pathways is effectively supporting the USPACOM Commander’s theater engagement strategy while reassuring friendly nations of the United States commitment to security in the Asia-Pacific Region. The additional Landpower Pathways brings to the AOR provides the USPACOM Commander with a better foundational force; one that can enable the joint force in achieving limited objectives, set the theater for follow on operations, respond to disaster relief or small contingencies, or serve as the foundation for larger operations.


Author: Colonel Walter James Wiggins

Published: September 2015

In order to sustain the Global Special Operations Forces (SOF) Network while waging a generational fight against violent extremist networks, United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) must make a cultural shift toward building the long-term resilience of its most precious asset--highly trained, skilled, and experienced people. Resilience is achieved by adaptation in the face of pressure. Adaptation occurs when people who are screened, assessed and selected for SOF are given time and opportunity to learn, grow and adjust to the demands of volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous environments. It is essential that SOCOM and its components invest in screening and selection processes that test for adaptability, build disciplined systems of time management to maximize black space, and leverage the preservation of the force and families programs to build a sustainable competitive advantage over future adversaries. Good leadership is critical to enabling adaptation and therefore SOCOM must invest in leadership development as the foundation upon which generational resilience is built.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel James D. Willson

Published: September 2015

Electricity is the lifeblood of our economy and the assumption of near continuous flow is taken for granted because the industry has achieved a remarkable level of reliability. But market pressure to find efficiencies coupled with weak government oversight is making the grid and society more vulnerable to the consequences of long-term power failures than they should be. At the direction of Congress, the Department of Defense is taking steps to isolate military installations from the commercial power grid to protect the capability to project military power. But increasing vulnerabilities to blended cyber and physical attacks could force the Department to deal with the consequences of large scale civil unrest and chaos domestically. Just as the Federal Aviation Administration regulates nearly all aspects of the aviation industry to counter the temptation to increase profits at the expense of public safety, the Department of Energy should regulate the power utilities similarly to ensure baseline reliability. However, long-term reliability will be achieved when renewable energy micro-grids are installed in thousands of communities and networked together similar to the internet in terms of scope, scale and reliability.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey D. Witt

Published: September 2015

Institutional education, standardized training, and self-development often supersede leader behavior patterns and social learning as the primary means for Army leader development resulting in missed subordinate leader developmental opportunities. Emerging leaders learn and enhance their skills by observing and emulating successful leaders, and developing leadership styles through experimentation in diverse social settings. A new paradigm for leader development focuses on self-aware and authentic senior leaders enabled by standardized programs of instruction. In realizing this new paradigm for leader development, senior leaders must deliberately and consciously acknowledge their own behavior patterns as the most significant factor in subordinate leader development. This paper applies research on leader prototypes and authentic leadership theory to place greater emphasis on the role that senior leaders in the operational domain fulfill in the context of the Army Leader Development Strategy.


Author: Colonel Kevin P. Wolfla

Published: September 2015

The evolving discussion of Strategic Landpower has tended to build on lessons learned through more than a decade of prolonged stability operations, which crowds out analysis of other common uses of landpower, particularly coercion. Coercive strategies will play an increasingly important role in securing national interests as the U.S. rebalances to the Asia-Pacific, where landpower proved vital to successful U.S. coercion during the Cold War and continues to serve as a deterrent there. Airpower and seapower may have more strategic agility than landpower, but coercion theory would suggest their agility makes them a weaker signal, both to adversaries and allies, of commitment and a willingness to escalate or de-escalate as necessary. As U.S. land forces remain stationed in and operating throughout the Asia-Pacific region, strategists and planners should do more than rhetorically state the deterrent value of force posture, presence, and security cooperation activities, and examine the most effective ways to leverage landpower for both compellence and deterrence.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Aaron D. Altwies

Published: September 2014

The National Security Strategy calls for the defeat, disruption, and dismantlement of al-Qa’ida and its affiliates. However, after 14 years, the goal to defeat al-Qa’ida seems unattainable. The goal should be changed from defeating al-Qa’ida to making them irrelevant. If the ends change, then the strategy must also change. Theorist Sir Julian Corbett’s ideas of command of the sea, dispute, and limited war align well with the new endstate. Using analogs between the Corbett of 1906 and his ideas applied contemporaneously, a maritime strategy develops as an option to degrade al-Qa’ida. Further, when maritime strategy concepts are expanded beyond the sea and military, then a much greater opportunity arises for strategic leaders to think about how to disrupt, dismantle, and make al-Qa’ida and their affiliates irrelevant. The United States should apply maritime theory ideas to the whole of government using all of the instruments of national power, making the strategy even more powerful.


Author: Colonel Matthew D. Anderson

Published: September 2014

Using the examples of the human domain and the seventh war fighting function this study demonstrates the utility of U.S. multilateral defense partnerships to support and achieve U.S. national security objectives. Specifically, this paper argues that for the U.S. military, multilateral military organizations such as the IADB serve to advance US defense policy interests in the region; establish and deepen mil-mil relationships through programs such as the Regionally Aligned Force; and leverage security cooperation to position the United States as the partner of choice for friends, allies, and fence sitters, while deterring adversaries.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Christopher S. Baril

Published: September 2014

In the wake of 9/11, strategic partnerships were further developed between interagency law enforcement authorities and the National Guard, particularly along the Southwest border. These partnerships enabled the National Guard to become a key contributor and supporter of federal law enforcement agencies who were charged with protecting the borders of the homeland. Operational requirements on the Southwest border have changed the size and scope of the National Guard presence, but not its effectiveness. Political leaders from the local to national level have voiced their continued support in recent years for the National Guard to continue its mission as a key enabler to interagency law enforcement in protecting the nation’s borders. Only time will tell if the current configuration of support will remain in place in an increasingly fiscally austere environment. The United States government must review and emplace long-term funding apparatuses to ensure enduring partnerships in an effort to protect the Southwest border, U.S. persons, and the United States.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Michael J. Best

Published: September 2014

There is concern among Army senior leaders that the equipment readiness information currently being portrayed is not communicating the true maintenance health of aircraft fleets or Combat Aviation Brigades. It is, therefore, important the Army take a harder look at aviation equipment readiness in ways which help better evaluate and articulate performance in order to secure resources to meet future demands. The process must include distinguishing equipment readiness rates by aircraft type and calculating aviation readiness standards, namely Fully Mission Capable Rates (FMC), on an annual basis for the each aircraft type. Furthermore, aircraft maintenance performance must be presented using more effective control charts so senior leaders can better understand and assess the true state of equipment readiness. These FMC standards should then remain the same for a unit regardless of the phase of the current or future Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) process. Finally, the Army should consider new alternative metrics to measure aircraft readiness that better describes aircraft fleet true availability.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Mark E. Blomme

Published: September 2014

Theory examining the purpose and motivations of war weds itself to human nature and obtains a degree of immutability. However, theory regarding the conduct of war, namely warfare, can more easily conflict with the changes brought by science and technology. Clausewitz provides a prophetic and lasting theory describing the tendencies and motivations that lead to war and limit its political aims, but his theory for the conduct of war has proven less enduring. His Napoleonic-era prescriptions maintained a powerful hold on the theory of warfare for nearly a century, but disruptive technologies, such as the gift of flight, eventually forced a reevaluation of theory and led to a rediscovery of sixth-century B.C theory attributed to Sun Tzu. Modern theorists like Julian Corbett, John Boyd, John Warden, and Shimon Naveh extended Sun Tzu’s concepts, perhaps unwittingly, and his theory continues to resonate within the twenty-first-century American theory of warfare. These theorists proved Sun Tzu remains relevant to the perpetually changing realm of warfare, while Clausewitz’s theory on war remains quintessential to the analysis and understanding of the purpose and motivations of war.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Joe Daniels Bookard

Published: September 2014

Since taking office, the Obama Administration has pursued a policy to expand its role in Asia by rebalancing diplomatic, military, and economic resources to the Asia-Pacific region. An important part of the rebalancing has been on Southeast Asia. In addition to the economic and strategic interests, the United States is also concerned with conflicts in the South China Sea surrounding Philippine-China territorial disputes. These concerns present significant security challenges for vital U.S. national interests in the Asia-Pacific, specifically in the Southeast Asia region. This writing raises a challenging question: how can the U.S. honor its treaty obligation to the Philippines without getting into an armed conflict with China in the Philippine-China territorial dispute in the South China Sea? The analysis will show, the U.S. can maintain regional security in the South China Sea without getting involved in three ways: by continuing its alliances and military-military aid with the Philippines, by investing in modernizing and training the Philippines Armed Forces, and by empowering the ASEAN as a collective security body. This policy option allows Southeast Asian states to resolve South China Sea territory and maritime disputes with China.


Author: Colonel James B. Botters

Published: September 2014

Twelve years of war, coupled with substantial Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding, allowed the Army to find materiel and personnel solutions to intelligence training and capability gaps. IWfF support to RAF builds upon these intelligence best practices and TTPs. Unfortunately, many of these solutions are cost prohibitive in the fiscally constrained environment and are now creating capabilities gaps that are unbeknownst to the senior leadership. Therefore, to meet the CSA’s specified tasks within the RAF concept, the IWfF must identify gaps created by this fiscally austere environment and prudently apply the resources needed to accomplish the mission. This paper uses the framework of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leader education, personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF) to assess these gaps which may impede the IWfF’s ability to effectively implement RAF across the Total Force.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Giles R. Boyce

Published: September 2014

This paper examines the roles and missions of the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) within the Asia-Pacific as part of the Department of Defense and U.S. government rebalance towards this important region. It briefly describes the growing importance of the region, the complex and dynamic geo-political environment and postulates a number of illustrated scenarios or vignettes to frame the strategic and operational context for likely USMC missions. Next, the paper assesses the capabilities and roles of the other services within existing concepts (Joint Operational Access Concept, Air-Sea Battle, and the Army’s Pacific Pathways concept) and divines the niche capability or “sweet spot” uniquely suitable for the USMC. The paper argues that the USMC should focus on the development and employment of company and battalion sized expeditionary units to meet the related likely contingencies while also focusing on developing a force generation model that assembles a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) for larger more deliberate forced entry operations as part of a larger joint task force. It concludes with recommendations on how to better focus USMC company and battalion force development efforts on USMC “sweet spot” capabilities.


