Army War College Publication Repository      Total Publications 371


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Aaron D. Altwies

Published:

The National Security Strategy calls for the defeat, disruption, and dismantlement of al-Qa’ida and its affiliates. However, after 14 years, the goal to defeat al-Qa’ida seems unattainable. The goal should be changed from defeating al-Qa’ida to making them irrelevant. If the ends change, then the strategy must also change. Theorist Sir Julian Corbett’s ideas of command of the sea, dispute, and limited war align well with the new endstate. Using analogs between the Corbett of 1906 and his ideas applied contemporaneously, a maritime strategy develops as an option to degrade al-Qa’ida. Further, when maritime strategy concepts are expanded beyond the sea and military, then a much greater opportunity arises for strategic leaders to think about how to disrupt, dismantle, and make al-Qa’ida and their affiliates irrelevant. The United States should apply maritime theory ideas to the whole of government using all of the instruments of national power, making the strategy even more powerful.


Author: Colonel Matthew D. Anderson

Published:

Using the examples of the human domain and the seventh war fighting function this study demonstrates the utility of U.S. multilateral defense partnerships to support and achieve U.S. national security objectives. Specifically, this paper argues that for the U.S. military, multilateral military organizations such as the IADB serve to advance US defense policy interests in the region; establish and deepen mil-mil relationships through programs such as the Regionally Aligned Force; and leverage security cooperation to position the United States as the partner of choice for friends, allies, and fence sitters, while deterring adversaries.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Christopher S. Baril

Published:

In the wake of 9/11, strategic partnerships were further developed between interagency law enforcement authorities and the National Guard, particularly along the Southwest border. These partnerships enabled the National Guard to become a key contributor and supporter of federal law enforcement agencies who were charged with protecting the borders of the homeland. Operational requirements on the Southwest border have changed the size and scope of the National Guard presence, but not its effectiveness. Political leaders from the local to national level have voiced their continued support in recent years for the National Guard to continue its mission as a key enabler to interagency law enforcement in protecting the nation’s borders. Only time will tell if the current configuration of support will remain in place in an increasingly fiscally austere environment. The United States government must review and emplace long-term funding apparatuses to ensure enduring partnerships in an effort to protect the Southwest border, U.S. persons, and the United States.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Michael J. Best

Published:

There is concern among Army senior leaders that the equipment readiness information currently being portrayed is not communicating the true maintenance health of aircraft fleets or Combat Aviation Brigades. It is, therefore, important the Army take a harder look at aviation equipment readiness in ways which help better evaluate and articulate performance in order to secure resources to meet future demands. The process must include distinguishing equipment readiness rates by aircraft type and calculating aviation readiness standards, namely Fully Mission Capable Rates (FMC), on an annual basis for the each aircraft type. Furthermore, aircraft maintenance performance must be presented using more effective control charts so senior leaders can better understand and assess the true state of equipment readiness. These FMC standards should then remain the same for a unit regardless of the phase of the current or future Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) process. Finally, the Army should consider new alternative metrics to measure aircraft readiness that better describes aircraft fleet true availability.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Mark E. Blomme

Published:

Theory examining the purpose and motivations of war weds itself to human nature and obtains a degree of immutability. However, theory regarding the conduct of war, namely warfare, can more easily conflict with the changes brought by science and technology. Clausewitz provides a prophetic and lasting theory describing the tendencies and motivations that lead to war and limit its political aims, but his theory for the conduct of war has proven less enduring. His Napoleonic-era prescriptions maintained a powerful hold on the theory of warfare for nearly a century, but disruptive technologies, such as the gift of flight, eventually forced a reevaluation of theory and led to a rediscovery of sixth-century B.C theory attributed to Sun Tzu. Modern theorists like Julian Corbett, John Boyd, John Warden, and Shimon Naveh extended Sun Tzu’s concepts, perhaps unwittingly, and his theory continues to resonate within the twenty-first-century American theory of warfare. These theorists proved Sun Tzu remains relevant to the perpetually changing realm of warfare, while Clausewitz’s theory on war remains quintessential to the analysis and understanding of the purpose and motivations of war.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Joe Daniels Bookard

Published:

Since taking office, the Obama Administration has pursued a policy to expand its role in Asia by rebalancing diplomatic, military, and economic resources to the Asia-Pacific region. An important part of the rebalancing has been on Southeast Asia. In addition to the economic and strategic interests, the United States is also concerned with conflicts in the South China Sea surrounding Philippine-China territorial disputes. These concerns present significant security challenges for vital U.S. national interests in the Asia-Pacific, specifically in the Southeast Asia region. This writing raises a challenging question: how can the U.S. honor its treaty obligation to the Philippines without getting into an armed conflict with China in the Philippine-China territorial dispute in the South China Sea? The analysis will show, the U.S. can maintain regional security in the South China Sea without getting involved in three ways: by continuing its alliances and military-military aid with the Philippines, by investing in modernizing and training the Philippines Armed Forces, and by empowering the ASEAN as a collective security body. This policy option allows Southeast Asian states to resolve South China Sea territory and maritime disputes with China.


Author: Colonel James B. Botters

Published:

Twelve years of war, coupled with substantial Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding, allowed the Army to find materiel and personnel solutions to intelligence training and capability gaps. IWfF support to RAF builds upon these intelligence best practices and TTPs. Unfortunately, many of these solutions are cost prohibitive in the fiscally constrained environment and are now creating capabilities gaps that are unbeknownst to the senior leadership. Therefore, to meet the CSA’s specified tasks within the RAF concept, the IWfF must identify gaps created by this fiscally austere environment and prudently apply the resources needed to accomplish the mission. This paper uses the framework of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leader education, personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF) to assess these gaps which may impede the IWfF’s ability to effectively implement RAF across the Total Force.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Giles R. Boyce

Published:

This paper examines the roles and missions of the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) within the Asia-Pacific as part of the Department of Defense and U.S. government rebalance towards this important region. It briefly describes the growing importance of the region, the complex and dynamic geo-political environment and postulates a number of illustrated scenarios or vignettes to frame the strategic and operational context for likely USMC missions. Next, the paper assesses the capabilities and roles of the other services within existing concepts (Joint Operational Access Concept, Air-Sea Battle, and the Army’s Pacific Pathways concept) and divines the niche capability or “sweet spot” uniquely suitable for the USMC. The paper argues that the USMC should focus on the development and employment of company and battalion sized expeditionary units to meet the related likely contingencies while also focusing on developing a force generation model that assembles a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) for larger more deliberate forced entry operations as part of a larger joint task force. It concludes with recommendations on how to better focus USMC company and battalion force development efforts on USMC “sweet spot” capabilities.


Author: Colonel F. Wayne Brewster II

Published:

Landpower will continue to remain an integral part of the Joint Force to meet new 21st century challenges and contribute to protecting U.S. national interests. The future operational environment places a premium on agility and interoperability. The anticipated A2AD challenges require cross-domain synergy to achieve national objectives. Land forces play considerable roles in this environment due to their comparative advantage in shaping the operational environment through human interaction and facilitating access. Mission command is a critical enabler of the agility requirement to achieve this synergy and respond to a dynamic operational environment, and land forces have embraced mission command as a foundational tenet. There is a natural tendency to reduce land forces in the quest to reap a “peace dividend” after protracted wars. We must temper this impulse by clearly articulating the role, value, and associated risks of Landpower in the future operational environment.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Teresa L. Brininger

Published:

Army Medicine, to combat the rising cost of health care, the increasing rate of preventable diseases, and the diminishing pool of eligible military recruits due to health related issues, is transforming from a health care system to a System for Health. The focus is shifting from a disease-based model to a preventive model of care. Although Army Medicine is changing practices and implementing health-focused initiatives to facilitate this paradigm shift, barriers inherent in the organization remain and are hindering the transformation process. Institutionalizing this new paradigm requires eliminating the cultural, economic, and educational barriers by providing tools and appropriate resources, implementing methods for promoting healthy lifestyles, and leveraging education, research, and technology. Transforming Army Medicine from a health care system to a System for Health has the potential to positively influence Army Medicine, the Military Health System, and ultimately shape health care in the nation.


Author: Colonel Paul T. Brooks

Published:

The Asia-Pacific region is the most dynamic and challenging in the world because of its unique blend of economic opportunities, diverse political systems, and broad security challenges. This region includes a set of responsibilities, threats and opportunities for the U.S. unlike any other. This paper describes the U.S. strategy for the Asia Pacific region and how the nation communicates this strategy. It concludes by analyzing how the regional actors are receiving the strategy and suggests possible lessons for the strategic planner. Direct communication activities appear to be resourced adequately; however, financial assistance and support programs still appear to reflect pre-rebalance priorities. Regional reactions to the rebalance suggest a number of points: first, the U.S. must avoid activities that force partners to choose between the U.S. and China; second, the U.S. is no longer the most important economy in the region; third, nations are evaluating the rebalance within the context of the U.S. fiscal situation; finally, China’s “containment narrative” is reinforced by U.S. actions to deepen relations with treaty allies.


Author: Colonel Jacqueline D. Brown

Published:

The accelerated pace of the cyberspace evolution over the last 20 years has introduced a national as well as a global reliance on a manmade infrastructure for economic prosperity, military power, and societal communications all of which affect the United States' Strategic Culture. Cyberspace crosses state boundaries, globally connecting societies, critical infrastructures and commerce, thus enabling unprecedented freedom of communication and access to information and trade. There is now an insatiable appetite for convenience of communication with the ease of use and desire for global reach. This increasing demand creates an environment vulnerable to exploitation and attacks. While both the government and the private sector recognize the threats posed through cyberspace and the risk of doing nothing, the current U.S. strategic culture does not align well to affect required change to secure U.S. interests in cyberspace. To effectively develop and implement a holistic cyberspace strategy, one must understand the cyberspace evolution’s impact on the strategic culture. This paper will analyze the current U.S. strategic culture, the impact of the cyberspace evolution on the strategic culture and provide cyberspace security policy and strategy recommendations.


Author: Colonel Douglas Ray Campbell

Published:

The Army trains its leaders how to think, not what to think. Yet, the Army also puts limits on thinking such as intent within mission command. Leaders make choices and issue their own intent and orders, as they understand the commander's intent and orders. In addition, the Army puts moral limits in place to guide thought and behavior. Within these limits, choice would seem to be clear and simple. Yet, a leader with the freedom to think, judge, and act will likely view what is best differently than his boss. This paper offers Critical Choice as a means for leaders to choose what is Best. The Critical Choice process provides a "clear, rational, open-minded, and informed" way to choose Best. Best is an informed, reasoned choice a leader can live with.


Author: Colonel Christopher J. Cardoni

Published:

The long, bloody, and expensive conflicts in Vietnam beginning in 1946 with France and ending in 1975 with the North Vietnamese unification of the country, still have much to teach students of strategy and policy making. These conflicts not only provide military lessons learned, but also lessons on policy and strategy formulation in the complex world that was post World War II. This paper will provide a case study on French policy making, strategy, and experiences in Indochina, and how they subsequently shaped the American theater strategy in building South Vietnamese military capability.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Trent R. Carpenter

Published:

In order to effectively command and control (C2) joint air operations in a contested and degraded environment, the concept and principles of mission command must be instilled into the U.S. Air Force and joint C2 culture. To do this, the operational and tactical level commanders must build a vital foundation of trust. Operational level commanders must create a shared understanding of campaign objectives and accordingly provide well-defined, clear intent which guides tactical level commanders in exercising disciplined and educated initiative. Furthermore, the use of mission type orders will facilitate decentralized execution and initiative in conjunction with assumption and acceptance of prudent risk. It is also critical to develop and employ an effective C2 architecture to lead joint air operations through mission command. However, it is even more critical for commanders to develop and employ a philosophy that enables a vital culture of trust, without which, mission command and effective joint air operations cannot succeed.


Author: Colonel Phillip A. Chambers

Published:

The Army’s regionally aligned forces (RAF) concept is a viable approach to provide trained and ready forces to combatant commanders (CCDRs). This paper examines the impact of the RAF concept on the movement and maneuver warfighting function (WfF), specific to a brigade combat team (BCT). The evidence indicates that the RAF concept increases the demand for reconnaissance operations to meet corresponding information requirements. Further examination of the RAF concept and the current Army force generation (ARFORGEN) process suggests that the current system requires adjustment to support an Army-wide readiness management philosophy that prepares RAF-designated forces and maintains a higher level of base readiness across the force. The RAF concept expands the movement and maneuver WfF’s role in deterring conflict and shaping the operational environment. An increased exposure to a region will amplify expertise that will better enable maneuver forces to effectively conduct unified land operations.


Author: Colonel William J. Clark

Published:

The United States Army Reserve (USAR), like its active component and National Guard counterparts has responsibilities in the military’s mission of Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA). The USAR has capabilities in place to address these responsibilities, but the utilization of these assets is not optimal. This paper makes recommendations for better utilization of USAR resources within the military’s response to various DSCA related organizations. The current USAR manpower structure assigned to the Office of the Chief of Army Reserves (OCAR) and the Joint Task Force Civil Support (JTF-CS) designed to work DSCA issues is investigated. The plan to train to task with active duty services, National Guardsmen, and other federal and civil organizations is also addressed. Recommendations based on integration and training is presented to streamline the process from notification to implementation of USAR assets in response to a declared emergency.


Author: Colonel Mark A. Colbrook

Published:

Although the Department of Defense (DoD) has a critical need to be able to develop and train Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), it does not currently have the authority from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to access the airspace it needs to fully realize the potential of these assets. Each Service has distinct airspace requirements that relate to how they train and utilize UAS. Due to these differences there is not a “one-size-fits-all” approach that meets each Service’s needs. Each Service, in coordination with the DoD, FAA, and other government organizations as necessary, must develop the policies, procedures, training programs, and equipment to meet the requirements necessary to gain this access. UAS already offer capabilities that are vital to DoD missions. As technologies continue to mature it is extremely likely that additional missions will continue to migrate to unmanned platforms. It is essential to the long-term strategic interests of DoD to maximize unmanned capabilities and retain a technological advantage in this discipline over any potential adversaries. Access to the necessary airspace to develop, train, and operate UAS is essential to maintaining this advantage.


Author: Commander Anthony Michael Conley

Published:

Throughout history, mankind conducted conflicts or war as the ultimate mechanism to settle disagreements. The nature of war has been timeless, with conventional warfare evolving from “man vs. man” to “army vs. army or navy vs. navy.” Several significant technological advances occurred over time that changed the character of war; one of which was the development and employment of nuclear weapons. On August 6, 1945, a B-29 Bomber dropped “Little Boy,” a uranium based atomic bomb on Hiroshima, Japan. Three days later, another B-29 bomber dropped “Fat Man,” a plutonium based atomic bomb on Nagasaki, Japan. The estimated death toll from both bombings represented a small percentage of the total number of people killed in World War II, but the impacts of the bombings still linger today. This paper will examine the historical context of nuclear weapons and strategy, concept of nuclear deterrence, current U.S. policy, 21st century security concerns, and propose a nuclear strategy going forward. The proposed strategy will still focus on deterrence, but also takes into consideration the need to modernize our nuclear arsenal, resume testing, and increase international transparency for all nuclear states.


Author: Colonel Gary P. Corn

Published:

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force (SROE/SRUF) for U.S. Forces is the provides strategic guidance to the armed forces on the authority to use force during all military operations. The standing self-defense rules in the SROE for national, unit, and individual self-defense form the core of these use-of-force authorities. The SROE self-defense rules are built on a unitary jus ad bellum framework legally inapplicable below the level of national self-defense. Coupled with the pressures of sustained COIN operations, this misalignment of individual and unit self-defense authorities has led to a conflation of self-defense principles and offensive targeting authorities under the Law of Armed Conflict. In order to reverse this trend and realign individual and unit self-defense with governing legal frameworks, this paper recommends reconceptualizing self-defense through the lens of the public authority justification to better reflect the status of service members as state actors whose actions are subject to the domestic and international legal obligations of the state.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Ryan B. Craycraft

Published:

China's rise during the early 21st century is similar to Athens' rise preceding the Peloponnesian Wars. The depiction of China within U.S. strategic and popular culture will shape the debate about how the U.S. should wield its instruments of national power when dealing with China. This paper examines what bronze of China is being cast by Americans via elite political speeches, State and Defense Department policies, and official documents. It also examines the way that China is depicted in the outlets of U.S. popular culture, including high-subscription newspaper articles, political cartoons, and entertaining news programs. Ultimately, the battle of the narrative, or the socially constructed idea of the “other,” is important. If the portrayal of China is distorted, the caricature can lead to inappropriate, overly hostile, or narrow policy choices in the event of conflict or crisis.


Author: Captain David A. Crounse

Published:

In the event of conventional military attack or invasion by an adversary upon the United States, it is clearly recognized that the US Armed Forces, could legally respond swiftly and decisively to “protect and defend” the nation. However, in the instance of a cyber-attack upon a civilian target in the United States the military’s ability to respond is limited and its role is less clearly defined. The same holds true if the attack is directed against one of the sixteen sectors of US critical infrastructure (CI), such as transportation. In the case of a cyber attack conducted upon transportation CI, failing to prevent, mitigate or respond swiftly could have serious consequences for national and economic security. On the surface, DoD protection of transportation CI against cyber threats may seem to be a convenient solution to a growing problem. On the other hand, DoD involvement in the protection of privately owned infrastructure is wrought with many challenges that are borne out of the scope and nature of the cyber threat as well as the dynamics of the public-private relationship. This paper will explore the cyber threat to US transportation CI, challenges to DoD’s role and offer recommendations to improve DoD’s responsiveness.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel John M. Cushing

Published:

The United States Army is entering a period of challenging times with respect to budgetary constraints and, more specifically, the reduction of United States Army personnel. One would argue that in order to keep the military at the state of readiness needed to fight the limited wars of the 21st century the Army needs to find unique and creative ways to recruit and retain talent. Just as General Martin Dempsey stated, “We must get the people ‘right’” if we are looking to maintain and build the next generation of leaders to retain our reputation as a dominant Army in the world. This paper defines the strategic environment and identifies failures in our talent management process in the last twelve years of war that have caused gaps in critical knowledge, skills, and attributes essential for strategic leaders. This paper proposes a definition of talent management in the current strategic environment and provides recommendations in the areas of officer assignments, officer evaluation reports, and promotion boards.


Author: Colonel Kenneth L. Cypher

Published:

The March 2013 Director of National Intelligence Worldwide Threat Assessment ranked cyber threats as the number one threat to National Security. The Department of Defense is working towards addressing the national security threat from cyberspace nefarious actors but, DoD is lethargic due to entrenched thoughts and bureaucratic processes. This paper addresses entrenched thoughts of network centricity. Network operations are not cyberspace combat operations. There are two distinct separate operational communities in cyberspace. Department of Defense information network operations are combat support, sustainment, and cyberspace resiliency operations. Defensive and offensive cyberspace operations are combat operations. Each community must have a distinctly different focus but must be under on command authority to ensure integration to defend the seams from adversary exploitation.


Author: Colonel Barry E. Daniels, Jr.

Published:

Recent conflicts illustrate that war remains a contest of wills between human adversaries. If influencing an opponent's will remains decisive, then the Army must develop leaders who understand the human dimension of war and are capable of thinking strategically. Given that the Army is moving toward a system of regional alignment focused on preventing conflict by influencing allies and partners, the Army needs to develop leaders who can develop subordinate leaders more effectively, understand complexity, operate among disparate cultures, and communicate persuasively. The Army should take steps to train good leaders to be good leader developers, enhance senior leaders' opportunity to gain understanding of complexity, improve cross-cultural skills, and improve communication skills to ensure that the Army is led by leaders who understand how to properly apply strategic landpower in the future.


Author: Colonel Michael James Daniels

Published:

This paper examines American grand strategy in the post-Cold War era, both as a term of art and as a guiding principle for great power politics, to answer several questions: Is grand strategy still relevant and necessary, especially for a great power? Is there an “American way” of grand strategy, and if so, is it unique? Does the United States currently have a grand strategy? Finally, what are the current challenges in grand strategic development, and can the process be better led, informed, communicated, and executed? There is a need for a grand strategy, now and in the future. However, defining and executing grand strategy is problematic. Current requirements must be brought into balance with a vision for the future, as well as with competing domestic and international interests. A specific proposal for U.S. grand strategy lies outside the scope of this paper, though some suggestions are presented that may help modernize, streamline, and demystify the strategic development process. Lastly, national power and strategy models are presented to help visualize the current strategic calculus, and improve future efforts.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Stephen Ross Davis

Published:

The requirements generated from the past decade of war have resulted in leaders in the United States Army concerned less with the accountability of government property as more time was spent preparing for combat operations. With the current fiscal constrained environment, the Army must concern itself with accounting for property. It can no longer simply purchase additional items when shortages are identified as was done in the past. Strategically, property accountability impacts unit readiness. Unit readiness impacts the Army’s ability to provide the Combatant Commander with trained and ready forces. Given these challenges, the Army has launched a comprehensive campaign on property accountability. Although company commanders own the property in the Army, they alone cannot solve this issue. This paper argues that engaged leadership at all levels from squad leader to senior Army leaders is required to achieve success in the Army’s campaign on property accountability.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Timothy C. Davis

Published:

Regionally Aligned Forces are the ways that the Army accomplishes its ends of being “globally responsive and regionally engaged” with reduced means in forces, headquarters, and budgets. Achieving the Army Vision through the RAF concept requires stronger commitment in habitual alignment of headquarters, units, and individuals and holistic commitment by the joint and Army community in enabling corps and divisions to be a Joint Task Force (JTF)-Capable Headquarters. This paper explains the interconnection of the Joint Vision 2020, the Army Vision, and RAF concept to posture forces for the future; then examines the impact for the corps and division as JTFs. The paper explores the approach by CENTCOM with 1AD in Jordan and the development of the Pacific Pathways concept by USARPAC under the RAF concept. The Army must improve across Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel, and Facility (DOTMLPF) to truly regionally align and enable corps and divisions as JTFs to prevent, shape, and win.


Author: Colonel Robert A. Dawson

Published:

This research paper examines the impact of the United States Army’s Regional Alignment of Forces (RAF) Policy on the Army’s ability to generate trained and ready forces through the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) process, and impact on the six geographic combatant commands. Regional alignment of forces provides combatant commands with Army units prepared for employment across the range of military operations specific to a geographic region of the world. Maintaining the Army Force Generation process allows the Army to prioritize resources and manage readiness for Army operating units supporting regionally aligned and contingency missions. However, refining both the Regional Aligned Force and Army Force Generation policies allows the Army to better prepare and manage Army forces for combatant command employment. Twelve policy recommendations are provided to enhance Regionally Aligned Force and Army Force Generation policies within the doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership and education, personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF) construct.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Glenn A. Dean

Published:

The Network Integration Evaluation (NIE) is the centerpiece of current Army efforts for innovation in network capabilities and rapid acquisition processes, but it has been criticized for cost-effectiveness. This study questions the role of the NIE in Army experimentation and its relevance in rapid acquisition. It assesses the strategic context for military experimentation in general and the NIE specifically. It then examines the range of current military experimentation in policy and doctrine, and explores the concepts of divergent and convergent experimentation activities. Alternative rapid acquisition processes are defined and compared to the NIE’s Agile Process. The NIE is then assessed in the context of the range of experimental concepts and rapid acquisition processes to determine what roles it is performing and the extent to which those roles are effective. The study concludes with recommendations for revision of Army experimentation strategy and strategic communication about the NIE itself.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Michael P. Doherty

Published:

As the U.S. transitions from 13 years of war into its next “interwar” period, it is confronted with an increasingly complex geo-strategic environment, replete with the full spectrum of threats, and the harsh realities of the growing financial crisis. Amid this environment, the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance and Capstone Concept for Joint Operations provide the U.S. Armed Forces clear strategic guidance to drive future force development and preparation for Joint Force (JF) 2020. The purpose of this paper is to explore and grade the U.S. Army’s preparation for JF 2020 by examining how the strategic guidance has been translated into Army priorities, and by exploring three of the Army’s major new initiatives--Mission Command, Regionally Aligned Forces, and Pacific Pathways--to determine how they relate to the following framework questions: Are these initiatives aligned with the strategic guidance? Do they contribute to joint warfighting requirements or do they trend toward parochial efforts to justify resources? Finally, do they contribute to developing a Joint Force which can Prevent, Shape and Win, regardless of the threat, when called to do so?


Author: Colonel John Dorrian

Published:

There is a broad consensus supporting the importance of information as an element of national power, and that consensus has led to a tremendous outpouring of effort, time and money on “strategic communication.” The U.S. government and the U.S. Department of Defense have gone through a variety of initiatives and policy changes in the attempt to establish and maintain credibility and trust with stakeholders. This paper examines past communication cases to assess which concepts seem to advance communication objectives and which ones fail. Credibility, trust, systems understanding and effective civil military relations are required for effective public information programs. Perceptions of disinformation or lack of compliance with civilian control of the military inevitably yield poor results.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel David S. Eaglin

Published:

After years in the Middle East and Afghanistan, America formally asserted its renewed attention and commitment to Asia with the announcement of the U.S. Pacific rebalance in 2012. With this policy shift, the U.S. turned its focus squarely toward China whose rise challenges U.S. influence. After more than 200 years of contact, China stands today as neither enemy nor close ally of the United States. While China has long maintained a large Army, its recent economic boom has allowed it to significantly upgrade its airpower capabilities enabling power projection well beyond its borders. These improvements have stirred regional alarm and threaten the existing international order where the U.S. has long stood as the hegemonic leader. Historically, the phenomenon of rising powers challenging or surpassing the existing leading power has rarely ended peacefully. Thus, America must develop a strategy to counterbalance China's rising air arm in order to secure U.S. interests, reassure allies, and maintain regional stability.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Shawn R. Edwards

Published:

The integration of women in Maneuver Fires and Effects branches in the Army represents a promising change for the Army and the nation. Not only will this long overdue change allow the Army to align with social norms pertaining to equality and inclusion, it will also enhance Army readiness and increase creativity and innovation in combat arms units. However, continued resistance to this change effort does not bode well for the Army moving forward. As such, senior Army leaders must understand factors that underscore resistance and communicate the importance of this change effort through strong messages and behavior patterns to influence institutional beliefs. This research project provides a historical review of women in the Army with emphasis on patterns of institutional resistance towards women, analyzes the benefits of integrating women into combat arms units, and provides recommendations for senior Army leaders to consider as they seek to effectively integrate women in combat arms units.


Author: Commander Jeff Farlin

Published:

A nation’s power to impose its will and to achieve its national objectives emanates from its instruments of national power. Today, instruments of national power include diplomacy, information, military, and economy, collectively identified by the acronym DIME. A nation does not necessarily have to be superior in each element of the DIME to achieve its national goals and interests. It does, however, have to be adept in managing each element of national power synergistically in order to achieve its desired results. During the Southern Campaign of the American Revolution (1778-1781), the rebels were outmatched and out-resourced in every conceivable way compared to Great Britain’s global power, yet they still managed to defeat the British. The Americans succeeded by utilizing their instruments of national power more adeptly than the British. The British had an advantage regarding military and economic national powers, but failed to leverage those advantages into a successful campaign against the Americans. This misstep by the British allowed the Americans to protract the war long enough to leverage its advantages of diplomatic and information national powers that ultimately resulted in victory, independence, and the birth of a new nation.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel David C. Foley

Published:

Character development is the starting point to build prototypical leaders committed to the Army's enduring purpose and charter. As the Army envisions the Land Force of 2020, it must cultivate prototypical Army leaders to meet the indeterminate demands of the 21st Century. Within its current design and intended purpose, the Army leader development strategy lacks the approach necessary to develop professional prototypical leaders of character who are committed to the Army profession and strategic vision, and reflect institutional values. This paper surveys the Army's archetypical development model as an instrument for professional growth, analyzes the need for committed prototypical leaders of character, and offers prescriptive and descriptive recommendations to the Army's leader development strategy for senior leaders to consider as they continue to shape and influence leader character and institutional behavior. To meet the unique demands of the transnational security community, the Army must invest time, energy, and resources in character development across the institutional and operational domains of leadership.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Todd M. Fox

Published:

Adopting an APEX-like approach at the NSC level would be a significant step to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of American foreign policy. State, USAID, and Defense all face significant obstacles “to ensure that their individual plans are based on shared assessments of conditions and appropriately aligned to account for each other’s priorities and plans.” Although each organization shares a common interest to promote US national security, distinct cultures, processes, language, timelines, and personalities lead to very different approaches and priorities. Establishing a common planning process that is based on the APEX system but modified to account for organizational differences is the next step in improving synchronization of all of the elements of national power. A National Security Council integrated and a UCP-like plan approved by the President would better align national ways and means to achieve national end states and reduce the confusion or mixed messages sent to our allies, adversaries, and partners throughout the world.


Author: Colonel Mitchell H. Fridley

Published:

The European imperialism after WWI embodied in the Sykes-Picot agreement and exacerbated by the French mandate rule reinforced and made worse the geographical, social, religious and societal divisions within Syria and the Levant. In addition to laying the foundations for political and sectarian conflict seen today in the Levant, Sykes-Picot and the French mandate policies paved the way for the rise of the Baathist party and the Assad Regime. This paper starts with a look at the historical divisions in the Levant that existed during the Ottoman Empire, then focuses on the period of the Sykes-Picot negotiations and the French Mandate period. The author argues that the divisions imposed by the French during this period had profound and lasting effects on the region leading up to the 2011 uprisings against the Assad regime. In conclusion, this paper considers some forward-thinking conflict resolution ideas involving a remapping of the Middle East. This author does not agree that a ‘partition solution’ can be foist upon the region to solve the seemingly intractable regional sectarian problems orbiting around the Syrian civil war, but that eventual solution may be the only way to bring a modicum of lasting peace to the region.