Author: Colonel F. Wayne Brewster II

Published: September 2014

Landpower will continue to remain an integral part of the Joint Force to meet new 21st century challenges and contribute to protecting U.S. national interests. The future operational environment places a premium on agility and interoperability. The anticipated A2AD challenges require cross-domain synergy to achieve national objectives. Land forces play considerable roles in this environment due to their comparative advantage in shaping the operational environment through human interaction and facilitating access. Mission command is a critical enabler of the agility requirement to achieve this synergy and respond to a dynamic operational environment, and land forces have embraced mission command as a foundational tenet. There is a natural tendency to reduce land forces in the quest to reap a “peace dividend” after protracted wars. We must temper this impulse by clearly articulating the role, value, and associated risks of Landpower in the future operational environment.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Teresa L. Brininger

Published: September 2014

Army Medicine, to combat the rising cost of health care, the increasing rate of preventable diseases, and the diminishing pool of eligible military recruits due to health related issues, is transforming from a health care system to a System for Health. The focus is shifting from a disease-based model to a preventive model of care. Although Army Medicine is changing practices and implementing health-focused initiatives to facilitate this paradigm shift, barriers inherent in the organization remain and are hindering the transformation process. Institutionalizing this new paradigm requires eliminating the cultural, economic, and educational barriers by providing tools and appropriate resources, implementing methods for promoting healthy lifestyles, and leveraging education, research, and technology. Transforming Army Medicine from a health care system to a System for Health has the potential to positively influence Army Medicine, the Military Health System, and ultimately shape health care in the nation.


Author: Colonel Paul T. Brooks

Published: September 2014

The Asia-Pacific region is the most dynamic and challenging in the world because of its unique blend of economic opportunities, diverse political systems, and broad security challenges. This region includes a set of responsibilities, threats and opportunities for the U.S. unlike any other. This paper describes the U.S. strategy for the Asia Pacific region and how the nation communicates this strategy. It concludes by analyzing how the regional actors are receiving the strategy and suggests possible lessons for the strategic planner. Direct communication activities appear to be resourced adequately; however, financial assistance and support programs still appear to reflect pre-rebalance priorities. Regional reactions to the rebalance suggest a number of points: first, the U.S. must avoid activities that force partners to choose between the U.S. and China; second, the U.S. is no longer the most important economy in the region; third, nations are evaluating the rebalance within the context of the U.S. fiscal situation; finally, China’s “containment narrative” is reinforced by U.S. actions to deepen relations with treaty allies.


Author: Colonel Jacqueline D. Brown

Published: September 2014

The accelerated pace of the cyberspace evolution over the last 20 years has introduced a national as well as a global reliance on a manmade infrastructure for economic prosperity, military power, and societal communications all of which affect the United States' Strategic Culture. Cyberspace crosses state boundaries, globally connecting societies, critical infrastructures and commerce, thus enabling unprecedented freedom of communication and access to information and trade. There is now an insatiable appetite for convenience of communication with the ease of use and desire for global reach. This increasing demand creates an environment vulnerable to exploitation and attacks. While both the government and the private sector recognize the threats posed through cyberspace and the risk of doing nothing, the current U.S. strategic culture does not align well to affect required change to secure U.S. interests in cyberspace. To effectively develop and implement a holistic cyberspace strategy, one must understand the cyberspace evolution’s impact on the strategic culture. This paper will analyze the current U.S. strategic culture, the impact of the cyberspace evolution on the strategic culture and provide cyberspace security policy and strategy recommendations.


Author: Colonel Douglas Ray Campbell

Published: September 2014

The Army trains its leaders how to think, not what to think. Yet, the Army also puts limits on thinking such as intent within mission command. Leaders make choices and issue their own intent and orders, as they understand the commander's intent and orders. In addition, the Army puts moral limits in place to guide thought and behavior. Within these limits, choice would seem to be clear and simple. Yet, a leader with the freedom to think, judge, and act will likely view what is best differently than his boss. This paper offers Critical Choice as a means for leaders to choose what is Best. The Critical Choice process provides a "clear, rational, open-minded, and informed" way to choose Best. Best is an informed, reasoned choice a leader can live with.


Author: Colonel Christopher J. Cardoni

Published: September 2014

The long, bloody, and expensive conflicts in Vietnam beginning in 1946 with France and ending in 1975 with the North Vietnamese unification of the country, still have much to teach students of strategy and policy making. These conflicts not only provide military lessons learned, but also lessons on policy and strategy formulation in the complex world that was post World War II. This paper will provide a case study on French policy making, strategy, and experiences in Indochina, and how they subsequently shaped the American theater strategy in building South Vietnamese military capability.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Trent R. Carpenter

Published: September 2014

In order to effectively command and control (C2) joint air operations in a contested and degraded environment, the concept and principles of mission command must be instilled into the U.S. Air Force and joint C2 culture. To do this, the operational and tactical level commanders must build a vital foundation of trust. Operational level commanders must create a shared understanding of campaign objectives and accordingly provide well-defined, clear intent which guides tactical level commanders in exercising disciplined and educated initiative. Furthermore, the use of mission type orders will facilitate decentralized execution and initiative in conjunction with assumption and acceptance of prudent risk. It is also critical to develop and employ an effective C2 architecture to lead joint air operations through mission command. However, it is even more critical for commanders to develop and employ a philosophy that enables a vital culture of trust, without which, mission command and effective joint air operations cannot succeed.


Author: Colonel Phillip A. Chambers

Published: September 2014

The Army’s regionally aligned forces (RAF) concept is a viable approach to provide trained and ready forces to combatant commanders (CCDRs). This paper examines the impact of the RAF concept on the movement and maneuver warfighting function (WfF), specific to a brigade combat team (BCT). The evidence indicates that the RAF concept increases the demand for reconnaissance operations to meet corresponding information requirements. Further examination of the RAF concept and the current Army force generation (ARFORGEN) process suggests that the current system requires adjustment to support an Army-wide readiness management philosophy that prepares RAF-designated forces and maintains a higher level of base readiness across the force. The RAF concept expands the movement and maneuver WfF’s role in deterring conflict and shaping the operational environment. An increased exposure to a region will amplify expertise that will better enable maneuver forces to effectively conduct unified land operations.


Author: Colonel William J. Clark

Published: September 2014

The United States Army Reserve (USAR), like its active component and National Guard counterparts has responsibilities in the military’s mission of Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA). The USAR has capabilities in place to address these responsibilities, but the utilization of these assets is not optimal. This paper makes recommendations for better utilization of USAR resources within the military’s response to various DSCA related organizations. The current USAR manpower structure assigned to the Office of the Chief of Army Reserves (OCAR) and the Joint Task Force Civil Support (JTF-CS) designed to work DSCA issues is investigated. The plan to train to task with active duty services, National Guardsmen, and other federal and civil organizations is also addressed. Recommendations based on integration and training is presented to streamline the process from notification to implementation of USAR assets in response to a declared emergency.


Author: Colonel Mark A. Colbrook

Published: September 2014

Although the Department of Defense (DoD) has a critical need to be able to develop and train Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), it does not currently have the authority from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to access the airspace it needs to fully realize the potential of these assets. Each Service has distinct airspace requirements that relate to how they train and utilize UAS. Due to these differences there is not a “one-size-fits-all” approach that meets each Service’s needs. Each Service, in coordination with the DoD, FAA, and other government organizations as necessary, must develop the policies, procedures, training programs, and equipment to meet the requirements necessary to gain this access. UAS already offer capabilities that are vital to DoD missions. As technologies continue to mature it is extremely likely that additional missions will continue to migrate to unmanned platforms. It is essential to the long-term strategic interests of DoD to maximize unmanned capabilities and retain a technological advantage in this discipline over any potential adversaries. Access to the necessary airspace to develop, train, and operate UAS is essential to maintaining this advantage.


Author: Commander Anthony Michael Conley

Published: September 2014

Throughout history, mankind conducted conflicts or war as the ultimate mechanism to settle disagreements. The nature of war has been timeless, with conventional warfare evolving from “man vs. man” to “army vs. army or navy vs. navy.” Several significant technological advances occurred over time that changed the character of war; one of which was the development and employment of nuclear weapons. On August 6, 1945, a B-29 Bomber dropped “Little Boy,” a uranium based atomic bomb on Hiroshima, Japan. Three days later, another B-29 bomber dropped “Fat Man,” a plutonium based atomic bomb on Nagasaki, Japan. The estimated death toll from both bombings represented a small percentage of the total number of people killed in World War II, but the impacts of the bombings still linger today. This paper will examine the historical context of nuclear weapons and strategy, concept of nuclear deterrence, current U.S. policy, 21st century security concerns, and propose a nuclear strategy going forward. The proposed strategy will still focus on deterrence, but also takes into consideration the need to modernize our nuclear arsenal, resume testing, and increase international transparency for all nuclear states.


Author: Colonel Gary P. Corn

Published: September 2014

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force (SROE/SRUF) for U.S. Forces is the provides strategic guidance to the armed forces on the authority to use force during all military operations. The standing self-defense rules in the SROE for national, unit, and individual self-defense form the core of these use-of-force authorities. The SROE self-defense rules are built on a unitary jus ad bellum framework legally inapplicable below the level of national self-defense. Coupled with the pressures of sustained COIN operations, this misalignment of individual and unit self-defense authorities has led to a conflation of self-defense principles and offensive targeting authorities under the Law of Armed Conflict. In order to reverse this trend and realign individual and unit self-defense with governing legal frameworks, this paper recommends reconceptualizing self-defense through the lens of the public authority justification to better reflect the status of service members as state actors whose actions are subject to the domestic and international legal obligations of the state.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Ryan B. Craycraft

Published: September 2014

China's rise during the early 21st century is similar to Athens' rise preceding the Peloponnesian Wars. The depiction of China within U.S. strategic and popular culture will shape the debate about how the U.S. should wield its instruments of national power when dealing with China. This paper examines what bronze of China is being cast by Americans via elite political speeches, State and Defense Department policies, and official documents. It also examines the way that China is depicted in the outlets of U.S. popular culture, including high-subscription newspaper articles, political cartoons, and entertaining news programs. Ultimately, the battle of the narrative, or the socially constructed idea of the “other,” is important. If the portrayal of China is distorted, the caricature can lead to inappropriate, overly hostile, or narrow policy choices in the event of conflict or crisis.


Author: Captain David A. Crounse

Published: September 2014

In the event of conventional military attack or invasion by an adversary upon the United States, it is clearly recognized that the US Armed Forces, could legally respond swiftly and decisively to “protect and defend” the nation. However, in the instance of a cyber-attack upon a civilian target in the United States the military’s ability to respond is limited and its role is less clearly defined. The same holds true if the attack is directed against one of the sixteen sectors of US critical infrastructure (CI), such as transportation. In the case of a cyber attack conducted upon transportation CI, failing to prevent, mitigate or respond swiftly could have serious consequences for national and economic security. On the surface, DoD protection of transportation CI against cyber threats may seem to be a convenient solution to a growing problem. On the other hand, DoD involvement in the protection of privately owned infrastructure is wrought with many challenges that are borne out of the scope and nature of the cyber threat as well as the dynamics of the public-private relationship. This paper will explore the cyber threat to US transportation CI, challenges to DoD’s role and offer recommendations to improve DoD’s responsiveness.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel John M. Cushing

Published: September 2014

The United States Army is entering a period of challenging times with respect to budgetary constraints and, more specifically, the reduction of United States Army personnel. One would argue that in order to keep the military at the state of readiness needed to fight the limited wars of the 21st century the Army needs to find unique and creative ways to recruit and retain talent. Just as General Martin Dempsey stated, “We must get the people ‘right’” if we are looking to maintain and build the next generation of leaders to retain our reputation as a dominant Army in the world. This paper defines the strategic environment and identifies failures in our talent management process in the last twelve years of war that have caused gaps in critical knowledge, skills, and attributes essential for strategic leaders. This paper proposes a definition of talent management in the current strategic environment and provides recommendations in the areas of officer assignments, officer evaluation reports, and promotion boards.