Author: Colonel Kenneth S. Fu

Published:

China has cautioned that the military components of the United States rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region complicates the region’s security environment and believes U.S. actions are aimed directly at constraining China, ultimately harming its strategic interests. This paper examines the roots of this distrust and why U.S.-China military-to-military confidence building measures will be insufficient to overcome this distrust to improve the relationship between two militaries. Military-to-military relationship building efforts should instead focus more on developing crisis management and escalation control measures.


Author: Colonel Patrick L. Gaydon

Published:

On four occasions in the last two centuries, great powers have conducted military withdrawals out of Afghanistan. Each time, these powers left mechanisms in place that protected their national interests. Despite the perception that both the British and Soviets suffered disastrous defeats, each still retained enough leverage to attain some of the objectives for which they went to war in the first place. The US-led North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) coalition is poised to make the fifth such withdrawal by the end of 2014. Can it also achieve similar strategic objectives? Each of these four departures from Afghanistan occurred in a geopolitical environment of competition between great powers: the Great Game and the Cold War. External competition will surely continue to influence post-2014 Afghanistan, as multiple regional and world powers have national interests at stake. This paper examines the lessons from the four previous great power withdrawals, in the context of Afghanistan’s long-running, competitive geopolitical environment. It also considers which of the lessons remain applicable in the post-2014 regional geopolitical environment.


Author: Ms. Lisa D. Gilley

Published:

Is it time to give up on joint basing? The short answer is “no.” Department of Defense leaders have debated the need for “jointness” in military operations for decades, a debate that reached a decisive point with the enactment of the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986. In another step toward jointness, the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) law’s creation of 12 joint bases by consolidating 26 individual military single-service bases also sparked lively debate across the DoD. Adding a perplexing wrinkle in 2012, a Government Accountability Office report highlighted a lack of projected savings thus far from the BRAC joint bases, an outcome that has caused some military service chiefs to question whether joint basing should continue. Rather than viewing the lack of savings as proof of the joint basing concept’s failure, this paper will present a case for reframing the way the DoD views joint basing, moving perspectives from the tactical plain of infrastructure consolidation for administrative efficiencies based on geographic proximity, to a broader strategic framework based on dimensions and levels of jointness, and on opportunities for leveraging joint mission synergies that may ultimately lead to greater cost savings efficiencies.


Author: Colonel Lorri A. Golya

Published:

China’s rise and the uncertainty or fear that it inspires in the United States have caused politicians, military leaders, political analysts and even academicians to reference Thucydides who wrote about the Peloponnesian War. According to Thucydides, the rise of Athens and the fear it inspired in Sparta, made war inevitable. Modern historians and political analysts refer to this as the “Thucydides Trap,” the idea that a peaceful transition between a rising power and a ruling power is not possible. This paper will examine great power transitions by considering extant Power Transition Theory, the roles that fear, honor and interest play in the competition for power and finally, provide a cursory overview of China’s strategic culture (identity, political culture, and resiliency) which influences these motives, informs their national interests, and determines their degree of satisfaction with the international system. Armed with this understanding, policymakers in both China and the United States may indeed avoid the Thucydides trap.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Steven T. Greiner

Published:

Asymmetric threats, such as man-made and natural disasters, agroterrorism, disease pandemics, attacks on the food supply and bioterrorism constitute some of the most serious challenges to U.S. national security in the 21st century. The U.S. Army Veterinary Corps (VC) serves a critical role in protecting military personnel and working animal health as the Department of Defense Executive Agent for Veterinary Services. However, better alignment to the U.S. national security vision through employment of unique and untapped capabilities transforms the VC into a more potent means to counter these asymmetric threats. The VC accomplishes this by aligning its capabilities in a more formal way with other government agencies charged with countering these threats, expanding its role in stability operations support, and regionally aligning its deployable units. Furthermore, building its capacity through training and professional education while enhancing diplomacy through its leadership development ensure a valuable, relevant and reliable VC prepared to counter these 21st century asymmetric threats.


Author: Colonel Scott Halstead

Published:

American policies towards South Asia have been inconsistent at best and neglectful at worst since the 1947 partition of India. The United States should therefore seize the window of opportunity provided by the political events of 2013-2015 and invest in improved diplomatic, economic, and military relationships with both India and Pakistan. The relationship between these two countries will largely determine the security and prosperity of not only Asia, but also the entire world in the 21st Century. The United States should therefore rebalance towards India and Pakistan, not the greater Asia-Pacific region, to better protect core national interests and those of its allies and key partners. The United States and China should seek common ground to facilitate a more stable South Asia based upon economic interdependence, transparent diplomacy, and mutual security objectives.


Author: Colonel Frances A. Hardison

Published:

The Army screens potential enlisted recruits against a baseline series of standards to assess their moral suitability for military service. Additionally, the Army claims it inculcates its soldiers with the Army values, thereby instilling high standards of moral character and personal conduct. However, recent cases suggest there has been a breakdown of moral character within the enlisted ranks. Does the Army need a better set of tools and standards to assess the moral suitability of its enlisted soldiers? This SRP first examines the current enlistment standards and assessment methods to determine if they are adequate screening tools for assessing candidates’ moral suitability to serve in today’s Army. The SRP then considers other tools that could be useful in the accession process along with the Army’s Tailored Personality Assessment System. Next, it describes screening methods used in private industry. The SRP concludes with a recommendation for enhanced moral screening to ensure that our all-volunteer Army remains the best trained and most professional fighting force in the world.


Author: Colonel David Wayne Hardy

Published:

This paper uses the Lebanese civil war and conflict resolution theories to look at the possibility of achieving a negotiated settlement in Syria. Lebanon contained many similar features to the current Syrian conflict and provides a useful perspective of the possible trajectory of the Syrian conflict, the challenges associated with resolving an ethno-sectarian civil war, and the long-term implications for the region. The Syrian civil war will continue for years under current conditions, and its effects will reverberate in the region for decades. The international community plays an essential role in resolving the conflict and mitigating its effects in the region. Policy recommendations include strengthening opposition unity and capability, developing a regional framework that includes all states with interests in the conflict, and focusing additional effort on the violent extremist networks emerging in Syria.


Author: Colonel James H. Harrell II

Published:

Viewed in terms of the role of the state and the complexities of intervention, the record of the United States in the face of genocide is defensible; it is the result of a deliberate and rational balancing between the role of the state to serve its own people, its domestic and international functions, and the state’s moral obligations as a member of the global community. As horrible as genocide is, American decisions to stop genocide unfold in the context of navigating difficult decision terrain; they have not been and will not be fait accompli. The U.S. system is not ruthlessly effective in preventing genocide, but that is not its purpose. The American system is designed to ruthlessly pursue the national interests of the United States. The paper examines the moral and legal roles and responsibilities of the state, the nature of strategy, and the idea of the United States as a unique state, describes the crime of genocide and the complex and frangible international legal and moral framework surrounding it, the context, complexity, and calculus of U.S. policy and actions during three genocides, and offers suggestions to assist future strategic leaders confronting the crime.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Chad J. Hartman

Published:

This research project argues that the Air Force should modify its current doctrine to strike an adaptive balance between centralized and decentralized control of Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) operations. An examination of contemporary context reveals a need for ISR agility due to a complex and dynamic environment full of networked and ever-changing threats. A detailed analysis of ISR operations reveals an inherently decentralized network of platforms, sensors, communications, exploitation nodes and analytical centers the orchestration of which involves more than just efficiently managing low-density/high-demand aircraft. Recent ISR operations also reveal an initial paradigm shift from a centralized and bureaucratic theater collection management process to the mission command inspired delegation of ISR authorities. An investigation of modern enemies indicates a hybrid mix of regular and irregular adversaries that increasingly offer only ambiguous and fleeting targeting opportunities. The study concludes by recommending three proposals designed to optimize ISR operations: adaptive control; the use of mission-type orders to focus the ISR enterprise on theater lines of effort; and the creation of expeditionary ISR support teams.


Author: Colonel Patrick L. Harvey

Published:

The execution of current U.S. counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine is insufficient because spoilers, specifically those driven by ideology, have changed the face of insurgency and COIN warfare. The contemporary COIN environment is significantly different from the environment that colonial theorists Mao Tse-tung and David Galula experienced. While their theories and principles of insurgency and COIN identify the population as the center of gravity, contemporary spoilers have profoundly changed the operating environment. As the operating environment evolved, the doctrine also evolved. However, flaws in execution still exist for various reasons that are discussed in this paper. This research paper examines the evolution of U.S. COIN doctrine, reviews the theoretical foundation of current doctrine, offers an analysis of the environment through the lens of Mao Tse tung and David Galula compared to the contemporary environment, and identifies flaws in the application of current doctrine. Finally, recommendations are offered to diminish the impact spoilers have in the future COIN campaigns. It is argued that the current approach to waging COIN must be restructured in favor of more narrowly focused objectives.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Richard Hawkins

Published:

America’s ability to attain its objectives in an environment shifting to a multi-polar reality has never been more complex. Global influence remains ever crucial for executing our foreign policy, engaging crises, maintaining strategic legitimacy and defending our interests. At the core of these abilities, two vital instruments of national power will be of increasing importance: economic resilience and the capability to project military power decisively in the 21st Century strategic environment. Reliance on an infrastructure system in rapid decline, namely our domestic roadways, hampers our competitive edge in both arenas and dramatically reduces navigable options for protecting our interests. To mitigate this growing risk, investment in our highways and funding reform is urgently required to stem the potential for losing relevance in global affairs.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Thomas C. Hawn

Published:

Highly empowered individuals and non-state groups and expanded access to lethal technologies shape the strategic environment of 2035. These trends, combined with a perception that the United States is a less willing and financially capable global security guarantor, may create conditions where non-state actors may choose to use violence to achieve ends counter to U.S. interests. This project identifies and assesses a strategy the United States may use to deter violent non-state actors. This analysis concludes that a cumulative deterrence strategy that combines denial and punitive concepts may deter violent non-state actors within certain limitations. Denial concepts alone are insufficient to deter all violence and requisite punitive measures are only acceptable against groups that pose significant risk to survival or vital U.S. interests. Collective-actor concepts may deter regional threats through the actions of regional partners and enable the United States to influence the behavior of groups that threaten peripheral interests. This strategy may reduce U.S. control over regional issues, but increased reliance on international partners will ultimately increase the ability of the United States to deter threats to vital and survival interests.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Gregory P. Haynes

Published:

The civil war in Syria is well into its third year with no end in sight. There is a very real possibility of the conflict spreading beyond Syria’s borders to engulf the entire region in a catastrophic war. Due to the chaotic and externally influenced nature of the situation, a diplomatic solution to the crisis in the near term appears to be highly unlikely. Moreover, the situation indicates that military intervention would likely require a sustained effort of some kind to have a serious chance at achieving suitable results toward any kind of acceptable resolution and, in the effort, preserving overall U.S. credibility. Yet the intensity of U.S. interests or an overall plan for employment of U.S. military force to achieve credible ends that serve those interests has not been effectively communicated to the American public. In the current U.S. environment of declining defense spending, economic viability concerns, and overall popular strategic skepticism, a significant strategic communication effort and a potential fundamental re-assessment of global priorities could well be necessary to achieve and/or sustain both feasibility and acceptability for the intensity and duration of any suitable military option chosen, even for protracted stand-off operations.


Author: Colonel Anthony J. Healey

Published:

Army leaders are considering a regional alignment of U.S. military forces to support the Geographic Combatant Commanders in their conduct of theater operations. This SRP assesses the viability of the Chief of Staff of the Army General Raymond Odierno’s new concept of Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF). It focuses on the single Warfighting of Protection, using the Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel, and Facility (DOTMLPF) problem solving construct as an analytical tool. It concludes with recommendations to ensure the RAF is employed with adequate Protection.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Bradley A. Heston

Published:

The end of major combat operations in Afghanistan in 2014 will bring the United States to a crossroads. Discretionary budget cuts affecting U.S. government interagency (IA) partners, especially the Department of Defense, could threaten the U.S.'s ability to effectively conduct global steady state operations. This, coupled with an increasingly volatile international strategic environment, can threaten regional stability and embolden the U.S.'s adversaries. Meeting these challenges requires the U.S. to leverage the capabilities of all Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational (JIIM) partners to effectively conduct steady state operations in support of U.S. interests. This paper describes the current state of IA and JIIM integration at the national, regional, and Embassy country team level and identifies opportunities to improve IA coordination and planning mechanisms. Addressing these opportunities calls for changing IA coordination mechanisms at the National Security Council and agency level, improving regional coordination between the geographic combatant commands and Department of State and USAID regional bureaus, and creating efficiencies for partnering with IA and multinational partners at the country level.


Author: Colonel Donn H. Hill

Published:

Total War is destruction, horror and loss at the greatest scale imaginable short of the Apocalypse. Historically, Total Wars have ended in a clearly defined victory for one side with a resolution of the issues that caused the war in the first place. Total Wars generally result in a lasting peace between the belligerents. Total War has not been practiced since the end of World War II. Aversion to Total War is attributed to the revulsion at the destruction, horror and loss that Total War entails, despite its decisiveness. The countless limited wars that have been waged since 1945 have brought about varied results, frequently with no real resolution to the conflict but merely a temporary halt in the fighting that is picked up at a later date. The destruction, horror and loss are significantly less in the short term, but drawn out for much longer with less well defined results. This paper argues that the means for waging Total War must be maintained in order to deter it and, if deterrence fails, to be able to win it.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel John D. Hixson

Published:

The Army finds itself at a critical point in its implementation of a mission command culture. Recent post-conflict history demonstrates tendencies towards centralization. While there are some differences in context, the anticipated future environment for the Army bears many similarities to its recent post-conflict past. Army senior leaders experienced the difficult days of “zero defect” command climates, reductions in end strength, and reduced promotion rates. Conversely, based on their experiences in combat over the last decade, the Army’s junior leaders have both mission command experience and an expectation of empowerment from their leadership. To increase the chances of successful implementation of a mission command culture, the Army should utilize Schein’s cultural embedding mechanisms. Specific recommendations include: consistent senior leader focus on mission command, senior leader role modeling mission command, rewarding positive examples of mission command, and adjusting the Officer Evaluation Report to ensure the Army promotes the right leaders. The implementation of a mission command culture will only occur when senior leaders overtly embrace and participate in the process.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Mark Alan Holler

Published:

The U.S. Army’s Patriot force is a national strategic asset vital to stability in volatile regions of the world. Patriot deployment to foreign soil sends a strong message of commitment and resolve to protect U.S. national interests. Recently, over one-third of the contingency Patriot force has been committed to enduring Theater Missile Defense (TMD) missions in USCENTCOM and USEUCOM. This level of commitment is unsustainable. The current level of rotational deployments threatens readiness and the success of contingencies which require short-notice Patriot deployment to ensure Joint Operational Access. Additionally, Patriot force organization and rotational schedule do not facilitate unity of command. The Army must enact solutions that will enable the Patriot force to simultaneously deter aggression, ensure a high state of readiness, provide an available pool sufficient to meet short-notice contingency requirements, and ensure unity of command throughout all phases of Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN).


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Arturo J. Horton

Published:

Mission command is the philosophy of command that Army commanders and leaders must use to lead Soldiers and units in the 21st Century. While first conceptually introduced in 1982 with the publication of Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, the Army did not officially adopt the evolved doctrinal term and concept of mission command until 2003 with the publication of FM 6-0, Mission Command. While mission command has been integrated into its doctrine, the Army still has yet to institutionalize it. The Army has not yet fully integrated mission command into its culture, fostered unit climates that engender it, incorporated it into its training methodologies, developed personnel management systems that reward it, and employed it consistently in all environments. These challenges result from the Army’s inability to create major change and transform over the past 11 years, as well as its rooted culture, organizational climates, tiered structure, bureaucratic processes, and dated training and personnel management systems. This paper describes this latest evolution of mission command, explains why challenges to its institutionalization exist, and proposes solutions to Army senior leaders as to what should be done to achieve institutionalization.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Donald W. Hurst III

Published:

Today’s fiscally constrained and complex threat environment requires the Department of Defense (DoD) to take a more active role in managing the Defense Industrial Base (DIB). Otherwise, DoD risks the loss of core competencies essential to U.S. National Security. In order to re-shape the DIB to support DoD’s twenty-first century requirements, U.S. policy makers must provide strategic guidance and direction. This guidance should begin with identification of the core competencies required to accomplish the mission set needed to support the National Military Strategy. Once these requirements are determined, the DIB must be assessed to identify capability gaps and vulnerabilities. This assessment will inform the development of an integrated long-term strategy designed to align the DIB’s efforts with the National Security Strategy, to manage the DIB collaboratively during an economic down-turn, and to reform the current regulatory regime in order to leverage the benefits of globalization. A comprehensive restructuring of the DIB promises to be a lengthy and complex process. This SRP identifies the challenges and suggests a methodology to prevent the atrophy of the DIB-a strategic asset essential to U.S. National Security for over sixty years.


Author: Mr. Jerome Jastrab

Published:

When conducting alliance or coalition operations, every nation sees interoperability as a desired force multiplier which enables economy of effort. Interoperability is also seen as a means to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of military and interagency operations in pursuit of national interests. However, there is not a common definition and understanding of the word itself, and there are many challenges. Additionally, interoperability occurs at the strategic, operational, and tactical level and covers the technical, doctrinal and human dimensions. Considering this multi-dimensional scope and the temporal nature of gains, a complete and absolute state of interoperability is not achievable. Therefore, in an environment of constrained resources, the Department of Defense must reconsider its approach. This paper recommends Department of Defense adopt an integrated team approach to interoperability and prioritize its efforts and resources on US allies and friendly nations with shared national interests. Subsequently, key staff leads and combatant commanders must play a much greater role in determining interoperability goals and objectives, and optimizing the results for the resources invested.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Nicole S. Jones

Published:

In today's global environment States are increasingly reliant on cyberspace for everything from banking services to infrastructure management. While this environment provides many benefits, reliance on digital systems also leaves us vulnerable. Malicious actions in cyberspace raise multiple legal and ethical questions for States wishing to respond to, or prevent, such actions. The Just War Framework provides an organized way to determine whether the reasons for going to war and the conduct of the war itself are morally justified; however, the international community has not yet adapted laws and international norms to cyberspace. Many questions remain regarding what actions rise to the threshold of armed attack, when a State has an inherent right to self-defense, and how to approach the problem of attribution for cyber attacks. The international community is seeking to clarify norms, most notably through NATO's Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, which published the Tallinn Manual in 2013. The United States must continue to participate in these and other forums and continue to partner with like-minded actors who share our goals of an open and secure cyberspace.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Steven Kyle Jones

Published:

The Army faces a significant challenge – how to best apply strategic landpower? The Army’s Irregular Warfare Fusion Center posits that strategic landpower should “shape conditions in the operational environment that influence unified action partners and deter adversaries in order to provide our country with an unsurpassed capability across the range of military operations.” Is the way ahead to define a new domain of conflict? On the other hand, is the Army better served to look inward and identify an organizational change to distribute skills across its forces to influence and shape the environment, to realign the staff to define/plan/assess the effects, or possibly create a new warfighting function to achieve the effects of influencing and shaping operations?


Author: Mister Benjamin D Kauffeld

Published:

The United States Department of Defense and United States Agency for International Development have interacted for 50 years to advance national security interests. With origins in the Marshall Plan, and through joint efforts in the Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan wars, the two have developed policies, liaison systems, and joint programming to advance practical coordination. After closely-combined defense, diplomatic and developmental (3D) efforts, USAID and DOD have never appreciated each other’s capabilities better. Despite this, significant challenges exist that impede sustained coordination, including resource imbalances, conceptual gaps, and personality-based rather than institutional relationships. As war efforts conclude, is a window of time closing on development-military coordination? What are the implications for unity of effort between military and development actors? This report analyses the history, policies, coordination structures, and experiences of USAID and DOD interaction; identifies trends and challenges; and recommends continued interagency engagement, particularly through joint planning, field programming and broader staff exchanges.


Author: Colonel Alan Kellogg

Published:

Women’s performance in Iraq and Afghanistan over the last 12 years showcased their extraordinary abilities and reinforced the belief that women are qualified to join combat arms specialties. As a result, on January 24, 2013, the Department of Defense (DoD) removed ground combat restrictions for women thereby removing some of the barriers for increased opportunities. Research suggests that integrating women into previously closed specialties can improve team performance and indicates that successful integration depends on the Army’s ability to plan and execute a comprehensive strategy for implementing change in organizations. Therefore, this paper examines the evolving role of women in the Army and acknowledges several concerns and benefits about integrating women into combat arms specialties. John Kotter’s eight step process for leading change in organizations is used to examine and offer recommendations about how the Army should implement DOD’s directive requiring women be integrated into combat specialties by 2016.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Carl D. Kelly, Jr.

Published:

As America winds down combat operations in Afghanistan and the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific occurs what else is going to draw the energies and attentions of America and DoD in the coming years? I submit that the greatest threat to America’s interests in the future will not be traditional nation state aggressors, but rather the growth in the number of weak, failing or failed states. How and why do countries regardless of their form of government collapse into chaos which breeds lawlessness, violence and regional instability and what can America do to counter these events and safeguard our interests? This paper proposes that Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCCs) and the interagency partners (IA) should consider using Village Stability Operations (VSO) as both a WAY and a MEANS that is cost efficient and has a small footprint to promote regional stability goals (ENDs).


Author: Mr. David Kissling

Published:

As the U.S. rebalances to the Asia-Pacific, the South China Sea (SCS) will become increasingly important to U.S. national interests. How the U.S. employs its vast national power in the SCS will have longstanding consequences for the U.S. and the rest of the world. In particular, employment of U.S. military power in the region serves numerous necessary functions. It ensures freedom of navigation, reinforces U.S. treaty commitments, demonstrates U.S. resolve, and builds familiarity with China in order to prevent miscalculation and improve safety at sea. This employment of U.S. military power carries with it significant risks as well as opportunities. While military power is an important component of U.S. strategy in the SCS, it should not be the U.S.’s primary mechanism for advancing U.S. policy at the expense of other available instruments. It is crucial for U.S. military influence to be employed in synchronization with other elements of power in order to best achieve U.S. strategic objectives.


Author: Colonel Jeffrey A. Klein

Published:

This paper posits that the South China Sea (SCS) maritime dispute between an increasingly coercive China and the four Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) claimants has reached a tipping point. First, ASEAN appears as unified as ever with its core states of Indonesia, Thailand, and Singapore wedded with its most vocal SCS claimants of Vietnam and the Philippines in pressing for a quick conclusion to the problem. Second, China has demonstrated an increased willingness to engage with ASEAN on the topic, departing from its usual demands for bilateral talks, in order to better relations with the bloc. Finally, a reasoned U.S. policy is providing resilience to ASEAN through a whole-of-government effort. These conditions offer tremendous opportunity for U.S. military support to efforts designed to strengthen ASEAN’s position vis-à-vis China. These military approaches include: active support to the establishment of a effective ASEAN Political Security Community; creation of opportunities for ASEAN to proselytize their views on a peaceful, multilateral solution; and, direct engagement with China and its military in order to influence its views on what constitutes an acceptable solution addressing its interests.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Charles H. Koehler III

Published:

In 2012, the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) established the Soldier for Life program and charged it with enabling Army, governmental, and community efforts to improve soldier transition into the civilian world. A subordinate component of this effort is the CSA’s vision of a lifelong “Soldier” mindset soldiers will carry with them to assist them in civilian success. This Strategy Research Project posits that a deeper concept of soldier identity is a foundational requirement inextricably linked to the profession of arms and trust inside and outside the Army. This identity must be established first in order to build trust in the institution, narrow military-civilian social gaps, and improve integration of transitioning soldiers into communities. The Soldier for Life program is best postured to champion this endeavor. This project provides a roadmap that logically advances Soldier for Life efforts towards an enduring and valued Army capability that instills soldier identity, builds trust, and compliments both the profession of arms and soldier transition.


Author: Dr. Peter G. Laky

Published:

The evolving Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) environment facing U.S. military power is a rational evolution of the characteristics of war. A2/AD strategies are designed to deny the U.S. and its allies permissive access and operating environments to project military power. China is developing A2/AD capabilities intended to deny opponents the ability to interfere with its own regional power projection. Future conflict with China would likely be limited war characterized by mutual denial of the global commons in maritime, space and cyber and domains and the mutual ability to strike and inflict hurt. Land forces with counter-A2/AD capabilities can exert power across all conflict domains asymmetric to China’s evolving platform-focused A2/AD threats to strategic effect and can serve as a powerful component of the military support to U.S. strategy in this region.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Kevin Lambert

Published:

The rescission of the 1994 Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule for women announced by Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey on 24 January, 2013 represents a promising change that will better align the Army with the society it serves and enhance the overall performance of combat arms units. In order to fully capitalize on this positive change, leaders at every level must challenge cultural resistance to women serving in previously all male Maneuver, Fires, and Effects (MFE) career fields at the brigade level and below. Many of these cultural impediments are contained in messages that oppose this change effort and have primarily dominated pre-execution dialogue, and thereby risk sabotaging the implementation process by marginalizing potential positive outcomes. Therefore, senior leaders must change cultural beliefs and assumptions by acknowledging the positive aspects of this change effort, while marginalizing negative sentiments. In doing so, subordinate leaders and Soldiers will be empowered to reinforce new assumptions and beliefs observed in senior leaders.


Author: Colonel Michael James Lawrence

Published:

After 13 years of fighting two counter-insurgency wars, the United States is entering another interwar period, and its Army must now justify its value and relevance at a time when the “biggest threat to U.S. national security” appears to be a run-away budget deficit. This Strategic Research Paper first identifies those lessons learned during previous interwar periods that are useful to Army leaders of today as they contemplate transformation in the 21st century. It then compares different arguments for how the emerging Army of the 2020’s should re-organize. This paper advocates for a consolidation of existing army structure, a reorganization of its capabilities, and a transformation of its role in the joint force supporting U.S. national security interests. In sum, it offers a plan for best managing the Army’s restructuring to a smaller, yet lethal, force while ensuring relevancy to the security environment of this interwar period and meeting the goals outlined in the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review. In the end, it will advocate for a 380K army that is optimized on the “left end” of conflict while preserving “at-risk” armor capability and a strategic vision characterized by a pivot to everywhere the rest of the Joint Force is not.


Author: Commander Bryan H. Leese

Published:

This paper examines the role of the intelligence staff in the development of the commander's intelligence requirements during the coalition crisis operations planning process. NATO's Operation Unified Protector (OUP) is a case study on intelligence staff's performance in a coalition environment. During OUP, NATO was unable to apply, in a timely manner, its doctrine to intelligence staff support of planning resulting in the desynchronization of intelligence with planning and poor intelligence staff alignment, up and down echelons. Many point blame for poor integration of intelligence at the commander, yet the intelligence organizations themselves must accept culpability as well. Coalition warfare is the character of conflict and the U.S. can improve intelligence support. The U.S. and NATO must use organizational change principles to improve doctrine, the selection of personnel assigned to intelligence staff positions, the training of intelligence personnel, and staff integration exercises. Reinforcement of these changes requires improved staff organization, design, and procedures. Intelligence staffs must lead operational planning teams and use Prioritized Intelligence Requirements (PIRs) as synchronization lynchpins.


Author: Colonel Mark S. Levine

Published:

Over twelve years of warfare resulted in significant increases in manned and unmanned Army Aerial Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (AISR) capabilities. Leveraging these increased capabilities to meet national demands during an era of fiscal constraints warrants an expansion of AISR roles in Mission Command, Joint Fires, Defense Support of Civil Authorities, Homeland Security, and Building Partner Capacity. Mission command recommendations include classification policy reviews and leader development and engagement. Joint Fires recommendations include using AISR for terminal guidance of munitions, strike coordination, and munitions delivery. Increasing AISR roles in homeland missions strengthens public safety and inter-agency coordination. Sharing AISR with partners is a cost effective option to increase ISR capability to combatant commanders. Expanding AISR roles is an expeditionary and fiscally responsible means to support national strategy and is a catalyst for intergovernmental and multi-national cooperation in a fiscally constrained environment.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel David Lineback

Published:

Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the nation demanded answers. What did we know? What did we miss? Could we have prevented the attacks? The 9/11 Commission determined that the attacks might have been prevented had the Intelligence Community (IC) connected the dots. The commission recommended reforms to integrate the IC and improve information sharing. The resulting Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) was heralded as the most significant reform of the nation’s IC since the National Security Act of 1947. Nearly a decade since the IRTPA’s passage, critics claim the IC remains fundamentally unreformed. Using an organizational analysis tool known as the McKinsey 7-S Model, this paper explains why reform has not been achieved. The model analyzes the alignment of seven key organizational elements—strategy, structure, systems, staffing, skills, style, and shared values—to evaluate the IC’s effectiveness. Using this analysis, this paper offers 12 recommendations to improve the IC’s alignment and integrate it into an effective enterprise capable of meeting 21st-century challenges in a volatile, uncertain, complex, ambiguous environment.


Author: Colonel Michael J. Loos

Published:

The mission appears simple: make the Army smaller after more than a decade of continued conflict, and prepare the Army and its leaders for contemporary war. Yet, while the Army has started laying out plans to rapidly reduce force structure, changes affect more than buildings, bases, and equipment. The human enterprise and specifically the Army’s leaders are a critical resource that must also undergo change. The Army has been in this position before and its actions during the post Vietnam and Gulf Wars are two examples from which the Army could glean valuable leader development lessons that will aid in keeping the Army ready. This research project examines leader development actions and initiatives that proved decisive in previous eras of fiscal constraint, and provides recommendations for senior Army leaders to consider as they seek to develop competent and committed leaders of character, and maintain the Army’s future competitive advantage.


Author: Commander Gregory H. Magee, Jr.

Published:

Creating sustainable commercial fisheries in the Asia-Pacific is crucial to regional stability and protecting U.S. interests. This requires enforcement mechanisms to protect the fisheries. As part of the U.S. rebalance to the Asia-Pacific, supporting regional efforts to improve fisheries enforcement not only protects fish stocks, but serves to increase regional stability and provides a means to engage nations that don’t normally work with the U.S.. The U.S. Coast Guard is the best agency to lead this initiative with considerable expertise in fisheries enforcement in the U.S. and through their leadership role in international engagement. Ways to improve fisheries enforcement include expanding regional forums, utilizing DOD assets for fisheries patrols and working to expand regional partners’ law enforcement capacity. Through these efforts, the U.S. will protect regional fisheries, create a means of engagement, and develop multimissioned forces capable of missions like search and rescue, combatting transnational crime, and humanitarian assistance.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Rogelio Maldonado

Published:

This monograph examines the investment the United States has made into the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program. The paper will analyze the potential long term effects the procurement of this aircraft will have on the United States’ ability to effectively implement its military power in an effort to act in its own national interests. A series of recommendations that includes the curtailment of the program, investment in viable commercial-off-the-shelf alternatives, and re-initiation of the Joint Capabilities Integration Development System (JCIDS) capability gap analysis process will be advanced. This work will suggest the path that senior government leaders should take in regards to this program in an effort to mitigate the shortfalls this aircraft’s acquisition has generated.


Author: Chaplain (Colonel) Timothy S. Mallard

Published:

What is the cost to a leader, both personally and professionally, in exercising a calling of strategic moral leadership to one's nation or to the world? This has profound implications for any military force, an institution of the state that U.S. Army Chaplains contend is subject to the rule of God, allowing Soldiers and Families who serve in it to be one with another in God while serving an institution dedicated to war. Understanding the process of strategic moral leader development can aid the Army in developing moral leaders in support of landpower across the career spectrum. The life and witness of Pastor Dietrich Bonhoeffer provide an excellent case study for this task. His move from trained academic and spiritual leader to active conspirator and subversive with fellow Abwehr participants against the Third Reich will be the focus of this project. We will conclude by delineating how the costly process of exercising strategic spiritual leadership can be prepared for, but still requires extensive moral courage to enact, both privately and publicly.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Cynthia Ann Matuskevich

Published:

The U.S. Army’s Training and Doctrine Command’s Cultural Understanding and Language Proficiency (CULP) program for Cadets was created to achieve the objectives of the Army Culture and Foreign Language Strategy -- to produce officers who possess language and cultural skills. Program execution fulfils security cooperation objectives of Combatant Commands and Embassy Country Teams. Studies have shown the direct benefits CULP has had on developing cultural insights into foreign cultures but has overlooked and under-assessed the subsequent development of cultural insights into the inter-agency process of the 3Ds (Diplomacy, Development and Defense). This paper suggests that the Army needs to review its current Officer Professional Military Education and develop specific education, training, and policies targeted at developing joint, interagency, inter-governmental and multi-national (JIIM) competence earlier in an officer’s career. It discusses the potential of adding new objectives to the CULP program focused on JIIM competency development, potential opposition, and makes final recommendations.


Author: Colonel Eric M. McFadden

Published:

This paper proposes a threat-based approach to utilizing the Critical Factors Analysis as a tool to see threat networks and systems in order to facilitate the synchronization of U.S. whole-of-government efforts as part the development of the Integrated Country Strategy at the Country Team level. Furthermore, it applies the model to Nigeria’s internal security threats, using the analysis of the terrorist group Boko Haram in northern Nigeria as an example. Based on this analysis and application an integral tool for the development the Integrated Country Strategy facilitating a whole-of-government synchronization at the country level is proposed.


Author: Colonel Fritzgerald F. McNair

Published:

National infrastructure provides daily critical functions across diverse and complex sectors of a privately owned industrial base. Over the last decade, cyber threats against critical U.S. infrastructure have increased significantly. Presidential directives, legislative proposals, and GAO assessments all indicate that increased information sharing within public-private partnerships is integral to U.S. efforts in Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP).


Author: Mr. William H. McQuail

Published:

The Department of Defense (DoD) faces extraordinary fiscal challenges. The Army made deep budget reductions to meet sequestration caps and those measures could be re-imposed in 2016. However, given results of several Lean Six Sigma projects in the U.S. Army-Europe, it proved possible to find significant savings in military pay entitlements which could lead to substantial savings elsewhere. Initiatives projected millions of dollars in savings over five years from efficiencies of several entitlements. Additionally, improving the accuracy of military pay entitlements contributes to the Army’s audit readiness, a Congressionally imposed DoD mandate for 2017. Replication of these projects elsewhere in the Army, unfortunately, has not occurred. Savings resulted from successful financial management organizational transformation, and the Army should use those lessons as it prepares to implement significant force structure changes. This paper explores why efficiencies did not spread throughout the service, what steps the Army should take to achieve benefits in other commands, and encourages the Army to assist other services with the replication of these projects to realize savings throughout DoD.


Author: Colonel David E. Mendelson

Published:

This paper critically analyzes and reviews many of the polarizing aspects of the USC/sexual assault debate in the armed services. Through a review of the statistical underpinnings, and an assessment of the proposed resolutions to the problem, this paper tries to widen the aperture of the debate and provide a more balanced picture of the problem. The ultimate aim of this paper is to provide the current, and purportedly objective, state of the issue in order to better inform the public and any pending or proposed resolution(s). Without an open discussion, resolutions may only be aimed at solving the perceived, rather than the actual, problems.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey A. Merenkov

Published:

Senior leader misconduct in the U.S. Army erodes trust critical to inculcation of Mission Command and endangers its ability to act as a profession. I assert that the U.S. Army underestimates the impact of leader misconduct on internal trust in the force and external trust of the institution. In light of these challenges, the U.S. Army should conduct a psychological assessment and counseling at the Pre-Command Course for lieutenant colonels and colonels, to identify leaders at risk for future misconduct, including toxic leader behaviors. Leaders identified without prejudice, as “at risk,” would be counseled and assisted by an U.S. Army psychologist to identify mitigating measures to reduce chances of future misconduct. Reducing levels of leader misconduct would strengthen trust internally, within the U.S. Army, and externally, with civilian leaders, and the American public. As the U.S. Army navigates an era characterized by reduced budgets and evolving roles, the foundation of trust will be vital to the implementation of Mission Command and maintaining the U.S. Army as a profession. The U.S. Army would be able to do so only if it restores the confidence and trust within the force, with civilian leadership, and the American public.


Author: Colonel Patrick R. Michaelis

Published:

The purpose of this paper is to examine current theoretical models that help inform the Beltway strategist to “understand” the unique nature of the Beltway as an area of responsibility (AOR), and from those theoretical models propose a “framework” that creates context in the mind of the Beltway strategist and a start point for developing political judgment and awareness. To the neophyte, the myriad of influences to decision making and strategy within the Beltway AOR seem an imponderable act to decipher. The policy, process (bureaucracy), politics, and personality (4-Ps) model, emphasizing a framework relationship between the 4-Ps; the twin forcing functions of time and interests; and the lens of strategy as a function of priorities, resources, and risk, give the Beltway strategist, in any policy domain, a start point for contextual analysis. Independent of the framework, recommendations to the Army to develop political judgment and awareness focus on exposure and experience, earlier educational opportunities and broadening experiences, and a competitive and desirable selection process.


Author: Colonel Jeremy B. Miller

Published:

The purpose of this study is to examine how the United States Army assesses strategic leaders and offer possible solutions to improve the current assessment methodology. This research first reviews the emerging strategic environment and current military doctrine to determine the most critical leader attributes needed to succeed in the ever-changing strategic environment. Next, this study reviews the Army’s officer assessment process and identifies limitations that prevent the Army from achieving its desired officer developmental outcomes. Finally, this study provides four recommended solutions to assist the Army in more effectively assessing officers for service, promotion, and command.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Thomas P. Mitalski

Published:

U.S. national values and societal norms continue to evolve concerning gender equality and equal opportunity. After the revocation of the combat exclusion rule, General Dempsey directed the validation of both physical and mental occupational performance standards in those military occupational specialties that had been closed to women. To date, the services have focused only on validating physical standards and have largely ignored mental and psychological standards. Regardless of gender and similar to physical standards, not all service members are psychologically suited for the combat arms. Through a review of life and death stress responses, psychological attributes critical in combat and psychological injuries linked to combat, this paper suggests that a psychological screening process be developed and implemented for the combat arms. Through use of psychological screening and in conjunction with physical and cognitive screening criteria, the services can optimize selection for the combat arms across the full spectrum of operations regardless of gender.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Steven W. Moritz

Published:

As the U.S. concludes the longest war in its history, it should assess the connection between its society and the use of military force. There are two factors which have helped distance the U.S. civilian population from the decision to use military force. First, technology has provided policy makers with the ability to provide military effects globally with little human cost to the U.S. Second, a civilian-military gap has widened since the creation of the all-volunteer force. These two factors have combined to allow U.S. leaders unprecedented freedom to take military action abroad due to reduced internal political pressure. This situation creates three main risks to the U.S.: using a simple, technological military solution to problems which may not fully address the issue, the potential to use the military as the preferred option, and a shift away from a values-based approach when pursuing U.S. national interests. Three recommendations are made to address these issues: improve transparency in use of unmanned aerial vehicles, focus on synchronized strategic communication, and increase the size of the Guard and Reserve relative to the active duty force.


Author: Colonel William B Mosle III

Published:

Operating in the grim 2014 fiscal environment, DoD strategic leaders are challenged to reduce the budget while retaining balance across military readiness, force structure, and modernization. Yet modernization has proven to be a double-edged sword. Despite delivering highly effective combat capability, complex new weapon systems are failing to meet reliability requirements driving higher life-cycle costs. Thus today’s modernization creates tomorrow’s operations and support budget dilemma. Sustainable modernization requires acquisition strategies to produce new capabilities which meet reliability requirements. To close the reliability gap, strategic engagement is required earlier in modernization to correct the cultural bias that favors effectiveness over reliability resulting in unacceptable long-term sustainment costs. Early strategic influence must create cultural change to set the conditions for existing reliability reforms to succeed. The paper provides four principles to guide strategic leaders in embedding modernization culture change. If strategic leaders do not correct modernization culture biases, unreliability will extend the gale force winds swirling the military into a budgetary perpetual perfect storm.


Author: Colonel Thomas E. Munsey

Published:

Coalitions have proven effective political and military instruments often adding to the legitimacy of military operations. Coalitions have not replaced traditional alliances; but they do have the ability to build upon partner capabilities, particularly regional capabilities as the U.S. increases its engagement in regions in which it has not operated extensively since the beginning of the War on Terror. Much of the work and study on coalition warfare has been in the technical arena to include creating and developing systems and networks that enable multinational communications and ease of information flow. An understanding of the social and cognitive dimensions across cultures is required to effectively lead multinational coalitions and the political purpose of military engagements. The Army should adopt the Cultural Lens Model as a framework for identifying cognitive differences among coalition partners to enable the effective application of coalition military capacity.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Amanda S. Myers

Published:

The unique convergence of personal qualities and leadership style made President Abraham Lincoln exactly the right man to lead the Nation through civil war and preserve the Union. Lincoln’s strategic leadership is assessed using the frameworks of presidential historians Fred Greenstein and Richard Neustadt. Greenstein identifies the attributes of public communication, organization, political skill, vision, cognitive ability and emotional intelligence as qualities that distinguish presidential performance. Studying Lincoln through these attributes highlights his uniqueness and extraordinary skill as a wartime president. More than any other one attribute, his emotional intelligence, characterized by his charity, empathy and magnanimity, separate him from his contemporaries and from other presidents. Neustadt uses a four-question framework to assess a president and the power he brings to the office in terms of personal influence and political leadership. Lincoln’s purpose, his use of his presidential power, how he handled the pressure of the office, and his legacy are all analyzed to assess the presidency of the sixteenth president. The same president who author Eliot Cohen has called, “the greatest of American war presidents.”


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Jodi A. Neff

Published:

An observed lesson from the past decade of war is that the DIME elements of national power are in use simultaneously but in different capacities to secure national interests in a VUCA environment. This same integration needs to be exercised at the strategic levels in the interagency workings to achieve unified action. The VUCA environment, further complicated by the effects of globalization, a wide range of threats, declining budget, and reduced military force structure, demands the synergistic application of the DIME. While there have been calls for reform of the NSS, those who have control over the system have not taken steps to enact such reform. In lieu of these changes, the military can increase its collaborative capacity to achieve unified action by providing emotional intelligence competencies to its officer corps at the O-4 level. By emphasizing development of the affective domain at this level, officers will be ready participants in the collaborative environment necessary to implement a whole of government approach.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Paul Dudley Noyes

Published:

Diversity is a powerful term advocated by an even stronger socio-political constituency. For some it portends a brighter, more resilient future. For others, it augurs a juggernaut on collision course with mediocrity. For most however, it arouses neither apprehension nor elation. Focusing on U.S. military officers, this strategy research project (SRP) reviews the current Department of Defense (DoD) and services’ definitions of diversity, then it considers how recent considerations of diversity have impacted the race and gender representations in the officer corps. Following a “deep dive” into U.S. Census data, it analyzes how concerns about diversity have shaped policies and perceptions regarding the demographic make-up of our nation’s population, which many believe our military should “reflect”. Overall, it addresses the question of how far the DoD has gone–and should go–to promote diversity in its officer corps.


Author: Mr. Sean M. O’Brian

Published:

The civilian workforce is an integral part of the Army; it provides essential services in support of the mission. Serving as force multipliers, our civilian employees provide myriad requisite skills, thereby freeing uniformed members for war-fighting tasks. As the military moves deeper into an era of significant resource reductions, it becomes even more vital that its civilian employees are properly trained and educated to perform their functions effectively and efficiently. The Army must seek to develop the civilian workforce across the spectrum by making effective use of the three educational domains--operational, institutional, and self-development--while leveraging all available mediums to ensure maximum impact with minimum expenditure. This Strategic Research Paper (SRP) examines the policy behind workforce development, describes current Army workforce development, considers plans for the future, and offers recommendations for improvement.


Author: Colonel Andrew A. Olson

Published:

Since the end of the Cold War, the capacity of states to maintain legitimacy and control their populations has become increasingly important to international stability. In the globally connected world, this situation is increasingly important because failed or fragile states serve as a host for conditions which are favorable to trans-national organized crime, violent extremism, and insurgency, all of which are destabilizing. First experiences are always formative and the United States efforts with the United Nations in Somalia have profoundly shaped the humanitarian and peace operations of the future. When United States Marines hit the beaches of Mogadishu in 1992, it was not to destroy enemy forces ashore, but rather to defeat the effects of famine in the Horn of Africa. The decision to intervene by the United Nations in 1992 was a manifestation of the expanded scope and capacity of multi-lateral efforts to confront threats to international security and well-being.


Author: Colonel Mark E. Orwat

Published:

A key effort in developing Joint Force 2020 is to “pioneer new ways to combine and employ emergent capabilities such as cyber, Special Forces, and ISR” and “examine organizational and other force development changes to better leverage game-changing capabilities.” Individually, the emerging capabilities are maturing in capability, capacity, and integration into military operations. However, collectively, the emerging capabilities are not advancing with respect to each other. This strategic research paper draws from my personal experience working in the three emergent areas and includes a comprehensive review of visionary concepts such as Joint Force 2020, SOCOM 2020, and LandCyber 2018-2030. Major touch points exist between emerging capabilities in terms of interoperable technology, organizational integration, and combined effects that will enable self-synchronization among networked cyber, space, and Special Operations Forces in support of the Joint Force. This research establishes touch points that allow networked emerging capabilities to achieve decentralized, coordinated action and effects through the human domain, improving the agility and effectiveness of the Joint Force.


Author: Colonel Gregory H. Penfield

Published:

The Army’s formal adoption of mission command as its central philosophical approach to leadership and as a warfighting function is nearly four years old. Its basic elements – mission type orders executed within the commander’s intent to exploit the initiative while accepting prudent risk – are not exactly new or innovative ideas. Yet the Army continues to struggle with implementing mission command as its core principle for leadership and command, and the force seems to not quite understand where the Army is going regarding mission command.This paper will seek to answer two fundamental questions: whether mission command is really a new philosophy or just an reintroduction of existing doctrinal precepts, and what the Army is really trying to accomplish with mission command. This paper will review the current mission command construct and look at command in previous Army doctrine to answer the first question; describe what the Army is doing to implement mission command to date to answer the second question; and finally offer potential potential measures to institutionalize mission command as a core philosophy.


Author: Colonel William Byron Penland

Published:

Iran’s nuclear ambitions are rooted in the desire to be a self-sufficient nation that has regional and global respect and influence, can defend its people and interests, and can ensure the survival of the Islamic Republic. Although Iran claims to seek nuclear capability for energy production, its seeming efforts to develop a program that is oriented towards weapon production, coupled with actions to keep these efforts clandestine, drive the United States and its allies to believe that Iran is working towards manufacturing nuclear weapons. U.S. incentives and sanctions have done little in the last 12 years to halt Iranian efforts. This lack of progress demands the United States and its partners take a bolder approach towards negotiations with Iran by offering a path towards a “Grand Bargain” in which the United States would grant Iran full diplomatic and economic recognition in exchange for total compliance with international treaties regarding nuclear proliferation. Doing so is the best hope to prevent Iran from becoming the next nation with an atomic weapon.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Michael J. Perez

Published:

Adversary cyberspace capabilities threaten the United States military and national security interests across all levels of conflict. Despite these threats, within the United States military and senior civilian leadership there exists limited knowledge on cyberspace beyond rudimentary user-level understanding. This project serves as a primer to help fill the educational gap of strategic military leaders on the attributes and issues of cyberspace relevant to modern national security. It will accomplish this task by reviewing cyberspace’s evolution, the legal issues surrounding the application of international law of armed conflict, and the ways and means of conducting offensive and defensive cyberspace operations. The discussion will conclude by developing a framework based on the variables of attribution, attacker identity, target criticality, and attack severity to provide the strategic military leader with a conceptual model for development of a whole-of-government response to adversaries who threaten the United States through cyberspace.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Jonathan D. Price

Published:

This research explores a Hybrid Operational Reserve – reserve units woven into active units over time – as a means to increase readiness and operational capacity at a lower cost. It is predicated on an evolutionary organizational construct based on the previous 12 years of combat - avoiding future reductions in structure, readiness, and modernization. Potential annual Marine Corps manpower savings of $262 million are generated through the more efficient use of full-time support personnel and reducing post-deployment (dwell) active duty costs, while avoiding tiered readiness. The Hybrid Operational Reserve effectively implements 10 U.S.C. §12304b authority by translating force generation and unit life cycle models to involuntarily activate Reserve companies and squadron Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMA) during peacetime. Predictable operational utilization maintains the tactical “edge” of Reserve units and recapitalizes on prior Active Component (AC) experience. Reversibility of OEF/OIF structure is achieved through the retention of AC battalion-level headquarters and IMA augmentation at the regiment/group level.


Author: Colonel Kevin Julius Quarles

Published:

Complex catastrophes are capable of causing significant casualties and extensive infrastructure damage. In extreme cases, they can trigger cascading effects that could threaten national security. Over the last decade there have been significant improvements in disaster response planning and emergency communications. However, there is a gap in the communications capability between the personnel coordinating disaster response operations and the victims who need assistance. The public needs an alternative method of communications to request help when phone service is unavailable. If left unsolved, during complex catastrophes this gap could lead to preventable casualties and unnecessary damage. Many government, private and volunteer organizations already use geospatial information during disasters to build situational awareness. Our disaster preparedness plans and policies need to incorporate the public’s use of social media with embedded geospatial information as a tool to build situational awareness and provide the public with an alternate method of emergency communications.


Author: Colonel David G. Ray

Published:

The multi-state maritime dispute in the South China Sea is a complex geopolitical problem and if left unchecked, a potential instigator of change in the international order. The United States does not take an official position on territorial disputes, but has four interests in the region; peace and stability, respect for international law, freedom of navigation, and unimpeded movement of commerce. The competing interests, claims, and strategies of China and the Philippines are resulting in tensions that could lead to a broader loss of confidence in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), an inadvertent escalation to hostilities on the high seas, and/or incidents of deliberate military action to secure disputed territory. These all have the potential to threaten U.S. interests. By ratifying the UNCLOS, creating a Pacific maritime forum, and leading a regional maritime protection network, the United States can reduce the factors pulling the region toward the highest-risk scenarios. These strategic actions will not resolve the ongoing territorial disputes, but will help decrease tensions and actively protect U.S. interests in the South China Sea.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Matthew Reiley

Published:

The Arctic’s receding ice offers potentially great benefits to the U.S. resulting from access to Arctic natural resources and an expanded global commons. These economic opportunities however are not uncontested. Russia and other Arctic nations have parallel interests and have made resource claims under the auspices of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), to which the U.S. is not a signatory. This leaves the U.S. mute and on the sideline to influence the outcome of Arctic resource claims, particularly those of Russia who stands to gain the most if the U.S. is not engaged. In addition to securing resources, UNCLOS provides legal certainty for operations at sea that are vital to securing the global commons and assuring freedom of navigation. The U.S. should ratify UNCLOS as a critical component of policy to peacefully achieve U.S. interests while facing an assertive and regionally powerful Russia.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel John Howard Rochford II

Published:

Successful counter insurgency operations require the development of local security forces to police and secure the population. These forces play a crucial role in “holding and building” an area after conventional forces have cleared an area of major resistance forces. The actions taken during the initial organization and recruitment of the force are crucial to ensure the success of the local security forces into the future


Author: Colonel Stephen C. Rogers

Published:

In the midst of significant transition, it is important that the Army reflects on what it has experienced over the last twelve years of combat and takes advantage of the opportunity to improve its ability to execute its core missions and meet its obligations. While there is much to be learned from recent experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, the lessons in leadership have the greatest implication for enduring effects on and for the force. By understanding the origins of mission command and approaching its implementation from a perspective of changing organizational culture, the Army stands to reap benefits well beyond merely empowering subordinate leaders. More importantly, truly inculcating mission command will also serve as a catalyst to an even greater lesson that Army leaders must learn: the ability to dialogue within, across, and outside the Force, undeterred by the trepidation of speaking truth to power when presenting dissenting views, alternative perspectives, and potentially unpopular options.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Gary A. Ropers

Published:

The National Guard has a long history of providing assistance to state and local communities in the wake of a hurricane, tornado, floods, forest fires or other natural disaster strikes. It is now time for the National Guard to build the next type of unit or section to help respond to the next potential man-made disaster, that being a cyber attack. The Department of Defense, the Active Army and Army National Guard should embrace the creation of Cyber Protection Teams in the National Guard. The National Guard has a strong relationship with civilian agencies, and these citizen-soldiers can play and increasing role in the cyber domain by leveraging National Guard personnel who already possess many of the core technological skills as a result of their civilian occupations. The cyber defense mission requirements performed at a home station can be expanded to provide DOD and the Governors with a synergistic capability.


Author: Colonel James C. Royse

Published:

Existing national and DoD classified military information (CMI) foreign disclosure policy does not effectively support U.S. security interests. The US National Security Strategy promotes US security interests through partner capacity, emphasizing at-risk states. Diplomatic and military elements of national power require support from the information element. Foreign disclosure policy can be changed to support better alignment of US interests and partner nation action. Principal-agent theory offers a way to frame foreign disclosure policy changes by applying a metric of improved interest alignment gained through reduced information asymmetry. A more effective national policy reflects the information environment, leverages technology to support foreign disclosure, and leverages CMI disclosure as a means of reducing information asymmetry to improve partner state interest alignment with U.S. security interests. The proposed information sharing policy enables the information element of national power to support U.S. interests in at-risk states in the context of a multi-polar international order.


Author: Colonel William S. Schaper

Published:

Throughout our nation’s history, the U.S. military has been involved in conflicts that have required post-combat reconstruction and stability operations. In the vast majority of our 20th century conflicts, the success, or lack thereof, has been glaring. Historically, the U.S. military has been the single element to conduct the burden of planning, preparing and executing stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) operations, (Phases IV and V). In the present-day era of persistent conflict, it will be critical that the U.S. military prepares to successfully conduct these operations to achieve the desired end state and successfully conclude military operations. This paper will examine the establishment of the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) as a dedicated force tasked with leading S&R operations, whose sole mission focuses on “winning the peace.”


Author: Colonel James Walter Schirmer

Published:

The equipment that the U.S. Army is fielding is growing more complex, requiring more hours of training for Soldiers to master. These skills decay over time and require frequent refresher training. The amount of equipment per Soldier and per unit is also increasing. Together, these three trends place an increasing training burden on units. This burden may force to reduce time spent on collective training to make room for the increasing equipment-specific tasks, or take shortcuts with equipment training. New equipment may not increase unit effectiveness as much as planned and in some instances may even reduce it. This problem is particularly important as resources fall and Army force structure falls. Current strategy calls for Army units to be proficient on a wider array of tasks than they have in the past, decisive action, stability operations, and building partner capacity. The length of time required for a unit to become proficient is a critical part of how many ready units the Army can deploy to a contingency. The Army should develop a training time budget for various unit types to help make tradeoffs when considering new equipment development and enforce trainability standards on new equipment acquisitions.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Mark Alan Sexton

Published:

The wave of Chinese Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) into the United States serves as a means to address the current trade imbalance, reduce U.S. unemployment, and even encourage economic growth. However, U.S. critics point to the current Chinese policy of using subsidized State Operated Enterprises (SOEs) and using devalued currency to gain an unfair competitive advantage. In addition, there is an anxiety that the Chinese desire for economic transformation will facilitate the theft of U.S. intellectual property and technology. Understanding how the Chinese came to rely on SOEs and a devalued currency is crucial to understanding the current international economic environment. In addition, the U.S. historical and current reaction to FDI requires analysis as the two nations embark on an era of economic interdependence. In order to navigate the challenges and opportunities of this new reality, U.S. policy makers and the Communist Party of China will be required to foster economic strategies that not only maintain, but also advance the interest of both nations.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel William A. Shomento

Published:

The National Guard State Partnership Program, Regionally Aligned Forces, and “Smart Power” Teams are all tools that can be used to efficiently and effectively build partner capacity. Each method has strengths that should be maintained, weaknesses that need to be addressed, and risks that require mitigation. However, real security cooperation synergies will be realized when the three methods are coordinated to leverage the already existing long-term partner relationships, regional expertise, and cultural knowledge.


Author: Colonel H.C. Silkman

Published:

The U.S. National Security Strategy says that America still bears the burden of global leadership. For nearly a century, Americans have considered themselves exceptional and an example for the rest of the world, but the old ways of holding onto power are slipping, and a new world order is slowly encroaching upon the United States. This monograph asserts that it is time for a divergent approach to the future of warfare and it is time to reverse long-held ideas on what should be the main effort, what capabilities should take center stage, and what strategic effects the U.S. should focus on resourcing. In a coming era of smaller defense budgets and fewer troops, the U.S. military must learn to use the force it has available to greatest effect and focus the funding pipeline to the various occupational specialties that influence change rather than force it.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel David Smith

Published:

The precedence of a military pension system was established in the colonies well before the birth of the United States and was modified throughout our country’s history to accommodate economic realities, social norms and military requirements. Although the current system has enjoyed a period of relative constancy since 1980, massive federal debt and the threat that military compensation liability will consume the DoD budget compels exploration of cost reduction modifications. Within the DoD, the Defense Business Board and 10-15-55 initiatives propose to restructure the current system to reduce costs and realign it towards the private sector model. Although the 10-15-55 proposal is superior, it remains unaligned as it does not adequately consider existing educational benefits, strategic communications and professionalism aspects of the military profession.


Author: Colonel Gregory M. Smith

Published:

As the Army winds down combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and faces a resource constrained future, it must find ways to organize and train to ensure flexibility and responsiveness to the needs of the geographic combatant commanders. With this challenge in mind, the Chief of Staff of the Army challenged Army leadership to provide regionally aligned forces to the combatant commander for his employment as part of Theater Security Cooperation (TSC), Phase 0 (Shape the Environment,) and Phase 1 (Deter the Enemy) operations. With effective and focused engagement, the combatant commander can prevent the escalation to Phase 2 (Seize the Initiative), but if required has a regionally familiar force available for decisive action. This paper will analyze potential challenges and opportunities within the fires WfF by considering the requirements of RAF and the current organization and capabilities of the fires WfF in the DOTMLPF framework.