Author: Colonel Kenneth L. Cypher

Published: September 2014

The March 2013 Director of National Intelligence Worldwide Threat Assessment ranked cyber threats as the number one threat to National Security. The Department of Defense is working towards addressing the national security threat from cyberspace nefarious actors but, DoD is lethargic due to entrenched thoughts and bureaucratic processes. This paper addresses entrenched thoughts of network centricity. Network operations are not cyberspace combat operations. There are two distinct separate operational communities in cyberspace. Department of Defense information network operations are combat support, sustainment, and cyberspace resiliency operations. Defensive and offensive cyberspace operations are combat operations. Each community must have a distinctly different focus but must be under on command authority to ensure integration to defend the seams from adversary exploitation.


Author: Colonel Barry E. Daniels, Jr.

Published: September 2014

Recent conflicts illustrate that war remains a contest of wills between human adversaries. If influencing an opponent's will remains decisive, then the Army must develop leaders who understand the human dimension of war and are capable of thinking strategically. Given that the Army is moving toward a system of regional alignment focused on preventing conflict by influencing allies and partners, the Army needs to develop leaders who can develop subordinate leaders more effectively, understand complexity, operate among disparate cultures, and communicate persuasively. The Army should take steps to train good leaders to be good leader developers, enhance senior leaders' opportunity to gain understanding of complexity, improve cross-cultural skills, and improve communication skills to ensure that the Army is led by leaders who understand how to properly apply strategic landpower in the future.


Author: Colonel Michael James Daniels

Published: September 2014

This paper examines American grand strategy in the post-Cold War era, both as a term of art and as a guiding principle for great power politics, to answer several questions: Is grand strategy still relevant and necessary, especially for a great power? Is there an “American way” of grand strategy, and if so, is it unique? Does the United States currently have a grand strategy? Finally, what are the current challenges in grand strategic development, and can the process be better led, informed, communicated, and executed? There is a need for a grand strategy, now and in the future. However, defining and executing grand strategy is problematic. Current requirements must be brought into balance with a vision for the future, as well as with competing domestic and international interests. A specific proposal for U.S. grand strategy lies outside the scope of this paper, though some suggestions are presented that may help modernize, streamline, and demystify the strategic development process. Lastly, national power and strategy models are presented to help visualize the current strategic calculus, and improve future efforts.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Stephen Ross Davis

Published: September 2014

The requirements generated from the past decade of war have resulted in leaders in the United States Army concerned less with the accountability of government property as more time was spent preparing for combat operations. With the current fiscal constrained environment, the Army must concern itself with accounting for property. It can no longer simply purchase additional items when shortages are identified as was done in the past. Strategically, property accountability impacts unit readiness. Unit readiness impacts the Army’s ability to provide the Combatant Commander with trained and ready forces. Given these challenges, the Army has launched a comprehensive campaign on property accountability. Although company commanders own the property in the Army, they alone cannot solve this issue. This paper argues that engaged leadership at all levels from squad leader to senior Army leaders is required to achieve success in the Army’s campaign on property accountability.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Timothy C. Davis

Published: September 2014

Regionally Aligned Forces are the ways that the Army accomplishes its ends of being “globally responsive and regionally engaged” with reduced means in forces, headquarters, and budgets. Achieving the Army Vision through the RAF concept requires stronger commitment in habitual alignment of headquarters, units, and individuals and holistic commitment by the joint and Army community in enabling corps and divisions to be a Joint Task Force (JTF)-Capable Headquarters. This paper explains the interconnection of the Joint Vision 2020, the Army Vision, and RAF concept to posture forces for the future; then examines the impact for the corps and division as JTFs. The paper explores the approach by CENTCOM with 1AD in Jordan and the development of the Pacific Pathways concept by USARPAC under the RAF concept. The Army must improve across Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel, and Facility (DOTMLPF) to truly regionally align and enable corps and divisions as JTFs to prevent, shape, and win.


Author: Colonel Robert A. Dawson

Published: September 2014

This research paper examines the impact of the United States Army’s Regional Alignment of Forces (RAF) Policy on the Army’s ability to generate trained and ready forces through the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) process, and impact on the six geographic combatant commands. Regional alignment of forces provides combatant commands with Army units prepared for employment across the range of military operations specific to a geographic region of the world. Maintaining the Army Force Generation process allows the Army to prioritize resources and manage readiness for Army operating units supporting regionally aligned and contingency missions. However, refining both the Regional Aligned Force and Army Force Generation policies allows the Army to better prepare and manage Army forces for combatant command employment. Twelve policy recommendations are provided to enhance Regionally Aligned Force and Army Force Generation policies within the doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership and education, personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF) construct.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Glenn A. Dean

Published: September 2014

The Network Integration Evaluation (NIE) is the centerpiece of current Army efforts for innovation in network capabilities and rapid acquisition processes, but it has been criticized for cost-effectiveness. This study questions the role of the NIE in Army experimentation and its relevance in rapid acquisition. It assesses the strategic context for military experimentation in general and the NIE specifically. It then examines the range of current military experimentation in policy and doctrine, and explores the concepts of divergent and convergent experimentation activities. Alternative rapid acquisition processes are defined and compared to the NIE’s Agile Process. The NIE is then assessed in the context of the range of experimental concepts and rapid acquisition processes to determine what roles it is performing and the extent to which those roles are effective. The study concludes with recommendations for revision of Army experimentation strategy and strategic communication about the NIE itself.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Michael P. Doherty

Published: September 2014

As the U.S. transitions from 13 years of war into its next “interwar” period, it is confronted with an increasingly complex geo-strategic environment, replete with the full spectrum of threats, and the harsh realities of the growing financial crisis. Amid this environment, the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance and Capstone Concept for Joint Operations provide the U.S. Armed Forces clear strategic guidance to drive future force development and preparation for Joint Force (JF) 2020. The purpose of this paper is to explore and grade the U.S. Army’s preparation for JF 2020 by examining how the strategic guidance has been translated into Army priorities, and by exploring three of the Army’s major new initiatives--Mission Command, Regionally Aligned Forces, and Pacific Pathways--to determine how they relate to the following framework questions: Are these initiatives aligned with the strategic guidance? Do they contribute to joint warfighting requirements or do they trend toward parochial efforts to justify resources? Finally, do they contribute to developing a Joint Force which can Prevent, Shape and Win, regardless of the threat, when called to do so?


Author: Colonel John Dorrian

Published: September 2014

There is a broad consensus supporting the importance of information as an element of national power, and that consensus has led to a tremendous outpouring of effort, time and money on “strategic communication.” The U.S. government and the U.S. Department of Defense have gone through a variety of initiatives and policy changes in the attempt to establish and maintain credibility and trust with stakeholders. This paper examines past communication cases to assess which concepts seem to advance communication objectives and which ones fail. Credibility, trust, systems understanding and effective civil military relations are required for effective public information programs. Perceptions of disinformation or lack of compliance with civilian control of the military inevitably yield poor results.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel David S. Eaglin

Published: September 2014

After years in the Middle East and Afghanistan, America formally asserted its renewed attention and commitment to Asia with the announcement of the U.S. Pacific rebalance in 2012. With this policy shift, the U.S. turned its focus squarely toward China whose rise challenges U.S. influence. After more than 200 years of contact, China stands today as neither enemy nor close ally of the United States. While China has long maintained a large Army, its recent economic boom has allowed it to significantly upgrade its airpower capabilities enabling power projection well beyond its borders. These improvements have stirred regional alarm and threaten the existing international order where the U.S. has long stood as the hegemonic leader. Historically, the phenomenon of rising powers challenging or surpassing the existing leading power has rarely ended peacefully. Thus, America must develop a strategy to counterbalance China's rising air arm in order to secure U.S. interests, reassure allies, and maintain regional stability.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Shawn R. Edwards

Published: September 2014

The integration of women in Maneuver Fires and Effects branches in the Army represents a promising change for the Army and the nation. Not only will this long overdue change allow the Army to align with social norms pertaining to equality and inclusion, it will also enhance Army readiness and increase creativity and innovation in combat arms units. However, continued resistance to this change effort does not bode well for the Army moving forward. As such, senior Army leaders must understand factors that underscore resistance and communicate the importance of this change effort through strong messages and behavior patterns to influence institutional beliefs. This research project provides a historical review of women in the Army with emphasis on patterns of institutional resistance towards women, analyzes the benefits of integrating women into combat arms units, and provides recommendations for senior Army leaders to consider as they seek to effectively integrate women in combat arms units.


Author: Commander Jeff Farlin

Published: September 2014

A nation’s power to impose its will and to achieve its national objectives emanates from its instruments of national power. Today, instruments of national power include diplomacy, information, military, and economy, collectively identified by the acronym DIME. A nation does not necessarily have to be superior in each element of the DIME to achieve its national goals and interests. It does, however, have to be adept in managing each element of national power synergistically in order to achieve its desired results. During the Southern Campaign of the American Revolution (1778-1781), the rebels were outmatched and out-resourced in every conceivable way compared to Great Britain’s global power, yet they still managed to defeat the British. The Americans succeeded by utilizing their instruments of national power more adeptly than the British. The British had an advantage regarding military and economic national powers, but failed to leverage those advantages into a successful campaign against the Americans. This misstep by the British allowed the Americans to protract the war long enough to leverage its advantages of diplomatic and information national powers that ultimately resulted in victory, independence, and the birth of a new nation.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel David C. Foley

Published: September 2014

Character development is the starting point to build prototypical leaders committed to the Army's enduring purpose and charter. As the Army envisions the Land Force of 2020, it must cultivate prototypical Army leaders to meet the indeterminate demands of the 21st Century. Within its current design and intended purpose, the Army leader development strategy lacks the approach necessary to develop professional prototypical leaders of character who are committed to the Army profession and strategic vision, and reflect institutional values. This paper surveys the Army's archetypical development model as an instrument for professional growth, analyzes the need for committed prototypical leaders of character, and offers prescriptive and descriptive recommendations to the Army's leader development strategy for senior leaders to consider as they continue to shape and influence leader character and institutional behavior. To meet the unique demands of the transnational security community, the Army must invest time, energy, and resources in character development across the institutional and operational domains of leadership.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Todd M. Fox

Published: September 2014

Adopting an APEX-like approach at the NSC level would be a significant step to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of American foreign policy. State, USAID, and Defense all face significant obstacles “to ensure that their individual plans are based on shared assessments of conditions and appropriately aligned to account for each other’s priorities and plans.” Although each organization shares a common interest to promote US national security, distinct cultures, processes, language, timelines, and personalities lead to very different approaches and priorities. Establishing a common planning process that is based on the APEX system but modified to account for organizational differences is the next step in improving synchronization of all of the elements of national power. A National Security Council integrated and a UCP-like plan approved by the President would better align national ways and means to achieve national end states and reduce the confusion or mixed messages sent to our allies, adversaries, and partners throughout the world.


Author: Colonel Mitchell H. Fridley

Published: September 2014

The European imperialism after WWI embodied in the Sykes-Picot agreement and exacerbated by the French mandate rule reinforced and made worse the geographical, social, religious and societal divisions within Syria and the Levant. In addition to laying the foundations for political and sectarian conflict seen today in the Levant, Sykes-Picot and the French mandate policies paved the way for the rise of the Baathist party and the Assad Regime. This paper starts with a look at the historical divisions in the Levant that existed during the Ottoman Empire, then focuses on the period of the Sykes-Picot negotiations and the French Mandate period. The author argues that the divisions imposed by the French during this period had profound and lasting effects on the region leading up to the 2011 uprisings against the Assad regime. In conclusion, this paper considers some forward-thinking conflict resolution ideas involving a remapping of the Middle East. This author does not agree that a ‘partition solution’ can be foist upon the region to solve the seemingly intractable regional sectarian problems orbiting around the Syrian civil war, but that eventual solution may be the only way to bring a modicum of lasting peace to the region.


Author: Colonel Kenneth S. Fu

Published: September 2014

China has cautioned that the military components of the United States rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region complicates the region’s security environment and believes U.S. actions are aimed directly at constraining China, ultimately harming its strategic interests. This paper examines the roots of this distrust and why U.S.-China military-to-military confidence building measures will be insufficient to overcome this distrust to improve the relationship between two militaries. Military-to-military relationship building efforts should instead focus more on developing crisis management and escalation control measures.


Author: Colonel Patrick L. Gaydon

Published: September 2014

On four occasions in the last two centuries, great powers have conducted military withdrawals out of Afghanistan. Each time, these powers left mechanisms in place that protected their national interests. Despite the perception that both the British and Soviets suffered disastrous defeats, each still retained enough leverage to attain some of the objectives for which they went to war in the first place. The US-led North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) coalition is poised to make the fifth such withdrawal by the end of 2014. Can it also achieve similar strategic objectives? Each of these four departures from Afghanistan occurred in a geopolitical environment of competition between great powers: the Great Game and the Cold War. External competition will surely continue to influence post-2014 Afghanistan, as multiple regional and world powers have national interests at stake. This paper examines the lessons from the four previous great power withdrawals, in the context of Afghanistan’s long-running, competitive geopolitical environment. It also considers which of the lessons remain applicable in the post-2014 regional geopolitical environment.


Author: Ms. Lisa D. Gilley

Published: September 2014

Is it time to give up on joint basing? The short answer is “no.” Department of Defense leaders have debated the need for “jointness” in military operations for decades, a debate that reached a decisive point with the enactment of the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986. In another step toward jointness, the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) law’s creation of 12 joint bases by consolidating 26 individual military single-service bases also sparked lively debate across the DoD. Adding a perplexing wrinkle in 2012, a Government Accountability Office report highlighted a lack of projected savings thus far from the BRAC joint bases, an outcome that has caused some military service chiefs to question whether joint basing should continue. Rather than viewing the lack of savings as proof of the joint basing concept’s failure, this paper will present a case for reframing the way the DoD views joint basing, moving perspectives from the tactical plain of infrastructure consolidation for administrative efficiencies based on geographic proximity, to a broader strategic framework based on dimensions and levels of jointness, and on opportunities for leveraging joint mission synergies that may ultimately lead to greater cost savings efficiencies.


Author: Colonel Lorri A. Golya

Published: September 2014

China’s rise and the uncertainty or fear that it inspires in the United States have caused politicians, military leaders, political analysts and even academicians to reference Thucydides who wrote about the Peloponnesian War. According to Thucydides, the rise of Athens and the fear it inspired in Sparta, made war inevitable. Modern historians and political analysts refer to this as the “Thucydides Trap,” the idea that a peaceful transition between a rising power and a ruling power is not possible. This paper will examine great power transitions by considering extant Power Transition Theory, the roles that fear, honor and interest play in the competition for power and finally, provide a cursory overview of China’s strategic culture (identity, political culture, and resiliency) which influences these motives, informs their national interests, and determines their degree of satisfaction with the international system. Armed with this understanding, policymakers in both China and the United States may indeed avoid the Thucydides trap.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Steven T. Greiner

Published: September 2014

Asymmetric threats, such as man-made and natural disasters, agroterrorism, disease pandemics, attacks on the food supply and bioterrorism constitute some of the most serious challenges to U.S. national security in the 21st century. The U.S. Army Veterinary Corps (VC) serves a critical role in protecting military personnel and working animal health as the Department of Defense Executive Agent for Veterinary Services. However, better alignment to the U.S. national security vision through employment of unique and untapped capabilities transforms the VC into a more potent means to counter these asymmetric threats. The VC accomplishes this by aligning its capabilities in a more formal way with other government agencies charged with countering these threats, expanding its role in stability operations support, and regionally aligning its deployable units. Furthermore, building its capacity through training and professional education while enhancing diplomacy through its leadership development ensure a valuable, relevant and reliable VC prepared to counter these 21st century asymmetric threats.


Author: Colonel Scott Halstead

Published: September 2014

American policies towards South Asia have been inconsistent at best and neglectful at worst since the 1947 partition of India. The United States should therefore seize the window of opportunity provided by the political events of 2013-2015 and invest in improved diplomatic, economic, and military relationships with both India and Pakistan. The relationship between these two countries will largely determine the security and prosperity of not only Asia, but also the entire world in the 21st Century. The United States should therefore rebalance towards India and Pakistan, not the greater Asia-Pacific region, to better protect core national interests and those of its allies and key partners. The United States and China should seek common ground to facilitate a more stable South Asia based upon economic interdependence, transparent diplomacy, and mutual security objectives.


Author: Colonel Frances A. Hardison

Published: September 2014

The Army screens potential enlisted recruits against a baseline series of standards to assess their moral suitability for military service. Additionally, the Army claims it inculcates its soldiers with the Army values, thereby instilling high standards of moral character and personal conduct. However, recent cases suggest there has been a breakdown of moral character within the enlisted ranks. Does the Army need a better set of tools and standards to assess the moral suitability of its enlisted soldiers? This SRP first examines the current enlistment standards and assessment methods to determine if they are adequate screening tools for assessing candidates’ moral suitability to serve in today’s Army. The SRP then considers other tools that could be useful in the accession process along with the Army’s Tailored Personality Assessment System. Next, it describes screening methods used in private industry. The SRP concludes with a recommendation for enhanced moral screening to ensure that our all-volunteer Army remains the best trained and most professional fighting force in the world.


Author: Colonel David Wayne Hardy

Published: September 2014

This paper uses the Lebanese civil war and conflict resolution theories to look at the possibility of achieving a negotiated settlement in Syria. Lebanon contained many similar features to the current Syrian conflict and provides a useful perspective of the possible trajectory of the Syrian conflict, the challenges associated with resolving an ethno-sectarian civil war, and the long-term implications for the region. The Syrian civil war will continue for years under current conditions, and its effects will reverberate in the region for decades. The international community plays an essential role in resolving the conflict and mitigating its effects in the region. Policy recommendations include strengthening opposition unity and capability, developing a regional framework that includes all states with interests in the conflict, and focusing additional effort on the violent extremist networks emerging in Syria.


Author: Colonel James H. Harrell II

Published: September 2014

Viewed in terms of the role of the state and the complexities of intervention, the record of the United States in the face of genocide is defensible; it is the result of a deliberate and rational balancing between the role of the state to serve its own people, its domestic and international functions, and the state’s moral obligations as a member of the global community. As horrible as genocide is, American decisions to stop genocide unfold in the context of navigating difficult decision terrain; they have not been and will not be fait accompli. The U.S. system is not ruthlessly effective in preventing genocide, but that is not its purpose. The American system is designed to ruthlessly pursue the national interests of the United States. The paper examines the moral and legal roles and responsibilities of the state, the nature of strategy, and the idea of the United States as a unique state, describes the crime of genocide and the complex and frangible international legal and moral framework surrounding it, the context, complexity, and calculus of U.S. policy and actions during three genocides, and offers suggestions to assist future strategic leaders confronting the crime.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Chad J. Hartman

Published: September 2014

This research project argues that the Air Force should modify its current doctrine to strike an adaptive balance between centralized and decentralized control of Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) operations. An examination of contemporary context reveals a need for ISR agility due to a complex and dynamic environment full of networked and ever-changing threats. A detailed analysis of ISR operations reveals an inherently decentralized network of platforms, sensors, communications, exploitation nodes and analytical centers the orchestration of which involves more than just efficiently managing low-density/high-demand aircraft. Recent ISR operations also reveal an initial paradigm shift from a centralized and bureaucratic theater collection management process to the mission command inspired delegation of ISR authorities. An investigation of modern enemies indicates a hybrid mix of regular and irregular adversaries that increasingly offer only ambiguous and fleeting targeting opportunities. The study concludes by recommending three proposals designed to optimize ISR operations: adaptive control; the use of mission-type orders to focus the ISR enterprise on theater lines of effort; and the creation of expeditionary ISR support teams.