Author: Mr. Robert E. Spoo

Published:

Instability deserves more extensive study regarding its use as a strategic tool for accumulating and executing the elements of national power. While theorists spend significant effort to study and promote political, military and economic stability, they invest little time to the study of instability. Theorists generally ignore instability's positive impacts in stimulating growth, change and innovation, or its possible contributions to orchestrating national power. Because of this, strategists generally see instability as a disruptive state with little strategic benefit. Although stability is necessary for social order and market confidence, overly stable conditions can also result in complacency, lowered economic resiliency, and even greater risk. Overly restrictive control measures aimed at preserving stability often worsen political, military or economic outcomes. While instability can have troublesome, negative effects, it is a recurring transformative state that offers potential strategic advantage to the United State's national interests.


Author: Colonel Deydre S. Teyhen

Published:

Although technology has been able to advance warfare, the cornerstone of Landpower’s historical and future success hinges around the human dimension. Physical and mental resilience are fundamental and often-unarticulated assumptions required to achieve national interests through Landpower. Although the military has struggled with negative impacts of poor sleep, activity, and nutrition throughout history, the current costs to readiness, recruitment, retention, and health require a comprehensive strategic plan to ensure the military is able to meet future security needs of our nation. The purposes of this review are to 1) outline the strategic importance of sleep, activity, and nutrition for both the military and nation’s youth from a readiness and health perspective and 2) provide recommendations to enhance readiness and resilience of the future military force. This review incorporates perspectives from military leaders and historical data with a specific emphasis on interwar eras. The recommendations include a whole of government approach, cultural and system changes, military recruitment strategies, leveraging environmental and social networks, military recruitment, and squad level programs.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Donald J. Tomich

Published:

Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental and Multinational (JIIM) organizations participate in the Theater Security Cooperation environment. Each of these organizations’ roles and responsibilities contribute to a holistic approach in the development of defense relationships. The Theater Security Cooperation environment is complex and plagued by disparities in terminology, doctrine, and policies of the U.S. military and interagency organizations, as well as those of our partner nations. These issues create interoperability gaps that impede their ability to synchronize actions and ensure complementary efforts are occurring to achieve unity of effort and action. This paper will analyze the various directives and publications to develop an understanding of the goals of security cooperation, the key organizations involved in security cooperation at the various levels of control, the roles and responsibilities of these organizations, and how these organizations contribute to the holistic approach to security cooperation. Lastly, the paper will provide recommendations on ways to better integrate organizational efforts to increase JIIM interoperability in the security cooperation arena and follow-on unified actions.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Doyle R. Tuisl

Published:

Many senior leaders struggle because they do not understand their job at the strategic level. The leadership skills and processes needed to succeed change as rank and responsibility increase. As junior leaders, the focus is on the execution of tasks and is dominated by direct leadership and technical/tactical expertise. As leaders advance to more senior positions, the focus shifts to providing guidance and setting the conditions for others to succeed. Both the Army and industry spend enormous amounts of time and money on technical and tactical improvements such as developing new doctrine, weapon systems, or process improvement programs. Unfortunately, these improvements, while important, do not address the more important aspects of organizational effectiveness and efficiency. This paper will argue that effective strategic leaders must focus on three principle areas: strategic leadership, strategic planning and decision making, and organizational design.


Author: Colonel Stephen K Van Riper

Published:

The U.S., Europe and regional African players must tackle drug smuggling in West Africa to prevent that region from falling into chaos. Today, West Africa is a significant nexus for the illegal trafficking of oil, weapons, cigarettes, drugs and other commodities. The United States has labeled Guinea-Bissau Africa’s first narco-state and it has become the epicenter of a region where Transnational Criminal Organizations are corrupting governments and societies at an alarming rate. Their nefarious efforts, and Guinea-Bissau’s state failure, conflict with U.S. stated interests. Tackling corruption, neutralizing spoilers, and increasing the societies’ culture of lawfulness are necessary steps to save West Africa. This will be challenging in Guinea-Bissau due to geography, culture, government structure, and a corrupted military. But with the right adjustments to resources, authorities and priorities, it can be done.


Author: Colonel Douglas C. Van Weelden

Published:

The United States Military has become increasingly dependent upon technology in the recent decades. While the use of technology and automation has improved the its effectiveness, the dependence upon that technology creates a vulnerability that is targeted by adversaries. The cyber domain is relatively new. As such, military technical capabilities are dependent upon it, yet the institution doesn’t have the capacity or understanding of how to dominate this domain. U.S. forces must retain the ability to operate absent the technology that makes them so effective. U.S. military and defense strategies currently overlook or undersell this necessity. U.S. military forces need to train to operate in absence of technology. The level and depth to which this training and associated proficiency must be maintained correlates with the level of risk each force faces regarding cyber compromise or digital denial. Until the U.S. military is able to assure cyber dominance or supremacy, it must train service members to fight enemies absent of technology.


Author: Captain Jason A. Vogt

Published:

This paper builds upon Captain Mark F. Light’s Strategy Research Project “The Navy’s Moral Compass” by investigating steps taken by the US Navy addressing commanding officer misconduct. Reviewing Captain Light’s findings, as well as findings of a recent Naval Inspector General report, this paper explores Navy Leadership initiatives such as the Charge of Command and Command Qualification Program along with analysis of statistics of Navy commanding officer firings from 2010 through 2013. The paper reviews previous recommendations and their effect on commanding officer misconduct. While some progress is apparent, the paper reviews additional steps for the Navy to consider and makes recommendations calling for the Navy to provide future transparency and consistency regarding data involving commanding officer misconduct, potential dissuasive measures to consider in the future and a call for additional and more thorough studies on the subject. By taking a fix of where the Navy stands regarding commanding officer misconduct, this paper will define today what has succeeded, what has not, and provide a path to the next level of debate regarding the Navy’s policies, standards, and ethics for commanding officers.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Jordan D. Walzer

Published:

America faces an uncertain and volatile future in the twenty-first century. Intelligence helps lift the veil of uncertainty by providing knowledge to commanders and decision makers. The intelligence officers selected today will be the strategic thinkers and leaders of tomorrow. America cannot afford to gamble its future by addressing twenty-first century challenges using twentieth century skills and thinking. To meet the national security challenges ahead, the U.S. military requires an innovative new approach to engaging with, assessing, and selecting tomorrow’s strategic intelligence thinkers and leaders from today’s generation of talented and diverse young minds.


Author: Colonel John W. Weidner

Published:

For several reasons, the United States must not ratify the CTBT before validating the safety, security, reliability and effectiveness of U.S. nuclear weapons as predicted by the stockpile stewardship program. First, testing is the most effective and lowest risk way to ensure the safety, security, reliability and effectiveness of the current U.S. stockpile. Testing is also needed to address the increasing risk of certifying the U.S. nuclear stockpile due to the combination of incremental changes introduced to refurbished nuclear weapons and the effects of aging. Testing would enable the acquisition of nuclear data that would validate and significantly enhance the stockpile stewardship program, perhaps make testing unnecessary in the future. A test program could improve the security of U.S. nuclear weapons, and would enable the testing and verification of improvised nuclear device designs as well as techniques to disable those weapons. Finally, testing is the only effective way to develop and maintain nuclear weapon-related competencies such as containment, instrumentation and nuclear forensics that took decades and billions of dollars to develop.


Author: Colonel Steven B. Weir

Published:

The Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) needs to be changed and modified in several areas. The sexual assault crisis has caused Congress to review the court-martial process and as a result several pieces of legislation have been proposed. The legislation is focused primary on sexual assault cases. This paper proposes sweeping changes that do not rely on the type of offense to be prosecuted. All victims should be treated equally and fairly regardless of the nature of the offense. The time has come to eliminate commanders and the convening authority from the court-martial process. The decision to send an accused to a court-martial should rest with the Staff Judge Advocate. The Staff Judge Advocate has the legal skills, training, and experience to determine what cases should result in trial by courts-martial. The guilty plea process should be completely overhauled. The Staff Judge Advocate and the accused with his defense counsel can negotiate a fair and just sentence. The military judge should have no role in the sentencing process. These changes and the others will restore faith in the military justice system. Most importantly commanders will not lose their ability to instill good order and discipline.


Author: Colonel Gary A. Wheeler

Published:

The health of Americans is a vital national interest. Despite the considerable resources devoted to healthcare, the US falls short of achieving optimal health. A strategic assessment shows this gap is due to disproportionate resource allocation to healthcare delivery. Historic strategic attempts to improve health through preventive strategies suffer from similar misalignment of ends, ways, and means. Future health strategies must more fully address governance, health resourcing, and health information. Health information is a strategic asset and a key enabler for effective health management. Although healthcare information is a subset of overall health information, current sources of health information are predominately sourced from healthcare delivery organizations. Development of information sources that reflect the broader determinates of health are needed. The challenges to achieving comprehensive health management include the current focus on healthcare delivery and the resultant limited patient treatment information collected. Improvement of health governance and establishing a broad-based health information architecture are the first steps toward achieving optimized health.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Jon C. Wilkinson

Published:

The revolution in adaptive planning, initiated in 2003, has yet to succeed. The disappointing results of this initiative are due to flawed paradigms that anchor the planning community in a tactical-level process that is misapplied at the operational level of warfare. The flawed paradigms are: 1) There is no difference between the planning process used at the tactical and operational levels, 2) The process for crisis action planning is the same as deliberate planning, just executed on a shorter timeline, 3) The more dynamic the environment, the more important a detailed plan becomes, 4) OPLAN development is compatible with mission command, and 5) Joint Operational Planning and Execution System (JOPES) specialists create the Time Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD) after planners write the plan and determine the requirements. This paper proposes a revised planning process, and offers five paradigms that are more supportive of adaptive planning at the operational level of warfare.


Author: Colonel Wade S. Yamada

Published:

After a decade of war in Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. military exits a period of adaptation and into an interwar period where innovation will be critical to drive future investments. In peacetime, the U.S. military faces a paradox where a demand signal is needed to inform future investments, yet innovation typically occurs in war. Innovation in peacetime is hindered by a Service’s dominant concept of war, Service bureaucracy, and politics influenced by the defense industrial base. This paper proposes a novel approach to creating innovation in peacetime and introduces the term operationalizing innovation. Operationalizing innovation requires a three-pronged approach that involves: 1) operational employment, 2) the pursuit of disruptive technologies, and 3) the promotion of capabilities competition. With an investment in force structure, this paper proposes the creation of a new organization, Task Force Innovate, whose sole focus is to challenge the current mix of capabilities through innovative concepts of war. Because of the low-cost footprint of Task Force Innovate and the freedom to experiment and explore, the concept of operationalizing innovation represents a viable approach to stimulating innovation in peacetime.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Lars N. Zetterstrom

Published:

The 2005 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Report Recommendation #146 called for the creation of 12 joint bases by September 15, 2011. The Department of Defense (DoD) executed the recommendation in accordance with the Joint Basing Implementation Guidance signed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense on January 22, 2008. This paper examines how this guidance shaped the formation and operation of the joint bases today. This research project also examines what effectiveness and efficiencies were expected and realized, and a root cause analysis of why they were or where not achieved. Finally, the implications on and strategic options for the future of Joint Basing in the Department of Defense are considered.


Author: Ms. Charisse A. Adamson

Published:

China’s increased presence in Latin America has raised alarm bells in the halls of government, the private sector and the mass media. In the span of one decade Chinese trade to the region has increased exponentially from $29 million in 2003 to $270 billion in 2012. Chinese sales of weapons, military training and cultural centers are steadily increasing in the region. This is causing many pundits to believe China’s engagement in Latin America is part of a broader geopolitical strategy to counterbalance the U.S. pivot to Asia policy by challenging the U.S. in its strategic backyard. The paper will examine this concern by first exploring how self-image, history, and current economic motivations affect U.S. and Chinese policies in Latin America. The second part of the paper will provide an in-depth look at Chinese and U.S. policies in Latin America. The final section will assess the impact of those polices on cooperation between China and the United States. Despite concerns, China currently is not eclipsing U.S. influence in Latin America. China’s presence in the region bears watching. Conflict with China in Latin America could distract the United States from engagement in the Asia Pacific region.


Author: Colonel Joel O. Alexander

Published:

The founding of the nation saw an inherent distrust of the military as an arm of the government. While this wariness is not uniquely American, it expresses society’s deeper concern with maintaining the delicate balance between protecting individual liberties and maintaining collective security. America’s military was challenged to dispel these concerns and demonstrate its value to the civilian leadership / population. Some challenges remain as a result of external political pressures or shifting societal opinions, while others are “self-inflicted”: e.g., poor communication, sexual assaults or other ethical lapses. Today, the U.S. military is viewed highly by much of the nation and enjoys a reputation as a profession of honor and respect. Yet with this cordial relationship--and overwhelming popular endorsement--the profession of arms is faced with the challenge of sustaining that support and promoting understanding of it as a valuable, civil service profession. This paper analyzes historical lessons and trends in public support of the military from America’s founding to the dawn of the 20th century and offers recommendations on how the profession of arms can best cultivate enduring, positive relationships between it and the society it represents and serves.


Author: Colonel Russell N. Bailey

Published:

Can the U.S. seize strategic opportunities and achieve its “Rebalance to Asia?” A more tailored implementation of U.S. national security policy and strategy is required if the U.S. is to achieve the desired ends. Building capacity among consequential nations strengthens internal security postures and supports regional stability. The unwise allocation of Security Assistance funds consumes precious resources that could otherwise address other pressing issues. A Pivotal States policy will better discriminate among competing national security objectives. Identifying Pivotal States will allow the U.S. to prioritize security assistance recipients and fund only those nations or programs that represent strategic necessities. Using a principled approach within the framework of the Pivotal States policy and establishing clear criteria for the identification of Pivotal States will facilitate a more successful Security Assistance strategy. Creating an NSC-led Interagency Policy Committee to oversee Foreign/Security Assistance planning and execution is necessary. Overcoming bureaucratic friction and developing common competencies among Foreign Assistance professionals from all agencies is critical.


Author: Colonel Stephen H. Bales

Published:

The challenge of North Korea’s drive for a nuclear arsenal represents a wicked problem for the United States, its allies, and the international community. Solving this problem requires critical thinking that addresses the interests of all parties, addresses divergent points of view within the context of the history of the Korean peninsula, and correctly assesses the implications of a selected policy and strategies. The current United States policy of complete and verifiable denuclearization of North Korea will not achieve its end. This stalemate requires a new policy approach. After an analysis of the history of conflict on the Korean peninsula and the current five-decade long stalemate, analysis of the Kim regime, and a review of national interests; this paper will propose a new policy. This new policy, a New Détente, will in the short-term achieve stability of North Korea, improve security and stability in the Northeast Asia-Pacific region, and in the long-term provide a path to peaceful denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. This new policy offers the greatest possibility of securing United States’ national interests while supporting the interests of North Korea, China, and United States allies and partners in the Northeast Asia–Pacific region.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Robert Sean Berg

Published:

Vladimir Putin’s annexation of Crimea in March of 2014 highlighted the Russian Federation’s expansionist actions to the world. The notion that Russian aggression and expansionism is a new threat fails to acknowledge centuries of an imperialist Russia. The 2015 US National Security Strategy calls for a continuous response to current Russian aggression in the wake of Putin’s Crimea and Eastern Ukraine involvement. As a long term counter to Russian actions, U.S. training for a domestically developed and supported, cellular, resilient resistance network to deter and counter the asymmetric intrusion of the Russian Federation into sovereign territory is a viable solution. Resistance networks in the Baltics and other former soviet states may leverage existing state structures and security elements. The intent is to establish an “on order” capacity from within, as a defensive measure, incorporating civil elements not currently involved. This resistance network is a bridging capacity to address an operational gap in a nation’s capacity to thwart Russian aggression which threatens national security but fails, by design, to clearly trigger a NATO Article V requirement.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel John A. Best

Published:

Adaptive, critical, and creative thinking attributes in today’s environment are essential components for solving complex, ambiguous and rapidly evolving problems. However, friction between Generation X and Y hinders the military’s ability to fully inculcate a training program that embraces the core foundations for building critical and creative thinking leaders. In order to solve this problem, the Army needs to change the culture of thinking in its senior leadership; to understand the fundamentals of learning and their impacts on adaptive training, and to understand the nuances of the rising generation of leaders and consequences of the “old method” of training.


Author: Colonel Mark O. Bilafer

Published:

Investigating joint and army level policies, field manuals, and theater rules of engagement (ROE) uncovered three main reasons the Army currently must rely on other services to meet joint level targeting requirements: 1) Organizationally the Army is not properly represented at multiple joint decision making forums that approve service effectiveness, training and certification requirements; 2) The Army has doctrine and publication gaps that limits Centers of Excellence ability to include joint requirements into Army publications; and 3) The Army lacks the hardware and software required to connect with joint and interagency targeting and intelligence systems. In this paper I will discuss each of these areas in depth and provide recommendations the Army must adapt to close these gaps.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel William E. Boswell

Published:

Click here, then enter abstract text. WAIT until AFTER paper is complete before writing the abstract. Abstracts should describe a paper as written, NOT as it will be written. Abstracts must fit this space AND the space on the abstract page (an approximate maximum of 200 words). After entering the abstract text here, double check to make sure the abstract appears in its entirety both here and on the abstract page.


Author: Colonel Jeff A. Bovarnick

Published:

During World War II, General George Marshall relieved numerous commanders. Rather than separate those officers, he allowed them to remain in the Army and contribute in other areas of demonstrated expertise. Currently, a commander relieved for cause stands little to no chance of being retained in the service. This paper suggests that under certain circumstances, a policy similar to Marshall’s is feasible in today’s Army to retain those officers who can continue to make valuable contributions. When effectively implemented, the principles of mission command foster an environment conducive to such a policy. The elements of trust, prudent risk taking and underwriting honest mistakes enable a senior commander to consider a relieved commander for continued service. Further, those officers who commit illegal, immoral, or unethical acts are not viable candidates where those who make honest mistakes should be considered. As current procedures make it unlikely that an officer could survive a relief from command, the Army would have to consider a policy similar to curtailment to allow a relieved officer to remain on active without the negative consequences that follow a relief for cause.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Scott Brodeur

Published:

The United States requires a strategic communication strategy to counter ISIL influence, recruiting, and propaganda. President Barack Obama outlined Operation Inherent Resolve, the recent strategy to defeat and ultimately destroy ISIL using a coalition counterterrorism methodology and a critical strategic communications effort. ISIL operates a professional propaganda campaign that leverages the full spectrum of social media, websites, and blogs to distribute their messages and recruit militant followers. After 14 years of conducting strategic communications against terrorists, the U.S. has failed to establish an effective strategy to combat these threats to national security. This study examines U.S. propaganda strategy during World War II in order to distill best practices that are applicable to modern strategic communications to defeat ISIL. A new strategy requires consolidated leadership for the numerous organizations involved in countering ISIL. Additionally, this strategy must geographically disaggregate the enemy to specifically address the at-risk populations and underlying regional factors. Finally, the U.S. strategy must be rooted in the truth. The U.S. must address these shortfalls in strategic communication strategy or the efforts to defeat ISIL will fail.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Bryan M. Brokate

Published:

The Army is preparing for an uncertain complex future by establishing Force 2025. One area lacking in preparation is Soldier resiliency to face a volatile, fluid environment. The suicide crisis that has plagued the force for 13 years demonstrates the resiliency shortfall. The last two years have seen a drop in fatalities, but the Army still lost 238 Soldiers to suicide in 2014. Suicide prevention must be part of any plan to increase Army resiliency. The current Army Suicide Prevention Program (ASPP) fails to apply a holistic approach to Soldier suicides and contains a gap in its coverage to the Reserve Component (RC), which make up 52 percent of the total Army structure. The bulk of the ASPP for RC personnel is limited to on-line and telephonic resources. The ASPP avoids the use of religious resources despite the fact that over 73 percent of the Soldiers identify a religious preference. Including local religious organizations into the ASPP provides an additional counseling tool for religious adherents across the formation. The recommendation is to establish a voluntary community partnership program between RC units and local religious organizations to provide RC Soldiers with local (face-to-face) resources for suicide prevention.


Author: Colonel Felicia Brokaw

Published:

United States efforts to bring about regime removal and democracy in Cuba through economic sanctions, travel restrictions and frozen diplomatic relations have not worked in over 55 years. Every President since Dwight D Eisenhower has corresponded through back channels to Cuba with the government, reviewed sanctions, property claimants, established negotiations, and largely left sanctions in place. This research paper reviews the history of U.S.-Cuban relations, analyzes U.S. sanctions against Cuba, and examines the security policy implications after the U.S. has to modify its policies towards Cuba. It examines whether the U.S. should “Spring Forward or Fall Back” in the motivation to drive change in Cuba with renewed U.S.-Cuban relations. Finally, it will determine if it is feasible, acceptable, and suitable to change the U.S. engagement with Cuba by renewing economic and diplomatic relations and remove the remaining travel restrictions and U.S. trade embargo.


Author: Commander Noel J. Cabral III

Published:

Arctic ice is melting at an accelerating rate, giving way to not only the last great frontier that promises navigable waterways and natural resources, but international attention to emerging geopolitical and economic significance. China has not published an Arctic strategy, nor explicitly described its interests in the Arctic; however it has declared itself a “near-Arctic” state and become the most active observer in the region. This analysis examines China’s rhetoric, investment, and collaborative engagement with the Arctic states. The key findings are that China’s geostrategic interests are to advance its global legitimacy and economic development. As such, China is interested in establishing a diplomatic and economic presence in the Arctic to elevate its global status and ensure China’s access to sea lanes and resources. China’s growing engagement in the arctic could represent another significant driver to a power shift from the U.S. to China.


Author: Commander Arthur M. Castiglia, Jr.

Published:

Military theorists from Sun Tzu to Clausewitz have warned of the dangers and unique challenges of combat in and around cities. By 2030, 60 percent of the world’s population is expected to live in massive urban areas or megacities. These megacities feature slums and endemic homelessness, uncontrolled expansion/urban sprawl, and lack of basic support structures making operations complex and extremely dangerous. Urban terrain is a powerful advantage for entrenched combatants. It magnifies the power of defense, and diminishes an adversary’s advantages in technology, firepower and mobility. To be effective in this sort of environment, security forces will need to blend police, infantry and military special forces. This research project will examine Special Operations Forces’ role in a future of increased urbanization. It describes the global trends responsible for the emergence of modern megacities. It also scrutinizes the three main considerations when defining the SOF role in megacity warfare: megacity typology variances, future urban threats, and the spectrum of urban combat operations.


Author: Colonel Chris William Chronis

Published:

Is Turkey under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan slipping out of the West’s orbit, and what are the impacts of the rise of political Islam on Turkey’s relationship with the West? Further, how can the West maintain—and possibly improve—its influence and relations with the Turkish people, the Turkish business community, and the Turkish military in the era of Erdogan? Since coming to power in 2003, President Erdogan and his Islamic Justice and Development Party have altered the political, judicial, military, and social landscapes within Turkey’s traditionally secular Muslim majority society in ways unimaginable since the era of Ataturk and the founding of the republic in 1923. Therefore, the West must make every effort to keep Turkey—a longtime ally and emerging economic power—within the post-war economic and military framework that facilitates free trade, inter-dependence, open markets, collective security, civil liberties, democratic values, and the resultant stability and prosperity that ensures the survival and expansion of a secular, modernized, and pro-western Turkish society, economy, and military.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel James Brandon Conway

Published:

In response to the territorial disputes in the East China and South China Seas and the ongoing build-up of military power in the Asia-Pacific region, many of the United States’ allies and partners in the region, including Australia and Japan, have demonstrated renewed interest in the development of amphibious forces. China, a potential adversary, is also continuing to expand its capabilities. This paper argues the development of allied amphibious forces provides a wide range of diplomatic, military, budgetary, and economic benefits to the U.S. policy for rebalance in the Pacific. Specifically, it augments U.S. amphibious capability, promotes stability, improves multi-lateral relations, and directly and indirectly contributes to the U.S. economy. As a method of analysis, this paper evaluates the development and potential employment of Japanese and Australian amphibious forces as examples of states that seek the capability, though for different purposes.


Author: Colonel Cory N. Costello

Published:

Strategic leaders and planners can take advantage of the U.S. military capability—its means—to establish an expeditionary medical system with sixty-minute evacuation response times to pick up wounded at the point of injury. This strategic research project (SRP) argues that our federal government must mandate the sixty-minute standard as national security policy. Furthermore, to export this professionalism, our senior leaders must encourage our allies and partners to adopt our same standard. The policy must be a requirement for this nation’s participation in coalitions or alliances. The range of U.S. military gains attending Secretary Gates’ initiative are a useful case study to highlight the challenges and potential strategic benefits that can result from this achievement.


Author: Ms. Laura M. Crawford

Published:

Over the last 60 years, the Department of Defense (DoD) has demonstrated a lack of commitment toward achieving financial improvement, accountability, and audit readiness. The DoD has spent billions attempting to meet the Congressional mandate of audit ready financial statements by September 30, 2017. It does not appear the DoD will be able to make this deadline. In these fiscally constrained times, DoD leadership must work toward changing the culture in regards to financial management. One way to do this is to implement a clear concise vision and utilize Kotter’s eight steps for cultural change in conjunction with Schein’s embedding and reinforcing mechanisms to implement a lasting culture change. Now is the time for the DoD to implement change due to the reduction of financial resources in accordance with the Budget Control Act of 2011 and a new Secretary of Defense that actively supports financial improvement. Without changing the cost culture first, the expenditures towards achieving audit readiness will not be worth the cost.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Michael D. Daniels

Published:

An option to build landpower for the United States Army in the 21st Century, in austere budget environments, is to glean insights from the practices of the Roman Army. During the Republican and early Imperial periods, the Romans used non-citizen soldiers in the Roman Army. Combined with the traditions and legacy of the U.S. Army and its own history of employing non-citizen troops as allies and within its own formations could result in a more affordable approach to providing land forces.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Chad J. Davis

Published:

The United States stands amid a strategic discontinuity – a period when unpredictable, unforeseen, and rapid changes occur that confound or disrupt previous expectations or estimates. A sudden shift in the external environment challenging status quo world order produces a discontinuity, as does a sudden transition in U.S. domestic interests or public will. Currently, rising powers and non-state actors challenge U.S. hegemony militarily and economically. Domestic fiscal uncertainty threatens critical funding sources for development and execution of the national instruments of power. Two discontinuities in U.S. history surface for their similarity to today’s environment – the post-Vietnam era and the post-Cold War timeframe. Following the Vietnam War, dramatic change occurred, but the U.S. assessed the new strategic environment and ultimately achieved new, prioritized goals. Short of such assessment after the Cold War, the U.S. failed to identify significant changes in the strategic environment, leading to major missteps later. U.S. leadership can apply lessons from these events to determine the best approach for managing the current discontinuity.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Joseph A. DiNonno

Published:

This paper describes the current and future operating environment for the National Guard and what sequestration might mean for a return of tiered readiness. A proposed hybrid model of force generation is described and a recommendation given for mitigating the deleterious effects it may have on the National Guard. The paper then explores emerging risks and other areas within the Department of Homeland Security that should be addressed by a fundamental shift in thinking about the National Guard. This paper first looks to the emerging importance and associated risk of the cyber domain and argues that the National Guard should play a leading role in Homeland Security’s efforts to address cyber security. Second, this paper makes a case for application of geographically appropriate and lower readiness tiered National Guard units to integrate efforts and resources with the Customs and Border Patrol as a part of Homeland Security. Finally, an argument is articulated advocating better integration of the National Guard in FEMA and state readiness plans with a particular focus on rehearsals and exercises.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Robert G. Dixon

Published:

Global urbanization has given rise to the megacity: large, densely-packed urban areas with more than ten million people. These cities are becoming increasingly connected, dense and complex, and are becoming non-state actors’ preferred hiding places. It is inevitable that the US military will find the need to operate in this environment, and it is currently unprepared to do so. Gaining and maintaining a comprehensive understanding of the environment is the first challenge to preparing forces for megacity urban operations. The emerging fields of big data, analytics, and data-driven decision-making offer significant potential towards this end. The Army must study this environment and the emerging sets of tools if it wishes to remain relevant in tomorrow’s fight.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Charles B. Dockery

Published:

The 21st century is the “connected century.” Globalization has created social and economic interconnectedness more broadly and deeply than at any other time in history. At the same time, America has entered this century without a grand strategy around which it will shape the environment to suit its interests. This paper will examine the concept of grand strategy and the lack thereof that led to failed nation-building efforts that bookend the post-Cold War period. It will then describe the current global environment and the constraints and restraints that will impact any American grand strategy for the remainder of the 21st century. Finally, the paper will proffer partnerships with India and Indonesia as two mechanisms for increasing global connectivity by cementing the position of those two nations within the global functioning core.