Author: Colonel Patrick L. Harvey

Published: September 2014

The execution of current U.S. counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine is insufficient because spoilers, specifically those driven by ideology, have changed the face of insurgency and COIN warfare. The contemporary COIN environment is significantly different from the environment that colonial theorists Mao Tse-tung and David Galula experienced. While their theories and principles of insurgency and COIN identify the population as the center of gravity, contemporary spoilers have profoundly changed the operating environment. As the operating environment evolved, the doctrine also evolved. However, flaws in execution still exist for various reasons that are discussed in this paper. This research paper examines the evolution of U.S. COIN doctrine, reviews the theoretical foundation of current doctrine, offers an analysis of the environment through the lens of Mao Tse tung and David Galula compared to the contemporary environment, and identifies flaws in the application of current doctrine. Finally, recommendations are offered to diminish the impact spoilers have in the future COIN campaigns. It is argued that the current approach to waging COIN must be restructured in favor of more narrowly focused objectives.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Richard Hawkins

Published: September 2014

America’s ability to attain its objectives in an environment shifting to a multi-polar reality has never been more complex. Global influence remains ever crucial for executing our foreign policy, engaging crises, maintaining strategic legitimacy and defending our interests. At the core of these abilities, two vital instruments of national power will be of increasing importance: economic resilience and the capability to project military power decisively in the 21st Century strategic environment. Reliance on an infrastructure system in rapid decline, namely our domestic roadways, hampers our competitive edge in both arenas and dramatically reduces navigable options for protecting our interests. To mitigate this growing risk, investment in our highways and funding reform is urgently required to stem the potential for losing relevance in global affairs.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Thomas C. Hawn

Published: September 2014

Highly empowered individuals and non-state groups and expanded access to lethal technologies shape the strategic environment of 2035. These trends, combined with a perception that the United States is a less willing and financially capable global security guarantor, may create conditions where non-state actors may choose to use violence to achieve ends counter to U.S. interests. This project identifies and assesses a strategy the United States may use to deter violent non-state actors. This analysis concludes that a cumulative deterrence strategy that combines denial and punitive concepts may deter violent non-state actors within certain limitations. Denial concepts alone are insufficient to deter all violence and requisite punitive measures are only acceptable against groups that pose significant risk to survival or vital U.S. interests. Collective-actor concepts may deter regional threats through the actions of regional partners and enable the United States to influence the behavior of groups that threaten peripheral interests. This strategy may reduce U.S. control over regional issues, but increased reliance on international partners will ultimately increase the ability of the United States to deter threats to vital and survival interests.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Gregory P. Haynes

Published: September 2014

The civil war in Syria is well into its third year with no end in sight. There is a very real possibility of the conflict spreading beyond Syria’s borders to engulf the entire region in a catastrophic war. Due to the chaotic and externally influenced nature of the situation, a diplomatic solution to the crisis in the near term appears to be highly unlikely. Moreover, the situation indicates that military intervention would likely require a sustained effort of some kind to have a serious chance at achieving suitable results toward any kind of acceptable resolution and, in the effort, preserving overall U.S. credibility. Yet the intensity of U.S. interests or an overall plan for employment of U.S. military force to achieve credible ends that serve those interests has not been effectively communicated to the American public. In the current U.S. environment of declining defense spending, economic viability concerns, and overall popular strategic skepticism, a significant strategic communication effort and a potential fundamental re-assessment of global priorities could well be necessary to achieve and/or sustain both feasibility and acceptability for the intensity and duration of any suitable military option chosen, even for protracted stand-off operations.


Author: Colonel Anthony J. Healey

Published: September 2014

Army leaders are considering a regional alignment of U.S. military forces to support the Geographic Combatant Commanders in their conduct of theater operations. This SRP assesses the viability of the Chief of Staff of the Army General Raymond Odierno’s new concept of Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF). It focuses on the single Warfighting of Protection, using the Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel, and Facility (DOTMLPF) problem solving construct as an analytical tool. It concludes with recommendations to ensure the RAF is employed with adequate Protection.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Bradley A. Heston

Published: September 2014

The end of major combat operations in Afghanistan in 2014 will bring the United States to a crossroads. Discretionary budget cuts affecting U.S. government interagency (IA) partners, especially the Department of Defense, could threaten the U.S.'s ability to effectively conduct global steady state operations. This, coupled with an increasingly volatile international strategic environment, can threaten regional stability and embolden the U.S.'s adversaries. Meeting these challenges requires the U.S. to leverage the capabilities of all Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational (JIIM) partners to effectively conduct steady state operations in support of U.S. interests. This paper describes the current state of IA and JIIM integration at the national, regional, and Embassy country team level and identifies opportunities to improve IA coordination and planning mechanisms. Addressing these opportunities calls for changing IA coordination mechanisms at the National Security Council and agency level, improving regional coordination between the geographic combatant commands and Department of State and USAID regional bureaus, and creating efficiencies for partnering with IA and multinational partners at the country level.


Author: Colonel Donn H. Hill

Published: September 2014

Total War is destruction, horror and loss at the greatest scale imaginable short of the Apocalypse. Historically, Total Wars have ended in a clearly defined victory for one side with a resolution of the issues that caused the war in the first place. Total Wars generally result in a lasting peace between the belligerents. Total War has not been practiced since the end of World War II. Aversion to Total War is attributed to the revulsion at the destruction, horror and loss that Total War entails, despite its decisiveness. The countless limited wars that have been waged since 1945 have brought about varied results, frequently with no real resolution to the conflict but merely a temporary halt in the fighting that is picked up at a later date. The destruction, horror and loss are significantly less in the short term, but drawn out for much longer with less well defined results. This paper argues that the means for waging Total War must be maintained in order to deter it and, if deterrence fails, to be able to win it.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel John D. Hixson

Published: September 2014

The Army finds itself at a critical point in its implementation of a mission command culture. Recent post-conflict history demonstrates tendencies towards centralization. While there are some differences in context, the anticipated future environment for the Army bears many similarities to its recent post-conflict past. Army senior leaders experienced the difficult days of “zero defect” command climates, reductions in end strength, and reduced promotion rates. Conversely, based on their experiences in combat over the last decade, the Army’s junior leaders have both mission command experience and an expectation of empowerment from their leadership. To increase the chances of successful implementation of a mission command culture, the Army should utilize Schein’s cultural embedding mechanisms. Specific recommendations include: consistent senior leader focus on mission command, senior leader role modeling mission command, rewarding positive examples of mission command, and adjusting the Officer Evaluation Report to ensure the Army promotes the right leaders. The implementation of a mission command culture will only occur when senior leaders overtly embrace and participate in the process.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Mark Alan Holler

Published: September 2014

The U.S. Army’s Patriot force is a national strategic asset vital to stability in volatile regions of the world. Patriot deployment to foreign soil sends a strong message of commitment and resolve to protect U.S. national interests. Recently, over one-third of the contingency Patriot force has been committed to enduring Theater Missile Defense (TMD) missions in USCENTCOM and USEUCOM. This level of commitment is unsustainable. The current level of rotational deployments threatens readiness and the success of contingencies which require short-notice Patriot deployment to ensure Joint Operational Access. Additionally, Patriot force organization and rotational schedule do not facilitate unity of command. The Army must enact solutions that will enable the Patriot force to simultaneously deter aggression, ensure a high state of readiness, provide an available pool sufficient to meet short-notice contingency requirements, and ensure unity of command throughout all phases of Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN).


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Arturo J. Horton

Published: September 2014

Mission command is the philosophy of command that Army commanders and leaders must use to lead Soldiers and units in the 21st Century. While first conceptually introduced in 1982 with the publication of Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, the Army did not officially adopt the evolved doctrinal term and concept of mission command until 2003 with the publication of FM 6-0, Mission Command. While mission command has been integrated into its doctrine, the Army still has yet to institutionalize it. The Army has not yet fully integrated mission command into its culture, fostered unit climates that engender it, incorporated it into its training methodologies, developed personnel management systems that reward it, and employed it consistently in all environments. These challenges result from the Army’s inability to create major change and transform over the past 11 years, as well as its rooted culture, organizational climates, tiered structure, bureaucratic processes, and dated training and personnel management systems. This paper describes this latest evolution of mission command, explains why challenges to its institutionalization exist, and proposes solutions to Army senior leaders as to what should be done to achieve institutionalization.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Donald W. Hurst III

Published: September 2014

Today’s fiscally constrained and complex threat environment requires the Department of Defense (DoD) to take a more active role in managing the Defense Industrial Base (DIB). Otherwise, DoD risks the loss of core competencies essential to U.S. National Security. In order to re-shape the DIB to support DoD’s twenty-first century requirements, U.S. policy makers must provide strategic guidance and direction. This guidance should begin with identification of the core competencies required to accomplish the mission set needed to support the National Military Strategy. Once these requirements are determined, the DIB must be assessed to identify capability gaps and vulnerabilities. This assessment will inform the development of an integrated long-term strategy designed to align the DIB’s efforts with the National Security Strategy, to manage the DIB collaboratively during an economic down-turn, and to reform the current regulatory regime in order to leverage the benefits of globalization. A comprehensive restructuring of the DIB promises to be a lengthy and complex process. This SRP identifies the challenges and suggests a methodology to prevent the atrophy of the DIB-a strategic asset essential to U.S. National Security for over sixty years.


Author: Mr. Jerome Jastrab

Published: September 2014

When conducting alliance or coalition operations, every nation sees interoperability as a desired force multiplier which enables economy of effort. Interoperability is also seen as a means to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of military and interagency operations in pursuit of national interests. However, there is not a common definition and understanding of the word itself, and there are many challenges. Additionally, interoperability occurs at the strategic, operational, and tactical level and covers the technical, doctrinal and human dimensions. Considering this multi-dimensional scope and the temporal nature of gains, a complete and absolute state of interoperability is not achievable. Therefore, in an environment of constrained resources, the Department of Defense must reconsider its approach. This paper recommends Department of Defense adopt an integrated team approach to interoperability and prioritize its efforts and resources on US allies and friendly nations with shared national interests. Subsequently, key staff leads and combatant commanders must play a much greater role in determining interoperability goals and objectives, and optimizing the results for the resources invested.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Nicole S. Jones

Published: September 2014

In today's global environment States are increasingly reliant on cyberspace for everything from banking services to infrastructure management. While this environment provides many benefits, reliance on digital systems also leaves us vulnerable. Malicious actions in cyberspace raise multiple legal and ethical questions for States wishing to respond to, or prevent, such actions. The Just War Framework provides an organized way to determine whether the reasons for going to war and the conduct of the war itself are morally justified; however, the international community has not yet adapted laws and international norms to cyberspace. Many questions remain regarding what actions rise to the threshold of armed attack, when a State has an inherent right to self-defense, and how to approach the problem of attribution for cyber attacks. The international community is seeking to clarify norms, most notably through NATO's Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, which published the Tallinn Manual in 2013. The United States must continue to participate in these and other forums and continue to partner with like-minded actors who share our goals of an open and secure cyberspace.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Steven Kyle Jones

Published: September 2014

The Army faces a significant challenge – how to best apply strategic landpower? The Army’s Irregular Warfare Fusion Center posits that strategic landpower should “shape conditions in the operational environment that influence unified action partners and deter adversaries in order to provide our country with an unsurpassed capability across the range of military operations.” Is the way ahead to define a new domain of conflict? On the other hand, is the Army better served to look inward and identify an organizational change to distribute skills across its forces to influence and shape the environment, to realign the staff to define/plan/assess the effects, or possibly create a new warfighting function to achieve the effects of influencing and shaping operations?


Author: Mister Benjamin D Kauffeld

Published: September 2014

The United States Department of Defense and United States Agency for International Development have interacted for 50 years to advance national security interests. With origins in the Marshall Plan, and through joint efforts in the Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan wars, the two have developed policies, liaison systems, and joint programming to advance practical coordination. After closely-combined defense, diplomatic and developmental (3D) efforts, USAID and DOD have never appreciated each other’s capabilities better. Despite this, significant challenges exist that impede sustained coordination, including resource imbalances, conceptual gaps, and personality-based rather than institutional relationships. As war efforts conclude, is a window of time closing on development-military coordination? What are the implications for unity of effort between military and development actors? This report analyses the history, policies, coordination structures, and experiences of USAID and DOD interaction; identifies trends and challenges; and recommends continued interagency engagement, particularly through joint planning, field programming and broader staff exchanges.


Author: Colonel Alan Kellogg

Published: September 2014

Women’s performance in Iraq and Afghanistan over the last 12 years showcased their extraordinary abilities and reinforced the belief that women are qualified to join combat arms specialties. As a result, on January 24, 2013, the Department of Defense (DoD) removed ground combat restrictions for women thereby removing some of the barriers for increased opportunities. Research suggests that integrating women into previously closed specialties can improve team performance and indicates that successful integration depends on the Army’s ability to plan and execute a comprehensive strategy for implementing change in organizations. Therefore, this paper examines the evolving role of women in the Army and acknowledges several concerns and benefits about integrating women into combat arms specialties. John Kotter’s eight step process for leading change in organizations is used to examine and offer recommendations about how the Army should implement DOD’s directive requiring women be integrated into combat specialties by 2016.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Carl D. Kelly, Jr.

Published: September 2014

As America winds down combat operations in Afghanistan and the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific occurs what else is going to draw the energies and attentions of America and DoD in the coming years? I submit that the greatest threat to America’s interests in the future will not be traditional nation state aggressors, but rather the growth in the number of weak, failing or failed states. How and why do countries regardless of their form of government collapse into chaos which breeds lawlessness, violence and regional instability and what can America do to counter these events and safeguard our interests? This paper proposes that Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCCs) and the interagency partners (IA) should consider using Village Stability Operations (VSO) as both a WAY and a MEANS that is cost efficient and has a small footprint to promote regional stability goals (ENDs).


Author: Mr. David Kissling

Published: September 2014

As the U.S. rebalances to the Asia-Pacific, the South China Sea (SCS) will become increasingly important to U.S. national interests. How the U.S. employs its vast national power in the SCS will have longstanding consequences for the U.S. and the rest of the world. In particular, employment of U.S. military power in the region serves numerous necessary functions. It ensures freedom of navigation, reinforces U.S. treaty commitments, demonstrates U.S. resolve, and builds familiarity with China in order to prevent miscalculation and improve safety at sea. This employment of U.S. military power carries with it significant risks as well as opportunities. While military power is an important component of U.S. strategy in the SCS, it should not be the U.S.’s primary mechanism for advancing U.S. policy at the expense of other available instruments. It is crucial for U.S. military influence to be employed in synchronization with other elements of power in order to best achieve U.S. strategic objectives.


Author: Colonel Jeffrey A. Klein

Published: September 2014

This paper posits that the South China Sea (SCS) maritime dispute between an increasingly coercive China and the four Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) claimants has reached a tipping point. First, ASEAN appears as unified as ever with its core states of Indonesia, Thailand, and Singapore wedded with its most vocal SCS claimants of Vietnam and the Philippines in pressing for a quick conclusion to the problem. Second, China has demonstrated an increased willingness to engage with ASEAN on the topic, departing from its usual demands for bilateral talks, in order to better relations with the bloc. Finally, a reasoned U.S. policy is providing resilience to ASEAN through a whole-of-government effort. These conditions offer tremendous opportunity for U.S. military support to efforts designed to strengthen ASEAN’s position vis-à-vis China. These military approaches include: active support to the establishment of a effective ASEAN Political Security Community; creation of opportunities for ASEAN to proselytize their views on a peaceful, multilateral solution; and, direct engagement with China and its military in order to influence its views on what constitutes an acceptable solution addressing its interests.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Charles H. Koehler III

Published: September 2014

In 2012, the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) established the Soldier for Life program and charged it with enabling Army, governmental, and community efforts to improve soldier transition into the civilian world. A subordinate component of this effort is the CSA’s vision of a lifelong “Soldier” mindset soldiers will carry with them to assist them in civilian success. This Strategy Research Project posits that a deeper concept of soldier identity is a foundational requirement inextricably linked to the profession of arms and trust inside and outside the Army. This identity must be established first in order to build trust in the institution, narrow military-civilian social gaps, and improve integration of transitioning soldiers into communities. The Soldier for Life program is best postured to champion this endeavor. This project provides a roadmap that logically advances Soldier for Life efforts towards an enduring and valued Army capability that instills soldier identity, builds trust, and compliments both the profession of arms and soldier transition.


Author: Dr. Peter G. Laky

Published: September 2014

The evolving Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) environment facing U.S. military power is a rational evolution of the characteristics of war. A2/AD strategies are designed to deny the U.S. and its allies permissive access and operating environments to project military power. China is developing A2/AD capabilities intended to deny opponents the ability to interfere with its own regional power projection. Future conflict with China would likely be limited war characterized by mutual denial of the global commons in maritime, space and cyber and domains and the mutual ability to strike and inflict hurt. Land forces with counter-A2/AD capabilities can exert power across all conflict domains asymmetric to China’s evolving platform-focused A2/AD threats to strategic effect and can serve as a powerful component of the military support to U.S. strategy in this region.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Kevin Lambert

Published: September 2014

The rescission of the 1994 Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule for women announced by Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey on 24 January, 2013 represents a promising change that will better align the Army with the society it serves and enhance the overall performance of combat arms units. In order to fully capitalize on this positive change, leaders at every level must challenge cultural resistance to women serving in previously all male Maneuver, Fires, and Effects (MFE) career fields at the brigade level and below. Many of these cultural impediments are contained in messages that oppose this change effort and have primarily dominated pre-execution dialogue, and thereby risk sabotaging the implementation process by marginalizing potential positive outcomes. Therefore, senior leaders must change cultural beliefs and assumptions by acknowledging the positive aspects of this change effort, while marginalizing negative sentiments. In doing so, subordinate leaders and Soldiers will be empowered to reinforce new assumptions and beliefs observed in senior leaders.


Author: Colonel Michael James Lawrence

Published: September 2014

After 13 years of fighting two counter-insurgency wars, the United States is entering another interwar period, and its Army must now justify its value and relevance at a time when the “biggest threat to U.S. national security” appears to be a run-away budget deficit. This Strategic Research Paper first identifies those lessons learned during previous interwar periods that are useful to Army leaders of today as they contemplate transformation in the 21st century. It then compares different arguments for how the emerging Army of the 2020’s should re-organize. This paper advocates for a consolidation of existing army structure, a reorganization of its capabilities, and a transformation of its role in the joint force supporting U.S. national security interests. In sum, it offers a plan for best managing the Army’s restructuring to a smaller, yet lethal, force while ensuring relevancy to the security environment of this interwar period and meeting the goals outlined in the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review. In the end, it will advocate for a 380K army that is optimized on the “left end” of conflict while preserving “at-risk” armor capability and a strategic vision characterized by a pivot to everywhere the rest of the Joint Force is not.


Author: Commander Bryan H. Leese

Published: September 2014

This paper examines the role of the intelligence staff in the development of the commander's intelligence requirements during the coalition crisis operations planning process. NATO's Operation Unified Protector (OUP) is a case study on intelligence staff's performance in a coalition environment. During OUP, NATO was unable to apply, in a timely manner, its doctrine to intelligence staff support of planning resulting in the desynchronization of intelligence with planning and poor intelligence staff alignment, up and down echelons. Many point blame for poor integration of intelligence at the commander, yet the intelligence organizations themselves must accept culpability as well. Coalition warfare is the character of conflict and the U.S. can improve intelligence support. The U.S. and NATO must use organizational change principles to improve doctrine, the selection of personnel assigned to intelligence staff positions, the training of intelligence personnel, and staff integration exercises. Reinforcement of these changes requires improved staff organization, design, and procedures. Intelligence staffs must lead operational planning teams and use Prioritized Intelligence Requirements (PIRs) as synchronization lynchpins.


Author: Colonel Mark S. Levine

Published: September 2014

Over twelve years of warfare resulted in significant increases in manned and unmanned Army Aerial Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (AISR) capabilities. Leveraging these increased capabilities to meet national demands during an era of fiscal constraints warrants an expansion of AISR roles in Mission Command, Joint Fires, Defense Support of Civil Authorities, Homeland Security, and Building Partner Capacity. Mission command recommendations include classification policy reviews and leader development and engagement. Joint Fires recommendations include using AISR for terminal guidance of munitions, strike coordination, and munitions delivery. Increasing AISR roles in homeland missions strengthens public safety and inter-agency coordination. Sharing AISR with partners is a cost effective option to increase ISR capability to combatant commanders. Expanding AISR roles is an expeditionary and fiscally responsible means to support national strategy and is a catalyst for intergovernmental and multi-national cooperation in a fiscally constrained environment.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel David Lineback

Published: September 2014

Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the nation demanded answers. What did we know? What did we miss? Could we have prevented the attacks? The 9/11 Commission determined that the attacks might have been prevented had the Intelligence Community (IC) connected the dots. The commission recommended reforms to integrate the IC and improve information sharing. The resulting Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) was heralded as the most significant reform of the nation’s IC since the National Security Act of 1947. Nearly a decade since the IRTPA’s passage, critics claim the IC remains fundamentally unreformed. Using an organizational analysis tool known as the McKinsey 7-S Model, this paper explains why reform has not been achieved. The model analyzes the alignment of seven key organizational elements—strategy, structure, systems, staffing, skills, style, and shared values—to evaluate the IC’s effectiveness. Using this analysis, this paper offers 12 recommendations to improve the IC’s alignment and integrate it into an effective enterprise capable of meeting 21st-century challenges in a volatile, uncertain, complex, ambiguous environment.


Author: Colonel Michael J. Loos

Published: September 2014

The mission appears simple: make the Army smaller after more than a decade of continued conflict, and prepare the Army and its leaders for contemporary war. Yet, while the Army has started laying out plans to rapidly reduce force structure, changes affect more than buildings, bases, and equipment. The human enterprise and specifically the Army’s leaders are a critical resource that must also undergo change. The Army has been in this position before and its actions during the post Vietnam and Gulf Wars are two examples from which the Army could glean valuable leader development lessons that will aid in keeping the Army ready. This research project examines leader development actions and initiatives that proved decisive in previous eras of fiscal constraint, and provides recommendations for senior Army leaders to consider as they seek to develop competent and committed leaders of character, and maintain the Army’s future competitive advantage.


Author: Commander Gregory H. Magee, Jr.