Author: Commander William G. Dwyer III

Published:

China has been active in the Arctic for many years conducting climate research and expeditions. Over the last few years, China has made overtures for greater involvement in Arctic affairs and governance seeking full membership status in the Arctic Council and further collaboration with Arctic nations. China's interest in the Arctic is driven by the need to fuel and feed the world's largest population and most powerful economy. This study begins with a review of China's historical activities in the Arctic then argues that its recently intensified interest there is driven by two factors: natural resources and new maritime trade routes. Next, it suggests venues for increased Chinese participation in the governance structures for the Arctic and concludes with recommendations of concrete steps that the United States can take to encourage China's responsible behavior in this dynamic international sphere of cooperation. The United States, as the incumbent chair of the Arctic Council in 2015, will need to work with the Chinese government to ensure both responsible stewardship and activities in the Arctic.


Author: Mr. Stewart C. Eales

Published:

George Washington asserted that the American people had been entrusted with the preservation of “the sacred fire of liberty and the destiny of the republican model of government.” The character of that “preservation” has evolved and expanded as the nation’s power and reach have grown; reaching new heights when the collapse of the Soviet Union gave American Presidents the mandate to pursue a “new world order” built on a democratic foundation. This paper begins with a contextual analysis of democracy--what was promoted, why it was promoted, and how it was promoted--and provides an allegorical description of democracy promotion as torch bearing, shield bearing, and standard bearing. It then examines how Presidents George H. W. Bush, William J. Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack H. Obama promoted democracy. It offers four broad recommendations for democracy promotion: demonstrate that liberal democratic values are a litmus test for policy decisions, clarify the role of military power in the promotion of democracy, reassert American Exceptionalism, and distinguish between the promotion of liberal values and the nurturing of democratic institutions.


Author: Colonel Willie J. Flucker, Jr.

Published:

There exists within the Army officer corps an inadvertent system of diversity suppression that consistently produces a senior officer class far less racially diverse than its soldiers and the general public. This system is composed of structural barriers (institutional factors that exclude minorities to a greater extent than majority soldiers) and perceptual barriers (individual perceptions that lead minorities to think that they should not pursue an Army career). For African-Americans, these impediments are pervasive and interrelated. Sociological factors are also in operation, taking (or mistaking) unproven or unexplained institutional impediments to substantiate the consensus opinion in many black communities that pursuing a career as an Army officer means competing on an uneven playing field. Given these diversity suppression mechanics, a sustained, coordinated information and engagement campaign is required to produce an Army senior leader corps as ethnically diverse as its soldiers and the American people.


Author: Colonel Lee P. Gearhart

Published:

Diversity is key to The U.S. Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World, the Army Vision--Force 2025 and Beyond, and the U.S. Army Human Dimension Operating Concept. The Army Reserve (AR) is a diverse force that represents and serves the American people well. This study examined AR Gender and Race/Ethnic Group representation within the force by leadership opportunity. A leadership diversity gap was found with regard to female and minority opportunities. While Gender and Race/Ethnic Group trends were encouraging, more work remains regarding opportunities and advancement to senior rank. Females were significantly less likely to advance to senior officer rank and serve in key officer or Non-Commissioned Officer positions. Further, Blacks and Hispanics were significantly underrepresented overall in the officer ranks and their numbers contracted as they progressed to more senior ranks, as did their representation in key leadership positions. The inverse is true for Whites who were overrepresented in the officer ranks and their representation strengthened as they progressed to more senior ranks, where their percentages in key leadership positions remained robust.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Roger S. Giraud

Published:

The Army Medical Department (AMEDD) currently has an opportunity to support the Army Leader Development Strategy, the Army Campaign Plan, and the Army Operating Concept in identifying an integrated model for developing leaders by conducting a system program review of AMEDD leader development. This review is capable of reducing the tension between the provision of quality medicine and quality leadership by establishing leader competencies as the foundation and through the identification and prioritization of other health care competencies. These competencies will enable the objectives, concepts, and resources of an AMEDD leader development strategy through three lines of effort: training, education, and experience and provide competency assessment tools in all three leader-training domains. The review will allow the Army to make an informed decision and assume any appropriate risk regarding its medical department. The health care environment is a volatile, complex system, which requires strong leaders to lead AMEDD organizations in it. Soldiers and beneficiaries deserve great leadership and quality health care. The Army and the AMEDD can provide both through a strong AMEDD leader development system.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel John C. Hafley

Published:

The United States’ strategic patience in support of a denuclearized North Korea has not stopped the regime from becoming a Nuclear State. After years of failed Six Party Talks and sanctions that have not changed the ideology within the Hermit State, the United States has to take a different whole of government approach in order to achieve security and stability in the region. This paper conducts a review of current U.S. policy towards North Korea and recommends necessary changes in the post-nuclear era.


Author: Colonel Jerry A. Hall

Published:

The 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance directed the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific and required the Department of Defense to develop “innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches” to achieve security objectives. One Army response to this directive was the innovative and efficient Pacific Pathways 2014 (Pathways) initiative. The Pathways approaches would primarily consist of exercises, rotational presence, and military-to-military engagement. However, the Army struggled to clearly explain Pathways so the program was challenged. Pathways was perceived by challengers to be an Army attempt to remain strategically relevant in competition with the Marine Corps. This paper examines how U.S. Army Pacific leaders and staffs communicated the Pathways program. It demonstrates that, despite challenges, they effectively communicated the Pathways concept. The paper reviews the strategic information environment in the late summer and fall of 2013. Following an overview of the situation, it analyzes the Pathways communication strategy and implementation. It concludes with recommendations on how to communicate future iterations of Pacific Pathways more effectively.


Author: Colonel Jason Halloren

Published:

Millennials are changing the landscape of how the Army operates. Millennials are less patriotic, adopt individualism or collectivism, and as a result of their increasingly sheltered upbringing, they seemingly lack the mental toughness to deal with tough crisis. These characteristics are in stark contrast to Army values. With nearly 75% of the total military comprised of Millennials it is important to understand the character and motivation of Millennials in order to best prepare them for military service. Changing the way leaders communicate with Millennials by explaining the mission and tasks, breeding a competitive environment, and incorporating adversity training into entry level training will help ensure the Army is prepared for future engagement


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Jerad Harper

Published:

The formation of an Iraqi National Guard offers significant opportunity for improving Iraq’s short and long-term security capabilities and presents a potential reconciliation tool for improving relations with Iraq’s Sunni minority. Three case studies -- the use of tribal levies in Oman, the Saudi Arabian National Guard, and the U.S. Army National Guard -- provide important examples to inform the development of an effective and professional force. Building the Iraqi National Guard into a competent and professional force will require 1) the commitment of U.S. or western advisors over a long period, 2) a sustained commitment of resources, and 3) significant efforts to synchronize operations between the future Iraqi National Guard and the Iraqi Ministry of Defense. Finally, while this is a positive measure, it must be accompanied by other reconciliation efforts to address the needs of the Sunni minority. Absent these measures, attempts to create an Iraqi National Guard force could be arming participants in a future Iraqi Civil War.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Dennis R. Hawthorne

Published:

Tomorrow’s global uncertainties will test the capability, capacity, and innovative nature of the United States Army. The U.S. Army Operating Concept provides a set of core competencies to develop such an adept force. This force must act decisively and effectively in complex environments that are further limited by resource constraints. Secondly, innovative concepts are needed to overcome the static institution that emphasizes process over efficiency. The ability of units to sustain readiness is critical in providing the right force mix when and where needed. This paper will analyze U.S. Army Pacific’s execution of an operation named “Pacific Pathways,” and how it embodies those core competencies outlined in the Army Operating Concept. It will also provide recommendations that may enhance utilization of the Total Force in operationalizing the Regionally Aligned Forces initiative across the Army. These include readiness sustainment; use of pre-positioned stock; and greater integration of the Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational efforts in such a dynamic environment.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Lawrence W. Henry

Published:

The manner in which the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) employs violence and terror on the local populace of the Middle East, coupled with the terrorist group’s ability to leverage social media, places achieving the Obama Administration’s counter-terrorism strategic end state at risk due to the administration’s reliance on a lethal approach-namely an air campaign. This study utilizes case studies and literary reviews to determine appropriate non-lethal approaches to degrade and defeat ISIL. Upon gathering this information, a non-lethal strategy was developed that targeted ISIL’s critical vulnerabilities. Further, this study examined the risk and counterpoints that challenged the employed of a non-lethal strategy to defeat the terrorist group. Upon evaluating the risk, the diplomatic and economic risk associated with employing the strategy outweighed the gain, therefore, the employment of a non-lethal strategy was deemed inappropriate. Acknowledging this reality, this study-while not supporting a lethal approach to defeat ISIL-strongly advocates for the employment of a blended lethal non-lethal approach that leverages a Middle Eastern whole of government approach.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Christopher J. Hickey

Published:

Strategists and planners can improve the effectiveness of strategy, design, and joint operational planning by integrating game theory into current processes. Integrating game theory into current processes provides strategists an additional perspective that is focused on outcomes and the information and decisions that drive them. It provides a stimulus for thinking deeply about who the critical players and decision-makers are and what their values, interests, and expectations are relevant to the situation. Most importantly, it creates conditions that can lead to creating Courses of Action that are focused on information and decision-making from conception. This has the potential to reduce risks and costs while achieving the best potential outcome.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Matthew W. Higer

Published:

Senior leaders can significantly enhance the impact of the Department of Defense budget communication strategy by adding macroeconomic context via reference to: defense as a percent of Gross Domestic Product, historical defense expenditures, international defense level-of-effort comparisons, and the relative size of major federal outlays. To enhance the “austerity drives increased risk” message resonance, macroeconomic context should complement, not replace, the threat-informed, strategy-based budget communication paradigm. Budget number magnitudes are often incomprehensible, but tangible level-of-effort comparisons are insightful. The federal budget informs a fiscal environmental assessment, including political risk, as part of a disciplined update to defense budget communication strategy. The ultimate objective of the strategy should be to communicate defense resource requirements using ways meaningful to the U.S. Congress and the American public, thus significantly mitigating fiscal risk to national security.


Author: COL Joseph E Hilbert

Published:

In 2014 USARPAC began Pacific Pathways describing it as a proof of principle or concept. This paper will examine how well Pacific Pathways functioned as a proof of concept. First, this paper will define specifically how Pacific Pathways was designed to function as a proof of concept. It will then examine how proof of concept and proof of principle experiments are conducted in the private sector and determine what analogies can be made between how those experiments are done and how they are done in the organizational environment. This paper will discuss causal functions and will show how understanding causality is a pre-requisite for learning organizations to actually prove a concept. The paper will then look at Pacific Pathways 14 and examine how well it functioned as a proof of concept and will look at the tools USARPAC and I Corps used to evaluate it. Finally, the paper will conclude with a set of recommendations showing how USARPAC can conduct and evaluate future Pathways using a revised proof of concept model.


Author: Mr. R. Carl Hoehne

Published:

Russia’s population and demographic dynamics have changed significantly since Soviet times and continue to evolve with strategic consequence for the United States. In the next fifteen to thirty years these changes will profoundly affect Russian society and its ability to reliably field land power of the size it has today. This trend may make Russia even more dangerous to the United States than it is today. The main elements of this analysis will seek to shed light on current and projected demographic trends in Russia, and examine how demographic change could influence the Russian strategic outlook and how it staffs and integrates its armed forces. In question is whether or not current or projected government policies will adequately manage the demographic changes occurring within the borders of the Russian Federation.


Author: Colonel Marc Hoffmeister

Published:

Combatant Commanders (CCDR) should maximize every opportunity to enhance joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) partnerships and improve strategic alliances. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) operates globally and integrates across the interagency, providing unique regional access, understanding and opportunity. Integrating USACE activities during all phases of planning synchronizes Combatant Command (CCMD) strategic effects with the planning efforts of the Department of State (DoS) and the US Agency for International Development (USAID). Formalizing the relationship of the aligned USACE Divisions with each CCMD enhances this process. Growing the capability of the USACE Liaison teams, improving the integration of engineer assets, and formalizing the USACE Division’s role on the CCDRs staff will enhance the strategic nexus of defense, diplomacy and development. To achieve the full potential for interagency support, the USACE and Army Engineer Regiment should pursue opportunities to refine and expand how engineer effects are integrated into security cooperation activities at all levels of planning from strategic to tactical.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Kelly R. Holbert

Published:

In today’s complex joint operational environment, American Airmen appear to be absent from commanding “combat-oriented” Joint Task Forces (JTFs). In the future, when considering general officers for command of combat JTFs, the domain background of potential commanders should matter less than their ability to effectively lead, conceptualize, and execute joint combat operations. Thus, American Airmen’s “Air-Mindedness” may need broadening in order to more effectively integrate and lead joint forces at the JTF level. While “Air-Mindedness” will always be a critical element of the joint fight, “Synergy-Mindedness” is increasingly important to the success of JTFs operating in high intensity combat environments.


Author: Colonel H. Warner Holt, II

Published:

The Budget Control Act of 2011 has driven significant reductions to our military budgets over the last several years. This fact, coupled with the reality that the United States is heavily burdened by more national debt today than at any point in history, will continue to drive budget shortfalls and will no doubt drive a reprioritization of our global strategic objectives. The National Security Strategy has emphasized the importance of building capacity with our partner nations. The State Partnership Program (SPP) is a shining star when it comes to building partnership capacity and security cooperation. The SPP is the only current program that integrates military and civilian capabilities and has proven to be an economical approach with a high return on investment. We must take advantage of this successful program and take it to the next level as we seek the most effective ways to build the security capacities of our partner nations.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Brian S. Horine

Published:

The primary goals of U.S. support to Latin America are to promote peace and to improve economic stability. Lessons learned from Plan Colombia and the War on Drugs and Narcoterrorism can be applied to the current threat perpetuated by the Sendero Luminoso (SL) in Peru. Using a framework consisting of the elements of National Power as viewed through the lens of Culture (C-DIME), the following paper will illustrate how the United States can support Peru in strengthening its national institutions and defeating the SL and its narco-criminal sponsors. This paper analyzes how the principles behind the success of Plan Colombia, rather than the specified practices employed, can be applied in Peru to defeat SL efforts in order to advance U.S. security interests while concurrently enabling host nation efforts to build legitimacy and expand security. Based upon this framework, the U.S. should continue its support of Peru in its endeavors to deter, defeat and demobilize the Sendero Luminoso.


Author: Colonel James E. Huber

Published:

Many researchers describe the Millennial Generation as portraying the best traits of previous generations. This paper uses generational theory to examine the characteristics of the three distinct generations currently serving in the Army. It identifies the characteristics unique to Millennials and discusses opportunities to enhance the future of the Army profession. Among other generational characteristics, It examines the collaborative and socially connected nature of the Millennial Generation. It includes a discussion on the Army Profession Campaign and draws a comparison of millennial characteristics and the essential characteristics of the Army Profession defined in Army Doctrine Reference Publication 1, focusing on trust as the principle characteristic. The paper concludes with recommendations for the Army to leverage millennial strengths to improve collaboration and ensure that millennial social connectedness secures a future of improved civil-military relations.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Frank P. Intini III

Published:

The Army’s currently accepted concept of “broadening” leaders focuses on individual development through a series of experiential opportunities. This paper explores the possibility of expanding the concept of broadening leaders and enhancing their ability to adapt to an increasingly complex world through a re-focus on integrating the systems and processes which were established in an effort to make the Army a learning institution. Specifically, it proposes we consider the benefits afforded by the Army’s Historical Program, potential areas for greater synergy between several post 9-11 institutions which capture experience-based insights, inculcating historical insights into the training development and reporting aspects of the Unit Training Management system, and further emphasis on “historical-mindedness” and the assets available to achieve it in our revised doctrine. This shift in philosophy reflects a logical evolution in empowered leadership rather than a revolution in leader development and, as such, may be possible through the limited reorganization and repurposing of existing assets with no growth in manpower or materiel.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Eric L. Jackson

Published:

During every past interwar period in our nation’s history there has been a drawdown of forces at conflict termination. However, the current interwar period falls during a time of persistent global conflict. Domestically, the armed forces are challenged by smaller budgets. These foreign threats and domestic political challenges have combined to create a requirement to properly execute a personnel drawdown that must be able to respond to today’s threats and be prepared to defeat tomorrow’s adversaries. As the Army downsizes to 440,000-450,000 active duty Soldiers, key questions remain as the Army marches towards this number. Is the drawdown being done correctly? Are the right people leaving and staying? Post separation board analysis suggests that some population subsets (based on commissioning source, branch, ethnicity, etc.) were more susceptible to involuntary separation than others. This paper offers assessments on whether the right people are staying and leaving. It also offers an assessment if this drawdown is being executed correctly. Lastly, it offers recommendations on how to obtain greater parity across all commissioning sources so that the entire officer corps can be strengthened.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Derek K. Jansen

Published:

The U.S. Army’s propensity to solve tactical problems through advances in high-technology solutions has created an increased requirement for electricity on the battlefield. For example, the largest portion of fuel used by a Stryker Brigade Combat Team in the tactical environment (36%) is used to generate electrical power in support of technology solutions, which is more fuel than used to supply ground vehicles or aviation. Congress, concerned with the strategic vulnerability of fuel supplies, has mandated the Army and other services reduce fuel requirements through efficiencies and the development of alternative energy sources. The U.S. Army has responded by increasing the energy efficiency of systems and platforms but has not addressed the doctrine or training shortfalls, which contribute to the lack of awareness among leaders and Soldiers of how wasted electricity could affect operations, budgets and lives.


Author: Commander Robert P. Johns

Published:

Even during a time of reduced budgets, the United States will continue to support worldwide stability efforts as part of its foreign policy and national security strategy. Accordingly, U.S. national interests are best served by partnering with other countries, international agencies, and non-governmental organizations to conduct stability operations effectively. Integral to any stability operation is information sharing to coordinate the efforts of all stakeholders involved. With a myriad of existing information systems and capabilities, the task of effectively sharing information among partners in a rapidly changing stability environment becomes imperative. The advent of “cloud computing” presents a unique opportunity to create information sharing among disparate groups at a relatively low cost. Conceptually, cloud computing offers an innovative means to assist in U.S. stability operations by optimizing and harmonizing the challenges of information sharing. This paper explores the basis for continued U.S. participation in stability operations, the salient challenges with information sharing during stability operations, the innovative solutions offered by cloud computing, and some of the challenges with respect to cloud computing.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Bradley L. Johnson

Published:

The United States Air Force (AF) maintains approximately 30% surplus infrastructure capacity across its airbase enterprise, but it lacks comprehensive strategic basing guidance to objectively evaluate and manage the excess. The excess infrastructure taxes critical fiscal resources and limits the AF’s ability to effectively maintain and keep its installations relevant. The AF recently published its 30-year strategic path in, “America’s Air Force: A Call to the Future,” and it articulates a strategy to emphasizing capability over capacity. The AF should take the same strategic approach of capability over capacity toward installation management and develop basing guidance framed by this strategy. Such guidance will allow the AF to efficiently manage its installations, objectively assess and articulate its excess capacity to its stakeholders, and strategically shape its future basing efforts. This paper provides recommendations for developing strategic basing guidance to align installation capability and capacity to air, space, and cyber mission generation.


Author: Colonel Wade B. Johnston

Published:

In conflict areas, a connection between the people and their government is a key aspect of how greater information sharing through social networking programs can enhance civil security efforts during counterterrorism operations. This paper will assess the viability of using an interactive web based program such as CRIMEWATCH to link security services to the population in order to deter, disrupt and defeat extremists. The following analysis uses security efforts in Nigeria as a case study for analyzing the feasibility, suitability and acceptability of employing this approach across political, infrastructure, social and information sectors. At the local level, web based programs can share relevant information between authorities and the public to be value-added in disrupting extremists efforts, thereby providing the government a strategic advantage. This potentially low cost investment would provide a significant payout at the strategic level in countering violent extremists and provide a method which could be replicated in other affected countries or regions.


Author: Mr. Jeffrey R. Jones

Published:

Cyberspace is a man-made environment created through the evolution of technology. People, institutions, organizations, and governments across the globe use cyberspace as the primary enabler for global communications, shipping, commerce, and finance. Cyberspace is also the newest warfighting domain that supports, yet challenges, traditional modes of warfare and its practitioners. Countless theorists through the centuries, such as Clausewitz, Corbett, and Sun-Tzu, have offered military theories for waging war. However, a theory for fighting from and in cyberspace has yet to be developed. Cyberspace theory would guide and enhance the DoD’s use of cyberspace in support of enterprise and military operations. For cyberspace to be truly used as a warfighting domain, it must be underpinned by theory in order to understand how to fight and win in the virtual space. Without a theoretic baseline, one will never know when to deviate from the norm and why. Evolving theories from classical theorists to create cyberspace theory will enable the DoD to effectively project cyberpower and gain the competitive advantage in cyberspace.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Marcus A. Jones

Published:

The U.S. National Interests presented by each Presidential Administration are codified in the National Security Strategy and serve as the foundation for U.S. policy formulation and implementation. The 2015 National Security outlines four National Interests – U.S. Security, U.S. Economic Prosperity, A Rules-based International Order, and Respect for Universal Values. Each of the National Interests evokes a different level of relative interest intensity. When compared with the other National Interests, and analyzed against ongoing foreign policy activities, Universal Values promotion is not aligned with other elements of the National Security Strategy. This inconsistency negatively effects U.S. credibility in the international community. In view of this interest conflict, the U.S. should revise the National Interests to remove Universal Values and replace it with Stability. This revision better articulates current policy actions and enhances U.S. credibility.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel K. Scott Katrosh

Published:

This paper addresses the wicked problem of toxic leadership in the U.S. Army. The paper begins by defining toxic leadership, explaining the scope of the challenge, describing its effects on subordinates and units, and examining current barriers to identification of toxic leaders. The paper explores methods to identify toxic leaders within the U.S. Army. Finally, the paper describes tools available to remove toxic leaders from military service. Taming this wicked problem requires positive and effective leadership at all levels. Leaders must first help establish a military culture that encourages Soldiers to report toxic behavior without fear of reprisal. Leaders must also make the hard choices necessary to document and remove toxic leaders from military service. The Army is moving in the right direction with several new initiatives including revamping the Officer Evaluation Report system and implementing the Commander 360 evaluations. The Army must continue to monitor and expand upon these initiatives to demonstrate its commitment to rid toxic leaders from its ranks and to protect the integrity of the military profession.


Author: Colonel Jason E. Kelly

Published:

Despite scientific data, tough talk from the White House and development of viable adaptation measures, efforts to increase coastal community resiliency remain stalled. This study investigates sea level changes in a strategically important coastal community and the impact of these changes on U.S. national interests. For many reasons, the country is developing a keen interest in adaptation and resiliency. Norfolk, Virginia is the second-most vulnerable city to sea level rise in the U.S. behind New Orleans. The risks posed to military facilities in this vibrant coastal community demand a response to climate consequences that are already affecting the area. This paper explores the science of rising seas, the significance of American ports, the strategic importance of Norfolk, and the potential role the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers could play in adaptation and resiliency.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Sharon K. E. Kibiloski

Published:

The idea of violent extremism as a security threat to the United States (U.S.) has evolved over the last 25 years, especially as it pertains to sub-Saharan Africa. Since the U.S. has not had to militarily confront large-scale violent extremism in sub-Saharan Africa, this region now provides the U.S. an exceptional strategic opportunity to move away from a military-dominated reflexive approach and instead fully commit to a more proactive human-focused approach to address the underlying conditions which allow violent extremism to grow and prosper. The U.S. must prioritize and adequately resource long-term development activities in key human-centered development areas focused on setting the conditions for stability in this region over military counterterrorism approaches which only address the immediate symptom of violent extremism. This paper makes three strategy-related recommendations focusing on resources, organizational structure and creativity, and two policy-related recommendations which focus on restraint and risk acceptance.


Author: Colonel Jason A Kirk

Published:

DoD’s Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs) have the imperative to assess their Theater Campaign Plans in response to DoD’s recent 2014 Climate Change Adaptation Roadmap. As a “case-study” relevant to all GCCs this paper analyzes the risks and opportunities facing U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) in reviewing climate change impacts primarily in the Caribbean region of its Area of Operations. In coordination with and sometimes in support of Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development’s climate change actions, SOUTHCOM has the opportunity to bolster both its “humanitarian assistance/disaster relief” and “partner nation of choice” end-state objectives. SOUTHCOM and its interagency partners can employ leader engagements, technical support and various funding mechanisms to assist select partner nations in improving their climate change resiliency.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Eric Knapp

Published:

The United States effectively countered enemy attempts to frame the Mexican War as a holy war against Catholicism. An actively engaged and hostile civilian population could have seriously jeopardized U.S. military operations during the invasion of Mexico. President Polk and General Scott planned and executed a strategy of conciliation toward Mexican civilians that sought to keep them on the sidelines of the contest. Negating a holy war narrative put forward by Mexican leaders was central to the U.S. strategy of conciliation. The United States accomplished this by incorporating Catholic priests into its army of invasion, cooperating with Catholic Church leaders, both in Mexico and in the United States, and by respecting Church property and symbols. Both U.S. political and military leaders accomplished this all during a time of strident anti-Catholicism in the United States. Although different in time and circumstance, the United States again finds itself fighting an adversary that seeks to put forward a narrative of holy war in reaction to perceived attacks on its faith. The U.S. experience in Mexico can be used to help shape potential approaches to countering such a narrative.


Author: Colonel David M. Knych

Published:

Strategy observers and pundits increasingly argue that the current United States grand strategy of maintaining its position of Primacy through an activist foreign policy, robust overseas military presence, and vast network of alliances and security commitments is proving disastrous to American interests. This cohort argues that America is overstretched and in decline, and can no longer afford to maintain its ambitious global reform agenda or meet its security obligations abroad. As such, they advocate for a grand strategy of Restraint, also known as Retrenchment, as way of preserving a narrower, but vital set of security interests by reducing its presence overseas, reducing its security commitments abroad, and shifting burdens to allies and partners. This paper questions ‘Restraint’ as a viable alternative to the current United States approach in grand strategy and refutes the key arguments and assumptions made by ‘Restraint’ advocates. In reality, the United States must remain engaged in the world and provide leadership, as it is the only sure way of securing its vital, national security interests.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Michael A. Konczey

Published:

Mission command enables the future joint force to successfully navigate the increasingly dynamic and complex operational environment. Trust, and the Army’s ability to foster trust across each echelon, is critical to mission command’s premise of leaders at all levels empowered through trust to execute disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent. As the Army transitions from a decade-plus of persistent conflict to garrison, leaders face challenges in fostering this trust. This research project explores the importance of trust as it relates to the philosophy pillar of mission command and how one builds trust. Next, it defines the garrison environment and the inherent risks to trust. Finally, it makes recommendations on how to encourage and sustain mission command in garrison.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Nelson G. Kraft

Published:

The 2013 Army Leader Development Strategy (ALDS), coupled with recommendations from the 2013 Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) Leader Development Task Force Final Report, provide an excellent road map to develop leaders for the future. However, there is a challenge in the development of strategic leaders that neither the ALDS, nor the CSA’s task force take into account; the time it will take to develop a strategic leader before the ALDS and CSA’s task force’s recommendations are fully implemented. In essence, a gap of time exists where strategic leaders remain underdeveloped. Bridging this gap is crucial for the Army in order to have strategic leaders in the near term. Additionally, a distinction between senior and strategic leaders and their development is needed to bridge this gap and improve leader development for the Army leadership that will face the challenges of the twenty-first century. This paper offers a strategy to fill the near-term gap in the Army’s development plan for strategic leaders serving at the ranks of Lieutenant Colonel and Colonel and recommends a way ahead to improve the development of officers in the same ranks that have not been earmarked for service as strategic leaders.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Clayton E. Kuetemeyer

Published:

The National Guard should serve a more active role supporting Combatant Command theater security cooperation requirements. Active Component force structure is decreasing while the demand for globally engaged operations increases. The National Guard has experience in relationship building from the State Partnership Program, and unique experience in Defense Support to Civil Authorities and consequence management. The National Guard needs to foster improvements to Department of Defense processes that more strongly consider National Guard forces for deployment in support of Combatant Commands’ requirements. The National Guard can achieve this through improvements in three areas: alignment mechanisms that enable GCCs to identify available National Guard forces and their capabilities; coordination between the National Guard Bureau and Combatant Commands; and finally, the requirements, reporting, and demonstration of National Guard readiness.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Robert B. Kuth

Published:

For decades, Iran has disrupted security and stability in the Middle East. Its unlawful pursuit of nuclear weapons and support of terrorist organizations continues to pose a significant threat to U.S. national interests and the international community. The acquisition of nuclear weapons would thrust Iran into a hegemonic status and create an undesirable imbalance of power across the region. The National Security Strategy states that Iran must meet its international responsibilities beginning with a peaceful nuclear program. It must cooperate with the international community, abide by international laws, and comply with the content of the 2013 Joint Plan of Action. While current United States (U.S.) policy is focused on prevention, it lacks the teeth required to compel Iran to comply. The U.S. must develop a broad, comprehensive, consistent, long-range strategy to contain Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons in order to promote stability in the region. This paper reviews current U.S. policy. More importantly, it will discuss additional options the U.S. Government should consider before entertaining the notion of a nuclear-armed Iran.