Published: September 2014

Creating sustainable commercial fisheries in the Asia-Pacific is crucial to regional stability and protecting U.S. interests. This requires enforcement mechanisms to protect the fisheries. As part of the U.S. rebalance to the Asia-Pacific, supporting regional efforts to improve fisheries enforcement not only protects fish stocks, but serves to increase regional stability and provides a means to engage nations that don’t normally work with the U.S.. The U.S. Coast Guard is the best agency to lead this initiative with considerable expertise in fisheries enforcement in the U.S. and through their leadership role in international engagement. Ways to improve fisheries enforcement include expanding regional forums, utilizing DOD assets for fisheries patrols and working to expand regional partners’ law enforcement capacity. Through these efforts, the U.S. will protect regional fisheries, create a means of engagement, and develop multimissioned forces capable of missions like search and rescue, combatting transnational crime, and humanitarian assistance.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Rogelio Maldonado

Published: September 2014

This monograph examines the investment the United States has made into the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program. The paper will analyze the potential long term effects the procurement of this aircraft will have on the United States’ ability to effectively implement its military power in an effort to act in its own national interests. A series of recommendations that includes the curtailment of the program, investment in viable commercial-off-the-shelf alternatives, and re-initiation of the Joint Capabilities Integration Development System (JCIDS) capability gap analysis process will be advanced. This work will suggest the path that senior government leaders should take in regards to this program in an effort to mitigate the shortfalls this aircraft’s acquisition has generated.


Author: Chaplain (Colonel) Timothy S. Mallard

Published: September 2014

What is the cost to a leader, both personally and professionally, in exercising a calling of strategic moral leadership to one's nation or to the world? This has profound implications for any military force, an institution of the state that U.S. Army Chaplains contend is subject to the rule of God, allowing Soldiers and Families who serve in it to be one with another in God while serving an institution dedicated to war. Understanding the process of strategic moral leader development can aid the Army in developing moral leaders in support of landpower across the career spectrum. The life and witness of Pastor Dietrich Bonhoeffer provide an excellent case study for this task. His move from trained academic and spiritual leader to active conspirator and subversive with fellow Abwehr participants against the Third Reich will be the focus of this project. We will conclude by delineating how the costly process of exercising strategic spiritual leadership can be prepared for, but still requires extensive moral courage to enact, both privately and publicly.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Cynthia Ann Matuskevich

Published: September 2014

The U.S. Army’s Training and Doctrine Command’s Cultural Understanding and Language Proficiency (CULP) program for Cadets was created to achieve the objectives of the Army Culture and Foreign Language Strategy -- to produce officers who possess language and cultural skills. Program execution fulfils security cooperation objectives of Combatant Commands and Embassy Country Teams. Studies have shown the direct benefits CULP has had on developing cultural insights into foreign cultures but has overlooked and under-assessed the subsequent development of cultural insights into the inter-agency process of the 3Ds (Diplomacy, Development and Defense). This paper suggests that the Army needs to review its current Officer Professional Military Education and develop specific education, training, and policies targeted at developing joint, interagency, inter-governmental and multi-national (JIIM) competence earlier in an officer’s career. It discusses the potential of adding new objectives to the CULP program focused on JIIM competency development, potential opposition, and makes final recommendations.


Author: Colonel Eric M. McFadden

Published: September 2014

This paper proposes a threat-based approach to utilizing the Critical Factors Analysis as a tool to see threat networks and systems in order to facilitate the synchronization of U.S. whole-of-government efforts as part the development of the Integrated Country Strategy at the Country Team level. Furthermore, it applies the model to Nigeria’s internal security threats, using the analysis of the terrorist group Boko Haram in northern Nigeria as an example. Based on this analysis and application an integral tool for the development the Integrated Country Strategy facilitating a whole-of-government synchronization at the country level is proposed.


Author: Colonel Fritzgerald F. McNair

Published: September 2014

National infrastructure provides daily critical functions across diverse and complex sectors of a privately owned industrial base. Over the last decade, cyber threats against critical U.S. infrastructure have increased significantly. Presidential directives, legislative proposals, and GAO assessments all indicate that increased information sharing within public-private partnerships is integral to U.S. efforts in Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP).


Author: Mr. William H. McQuail

Published: September 2014

The Department of Defense (DoD) faces extraordinary fiscal challenges. The Army made deep budget reductions to meet sequestration caps and those measures could be re-imposed in 2016. However, given results of several Lean Six Sigma projects in the U.S. Army-Europe, it proved possible to find significant savings in military pay entitlements which could lead to substantial savings elsewhere. Initiatives projected millions of dollars in savings over five years from efficiencies of several entitlements. Additionally, improving the accuracy of military pay entitlements contributes to the Army’s audit readiness, a Congressionally imposed DoD mandate for 2017. Replication of these projects elsewhere in the Army, unfortunately, has not occurred. Savings resulted from successful financial management organizational transformation, and the Army should use those lessons as it prepares to implement significant force structure changes. This paper explores why efficiencies did not spread throughout the service, what steps the Army should take to achieve benefits in other commands, and encourages the Army to assist other services with the replication of these projects to realize savings throughout DoD.


Author: Colonel David E. Mendelson

Published: September 2014

This paper critically analyzes and reviews many of the polarizing aspects of the USC/sexual assault debate in the armed services. Through a review of the statistical underpinnings, and an assessment of the proposed resolutions to the problem, this paper tries to widen the aperture of the debate and provide a more balanced picture of the problem. The ultimate aim of this paper is to provide the current, and purportedly objective, state of the issue in order to better inform the public and any pending or proposed resolution(s). Without an open discussion, resolutions may only be aimed at solving the perceived, rather than the actual, problems.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey A. Merenkov

Published: September 2014

Senior leader misconduct in the U.S. Army erodes trust critical to inculcation of Mission Command and endangers its ability to act as a profession. I assert that the U.S. Army underestimates the impact of leader misconduct on internal trust in the force and external trust of the institution. In light of these challenges, the U.S. Army should conduct a psychological assessment and counseling at the Pre-Command Course for lieutenant colonels and colonels, to identify leaders at risk for future misconduct, including toxic leader behaviors. Leaders identified without prejudice, as “at risk,” would be counseled and assisted by an U.S. Army psychologist to identify mitigating measures to reduce chances of future misconduct. Reducing levels of leader misconduct would strengthen trust internally, within the U.S. Army, and externally, with civilian leaders, and the American public. As the U.S. Army navigates an era characterized by reduced budgets and evolving roles, the foundation of trust will be vital to the implementation of Mission Command and maintaining the U.S. Army as a profession. The U.S. Army would be able to do so only if it restores the confidence and trust within the force, with civilian leadership, and the American public.


Author: Colonel Patrick R. Michaelis

Published: September 2014

The purpose of this paper is to examine current theoretical models that help inform the Beltway strategist to “understand” the unique nature of the Beltway as an area of responsibility (AOR), and from those theoretical models propose a “framework” that creates context in the mind of the Beltway strategist and a start point for developing political judgment and awareness. To the neophyte, the myriad of influences to decision making and strategy within the Beltway AOR seem an imponderable act to decipher. The policy, process (bureaucracy), politics, and personality (4-Ps) model, emphasizing a framework relationship between the 4-Ps; the twin forcing functions of time and interests; and the lens of strategy as a function of priorities, resources, and risk, give the Beltway strategist, in any policy domain, a start point for contextual analysis. Independent of the framework, recommendations to the Army to develop political judgment and awareness focus on exposure and experience, earlier educational opportunities and broadening experiences, and a competitive and desirable selection process.


Author: Colonel Jeremy B. Miller

Published: September 2014

The purpose of this study is to examine how the United States Army assesses strategic leaders and offer possible solutions to improve the current assessment methodology. This research first reviews the emerging strategic environment and current military doctrine to determine the most critical leader attributes needed to succeed in the ever-changing strategic environment. Next, this study reviews the Army’s officer assessment process and identifies limitations that prevent the Army from achieving its desired officer developmental outcomes. Finally, this study provides four recommended solutions to assist the Army in more effectively assessing officers for service, promotion, and command.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Thomas P. Mitalski

Published: September 2014

U.S. national values and societal norms continue to evolve concerning gender equality and equal opportunity. After the revocation of the combat exclusion rule, General Dempsey directed the validation of both physical and mental occupational performance standards in those military occupational specialties that had been closed to women. To date, the services have focused only on validating physical standards and have largely ignored mental and psychological standards. Regardless of gender and similar to physical standards, not all service members are psychologically suited for the combat arms. Through a review of life and death stress responses, psychological attributes critical in combat and psychological injuries linked to combat, this paper suggests that a psychological screening process be developed and implemented for the combat arms. Through use of psychological screening and in conjunction with physical and cognitive screening criteria, the services can optimize selection for the combat arms across the full spectrum of operations regardless of gender.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Steven W. Moritz

Published: September 2014

As the U.S. concludes the longest war in its history, it should assess the connection between its society and the use of military force. There are two factors which have helped distance the U.S. civilian population from the decision to use military force. First, technology has provided policy makers with the ability to provide military effects globally with little human cost to the U.S. Second, a civilian-military gap has widened since the creation of the all-volunteer force. These two factors have combined to allow U.S. leaders unprecedented freedom to take military action abroad due to reduced internal political pressure. This situation creates three main risks to the U.S.: using a simple, technological military solution to problems which may not fully address the issue, the potential to use the military as the preferred option, and a shift away from a values-based approach when pursuing U.S. national interests. Three recommendations are made to address these issues: improve transparency in use of unmanned aerial vehicles, focus on synchronized strategic communication, and increase the size of the Guard and Reserve relative to the active duty force.


Author: Colonel William B Mosle III

Published: September 2014

Operating in the grim 2014 fiscal environment, DoD strategic leaders are challenged to reduce the budget while retaining balance across military readiness, force structure, and modernization. Yet modernization has proven to be a double-edged sword. Despite delivering highly effective combat capability, complex new weapon systems are failing to meet reliability requirements driving higher life-cycle costs. Thus today’s modernization creates tomorrow’s operations and support budget dilemma. Sustainable modernization requires acquisition strategies to produce new capabilities which meet reliability requirements. To close the reliability gap, strategic engagement is required earlier in modernization to correct the cultural bias that favors effectiveness over reliability resulting in unacceptable long-term sustainment costs. Early strategic influence must create cultural change to set the conditions for existing reliability reforms to succeed. The paper provides four principles to guide strategic leaders in embedding modernization culture change. If strategic leaders do not correct modernization culture biases, unreliability will extend the gale force winds swirling the military into a budgetary perpetual perfect storm.


Author: Colonel Thomas E. Munsey

Published: September 2014

Coalitions have proven effective political and military instruments often adding to the legitimacy of military operations. Coalitions have not replaced traditional alliances; but they do have the ability to build upon partner capabilities, particularly regional capabilities as the U.S. increases its engagement in regions in which it has not operated extensively since the beginning of the War on Terror. Much of the work and study on coalition warfare has been in the technical arena to include creating and developing systems and networks that enable multinational communications and ease of information flow. An understanding of the social and cognitive dimensions across cultures is required to effectively lead multinational coalitions and the political purpose of military engagements. The Army should adopt the Cultural Lens Model as a framework for identifying cognitive differences among coalition partners to enable the effective application of coalition military capacity.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Amanda S. Myers

Published: September 2014

The unique convergence of personal qualities and leadership style made President Abraham Lincoln exactly the right man to lead the Nation through civil war and preserve the Union. Lincoln’s strategic leadership is assessed using the frameworks of presidential historians Fred Greenstein and Richard Neustadt. Greenstein identifies the attributes of public communication, organization, political skill, vision, cognitive ability and emotional intelligence as qualities that distinguish presidential performance. Studying Lincoln through these attributes highlights his uniqueness and extraordinary skill as a wartime president. More than any other one attribute, his emotional intelligence, characterized by his charity, empathy and magnanimity, separate him from his contemporaries and from other presidents. Neustadt uses a four-question framework to assess a president and the power he brings to the office in terms of personal influence and political leadership. Lincoln’s purpose, his use of his presidential power, how he handled the pressure of the office, and his legacy are all analyzed to assess the presidency of the sixteenth president. The same president who author Eliot Cohen has called, “the greatest of American war presidents.”


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Jodi A. Neff

Published: September 2014

An observed lesson from the past decade of war is that the DIME elements of national power are in use simultaneously but in different capacities to secure national interests in a VUCA environment. This same integration needs to be exercised at the strategic levels in the interagency workings to achieve unified action. The VUCA environment, further complicated by the effects of globalization, a wide range of threats, declining budget, and reduced military force structure, demands the synergistic application of the DIME. While there have been calls for reform of the NSS, those who have control over the system have not taken steps to enact such reform. In lieu of these changes, the military can increase its collaborative capacity to achieve unified action by providing emotional intelligence competencies to its officer corps at the O-4 level. By emphasizing development of the affective domain at this level, officers will be ready participants in the collaborative environment necessary to implement a whole of government approach.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Paul Dudley Noyes

Published: September 2014

Diversity is a powerful term advocated by an even stronger socio-political constituency. For some it portends a brighter, more resilient future. For others, it augurs a juggernaut on collision course with mediocrity. For most however, it arouses neither apprehension nor elation. Focusing on U.S. military officers, this strategy research project (SRP) reviews the current Department of Defense (DoD) and services’ definitions of diversity, then it considers how recent considerations of diversity have impacted the race and gender representations in the officer corps. Following a “deep dive” into U.S. Census data, it analyzes how concerns about diversity have shaped policies and perceptions regarding the demographic make-up of our nation’s population, which many believe our military should “reflect”. Overall, it addresses the question of how far the DoD has gone–and should go–to promote diversity in its officer corps.


Author: Mr. Sean M. O’Brian

Published: September 2014

The civilian workforce is an integral part of the Army; it provides essential services in support of the mission. Serving as force multipliers, our civilian employees provide myriad requisite skills, thereby freeing uniformed members for war-fighting tasks. As the military moves deeper into an era of significant resource reductions, it becomes even more vital that its civilian employees are properly trained and educated to perform their functions effectively and efficiently. The Army must seek to develop the civilian workforce across the spectrum by making effective use of the three educational domains--operational, institutional, and self-development--while leveraging all available mediums to ensure maximum impact with minimum expenditure. This Strategic Research Paper (SRP) examines the policy behind workforce development, describes current Army workforce development, considers plans for the future, and offers recommendations for improvement.


Author: Colonel Andrew A. Olson

Published: September 2014

Since the end of the Cold War, the capacity of states to maintain legitimacy and control their populations has become increasingly important to international stability. In the globally connected world, this situation is increasingly important because failed or fragile states serve as a host for conditions which are favorable to trans-national organized crime, violent extremism, and insurgency, all of which are destabilizing. First experiences are always formative and the United States efforts with the United Nations in Somalia have profoundly shaped the humanitarian and peace operations of the future. When United States Marines hit the beaches of Mogadishu in 1992, it was not to destroy enemy forces ashore, but rather to defeat the effects of famine in the Horn of Africa. The decision to intervene by the United Nations in 1992 was a manifestation of the expanded scope and capacity of multi-lateral efforts to confront threats to international security and well-being.


Author: Colonel Mark E. Orwat

Published: September 2014

A key effort in developing Joint Force 2020 is to “pioneer new ways to combine and employ emergent capabilities such as cyber, Special Forces, and ISR” and “examine organizational and other force development changes to better leverage game-changing capabilities.” Individually, the emerging capabilities are maturing in capability, capacity, and integration into military operations. However, collectively, the emerging capabilities are not advancing with respect to each other. This strategic research paper draws from my personal experience working in the three emergent areas and includes a comprehensive review of visionary concepts such as Joint Force 2020, SOCOM 2020, and LandCyber 2018-2030. Major touch points exist between emerging capabilities in terms of interoperable technology, organizational integration, and combined effects that will enable self-synchronization among networked cyber, space, and Special Operations Forces in support of the Joint Force. This research establishes touch points that allow networked emerging capabilities to achieve decentralized, coordinated action and effects through the human domain, improving the agility and effectiveness of the Joint Force.


Author: Colonel Gregory H. Penfield

Published: September 2014

The Army’s formal adoption of mission command as its central philosophical approach to leadership and as a warfighting function is nearly four years old. Its basic elements – mission type orders executed within the commander’s intent to exploit the initiative while accepting prudent risk – are not exactly new or innovative ideas. Yet the Army continues to struggle with implementing mission command as its core principle for leadership and command, and the force seems to not quite understand where the Army is going regarding mission command.This paper will seek to answer two fundamental questions: whether mission command is really a new philosophy or just an reintroduction of existing doctrinal precepts, and what the Army is really trying to accomplish with mission command. This paper will review the current mission command construct and look at command in previous Army doctrine to answer the first question; describe what the Army is doing to implement mission command to date to answer the second question; and finally offer potential potential measures to institutionalize mission command as a core philosophy.


Author: Colonel William Byron Penland

Published: September 2014

Iran’s nuclear ambitions are rooted in the desire to be a self-sufficient nation that has regional and global respect and influence, can defend its people and interests, and can ensure the survival of the Islamic Republic. Although Iran claims to seek nuclear capability for energy production, its seeming efforts to develop a program that is oriented towards weapon production, coupled with actions to keep these efforts clandestine, drive the United States and its allies to believe that Iran is working towards manufacturing nuclear weapons. U.S. incentives and sanctions have done little in the last 12 years to halt Iranian efforts. This lack of progress demands the United States and its partners take a bolder approach towards negotiations with Iran by offering a path towards a “Grand Bargain” in which the United States would grant Iran full diplomatic and economic recognition in exchange for total compliance with international treaties regarding nuclear proliferation. Doing so is the best hope to prevent Iran from becoming the next nation with an atomic weapon.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Michael J. Perez

Published: September 2014

Adversary cyberspace capabilities threaten the United States military and national security interests across all levels of conflict. Despite these threats, within the United States military and senior civilian leadership there exists limited knowledge on cyberspace beyond rudimentary user-level understanding. This project serves as a primer to help fill the educational gap of strategic military leaders on the attributes and issues of cyberspace relevant to modern national security. It will accomplish this task by reviewing cyberspace’s evolution, the legal issues surrounding the application of international law of armed conflict, and the ways and means of conducting offensive and defensive cyberspace operations. The discussion will conclude by developing a framework based on the variables of attribution, attacker identity, target criticality, and attack severity to provide the strategic military leader with a conceptual model for development of a whole-of-government response to adversaries who threaten the United States through cyberspace.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Jonathan D. Price

Published: September 2014

This research explores a Hybrid Operational Reserve – reserve units woven into active units over time – as a means to increase readiness and operational capacity at a lower cost. It is predicated on an evolutionary organizational construct based on the previous 12 years of combat - avoiding future reductions in structure, readiness, and modernization. Potential annual Marine Corps manpower savings of $262 million are generated through the more efficient use of full-time support personnel and reducing post-deployment (dwell) active duty costs, while avoiding tiered readiness. The Hybrid Operational Reserve effectively implements 10 U.S.C. §12304b authority by translating force generation and unit life cycle models to involuntarily activate Reserve companies and squadron Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMA) during peacetime. Predictable operational utilization maintains the tactical “edge” of Reserve units and recapitalizes on prior Active Component (AC) experience. Reversibility of OEF/OIF structure is achieved through the retention of AC battalion-level headquarters and IMA augmentation at the regiment/group level.


Author: Colonel Kevin Julius Quarles

Published: September 2014

Complex catastrophes are capable of causing significant casualties and extensive infrastructure damage. In extreme cases, they can trigger cascading effects that could threaten national security. Over the last decade there have been significant improvements in disaster response planning and emergency communications. However, there is a gap in the communications capability between the personnel coordinating disaster response operations and the victims who need assistance. The public needs an alternative method of communications to request help when phone service is unavailable. If left unsolved, during complex catastrophes this gap could lead to preventable casualties and unnecessary damage. Many government, private and volunteer organizations already use geospatial information during disasters to build situational awareness. Our disaster preparedness plans and policies need to incorporate the public’s use of social media with embedded geospatial information as a tool to build situational awareness and provide the public with an alternate method of emergency communications.


Author: Colonel David G. Ray

Published: September 2014

The multi-state maritime dispute in the South China Sea is a complex geopolitical problem and if left unchecked, a potential instigator of change in the international order. The United States does not take an official position on territorial disputes, but has four interests in the region; peace and stability, respect for international law, freedom of navigation, and unimpeded movement of commerce. The competing interests, claims, and strategies of China and the Philippines are resulting in tensions that could lead to a broader loss of confidence in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), an inadvertent escalation to hostilities on the high seas, and/or incidents of deliberate military action to secure disputed territory. These all have the potential to threaten U.S. interests. By ratifying the UNCLOS, creating a Pacific maritime forum, and leading a regional maritime protection network, the United States can reduce the factors pulling the region toward the highest-risk scenarios. These strategic actions will not resolve the ongoing territorial disputes, but will help decrease tensions and actively protect U.S. interests in the South China Sea.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Matthew Reiley

Published: September 2014

The Arctic’s receding ice offers potentially great benefits to the U.S. resulting from access to Arctic natural resources and an expanded global commons. These economic opportunities however are not uncontested. Russia and other Arctic nations have parallel interests and have made resource claims under the auspices of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), to which the U.S. is not a signatory. This leaves the U.S. mute and on the sideline to influence the outcome of Arctic resource claims, particularly those of Russia who stands to gain the most if the U.S. is not engaged. In addition to securing resources, UNCLOS provides legal certainty for operations at sea that are vital to securing the global commons and assuring freedom of navigation. The U.S. should ratify UNCLOS as a critical component of policy to peacefully achieve U.S. interests while facing an assertive and regionally powerful Russia.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel John Howard Rochford II

Published: September 2014

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