Author: Colonel Bryan J. Laske

Published:

Both State Department and Department of Defense leaders have articulated policy and guidance emphasizing the importance of building partner capacity as part of regional security strategies and overall national interests. In addition, the President has set forth policy to strengthen the ability of the United States to help allies and partner nations build their own security capacity. Yet, the ability to bring the instruments of national power to effective use remains a challenge. The United States must pursue a new approach to better meet a complex and interdependent security environment. The cross-functional teams represented in joint-interagency task forces are a model that has proven its effectiveness toward national security goals in multiple regions and for a variety of purposes. Institutionalizing cross-functional teams in the model of the joint-interagency task force and employing them to link geographic combatant command regional strategies with U.S. Embassy country strategies in the security sector will establish an effective mechanism to integrate capabilities, authorities, and resources of all U.S. Government departments and agencies in key regions, sub regions, or high-risk countries.


Author: Mr. Gregory F. Lawless

Published:

In 1965, the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) took up arms against Thai security forces. The Thai response to the insurgency was uneven. A 1968 article for Foreign Affairs reflected contemporary concerns: “Northeast Thailand: Tomorrow’s Vietnam?” Questions arose whether the Thai government was quelling the uprising or fueling the grievances that supported the insurgency. This case study examines the Royal Thai Government’s successful suppression of the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT), including activities in 1978-1980 and the political policies announced in 1980 that reduced the CPT’s strength and diminished its appeal to the populace. This review will examine the security situation and the political landscape of Thailand from 1965 to 1985 to test the thesis that the political astuteness of the “semi-democratic” military regime in power from 1977 until 1988 bears the greatest responsibility for the successful elimination of the Communist Party of Thailand as a viable threat. The key to the success of this counterinsurgency strategy lay in the political formulae the Thai regime employed for a “political offensive.”


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Matthew W. Lawrence

Published:

The Army Reserve has experienced difficulty in attracting recruits, missing its recruiting targets every year since 2011. Some in the Army Reserve have discussed establishing a distinct brand for the Army Reserve to improve the image of the component in the public’s mind and alleviate the difficulty in attracting recruits. However, branding an organization is not merely marketing, and the Army Reserve is neither equipped to undertake such an endeavor, nor does it have the characteristics of a valuable brand. A brand has five characteristics that define its position: distinctive, coherent, appropriate, protectable and appealing. The Army Reserve does not have elements at its core identity that meet all of those criteria. In addition, the Army has embarked on a new branding initiative called the Enterprise Army Brand that includes the Army Reserve. Despite the research and effort that has gone into the Enterprise Army Brand, its success is not guaranteed, which calls into question the wisdom of the Army Reserve establishing a separate identity.


Author: Lt Col Christopher T Lay

Published:

The 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, U.S. policy in the Middle East emphasizes security through collaboration with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. The United States and Saudi Arabia have had a long-standing relationship focused on regional stability and shared security interests. The closeness and strength of the U.S.-Saudi relationship stems from a long relationship based on common interests in oil, strategic regional stability, and Saudi security. The United States Military Training Mission (USMTM) to Saudi Arabia remains a foundational part of this relationship, focusing on “training, advising, and assisting” Saudi Arabian defense services. This military relationship remains intact today because of common interests and strategic objectives; however, it was not born overnight. Rather, the relationship required sixty tumultuous years to mature into what it is today. This is the story of that relationship’s evolution.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Eric D. Little

Published:

The announced rebalance towards the Pacific by the United States comes with a renewed effort to establish partnerships and adopt a cooperative posture with not just friends and partners in the region, but also with potential adversaries. Despite U.S. policy clearly stressing the importance of expanded partnerships and cooperation with China, there is a continued adversarial posture maintained by the U.S. in the space realm. Failing to cooperate with China will result in a contested and congested space environment that will lead to catastrophic and irreversible consequences. Additionally, the exorbitant cost associated with space acquisition, combined with the very robust inventory of systems providing capabilities to end-users is not sustainable in the current fiscal environment. A U.S. – China space partnership comes with risk, however, these risks do not outweigh the advantages of a positive U.S.-China relationship, nor do they outweigh the consequences of a failure to establish this relationship.


Author: Colonel Joseph G. Lock

Published:

After nearly fourteen years of continuous combat and a global campaign to defeat al-Qa’ida (AQ), the United States Military is more capable, agile, and lethal than ever before. However, this exceptional capability is insufficient to reverse the expanding threat presented by AQ and other similarly inspired Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs) that exploit fragile governments and thrive in ungoverned spaces. In order to reverse this trend, the U.S. needs to rebalance the current counterterrorism strategy, with much greater emphasis and resources applied toward building partner capacity (BPC) to reduce ungoverned space and eliminate emerging threats before they can take root. Increasing partner nation capacity building efforts requires persistent presence, a more streamlined funding authority, and better Special Operations Forces / Conventional Forces integration to maximize available manpower.


Author: Colonel Clyde Arthur Lynn III

Published:

The Army is experiencing and increasingly observable “values to virtue” gap. This gap is most evident through the high profile breaches of moral conduct reported in the media. The Army established its seven values, coupled with other programs such as Comprehensive Soldier and Family Fitness (CSF2), to serve as the base for moral development of Army professionals. The CSF2 program states that values reside in the spiritual dimension and psychology informs us that humans have a need to believe in the supernatural. Indeed, more than eighty-four percent of Americans embrace some form of religion. Values are normally transformed into virtue through religious instruction and experience. However, many recent Army and Department of Defense policies and actions have limited the religious liberty of soldiers, undermining the effort to close the values to virtue gap. The Army can emphasize the spiritual dimension by exposing its soldiers to various religious and secular resources without endorsing and religion (or non-religion) over any other and without violating the constitutional rights of its soldiers. Failure to do so will result in the continued widening of the gap and further disconnect the force from the public it serves.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Donald A. MacCuish

Published:

This paper provided an analysis of leadership development strategies that are applicable to logistics officer education. It concludes that the Logistics Leadership Development Strategy puts the Army on the right track in developing logistics officers through education. Although on the right track, the paper also argued that the LLDS is insular in its view of leadership development. Criteria for analysis was developed from various white papers, futures concepts, and theories of professional education. Additionally, trends in public and private logistics and supply chain education was reviewed. The paper was divided into three sections, first the Framework. In this section the author provided a synopsis of the competencies and skills required of future logistics leaders based on recently published Army and Joint concepts and strategies. The second section offers a critique of the framework laid out in section I, answering the question “can the LLDS develop the future logisticians the criteria call for, and why”? Section III then offers some recommendations on changes that should be made to existing logistics education to better meet the strategy for developing future army logistics officers.


Author: Colonel Silas G. Martinez

Published:

Given the importance of whole-of-government approaches to solving volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous strategic problems in this era of fiscal austerity, the United States (US) Army owes it to the American people to maximize the effectiveness every employee. The US Army has focused on talent management in its Senior Officer Corps as one way of developing the next generation of leaders to work in that environment. Still, precious little has been written about talent management for the Department of the Army (DA) Civilians who comprise nearly one-third of the US Army, and who provide continuity in the organizations that conduct Army operations around the globe and across the Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic objectives. This paper focuses on talent management of DA Civilians. We start with a review of talent management literature, and then outline the general goals of talent management for any population. We will look at the current state of talent management for the DA Civilians, and make recommendations on how to better employ that talent. We end with a discussion about a lateral entry, a specific business talent management practice that may be suitable for use for DA Civilians.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Pete McAleer

Published:

The proliferation of advanced anti-access and area denial weapons systems (A2AD) creates a significant threat to U.S. Joint Forces operating in the global commons. Current joint doctrine is insufficient for preparing the Joint Force to operate in an A2AD environment. The military’s Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons (JAM-GC) and The Air-Sea Battle Concept, developed to counter A2AD threats, establishes assumptions about the operating environment but does little to manage the risk inherent with the assumptions. Changes in joint force command and control, training and operations, and interoperability and equipment procurement must be made to fully develop an effective doctrine for countering A2AD threats. Without the recommended changes, the U.S. joint force will not be able to ensure the accomplishment of national objectives.


Author: Dr James C McNaughton

Published:

In the mid-1950s, the U.S. Army became the world’s first landpower trained and equipped to deliver nuclear fires on the battlefield. Within a decade the Army operated ten different nuclear weapons systems, even though by then their strategic rationale had sharply eroded. For a time, industry’s ability to design ever smaller and more sophisticated weapons outstripped their operational rationale. Yet soldiers and leaders at unit level continued to maintain these complex systems for field artillery, air defense artillery, atomic demolition munitions and intermediate-range ballistic missiles. They devised solutions to the problems of sharing the technology with allies and the Reserve Components and securing the weapons on foreign soil. Soldiers continually innovated as new and improved systems became available and maintained these capabilities through decades of rapid change, including non-nuclear conflicts, the transition to an All-Volunteer Army and racial and gender integration. The Army adapted its personnel management, training, security and maintenance systems at enormous cost. Not until the end of the Cold War did the president finally direct the Army to stand down from this demanding mission.


Author: Colonel Stephen A. Miller

Published:

The West is in a rut after fighting radical Islamic fundamental terrorists since 2001. We use medical analogical thinking to reset an approach to this complex, challenging problem. The West has been fighting the symptoms, avoiding the root causes. By asking “what?” questions, instead of “who?” questions, we can shift the West’s approach from a mostly military interventionist strategy to adopt the medical analogy of “gateway drugs.” The paradox of the root cause analysis is that America is a guarantor of religious freedom yet it is an extreme form of religious fundamentalism that is the threat. A counter narrative is needed that targets fundamentalists who have not yet turned to violent extremism. To do this, the West’s security apparatuses need to collaborate with social scientists and other experts to develop such counter narratives. The successes of Human Terrain Teams and the Minerva Research Initiative can serve as exemplars to create such strategic narratives.


Author: Colonel Daniel S. Morgan

Published:

China’s expanding influence into the LAC region along with growing Asia-Pacific and LAC relationships present challenges to the U.S.. The complexity of the relationships between LAC and Asia-Pacific governments, to include China, suggest the U.S. rebalancing to Asia strategy is inadequate to address the cross-regional impacts. This paper explains political, economic, and military impacts and proposes a broader Pacific solution that links LAC into the U.S.’ Asia rebalancing strategy. The political relationships between LAC and Chinese governments can undermine U.S. values of democracy, human rights, rule of law, and international norms. China’s soft power through economic statecraft increases their influence by providing trade and investment alternatives other than U.S. options. Increased cross-regional trade flows are also creating integrated supply chains. Last, Chinese arms sales, training exercises, and military education exchanges provide revenue and support their military modernization in Asia. These factors create one integrated problem, not two separate ones. Without a broader Pacific strategic option, the U.S. regional approach to the Asia-Pacific will result in reduced access to markets and future strategic risk to U.S. influence in both regions.


Author: Colonel Brandon Newton

Published:

This paper examines flaws in the strategic discourse on cyber power. The current discourse is flawed because it is dominated by hyperbole, misapplies context, and lacks sufficient precision in terms and definitions. There are two critical flaws in the current discourse. The first is descriptions of the existential nature of strategic cyber war, and the Armageddon like environment that would be created by such a war, despite evidence to the contrary. The second flaw is in the understanding of the context of any cyber action potential adversaries, state or non-state. Recommended adjustments to the discourse need to be informed by clear and valid assumptions on what can be done with cyber power, as well as the application of a model for cyber threat prioritization. The final analysis addresses the needed changes in education and training, and the role of humans in understanding the nature of cyber power.


Author: Colonel Constantin E. Nicolet

Published:

This paper explores the moral implications of the use of Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPAs) to conduct lethal strikes as a tactic in the United States counterterrorism campaign. In doing so, and at the unclassified level, this paper presents a factual overview of RPAs by outlining their capabilities and characteristics. It then provides a synopsis of just war theory, which serves as the basis for the discussion of the moral aspects of RPA use. Following this background material, the paper addresses some of the ethical considerations and challenges of RPAs and their use in principle and in the context of the war against al-Qa’ida. The paper concludes that the U.S. meets the jus ad bellum requirements for fighting al-Qa’ida and that the use of RPAs to conduct lethal strikes, provided it adheres to the published standards, is morally acceptable as a component of the U.S. counterterrorism campaign, meeting jus in bello criteria.


Author: Colonel Heath Niemi

Published:

As military leaders will soon possess an almost deistic ability to see the battlefield, approaching remote omniscience, omnipotence, and omnipresence (O3); strategic and operational commanders will have a better understanding of the common operational picture. The perception of O3 will potentially cause senior leaders to interfere and centrally control their subordinate leaders and elements prohibiting the effective use of mission command. This paper postulates leadership, in an O3 environment, will preclude the full employment of an empowered force within the definition of mission command. Instead, leaders need to find a middle ground between the ability to centralize control and the capacity to resource empowered leaders and teams. As globalization in a volatile international arena requires every technological tool available to allocate limited resources and project the effective use of leadership, the use of advanced technology can enhance the effectiveness of leadership for a globally dispersed organization. The future capability technology brings to leadership highlights the required doctrine, training and appropriate barriers to enable mission command in an environment of perceived godlike visibility of operations.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Geoffrey A. Norman

Published:

Mission command represents a significant cultural shift in the leadership philosophy of the U.S. Army, yet recent studies indicate Army leaders and organizations struggle to implement its fundamental principles. Effective mission command relies heavily on teams and team building, but many Army leaders and organizations demonstrate weak team development and team leadership. This paper explores the Army’s shift to mission command as a leadership philosophy; reviews recent leadership survey results to reveal areas of improvement in the exercise of mission command within the force; and considers contemporary civilian organizational behavior models, such as senior team leadership. The paper concludes by providing recommendations on ways to infuse senior team leadership methods by addressing doctrinal and training shortfalls in team building, reduce leader and team member turnover, and improve leadership feedback to harness the talents of leaders at all levels and more fully exercise mission command.


Author: Colonel Paul R. Norwood

Published:

How does any commander or leader invested with institutional authority make sound judgments related to justice and other command authorities? A commander’s decision to establish accountability through an array of disciplinary tools (ranging from light to severe), directly impacts the perception of organizational justice within the unit. This paper will provide a detailed analysis of an illustrative justice-related decision framework and explore how the Army trains and develops leaders to exercise their command authority and responsibility. It reviews what other ethical decision making models exist that may be of use to commanders, what is being taught to commanders and when it is taught. It considers the impacts of a loss in confidence in commanders to make these decisions and the potential outcome of a loss of authority due to poor command performance. Ultimately, this paper recommends an illustrative decision making framework which commanders may find helpful in developing their sound judgment related to justice matters. Then, training together with senior commanders, they may use their personal framework to practice making sound judgments with an eye better attuned to what makes a decision good.


Author: Colonel William T. Nuckols Jr.

Published:

The Iraqi Army built by the United States from 2004 to 2012, at a cost of billions of dollars and thousands of service members lives’ lost, has disintegrated under the onslaught of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). ISIS controls much of western Iraq, including its second largest city, Mosul. The Government of Iraq, with assistance from the U.S. and other allies, must build a small and professional Army. To re-establish a resilient and effective organization, the Iraqi Army (IA) must be massively reorganized and trained with an understanding that the effort will take years of persistent U.S. and allied presence. This has been proven to be effective in Columbia. The new IA will require long term U.S. (or NATO) advisors, to live with and train their Iraqi counterparts. Finally, the IA must be professionalized, with greater focus on selfless service and loyalty to the constitutionally appointed and elected leaders of Iraq. This will require a change in culture, which will include a level of accountability and discipline that has been generally absent from many of the members of the IA. This approach will also require a long term commitment from the United States, both in terms of military personnel and money.


Author: Colonel Daniel E. O’Grady

Published:

The United States Army is downsizing. It is critical that we recruit and retain the best and brightest, ensuring our ability to meet complex, unpredictable missions in more effective and efficient ways. The United States Army relies on an all-volunteer force to execute its assigned missions while simultaneously maintaining its congressionally mandated end-strength. The number of soldiers and their ability to conduct full-spectrum operations directly impacts the Army’s ability to execute the National Military Strategy. As the Army continues to procure and use technologically advanced equipment to help counterbalance reduction in forces, it will need to recruit those individuals that demonstrate the capability to quickly learn and apply new skill sets. This paper will outline a strategy and provide recommendations for ensuring the United States Army Recruiting Command can best compete for and acquire the talent the Army requires between now and 2025.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Derek James O’Malley

Published:

The rhetoric is heated in the debate over the future of the A-10. The F-35, which has been touted as the replacement for the A-10 and several other legacy fighters, is behind schedule and currently lacks many of the A-10’s capabilities. Critics argue that the F-35 will never match the A-10 and is a leap backwards in CAS capability, while F-35 advocates cite the impressive 5th generation capabilities the F-35 will eventually bring to the fight. Amidst this war of words, where emotions run high, it is difficult to wade through the ensembles of points and counterpoints to discern a productive path. Thus, this paper is not just about the A-10 or the F-35. Rather, it is about making tough choices to forge effective defense strategies in a complex, resource constrained, and rapidly changing environment. To this end, we will explore a series of cases from both the business world and the Department of Defense (DoD). These vignettes will reveal patterns of behavior, which converge to stifle critical thinking in competitive landscapes. This paper will present a balanced discussion on future defense strategies, allowing readers to draw their own conclusions about the future of the A-10.


Author: Colonel Morgan D. O’Rourke

Published:

The US finds itself in an increasingly unstable and unpredictable world with a shrinking military. Smaller JTFs will have to form on short notice from multiple bases to cover the joint functions. We cannot allow the enemy to control key terrain and use their countermobility systems to pin down and destroy our forces. During the recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, we ceded the countermobility fight to the enemy and lost the initiative. Engineers focused on building protective structures and finding IEDs. After 10 years of overreliance on remote sensor-fires links and aviation we are ill prepared for the fights ahead. In the process we lost our proactive mindset in using countermobilty to support defensive and offensive operations. Our current systems are nearing the end of their lifecycle and are inadequate for supporting future operations. We must engage with all stakeholders and swift action across DOTMLPF to develop scalable, reliable, affordable, and effective lethal and non-lethal countermobility capabilities in support of the joint commander’s intent. The days of legacy landmines are mercifully gone, FASCAM is inadequate, the demands of man-in-the loop systems are tremendous and we must train and equip for the fight ahead.


Author: Colonel Lance Oskey

Published:

The U.S. Army should adopt Outcomes Based Training and Education (OBTE) as the teaching and training methodology that guides training programs at all levels. The current strategic environment in the Institutional Domain has established conditions for this initiative with the publishing of the Army Learning Concept 2015, and updated Army Training and Leader Development concepts. Many Army organizations have already successfully implemented OBTE within their local training programs. The effort to fully implement OBTE must begin within the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command. Key milestones required for implementation include defining the model, expanding the Army’s Mission Command philosophy to include application in the Institutional Domain with OBTE as one of its principles, and implementing changes across the Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership & Education, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) framework.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel John P. Pantleo

Published:

The development of long-range weapons is increasing the need for deconfliction within the joint force and challenging the traditional methods of integrating fires. At the same time, the concepts of Mission Command and cross-domain synergy create tensions on how best to manage such assets. In order to quickly and effectively field new weapon systems, simulations that focus on integrating emerging capabilities should be conducted during materiel solution development and acquisition. These simulations should not be service-specific exercises that validate Key Performance Parameters or inform requirements, rather they should focus on how these systems would be used in future conflict with an eye toward gaining enough experience that joint doctrine can be tested and either validated or revised. Current simulations using the Army Tactical Missile System and potential counter-unmanned aerial systems are provided as examples of how early simulation would have allowed for quicker, more effective integration of long range fires into the joint fight.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Carl Lamar Parsons

Published:

Defending critical infrastructure against attack is vital to the National Security of the United States and is essential to maintaining national economic prosperity. As a symbol and instrument of national power, the U.S. military plays a broad role to protecting and defending the homeland. The military must be prepared and ready to execute homeland defense tasks and provide support to other agencies to protect critical infrastructure. To mitigate the risks to our critical infrastructure, the military, in cooperation and collaboration with other governmental agencies, must maintain a robust defense and protection plan. This paper does not advocate large overt security measures. Instead, it emphasizes the continued importance of defending the Nation’s critical infrastructure by showcasing the layers of complexity and interagency support required to conduct critical infrastructure protection. The paper will make recommendations on how to move forward on defending and protecting our critical infrastructure from a whole of government approach.


Author: Ms. Phala L. Patton-Reed

Published:

In recent years, a general consensus has developed that employing the instruments of power effectively requires close cooperation between all the parts of government that wield the instruments of national power; Diplomatic, Informational, Military and Economic. In particular, the Department of State (DoS) must be fully integrated with the Department of Defense (DoD). Historically, close cooperation between the DoS and the DoD has presented a challenge as the two organizations have culturally been at odds. In short, the DoD prepares for crises, the DoS aims to avoid them. However, if we look at these goals as two sides of the same coin, it would seem that they are actually ideally suited to work together. The concept of Regionally Aligned Forces presents this opportunity.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Jesse T. Pearson

Published:

The U.S. Army has established its Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) policy as a way to provide the Combatant Commanders (CCDRs) with tailored, globally responsive, regionally engaged, and consistently available forces. In order to more fully realize the potential of RAF and maximize the utility of Army forces to the CCDRs, the Army must address four issues. First, the Army must conduct an effective information campaign to communicate the value of RAF to internal and external audiences. Second, the Army must establish long-term RAF unit alignment with the Combatant Commands (CCMDs) and reduce RAF unit rotation. Third, the Army should assign active component CONUS-based Army divisions to the Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs) instead of brigade combat teams (BCTs). Fourth, the Army must clarify RAF funding responsibilities. These changes will increase the value of the RAF policy and Army forces to the Nation.


Author: Colonel Isaac J. Peltier

Published:

This strategic research project begins by examining the history, theory, and doctrine of Mission Command to arrive at an understanding of why changing military culture is important to successfully instilling a new command philosophy. The project then examines the Army’s systems of institutional education, unit-based training and leader development and analyzes these systems using findings from the 2013 Center for Army Leadership Survey of Army Leadership to evaluate the challenges facing the Army and offer recommendations for improvement. Finally, the project examines how Special Operations Forces successfully changed their organizational culture in Iraq and Afghanistan to achieve effectiveness in employing the principles of Mission Command and highlights those best practices that the Army could adopt.


Author: Colonel Celestino Perez, Jr.

Published:

How can military professionals improve U.S. strategic performance? Prominent policymakers, military professionals, and opinion leaders argue that the United States suffers from repeated bouts of strategic discontent arising from the failure to conjoin strategic intent and actual outcomes. This paper presumes that military professionals share with policymakers the responsibility to improve U.S. strategic performance. Motivated by assessments from top military professionals and Séverine Autessere’s research on the failure of international peacebuilding, I argue that two intellectual errors plague American strategic thinking. The first error, anti-politics, describes the military professional’s tendency to discount the importance of ground-level politics as a military concern. The second error, the macro bias, leads strategists and military professionals to neglect local knowledge and bottom-up dynamics. This error eclipses crucial strategies to mitigate violence. Both anti-politics and the macro bias have strategic consequences, which military leaders and educators can help reverse through educational reforms that integrate cutting-edge social and political science into the military classroom.


Author: Colonel Kris N. Perkins

Published:

In the realm of WMD-related capability proliferation, the intersection of availability, opportunity and desire has the potential to be the United States’ and our international partner’s most significant nonproliferation challenge for the 21st century. Africa is a continent where availability, opportunity and desire intersect creating a high risk of actors of concern acquiring capabilities to develop, proliferate and eventually employ WMD. To ensure the U.S. achieves the DOD end state of “no new WMD possession,” the U.S. must implement a “whole of government” approach to address the WMD-related capabilities proliferation threat presented within Africa. This approach can begin with an already established National Security Policy and Interagency system that informs diplomacy, development, and defense planning at the regional and country levels.


Author: Colonel Jeffery E. Phillips

Published:

The U.S. Government has placed significant reliance on Private Security Companies (PSC’s) to provide protection for operational contract support efforts and must improve current processes to provide effective security for future contract execution. Government agencies now routinely contract for private security functions during all types of contingency operations for the purpose of guarding their personnel, facilities, work sites, and contractors. Based on U.S. global commitments and military end-strength, the use of contractors to support contingency operations will be an enduring method for providing support to U.S. Government agencies in future operations, and the U.S. Government must make efforts to improve the utilization of PSCs. This paper proposes six recommendations on providing better government oversight and coordination of PSCs to increase future operational contract support success.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel David S. Pierce

Published:

The U.S. created and implemented the Marshall Plan out of necessity. Credited for saving Western Europe, the Marshall Plan assisted European Nations in recovering from the aftermath of WWII while preventing the Soviet Union from absorbing the entire continent. Implementation called for new organizations with experts in politics, agriculture, banking and others. Clear strategic objectives enabled unity of effort by DOS and the international community. In 2003, the U.S. invaded Iraq without a coordinated synchronized plan for construction operations. An ad hoc creation of an organization to oversee the program changed 3 times and each time it had new objectives, goals and vision. Reconstruction efforts in Iraq ignored the principles of the Marshall Plan. The Plan’s basic framework allows for the implementation of reconstruction operations in today’s complex environment, just as it did in 1947. The U.S. must consider the creation of a permanent office that follows the Marshall Plan’s structural framework. The office executive serves as the central focal point to address all issues concerning nation building to ensure coordination and synchronization of all resources across the interagency.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Jose L. Polanco

Published:

The United States continues to face multiple strategic challenges throughout the globe. Complex issues in the Middle East, Europe and a rebalance to the Pacific have monopolized the U.S. foreign policy agenda, resulting in a loss of U.S. influence in the nearby Latin American Caribbean region. State actors outside the Western Hemisphere, such as China, have taken notice of this perceived vacuum and have sought to advance their own interests in the Americas. China’s use of soft power in this developing region is steadily making it the partner of choice over the United States. Today’s fiscal austerity further compounds this challenge as the U.S. seeks to address budgetary limitations. However, the United States does have options and one possible solution is Strategic Landpower. Strategic Landpower, if implemented correctly, as part of a holistic approach can make a difference in restoring U.S. influence in the region. Landpower can shape and influence the strategic environment and promote U.S. national interests in the Western Hemisphere by building enduring relationships through military engagement and security cooperation.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Thomas R. Powers

Published:

Since 2001, the United States has led a multinational war on terrorism and expended significant blood and treasure replacing corrupt regimes with fragile, democratic institutions. Yet, in just a handful of years, deteriorating conditions in Iraq threatens to erode the hard-won gains achieved in the early days of the military campaign. Towards that end, the United States should renew efforts to resolve the underlying political problems in Iraq and Syria as part of its long-term strategy to degrade and destroy the Islamic State. Military operations should be conducted as part of a whole-of-government approach, but Coalition military action is just a supporting role to the more important diplomatic efforts. Absent new political frameworks, military action is irrelevant. Additionally, U.S. and Coalition efforts must be actively managed below the national policy level. The existing strategy, if nested within a larger diplomatic effort, balances risk and reward over the long-term and offers the greatest opportunity to succeed.


Author: Colonel Michael Trey Rawls

Published:

The post-Cold War era has proven to be fraught with difficulties created when the idealistic goals of Liberal Hegemony clash with complex international realities. Nowhere is this idea more pronounced than in the rhetoric of the modern Presidency. Presidential rhetoric in the post-Cold War era and its corresponding military operations often present conflicting information and thereby generate unrealistic expectations in the public sphere both at home and abroad. Through an analysis of the rhetoric of modern presidents during times of conflict this paper seeks to better understand the phenomenon and recommend practices to more closely align rhetoric with achievable foreign policy goals.


Author: Mr. Nathan Timothy Ray

Published:

Public disclosure websites (PDW)—sites like WikiLeaks—constitute a serious security challenge to the United States and other nations. PDW activists are dedicated to exposing sensitive government and commercial information in the belief that they are acting in the public good. As a result, PDWs have revealed hard-to-find, strategic and tactical level information that benefits the resiliency and operations of insurgent, terrorist, and criminal groups. To date, there is no evidence linking PDWs to an attack by violent nonstate groups, but this threat is almost certain to grow as Internet access expands globally. Given the high likelihood of future leaks, the U.S. Government should adopt stronger controls to safeguard information, including new legislation to address leaking, as well as tailoring “need to share” practices. Left unchallenged, PDWs imperil the ability of the United States to counter violent nonstate groups.


Author: Ms. Karan L. Reidenbach

Published:

Despite the widely different leadership styles of Donald Rumsfeld and Robert Gates, intrusive monitoring actions taken by both Secretaries of Defense have negatively affected civil-military trust relationships in the United States. While many discussions of civil-military relations center on a coup d’état, the direct seizure of political power by the military or overthrow of government by the military, this does not appear to be a realistic threat in the United States today. Rather, the challenge for civil-military relations in the twenty-first century is a growing mistrust between elected civilian leaders and the military. Actions by the military such as leaking information, performing end runs around a policy decision, and foot-dragging in carrying out actions contribute to this growing mistrust. Actions by civilian leaders such as inserting themselves in the military leaders’ day-to-day business, requiring excessive reporting, and conducting invasive investigations or audits also contribute to the growing mistrust. To address the civil-military relations challenge of the twenty-first century, this paper will review the history of civil-military relations, then briefly examine the theories from Huntington and Janowitz before turning to an in-depth analysis of Feaver’s agency theory.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Travis D. Rex

Published:

The United States Air Force selects its General Officers earlier than any other armed service, with over 90 percent of all O-7s selected on or before 24 years in service--nearly two years earlier than all other service branches. This self-imposed early timeline to General Officer gives the USAF some advantages valued by senior Air Force leaders. However, this early promote dynamic also causes impacts in personnel management and development priorities throughout the entire officer promotion system, many of them deleterious to overall health of the Air Force. Drawbacks of the current paradigm include problems in strategic joint leadership competitiveness, organizational behavior, overall leader development, and retention. By relaxing the 24-year timeline, in addition to other recommended measures, the Air Force active component can make adjustments to the system to better develop both operational and strategic leaders while preserving and promoting an officer talent pool that will ensure current and future success.


Author: Colonel Lori L. Robinson

Published:

As Americans, we tend to view situations through our own cultural lens with, sometimes, insufficient consideration of the perspectives or interests of others. Although many countries, to include the United States, are facing similar security dynamics in the 21st Century, each represents a range of historical narratives, experiences, backgrounds, and traditions that have direct impact on their policy and decision-making. In the Asia-Pacific region, each country is pursuing their own path to security balancing U.S. security cooperation with trade and investment links to China. To enhance success, U.S. Army Pacific Pathways design should incorporate, fuse, and balance host nation security cooperation priorities and evolving military roles and missions with U.S. strategic and military objectives in the region. This will help ensure that Pacific Pathways garners host nation domestic support and funding, compliments ongoing diplomatic and economic efforts of the United States, and avoids causing any unintentional negative influences on the strategic objectives of all participants.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Monte’ L. Rone

Published:

Lessons learned from hard fought wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the uncertain character of the anticipated operating environment served as catalysts for change in how the United States Army organizes, trains, and equips Soldiers and units for missions in support of Unified Land Operations. In order to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative from a relative position of advantage, the Army must develop an organizational culture that emphasizes decentralization and inculcates a long-term commitment to leader development and talent management. The Army’s failure to operationalize Mission Command is due to a lack of trust and paralysis cultivated in an organizational culture that values the tradition of centralized command and control. This incongruence in Army culture creates a trust deficit that militates against producing leaders with an entrepreneurial spirit. This disjunction is the heart of the adaptive challenge confronting the Army.


Author: Mr. David T. Roscoe

Published:

In September 2014, President Obama addressed the United Nations General Assembly on the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS), stating: “The only language understood by killers like this is the language of force.” In one sense, the President is correct, Western efforts to reason with ISIS to halt their brutal campaign are almost certainly futile. However, in another sense, the President’s statement reveals a flawed strategy and a myopic focus on using force at the expense of waging an effective war of ideas. To say ISIS only understands the language of force ignores their effective use of social media to recruit, fundraise, and encourage attacks in Western nations. Meanwhile, U.S. efforts to counter ISIS’s social media campaign fail to neutralize ISIS’s appeal to sympathetic audiences - appearing stiff, unimaginative, and contrived. With military options against ISIS limited by political and economic considerations, the U.S. must re-examine its strategic communications and improve its use of social media. This paper explains why the U.S. must adapt to emerging social media technologies, build culturally resonant messages, and exploit several key weaknesses in ISIS’s strategic messaging.


Author: Colonel Craig Roseberry

Published:

The United States is facing significant threats to critical space assets due to emerging military technologies such as direct assent anti-satellite weapons and directed energy weapons. The U.S. Space Policy identifies deterrence as a key method to prevent attacks on space systems and proclaims the inherent right to respond to defeat attacks if deterrence fails. The threat of punishment by itself is insufficient to deter either opportunistic states or anonymous actors from employing these technologies to achieve strategic surprise. In light of these challenges, the United States must strengthen its current space deterrence approaches to prevent future attacks on space borne assets. This paper first reviews the relevant strategic documents regarding space deterrence. Second, it identifies the impact anonymity, the lack of international norms and frameworks, and a currently tepid U.S. declaratory policy poses as potential sources of failure to space deterrence. Finally, this strategic research project offers practicable recommendations to overcome limitations that inhibit the implementation of deterrence strengthening mechanisms in line with the National Space Policy in the present strategic environment.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Jason Rueschhoff

Published:

A unique nexus exists between coalition warfare, its employment of Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS), and Just War Theory (JWT). Understanding the profound moral implications of UASs upon coalition warfare will facilitate successful combined engagements. This paper will examine UAS usage in coalition warfare within the framework of JWT and highlight the results to coalition cohesion, integration, and future relationships. It will then provide several recommendations on the way forward.


Author: Colonel Michael Runey

Published:

America’s modern All-Volunteer Force (AVF) just celebrated its fortieth anniversary. Yet the last fourteen years of war put unprecedented demands on the AVF, pushing the enlisted force in the Army in particular nearly to the breaking point. As the military faces new global threats, America’s youth head off to college at historically high rates funded in large measure by federal aid. The AVF’s long-term viability as a high-quality, affordable, professional volunteer force is increasingly at risk. Acquiring enlisted talent is increasingly challenging for the services, especially the Army. This research study uses an operational design approach from Joint Doctrine to scan the environment, reframe the strategic problem, and propose an approach to aid law and policy makers in sustaining the long-term viability of the AVF. Accounting for the inherent tensions between the key AVF stakeholders—the military, society—recommendations include fostering a national culture of service, realigning incentives to motivate qualified men and women, developing a talent-vetting system to qualify more people, and continuing to compete for and enlist highly qualified young Americans.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Anthony W. Rush

Published:

The doctrinal view of risk and its assessment is inadequate for use at the strategic level. The reliance upon models which assign a single-value, such as low, medium, or high, to risk creates an over simplistic view of risk and its consequence. Shifting the definition of risk from the probability and severity of loss calculus in doctrine to a definition that incorporates ends, ways, means, interests, and consequence sharpens the view of risk. This definition demands a new framework to assess risk. A five-step risk assessment process is proposed to broaden the view of risk and how it may be more sufficiently conveyed to strategic leaders by shifting away from an actuarial model of risk assessment to a framework suitable for strategy.


Author: Mr. Shaun J. Ryan

Published:

This paper establishes that the national security environment requires that we operate together. The imperative to unified action applies across the whole United States national security enterprise, and extends to international and multilateral fora. Leaders can apply insights drawn from theories of social network analysis, organizational culture, and organizational traps to better understand common organizational dynamics which affect cooperation between organizations. Taken together, these tools arm senior leaders with a way to achieve greater impact and effectiveness when they work in the interorganizational space. This will lead, in turn, to outcomes which advance the nation’s interests and security.


Author: Colonel James R. Salome

Published:

The art of command, how leaders apply judgment shaped by learning and experiencing their environment, has atrophied over the last 14 years of war. The length of the global war on terrorism, the inability to achieve decisive victory, and the return to Iraq in 2014 reveal a lack of artful command. The complex and ambiguous character of future conflict continues to require judgment under pressure and leaders to rely on their training to produce results. Leaders caught astride a transition between the Industrial Age and a new Information Age struggle to adapt to additional complexity. Generational tensions add strain between leaders educated by sequential Industrial Age models and those educated in a rapidly globalizing Information Age. This monograph will describe how Operational Design provides a tool to restore the art of command, reinforced with examples from transformational business practices and change experts. This restoration requires leaders who commit to demonstrate the art of command, operationalize it, and institutionalize its use.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Jocelyn J. Schermerhorn

Published:

Engaging Russian President Vladimir Putin as a credible world leader, building a stronger economic relationship with Russia, and acknowledging Russia’s regional influence as a coalition partner may be far more successful in influencing Putin than the confrontational approach currently used by Western leaders. Strategic leader competencies contribute to leadership skills that include the ability to determine future requirements and to use integrative thinking techniques to address complex challenges. The four strategic leadership competencies most important for Western leaders to understand and appreciate in order to better interact with and influence Putin’s decision-making are frame of reference development, envisioning the future, systems understanding, and communication. While some may argue that the only way to deal with Russia is through policies that subordinate Russia to the West, this paper identifies three more effective recommendations related to acknowledging Putin as an influential leader in world affairs, building greater economic interdependence between the West and Russia that is mutually beneficial, and bringing Russia into a coalition partnership to comprehensively address global security issues.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Thomas P. Seymour

Published:

United States air forces have operated under the tenet of Centralized Control/Decentralized Execution for decades. The proliferation of advanced technology, however, has enabled potential adversaries to disrupt the communication systems that Centralized Control requires. To address this challenge, Air Force leaders are developing the concept of Distributed Control in order to enable lower-echelon commanders to continue operations when communication links with higher-headquarters have been broken. While this term may be new, the idea behind it is not. Air commanders have relied upon Distributed Control at other points in history. This work examines how General George C. Kenney, who commanded Allied Air Forces in the Pacific, overcame similar challenges during World War II. Using Kenney’s organization as a model, this paper discusses ways in which future air commanders might organize the air component in preparation for Distributed Control operations. By examining doctrine, this work also considers the specific authorities the Combined Force Commander and Air Component Commander must delegate to their subordinates to continue air operations under the Distributed Control concept.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey R. Sgarlata

Published:

Throughout its history the United States has faced numerous ideological conflicts. Despite extensive experience in this type of struggle America has failed to develop an effective strategy by which to counter such challenges. This paper examines the nature of ideological movements, the process by which they grow, and critical vulnerabilities in that process which may present strategic opportunity. The author then recommends a framework for counter ideological strategy development in context of the challenge presented by the transnational militant Islamic movement.


Author: Colonel Curt R. Simonson

Published:

The 21st century security environment is volatile and unpredictable. The United States faces a variety of threats to its national security interests. As the Army grows smaller, it must maintain the ability to regenerate capabilities to meet unforeseen threats. Regeneration of land forces includes actions taken to rapidly develop new capabilities. The creation of the 10th Mountain Division in World War II provides a case study in the force regeneration role played by the National Ski Patrol System (NSPS). Beginning in 1940, the NSPS petitioned President Roosevelt and Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall to create a specialized Army unit capable of operating in cold weather and in mountainous terrain. Once mountain infantry units were created, the War Department took the unprecedented step of contracting the NSPS to recruit qualified men. Military and civilian leaders employed strategic leadership competencies to work across public-private organizational boundaries. The visionary arrangement between the War Department and the NSPS provides an example of how a civilian organization can be leveraged to assist in creating specialized units to address emerging national security threats.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Paul M. Skipworth

Published:

The gross federal debt now tops $18 trillion, but the outlook appears to be improving as the economy continues to rebound from the Great Recession. In 2014, the nation experienced its fastest economic growth in over ten years, the stock market doubled, the health care inflation rate was at its lowest rate in 50 years, and the deficit had been cut by two-thirds. But much debate remains before the actual debt improves. This paper aims to inform that debate by providing a general description about government debt, reviewing our nation’s history and projections of debt, and describing the impact of debt on national security. Finally, it offers broad recommendations based on this context.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Edward R. Sullivan

Published:

The Islamic State (IS) should be understood as an Islamist millenarian mass movement possessing broad anti-western appeal. Possessing an ideology distinct from Al-Qaeda, for more than a decade they have deliberately and methodically worked to arrive at their present situation. They ground their message in solid theological roots, utilizing, among other writings, the Salafist ideology of Sayyid Qutb. Their ideology is one of revolution in which Islam is on par with communism and capitalism as a basis of societal organization. The clarity of their utopian social message of equality and brotherhood contrasts sharply with the chaos and cultural confusion of globalization, making IS attractive to those already susceptible to radicalization in and out of the Islamic world. Highly capable in their media enterprises, IS nonetheless remains vulnerable to rogue messages released in its name that run counter to the image it is trying to cultivate. Countering its ideology is more problematic than countering its organization and requires increased international effort. A failure to act now leaves the Arab and Islamic heartland in the hands of a methodical and capable cult-like organization whose continued existence directly threatens the entire Middle East and North Africa.


Author: Colonel Kenneth J. Tauke

Published:

This paper provides historical overview of confinement during war, examines the genesis and guiding international law of detention operations, and reviews the detention processes utilized during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan, and the detention facility in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. This paper addresses four questions in regards to the future of detention operations. First, when the United States captures a high-value target, what type of prosecution is pursued? Second, where and how will the individuals be detained and what type of review processes should be utilized? Third, what will be the status of the individuals detained? Fourth, should one federal agency remain the executive agent for detention of non- US citizens who wage war against the United States. Finally, the papers offers a strategic Detainee Disposition Process.


Author: Mr. Matthew Taylor

Published:

Senior Army leaders recognize the Army Civilian workforce as a critical part of the total Army and the need to develop multifaceted civilian leaders similar to military senior leaders. The Army conducted multiple surveys and studies over the last decade and launched a Civilian Workforce Transformation in 2010. Three key structural issues—decentralized management of the Army civilian workforce, lack of civilian employee mobility, and an unbalanced grade structure—will prevent these latest initiatives from achieving the Army’s strategic intent. Analysis of key characteristics of these structural issues and the resulting effects on the Army Civilian Leader development programs, the Civilian Education System (CES) and Senior Enterprise Talent Management (SETM) program, show the futility of the current approach. Recommendations include continuing an evolutionary approach that cannot completely ameliorate the existing structural issues or a revolutionary approach where the Army fundamentally reexamines its Army Civilian leader development approach. Further research is needed on the growth in retired military officers transitioning into civil service at high GS pay grades since significant law changes starting in 1998.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Richard S. Taylor

Published:

In May 2013, President Barack Obama directed the release of an unclassified whitepaper that outlined “U.S. Policy Standards and Procedures for the Use of Force in Counterterrorism Operations Outside the United States and Areas of Active Hostilities.” The Presidential Policy Guidance sets in place sound standards and procedures to ensure that U.S. decisions to employ lethal force under the policy comply with international and U.S. domestic laws. However, as with any law or policy, there will always be times when guidance is inadequate to the occasion, and choices among competing lawful options are not clear. This is especially true when one must consider whether to take a life or harm another person. In these instances, decisions require heightened ethical scrutiny to ensure the contemplated act is morally just under the prevailing circumstances and the explanatory power of the proffered justification fully resonates. Building an ethical cannon to compliment the U.S. policy ensures policy intricacies are fully understood by Administration officials and military advisors/operators, who must make the best decisions under the most trying of circumstances.


Author: Ms. Elizabeth E. Torres

Published:

The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) has been plagued by problems with Veterans’ access to benefits and care for decades. Criticism from the media, Congress, and other stakeholders about the growing bureaucracy, constrained resources, and an overburdened system led to ethical failures, and the eventual resignation of Secretary Shinseki amid a crisis that erupted in the Spring of 2014. This paper seeks to understand the underlying causes of the failures and demonstrate how one senior leader’s approach to culture change, specifically, Secretary Robert McDonald, compares to Schein’s theory of organizational culture and its effect on values. It will look at the environmental conditions that played into the crisis, analyze and understand the problem, and evaluate the approach taken by Secretary McDonald in addressing the problem.


Author: Colonel Craig Trebilcock

Published:

The Army has experienced a dramatic increase in opioid use, misuse, and addiction since 2001, with nearly 14% of soldiers prescribed opioid pain medication as of 2010. These levels adversely impact force readiness, Army death rates, and overall soldier health. The Army response has been uncoordinated, with the medical branch framing widespread opioid use as a medical issue, Army leadership deeming it the result of risk taking soldiers and poor leadership, and the legal branch addressing it as a disciplinary issue. Opioid use is a new threat environment created by changing medical views on pain treatment, unique wartime drivers that render soldiers particularly susceptible to opioid abuse, and military culture. The Army must review this issue anew to develop an effective response. Army policies, using Vietnam era drug enforcement methods, are failing to mitigate the problem. Preventative policies such as medical monitoring of soldiers prescribed opioids, opioid risk training, and removing stigma for those seeking opioid abuse help are needed to reverse the problem. Erroneously framing the threat as primarily a disciplinary issue is perpetuating misuse and harming soldiers, force readiness, and civilian communities.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Clifton Brian Trout

Published:

The United States (U.S.) military is at an inflection point. Facing an increasingly complex security environment and declining budgets, military leaders must make hard choices in order to build and maintain the joint force the nation needs. With an anachronistic view of risk, a bias to procure the most technologically advanced high-end platforms, and a floundering defense strategy, the U.S. military is struggling to adapt to the current environment. Fundamental changes must be made to the way the military manages risk, allocates resources, and develops strategy. First, we must identify and determine an acceptable level of risk while finding innovative and balanced approaches to risk management. Second, we must adjust our acquisition strategy and resource allocation model to allow for offsetting ways and means. This includes a healthy high-end/low-end platform mix. Third, we must develop a strategy that aligns ends, ways, and means in a realistic and prioritized manner. This may require adjustments of desired ends, innovative use of reduced means, and ways that shares the burden with friends and partners around the globe.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey A. Vandaveer

Published:

Vietnam re-enters contemporary American military consciousness as a key player in Southeast Asia power dynamics relative to US rebalance to the Pacific. Vietnam’s historical ability to complicate Chinese aspirational calculations is a unique quality that has direct implications for US strategic interests in the Pacific. This paper examines the Socialist Republic of Vietnam’s (SRV) strategic “status quo” in the region and analyzes Hanoi’s ability to respond to perceived security challenges against Chinese ascendancy. Finally, the paper posits opportunities and limits to which US security interests in Southeast Asia may align with Vietnam’s for future potential collaboration.


Author: Colonel Gail Lynn Washington

Published:

In an austere fiscal environment, Commercial-Off-The-Shelf Acquisition (COTS) offers an acquisition alternative to support a ready and modern force in the twenty-first century. The decision to use COTS is not always an easy choice; but chosen appropriately, COTS reduces developmental time and costs. It is a quick means of acquiring capabilities from a broad commercial base. Its value has been affirmed in rapid acquisition programs designed to support our Warfighters in the current protracted conflicts and it has proven to be a force multiplier that has enhanced both force lethality and force protections. The acquisition process of design-and-integrate must be analyzed thoroughly to consider all other alternatives before selecting COTS as the best options. Greater use of COTS increases competition, innovation and enables the acquisition community to fill gaps in capability. COTS frequently gives program managers the flexibility to control cost, to minimize schedule, and to gain assured performance. Changing the culture of the acquisition community remains the biggest obstacle for making optional use of COTS. Senior leadership oversight can critically support implementation of a COTS-centric acquisition process.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Mitchell O. Watkins

Published:

In September 2014, the Army deployed a Stryker Brigade Combat Team from Joint Base Lewis McCord to Indonesia and Malaysia, completing exercises in Japan. The exercise, called Pacific Pathways is serving as a new model to project Landpower into the Pacific. Pathways trains better warfighters who understand the people, culture and environments in the AOR. Pathways deployments and exercises prevent conflict by demonstrating a credible U.S. Landpower commitment. Pathways programs shape the security environment by building military capacity within allies and partners. Pathways is effectively supporting the USPACOM Commander’s theater engagement strategy while reassuring friendly nations of the United States commitment to security in the Asia-Pacific Region. The additional Landpower Pathways brings to the AOR provides the USPACOM Commander with a better foundational force; one that can enable the joint force in achieving limited objectives, set the theater for follow on operations, respond to disaster relief or small contingencies, or serve as the foundation for larger operations.


Author: Colonel Walter James Wiggins

Published:

In order to sustain the Global Special Operations Forces (SOF) Network while waging a generational fight against violent extremist networks, United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) must make a cultural shift toward building the long-term resilience of its most precious asset--highly trained, skilled, and experienced people. Resilience is achieved by adaptation in the face of pressure. Adaptation occurs when people who are screened, assessed and selected for SOF are given time and opportunity to learn, grow and adjust to the demands of volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous environments. It is essential that SOCOM and its components invest in screening and selection processes that test for adaptability, build disciplined systems of time management to maximize black space, and leverage the preservation of the force and families programs to build a sustainable competitive advantage over future adversaries. Good leadership is critical to enabling adaptation and therefore SOCOM must invest in leadership development as the foundation upon which generational resilience is built.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel James D. Willson

Published:

Electricity is the lifeblood of our economy and the assumption of near continuous flow is taken for granted because the industry has achieved a remarkable level of reliability. But market pressure to find efficiencies coupled with weak government oversight is making the grid and society more vulnerable to the consequences of long-term power failures than they should be. At the direction of Congress, the Department of Defense is taking steps to isolate military installations from the commercial power grid to protect the capability to project military power. But increasing vulnerabilities to blended cyber and physical attacks could force the Department to deal with the consequences of large scale civil unrest and chaos domestically. Just as the Federal Aviation Administration regulates nearly all aspects of the aviation industry to counter the temptation to increase profits at the expense of public safety, the Department of Energy should regulate the power utilities similarly to ensure baseline reliability. However, long-term reliability will be achieved when renewable energy micro-grids are installed in thousands of communities and networked together similar to the internet in terms of scope, scale and reliability.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey D. Witt

Published:

Institutional education, standardized training, and self-development often supersede leader behavior patterns and social learning as the primary means for Army leader development resulting in missed subordinate leader developmental opportunities. Emerging leaders learn and enhance their skills by observing and emulating successful leaders, and developing leadership styles through experimentation in diverse social settings. A new paradigm for leader development focuses on self-aware and authentic senior leaders enabled by standardized programs of instruction. In realizing this new paradigm for leader development, senior leaders must deliberately and consciously acknowledge their own behavior patterns as the most significant factor in subordinate leader development. This paper applies research on leader prototypes and authentic leadership theory to place greater emphasis on the role that senior leaders in the operational domain fulfill in the context of the Army Leader Development Strategy.


Author: Colonel Kevin P. Wolfla

Published:

The evolving discussion of Strategic Landpower has tended to build on lessons learned through more than a decade of prolonged stability operations, which crowds out analysis of other common uses of landpower, particularly coercion. Coercive strategies will play an increasingly important role in securing national interests as the U.S. rebalances to the Asia-Pacific, where landpower proved vital to successful U.S. coercion during the Cold War and continues to serve as a deterrent there. Airpower and seapower may have more strategic agility than landpower, but coercion theory would suggest their agility makes them a weaker signal, both to adversaries and allies, of commitment and a willingness to escalate or de-escalate as necessary. As U.S. land forces remain stationed in and operating throughout the Asia-Pacific region, strategists and planners should do more than rhetorically state the deterrent value of force posture, presence, and security cooperation activities, and examine the most effective ways to leverage landpower for both compellence and deterrence.


Author: Colonel Steven J. Adams

Published:

Winning in a complex world requires more than highly trained, educated, and experienced individual soldiers and leaders. While our greatest asset is the American Soldier, the Army is a team of teams and winning depends on how effectively Army leaders are able to harness the collective knowledge and power of teams to achieve success. Cohesive and effective teams provide a competitive advantage to the Army as it navigates through a complex and rapidly changing strategic environment. Building winning teams requires growing effective leaders, creating a positive command climate, and placing a greater focus on the team rather than the individual. From a review of academic leadership concepts, effective leaders focus on trust, commitment, purpose, and communication when developing quality teams. To better develop the next generation of Army leaders to build winning teams for a complex world, the Army should mandate command climate surveys at the Brigade and Battalion level; update ADP 6-22, Army Leadership, to reflect a greater emphasis on teams; and mandate that leaders conduct a follow-up personalized assessment with professional coaches as part of the MSAF360 Multi-Source Assessment and Feedback.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Brian Albon

Published:

Iranian supported Houthi rebels are the primary destabilizing factor in Yemen. Iranian provision of money, training, and lethal aid to this quasi-Shia minority empowered them to oust the internationally recognized government of Yemen and plunge the impoverished nation into civil war. This Houthi-caused strife precipitated a significant humanitarian disaster by creating over one million internally displaced people that greatly exacerbated preexisting food, water, and fuel shortages. The Houthis also expanded the fighting into Saudi Arabia in retaliation for the Saudi-led coalition fighting to return ousted Yemeni President Hadi to power. Iranian armed Houthi fighters could easily threaten global shipping passing through the Bab el-Mandab Strait in which 4.7 million barrels of oil transit daily. Lastly, the Houthi-generated civil war disrupted U.S. counterterrorism operations targeting Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, arguably one of the most dangerous extremist groups attempting to target the U.S. homeland. U.S. intervention through diplomatic dialogue and economic incentives to persuade Iran to abandon their lethal aid and decrease financial support to the Houthi rebels would likely revert the Houthis to a localized danger vice a regional threat.


Author: Colonel Erik Anderson

Published:

The Army’s professional identity is critically important to maintain its legitimacy with the American people and to operate effectively in today’s morally ambiguous operational environment. In 2010 the Army embarked on a Campaign of Learning to assess the health and understanding of the Army Profession among its members after nearly a decade of conflict. While the renewed emphasis on the Army Profession raised overall awareness, implementation activities to date have failed to reach the audience and echelon most effective at fostering a professional identity and enduring commitment to the Army Ethic among Army Profession practitioners. Rather than continuing to develop more programs and activities at the strategic level the Army needs to focus on the organizational level, specifically the battalion command teams, as the best source to foster the Army Ethic in Army professionals.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel David R. Anzaldúa

Published:

This paper builds on the Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction manual and the Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments (MPICE) metrics framework. The Guiding Principles manual outlines strategic principles for conducting stability and reconstruction (S&R) operations and serves as a foundation for the development of S&R mission priorities. The manual espouses five major end states and seven cross-cutting principles to guide the execution of S&R missions. The MPICE companion publication provides recommended objectives, goals, indicators and measures for each of the five end states, but does not include measures for the seven cross-cutting principles. Based on the research conducted, the paper proposes outcome-based objectives, goals, indicators and measures for measuring progress for the first four of the seven cross-cutting principles of the stabilization and reconstruction framework. A discussion on why S&R competencies remain important to the U.S. military, the contemporary environment in which these missions are being conducted and the evolution of metrics in the S&R community are also included.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Bethany C. Aragon

Published:

The information instrument of national power, which has neither a recognized government lead nor a clear strategy for employment, remains the most misunderstood and underutilized element of D-I-M-E (Diplomacy, Information, Military, Economic). However, an examination of the application of information power from the First World War through the Cold War revealed that information has served as a potent instrument of national power. It is most effective when it is directed and supported by the President, guided by strategy that recognizes it as a fundamental component of official policy, coordinated across the whole of government, and implemented across the broadest spectrum of communication. Administrations should first decide whether the application of information power comports with enduring national values, their respective policy and national security objectives. Then, once the decision is made to employ information power, it must be adequately resourced to ensure its application aligns with the four key requirements.


Author: Colonel Brendan Arcuri

Published:

The forces of globalization are eroding state sovereignty, empowering non-state actors, and increasing the prospect of intra-state conflict. Greater interdependence between states has reduced the prospect of state-on-state conflict between powerful industrial age armed forces. However, the likelihood of intra-state conflict with non-state armed groups and conflict with globally networked non-state actors has increased. The United States lacks a credible deterrence for dissuading undesirable behavior in violent non-state armed groups. Consequently, the United States must consider the policy and strategy implications of the changing global environment and the character of war. The author recommends changing USSOF doctrine, organization and training in order to increase success against violent non-state actors and networked insurgents, who take advantage of asymmetries in power, economy, and technology to challenge state sovereignty and the international order.


Author: Mr. Brent G. Bahl

Published:

The 2015 National Military Strategy identified strengthening the U.S.' global network of allies and partners as a national military objective. Specifically how to provide security force assistance (SFA) is an Army Warfighting Challenge. However, Geographic Combat Commands (GCC) have conducted security cooperation, including SFA, with varying results. While structural inefficiencies are widely acknowledged, it is unlikely the underlying law will change significantly in the near term. This paper proposes as a practical matter, GCCs should increase cooperation with Ambassadors and better employ the senior defense official/defense attaché (SDO/DATT) to leverage country teams to develop a Common Operating Picture (COP) of the countries receiving the security assistance. This will result in increased and shared situational awareness and unity of effort between the GCC and the Country Team. Security cooperation officers (SCO) should consider adopting a more balanced approach to cooperation and assistance and GCC deploy a Special Operations Command – Forward, if appropriate. These practical measures will result in better implementation of security cooperation.


Author: Colonel John K. Baker

Published:

Congress has deemed the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) Arctic Strategy inadequate to address the national security significance of the region. Diminishing Arctic ice has increased human access for trade routes and natural resources, including an estimated twenty-five percent of the world’s untapped oil and gas reserves. The geopolitical and environmental impacts, particularly with Russia’s aggressive economic and military posture, threaten the relative stability of the Arctic region and challenge U.S. interests. Budget cuts and a proposed drawdown of U.S. troops in Alaska may have created the perception of a U.S. retreat from the region at a time when the U.S. holds the chairmanship of the Arctic Council and has no better time to lead internationally. As it revises its Arctic Strategy in the next year to comply with Congressional mandate, DOD has the opportunity to develop and articulate a more comprehensive and collaborative approach. This paper proposes recommendations by which DOD can address threats in an uncertain future to help achieve U.S. Arctic policy objectives.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Richard J. Ball

Published:

This paper advocates that Military Police are the most viable force to “establish police primacy as the military exit strategy” as part of Phase IV operations. The concept of Rule of Law and its importance to the legitimacy of governance and its necessity as part of re-establishing a police force during transition and stability operations is reviewed. Historical case studies will compare where Military Police were used successfully in transition law enforcement tasks as well as instances where they were not at the forefront in assisting with Rule of Law and police operations and the corresponding affects. Alternative forces to Military Police will be assessed for their capabilities and capacity to support Rule of Law and post conflict police units. Lastly, current force structure capabilities, partnering initiatives with local, state and federal law enforcement agencies within the United States and advancements in professionalism and certifications within the Military Police will also be explored. These points will reinforce that Military Police are best qualified to bridge the transition between military forces and post conflict police forces during Stability operations.


Author: Colonel Andre P. Balyoz

Published:

From 2001 through 2014 the United States spent nearly $165 billion on reconstruction in Afghanistan and Iraq. As a part of these efforts, infrastructure construction programs managed by military engineers during Operations Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Iraqi Freedom (OIF) provided new government facilities, road networks, and utility support infrastructure for the host-nation governments. These efforts reflect the tremendous capabilities of military engineers but they also highlight the importance of aligning work on the ground with national policy and military doctrine. This paper recommends: 1. Department of State taking the lead for stabilization and reconstruction; 2. Defining the scope of reconstruction as an interagency team before beginning; 3. Involving the host-nation in planning, prioritization, and oversight; and 4. Establishing security and legitimacy prior to beginning construction.


Author: Colonel Andrew M. Barr

Published:

The health of the force is among the most important indicators of Army readiness and is critical to both the present and future readiness of the force. The Army defines individual medical readiness (IMR) as the ability to achieve medical fitness standards within 72 hours of deployment. Future health readiness focuses on Soldier wellness, maximization of holistic health, and prevention of chronic disease and injury. Improvements in future health readiness should increase rates of IMR, improve the health of the force, and decrease DoD and Army healthcare costs. Army doctrine, systems, and programs such as the System for Health, the Performance Triad, and the Army Wellness Centers provide a strong framework for Army health promotion. Improvements in Army doctrine, systems, programs, and policies as well as further alignment with wellness industry best practices will increase future health readiness in the Army and provide cost savings to the Military Health System.


Author: Colonel Richard C. Bell, Jr.

Published:

Following periods of major conflict, reductions to United States (U.S.) defense budgets and military forces are the norm as the nation reprioritizes resources from international to domestic concerns. The two most recent military drawdowns in U.S. history include the post-Cold War drawdown of the 1990s and the current drawdown that began in 2011. Driven by the contentious Budget Control Act of 2011, however, today's drawdown of Regular Army forces presents a greater risk to national security than the post-Cold War drawdown. While the current drawdown promises to be less significant in terms of total personnel reductions, it is also less consistent with stated U.S. foreign policy goals, it is hampered to a larger extent by domestic political disagreements, and it begins with more internal program risk. Accordingly, the Army should revise its current strategic messaging to better communicate the challenges of the current drawdown to both external and internal audiences.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Jason B. Blevins

Published:

The U.S. military has experienced tremendous success in winning the conventional combat phases of its wars since World War II, but struggles to win the peace during post-combat hostilities. Informed by the lessons of OIF and the historical success of the U.S. Zone Constabulary in Germany after WWII, the Army should develop conventional units focused on a hybrid combination of stability and limited Irregular Warfare operations. These units, referred to in this paper as U.S. Army Constabulary Brigades, serve as a force modernization effort that supports “the process of improving the Army’s force effectiveness and operational capabilities through force development and integration.” Constabulary brigades balance the efforts of the U.S. military’s unmatched ability to succeed in conventional warfare, and its decade’s long struggle to win the peace during post-conflict stability operations. Several options exist for forming a constabulary force including reassignment of stability operations as service specific roles and converting existing structure to fill this capability gap. This paper recommends the U.S. Army convert selected BCTs to constabulary brigades, who serve as solider-police trained and focused on stability and limited IW operations.


Author: Mr. Douglas A. Boerman

Published:

The use of Clausewitzian-based limited war strategies have increased the frequency for United States policy makers to use war as a political tool while delivering less effective results. Clausewitz left indications in his writing that suggest he was still deliberating aspects of his theory, in particular the strict reliance upon force-on-force strategies. This paper provides analysis on how successful the United States military has been in delivering desired political results through war both before and after it began its strict adherence to limited war strategies. The results show that the adoption of limited war strategies coincides with increased frequency and decreased effectiveness at applying war as a political tool. The paper then provides an international politics framework that might be applied to enhance the development of grand strategic thinking. Based upon the assessment findings, recommendations are made to expand the strategic options available to military planners. Finally, the ongoing war against radical Islamic terror is used as a case study for the application of the political model


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Chris Marie Briand

Published:

After years of deployments, the US Army Reserve Components (RC), comprised of both the Army National Guard and Army Reserve, have emerged and been recognized as critical components of the “operational” Army. As the military continues the post OIF/OEF drawdown, the Army needs to reexamine its Total Force concept and revise its current readiness model to capitalize on the capabilities as well as the economies and efficiencies inherent with the reliance on the RC. The RC provides a cost effective solution to help field a balanced and affordable force capable of meeting the full range of mission requirements. Importantly, the USAR provides capabilities that augment, supplement and are unique with those provided by the Active Component (AC). Central to optimizing the AC-RC force mix for the Total Force is the development of a viable force generation model and codification of what has been loosely termed as the “Operational Reserve.” This paper examines and defines the “Operational Reserve,” assesses readiness and resourcing challenges with operationalizing the RC, and recommends a stratified strategic management process to exploit the capabilities and cost effectiveness of the US Army Reserve.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Richard D. Butler

Published:

The concept of feasibility is a central, but often underappreciated, part of the planning processes and resulting senior leader dialogues that allow civil and military leaders to make difficult choices. Identification of flexible military options demands that political, strategic and operational echelons coordinate to maintain the means-ways-ends balance. Discussions and synchronization of means allows military leaders to know what is within the realm of the possible and enables a discussion of ways with civilian leadership. The narrative of this paper seeks to explain some of the more salient points that allow senior leaders to accomplish good feasibility assessments. The selected historic examples illuminate where many of these points either aligned to provide the civilian-military leadership team with the flexibility to meet the final desired end state, or where non-adherence to feasibility assessments resulted in a less savory end.


Author: Colonel Edwin Callahan

Published:

The United States (U.S.) Army is a large organization with more than a million soldiers. It is an expensive organization to sustain, and one that is constrained by resources. Uncertainty, complexity, declining resources, and increased demand define the Army’s current strategy. The Army’s strategic leaders are responsible for creating good strategy that solves complex problems and inspires organizational change. They are responsible for reducing uncertainty and complexity while balancing resources and demands. In short, they are responsible for creating good strategy. The Army has a strategy to adapt it towards the future; however, it is difficult to understand because it suffers from the pitfalls of bad strategy. As a result, the Army’s strategy increases uncertainty and a resistance to organizational change. Good strategy provides direction and focus for the organization to follow. It reduces uncertainty, and is necessary for leading organizational change and creating competitive advantages. The purpose of this paper is to describe good and bad strategy, uncertainty and organizational change, and provide recommendations for improving the Army’s current strategy to adapt the Army toward the future.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Kevin S. Capra

Published:

The Army is currently in the process of cutting the size of its headquarters as well as reducing the grade plate structure within them. Although seen as a method of preserving readiness of combat formations, it may be counterproductive given the current strategic environment. By cutting Army Service Component Commands (ASCCs), Corps and Division headquarters to preserve force structure and readiness at the tactical level, the Army is creating a capability gap and shrinking readiness at the theater-strategic and high operational level. Winning at the strategic level requires the focus and synchronization of the elements of national power and the integration of allies and other partners, which itself requires well-led, senior staffs. In short, the need for more and permanent Joint Task Force (JTF)-capable headquarters with senior personnel in key positions is growing, rather than shrinking. This paper will examine the challenges with reducing headquarters within three critical Army organizations: the Army Service Component Commands (ASCCs), Corps and Divisions based on their requirement to serve as a JTF headquarters and how these cuts have caused a gap between the Army Operating Concept (AOC) and force structure.


Author: Mr. Mark A. Carter

Published:

On July 20, 2015, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) endorsed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), an international agreement on the nuclear program of the Islamic Republic of Iran, hereafter referred to as Iran. The JCPOA was negotiated between Iran and the five permanent members of the UNSC, plus Germany (P5+1) to eliminate Iran’s path to the development of a nuclear weapon. The signatories to the JCPOA state the agreement puts in place safeguard measures that prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon or weapons-grade nuclear material. The JCPOA is the first agreement to limit fissile material and uranium enrichment capability since the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty entered into force in 1970. As a historic agreement and one that affects the Middle East, and possibly global, security, it is appropriate to analyze its safeguard provisions to determine if deficiencies in coverage exist and the ramifications of such deficiencies. This analysis will demonstrate that P5+1 claim that the JCPOA has completely, and indefinitely, blocked Iranian attempts to develop a nuclear weapon is not verifiable.


Author: Colonel John R. Cavedo Jr.

Published:

Science and Technology is the “seed corn” for the Army’s Future warfighting systems. As such it must be exceptionally managed if the Army is to be prepared to fight and win in a Volatile, Complex, Uncertain, and Ambiguous environment. The recently released Army Operating Concept (AOC) asserts that innovation is required to ensure the Army is prepared to fight and win in that complex world. Further, the AOC highlights how the Army must be able to “continuously learn, adapt and innovate” and that this ability must not only be mastered by the operational forces, but by the institutional forces as well. Army S&T efforts are managed by bureaucratic institutional “enterprise”, which may be ill-suited in its current construct and policy limitations to meet the demands of the future. The Army S&T enterprise may require a period of punctuated equilibrium, where, as an enterprise, it must be adaptive and innovative lest the Army finds itself at a technological disadvantage in the Future Force 2025 and Beyond (F2025).


Author: Colonel Chad Chasteen

Published:

Diversity presents a paradox. On one hand, it is a source of creativity and innovation contributing to competitive advantage. On the other hand, diversity can create social divisions which degrade team cohesion, communication, and performance. Increasing diversity, therefore, presents a proverbial Gordian knot, or seemingly unsolvable problem, for many organizations. Fortunately, some have found ways to cut through the cord, untangle the complexity, and achieve positive results, including increased trust, satisfaction, and productivity. With demographic diversity rising, the U.S. Army needs to better understand the potential challenges in order to align policies and programs to improve organizational effectiveness in the future force. The purpose of this research project is to discuss the benefits and burdens of diversity on team outcomes, evaluate the effectiveness of diversity training, assess the alignment of current DoD diversity initiatives, and offer recommendations to improve the diversity-performance relationship in the Army.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Jung W. Choi

Published:

The thesis of this paper is that the current U.S. policy toward North Korea has created an imbalance between the objectives and concepts at the strategic level. As a result, the U.S. has not been able to achieve its stated policy objective of denuclearized North Korea. In an effort to secure effectively U.S. national interests, the Obama administration forthwith should reevaluate the policy of “strategic patience” and consider approaches that could ameliorate the imbalance. The strategic environment has changed significantly since Obama took office in 2009. Significant changes in the strategic environment require significant modifications to the current policy. President Nixon in 1972 proactively took steps to seek rapprochement with the communist China—then, and still, a nuclear weapons state—against the Cold War policy of containment. Recently, President Obama made a historic visit to Cuba, once a nuclear weapons proxy state, and made a historic deal with Iran, a member of the axis of evil and once an aspiring nuclear weapons state. The strategic environment is now conducive to a new engagement approach that is proactive, principled, pragmatic, and persistent with a hint of realism.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Andrew M. Clark

Published:

United States civilian law enforcement agencies (LEAs) are largely ignorant of the capabilities and limitations inherent to our nation's armed forces. Specifically, they are unaware what assistance Active Duty (Title 10) forces can and can't offer when they approach capability or capacity limits. Consequently, there is a certain amount of friction between the military and the interagency communities, as well as a lack of adequate contingency planning on the part of both. This is due in no small part to the very limited exposure that most LEAs have to military operations. This research project explores the military-civilian relations problem and attempts to identify a means of bridging the knowledge gap. The ultimate goal of this work is increased exposure and a baseline of common understanding at the federal, state, tribal, and local levels.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Corey Collier

Published:

The collaboration of technology and weapons development occasionally yields strategic advantages, dramatically changing the way war is waged and significantly shifting power projection and great power alignment. Many believe lethal autonomous weapons (LAWs) to be in that category. Others, however, contend that removing human oversight from the offensive targeting process violates the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC), specifically the principles of discrimination and proportionality. In order to stop their development, numerous organizations are calling for an international ban on the development of LAWs, claiming their use violates the basic human code of morality derived from Just War Theory. Conversely, developers are pursuing programmable, human-like intelligence, capable of the autonomous application of International Humanitarian Law and the LOAC. Regardless of the opposition, technology continues to advance. The author addresses both sides of this issue for consideration and offers recommendations on a possible compromise for the way ahead.


Author: Colonel Rob Connell

Published:

This paper states that emerging nations are not an existential threat to the U.S. Instead, the primary threat to U.S. power and influence is dual natured and revolves around the nation’s massive debt and inability to adapt to the changing world. To address these threats and maintain its position as a global leader, the U.S. must adopt a strategy focused on becoming more economically competitive via a smart power approach designed to contain emerging powers economically by dominating global market shares. To ensure effectiveness, the executive branch must develop, sponsor and maintain this strategy in the same manner that the U.S. government managed the containment of the USSR under NSC-68.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Patrick M. Costello

Published:

The current strategic environment and threat pose an immense challenge for outnumbered Air and Missile Defense forces. It is not possible for U.S. forces to deter and defeat current ballistic missile threats alone. Building partner capacity and seeking opportunities to work together with partners and allies are mandates in current defense strategic guidance. Critical to meeting the evolving and expanding threat that ballistic missiles pose, is establishing an interoperable and Integrated Air and Missile Defense capability with partners that have purchased U.S. defense systems through Foreign Military Sales. However, current policy constraints limit the ways in which integration can be achieved, rendering the current strategy inept. Updating policy guidance and ensuring process synchronization offer a possible solution to attain synergy and enable burden sharing to partially mitigate the risk currently imposed by the supply versus demand imbalance.


Author: Colonel Eric S. Crider

Published:

Creating adaptability in Soldiers is an Army Chief of Staff strategic priority and a critical requirement for the future Army. The purpose of this paper is to make a recommendation to create adaptability in the current Army training system through initial research of behavior performance measures and then embed the results into the training system. Arguably, the Army training system produces some level of adaptability as a byproduct of producing ready units. However, adaptability performance behaviors are too critical to leave to chance creation. To address this imbalance, the Army needs to be deliberate in its goal to increase adaptability through the existing training system. Defining adaptability’s trainable aspects and understanding how the Army trains are the first steps in determining how to change current mechanisms to create a system that fosters purpose-driven adaptability. The tasks trained in the system are the key to driving adaptability behavior change in the Soldiers tasked to win in a complex world.


Author: Colonel Rory A. Crooks

Published:

In the words of author Robert D. Kaplan, “the South China Sea is the future of conflict.” With vital national interests at stake and frequent military activities occurring in close proximity, parties involved in the South China Sea must develop ways of managing tensions that inevitably accompany sensitive interactions. While all military confidence building measures (CBM) generate a degree of improved communication, transparency of intent, and predictability, the magnitude of beneficial outcomes beyond these becomes a function of how well interests align between the parties. To achieve sustainable success, CBM activities must meet a short list of prerequisites and must trend toward inclusivity by building on small successes. Norms established through multiple successful CBM iterations between a small number of partner militaries serve as a baseline for incrementally including other militaries. Deliberately including key militaries in this process ultimately contributes to stability in this volatile region.


Author: Mr. Elver Sherrell Crow

Published:

The President and the Secretary of Defense recognize global climate change as a national security risk in the 2015 National Security Strategy and a Department of Defense report to Congress. Two significant implications for the United States are sea-level rise affecting coastal areas (particularly during severe storms) and drought-induced wild land fires in the western part of the country. The National Guard provides significant defense support to civil authorities during emergency response to events in these categories. This paper measures the Guard’s “Essential 10” mission capabilities against the emergency support functions used by the Federal Emergency Management Agency as a framework to evaluate adequacy of the distribution of National Guard units to respond to coastal flooding and wild land fires. It proposes a number of force structure changes across the Army National Guard to better align “Essential 10” capabilities against these two climate-related threats. Finally, the author offers an assessment of the risk these changes might pose to future global National Guard combat missions.


Author: Colonel Robert A. Culp II

Published:

This paper outlines the Kremlin’s hybrid warfare strategy, operational design and associated tactics. Included are how Moscow integrates unconventional warfare, information operations and cyber operations along with diplomatic and economic coercion to achieve political and military objectives. Understanding the Kremlin’s hybrid warfare strategy offers the United States and its allies opportunities for exploiting vulnerabilities embedded in the ways and means of Russian hybrid warfare. Recommended are actions, all of which fit into a Political Warfare strategic construct, to exploit vulnerabilities associated with Russian hybrid warfare. Implementing them aligns the ways and means necessary to successfully counter future Russian hybrid warfare and achieve our political objectives. Recommendations include changing personnel policies to better enable Strategic Landpower by making long-term investments in human capital to successfully engage in the human domain. Additional recommendations include organizational and policy changes to better organize the US Army, Cyber Command and our information operations enterprise across the Interagency to conduct Irregular Warfare and counter hybrid threats. Also recommended are changes to our intellectual culture and the professional military educational that underpins it.


Author: Colonel Samuel W. Curtis

Published:

This paper proposes that national security decision makers consider using special operation forces (SOF) forward in contested security environments outside of theaters of war to enable partner forces to combat violent extremist threats. Assumption of low-risk presence early buys down risk later as U.S. forces gain needed situational understanding. To the degree that SOF enablement activities are successful, the United States can achieve positive effects for U.S. national security interests in an acceptable time horizon. Additionally, time is gained for long-term institution building and governance activities to achieve sustainable results. First, this paper addresses key concepts and assumptions concerning the strategic indirect approach in terms of security cooperation and shaping operations. Second, we discuss the strategic environment and threat in North and West Africa. The paper then addresses the USSOF enablement model of select regional partner forces. By analyzing SOF supporting actions in North and West Africa, we present four specific insights for future potential enablement operations outside of areas of declared combat operations.


Author: Colonel Peter E. Dargle

Published:

Installations play a vital role in power projection capability and contribute to overarching unit, Soldier, and Family readiness during the force generation process. Given current realities result in reductions to force structure, the Army can still provide military professionals with the training, education, and experiences to enhance installation leadership. In a resource-constrained, complex operating environment, Garrisons require strategic leaders to maintain the foundation of Army readiness, navigate the challenges of community partnership, and ensure preparedness to serve as joint power-projection platforms. Garrisons can better accomplish the myriad of complex strategic tasks by creating a military career path specifically aligned to Installation Management. Deftly applying resources to develop a core of military leaders, knowledgeable in the complexities of installation management programs and policies, allows the Army to lead, sustain, and guide installations through assured challenges in a volatile future.


Author: Colonel Robert A. Davel

Published:

US forces remain increasingly engaged in stability operations throughout the world. Achieving the level of operational adaptability needed to perform these operations requires the Army to complement its traditional lethal capabilities with Non-Lethal Weapons (NLW). NLW enable U.S. forces to achieve strategic objectives while minimizing collateral damage both inside and out of mega-populated urban centers – such as harming non-combatants, destroying critical infrastructure, and poisoning the environment. The use of NLW is essential to stability operations. Accordingly, the DoD should develop NLW capabilities to enhance full spectrum operations. In an era of austere budgets, NLW must be affordable, effective, and suitable. NLW must provide feasible support to all services, regardless of the service’s mission set and personnel. The DoD must incorporate NLW and synchronize efforts to meet our strategic and operational challenges for all forces 2025 and beyond. This SRP describes tactical, operational, and strategic applications of non-lethal weapons. It concludes with recommendations for the military’s employment of non-lethal weapons in full spectrum operations.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel John L. Dawber

Published:

The most recent and highly publicized major defense policy evolution the United States has pursued is the rebalance to the Pacific. Essential to stability and security of the greater Asia-Pacific is ensuring the stability of Northeast Asia, where maintaining a tenuous armistice on the Korean peninsula is vital. U.S. defense policy for the peninsula over the last half century has been remarkably resolute in maintaining this fragile peace. Although this policy has failed to deny North Korea the acquisition of nuclear weapons, it has ensured security and stability in a complex geopolitical environment where military options risk escalation, immense devastation, and de-stabilization of the region. The question is not whether the United States should maintain a forward presence on the peninsula; rather, how better can it maintain this defense posture within the U.S.-ROK alliance. Pre-occupation with events in Southeast Asia must not risk diminishing the strategic priority of the U.S. commitment to Korea.


Author: Commander Michael R. Dolbec

Published:

Over the past three decades, the Department of Defense (DOD) has developed and fielded a fleet of unmanned drones without a Joint coordinated strategy. Contrary to service interoperability encouraged by the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the military deferred unifying drone programs and development in 1988. This has resulted in years of wasteful duplication and a drone fleet in which interoperability is an afterthought. Conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan created significant demand for drone capabilities, and nearly unconstrained military budgets fueled service-specific drone development. Drones are the largest growth market in the aerospace industry, and the DOD is predicted to spend $93 billion on them in the next decade. Attempting to coordinate service-specific drone development, the DOD has published many unmanned vehicle roadmaps and established several advisory task forces. However, without a truly Joint strategy to consolidate efforts and resources, as well as an organization with the authority to enforce it, little change has occurred. The wasted effort and resources of service-specific drone capability development weakens the U.S. military and is not sustainable in a fiscally constrained environment.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Sean Duvall

Published:

Defending the United States Homeland, allies, and interests against attacks of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is a vital national interest. As America wrestles with the best way to deter or respond to a WMD attack, the National policy and National strategy to counter WMD has undergone a subtle but significant evolution since the terrorist attacks in America on 9/11. Defending the U.S. from WMD attack evolution can be categorized into two frameworks: Combating WMD (2002-2009) and Countering WMD (2010-Present). These frameworks for national strategy and policy can be traced all of the way through multiple levels of national documents to Army doctrine. The change to countering WMD policy and strategic guidance is generally consistent from National and Department of Defense (DoD) documents. The Joint doctrine and service doctrine is also generally consistent with the National and DoD guidance. Army strategic guidance and doctrine does not reflect some of the changes from the combating to countering WMD framework and should be updated to avoid confusion in the Joint Force and Army leadership.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Brian P. Elliott

Published:

The Army Reserve has shifted from a strategic to an operational reserve since 9/11. An effective way for the Army to achieve national defense and national military end states is for Combatant Command (COCOM) to assign United States Army Reserve (USAR) forces to Combatant Commanders. While the concept of regionally aligned Army forces begins to address this pursuit, a formal relationship, such as assignment, has not been established. Legislation, such as Goldwater-Nichols, Total Force and Total Army policies, and both Army and Joint doctrine support COCOM assignment while granting Operational Control to the Army Service Component Command. Evidence of successfully executing a proper formal relationship is the assignment of the 351st Civil Affairs Command (CACOM) to US Pacific Command. Assignment of the remaining CACOMs should happen at the earliest opportunity. Foregoing the Army Reserve Engagement Team concept at the Geographic COCOM and focusing efforts on the Army Reserve Engagement Cells will better integrate assigned USAR forces into Joint, theater activities. Assignment of additional USAR commands gives Combatant Commanders the tools they need when they need them.


Author: Colonel Peter H. Fechtel

Published:

Germany’s rise in the last five years as a regional and global leader has caused domestic and international elites to question its traditional reticence for foreign engagements. Correspondingly, the German government has begun work on a new security policy, also known as a “White Paper.” This study posits that Germany must align its new security policy to enhance its relevance as an ally and partner for regional and global stability. It examines Germany’s evolving security policy by: 1) analyzing relevant statements from German and other international leaders on the topic; 2) reviewing German security engagement over the last five years; 3) exploring the foundational components of German security thinking; 4) analyzing the current process of developing the new White Paper; and 5) considering what policy changes may be contained within the document, and the associated implications for United States policy makers. This paper concludes that Germany’s proclivity for engagement within international organizations will increasingly make it impossible for Germany to remain a reluctant power. It also concludes that stability operations may be a domestically palatable way for German security engagement.


Author: Colonel Kyle E. Feger

Published:

Donald Rumsfeld’s desire to transform the Department of Defense into a lean, flexible, and expeditionary organization in 2001 was not a bad initiative. However, in applying the transformation based on three strategic influencers to the plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom, the result was a failed strategy. The first was a wrongheaded application of the lessons learned in Operation Desert Storm. Second, an emerging Revolution in Military Affairs predicated on network centric and rapid decisive operations underestimated the amount of military power required on the ground in Iraq. Finally, a “New American Way of War” focused on small numbers of special operations forces supported by airpower that initially saw success in Afghanistan reinforced Rumsfeld’s concept for regime change in Iraq. The combination of these factors in the decade between Operation Desert Storm and the 9/11 attacks resulted in flawed assumptions and a failed strategy for Operation Iraqi Freedom.


Author: Colonel Sean N. Fisher

Published:

The purpose of this research project is to examine the challenges and opportunities inherent in the practice of mission command in a multinational environment. The research paper begins with an analysis of past and recent multinational operations to emphasize the relevance of mission command in this context. The paper then transitions to an examination of three of the six mission command principles; building cohesive teams through mutual trust, creating shared understanding, and accepting prudent risks. These three principles prove particularly challenging primarily due to disparities in training proficiency, combat capabilities, and importantly cultural differences among partner nations. In examining and analyzing these challenges, this research paper advocates the importance of cross-cultural competence, places emphasis on the need to focus on capabilities as opposed to limitations among partners and allies, and addresses the importance of common doctrinal language. Addressing these three important factors through education, experience, and training better prepares leaders to apply mission command during multinational operations.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Kristofer W. Gifford

Published:

The current strategy against ISIL is best described as containment plus with a lead from behind approach. There is a gap between the rhetoric and reality of the proposed endstate to defeat ISIL. The strategy employs ill suited proxy forces that are committing atrocities against the people they liberate. The strategy also attempts to win slowly and avoid stability operations. Though an effective degrade strategy, it cannot achieve the desired end state of destroying ISIL because of a weak Iraqi Security Force and limited U.S. means and resources. Current strategy also fails to address the root causes of the conflict, offer lasting political solutions, or win the information war. To correct these deficiencies, U.S. leaders should reframe the problem set and better align ends, ways, and means with the following strategic adjustments. Utterly defeat ISIL using rapid, decisive, kinetic and non-kinetic means. The Coalition must embrace a U.N. led Arab ground force, strike at ISIL’s ability to govern, and attack ISIL’s ideology more aggressively. To win the peace a new political order should be established, granting semi-autonomy to Sunnis and Kurds, and stabilized by the U.N. led Arab forces. It is also crucial to achieve similar objectives in Syria through diplomacy with Russia and Iran, similar to the P5+1 negotiations.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Kennon S. Gilliam

Published:

With shrinking budgets and force structure, the Department of Defense (DoD) has requested congressional authority to conduct another round of base realignment and closures (BRAC) in fiscal year 2019. Multiple stakeholders, both inside and outside the DoD, influenced by BRAC history and representing competing objectives, are critical players in an already complex environment. Developing the appropriate organizational structure armed with the proper analytical guidance is essential to a successful BRAC analysis. Instead of building upon historical BRAC examples or currently existing organizational structures, the three frames of operational design can assist the DoD in exploring alternative structures for the next BRAC. Framing the operational environment allows the Department of Defense to understand the current and desired environments. Accurately defining the problem provides insights on how to achieve the desired endstates. Developing operational approaches for organizing the BRAC analytical groups can produce structures that are noticeably different from previous BRAC efforts.


Author: Colonel Ricardo Gonzalez

Published:

Transnational Organized Crime in Latin America has expanded in the last decade and is responsible for most of the illicit trafficking of drugs, contraband goods and humans in the Western Hemisphere. These criminal activities take place along well-established and resourced networks, which lack effective government control measures. This sophisticated grid with access into U.S. territory could conceivably be used by extremist terrorist organizations to inflict harm inside the United States. Yet ironically, if Transnational Crime Organizations allow the use of illicit networks by extremist organizations, it could bring about adverse consequences for their own lucrative international operations. This Strategic Research Project examines these networks and potential links to terrorism that could be manipulated by religious extremist terrorist organizations. It also assesses the possible U.S. response to a significant terrorist event borne out of this convergence. The study concludes by providing recommendations for U.S. policymakers.


Author: Ms. Alice Y. Goodson

Published:

The use of cyberspace capabilities during peacetime by state and non-state actors is having a disruptive effect on the international system and the community has varying views on how to deal with these issues. The lack of technical and legal limitations threaten key cyberspace terrain and offers state actors with the political will and technical capability a way to achieve the strategic advantage against an adversary. Cyber operations conducted against a state’s critical infrastructure could lead to misinterpretations that result in conflict escalation from the cyberspace domain to traditional air, land, or sea. This paper recommends the international community collaborate to define international characteristics for key cyberspace terrain; develop standards that ensure states provide timely technical attribution to states accused of cyberwarfare; and create guidelines to verify state intentions in order to increase understanding, promote fairness, and decrease the chances of conflict escalation.


Author: Colonel Gary R. Graves

Published:

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) remains not only relevant, but an essential component for the protection and advancement of U.S. national interests in Europe, with ancillary effects globally. By maintaining a strong collaborative transatlantic security approach between the United States and its closest and strongest allies, the member nations of NATO, the United States can advance U.S. national interests while supporting the international order of the 21st century. However, the United State must assist NATO in increasing its overall capabilities (Means), to respond to a multitude of threats, by applying interoperable resources across all of the warfighting domains (Ways), to achieve the desired political end states – i.e. deter, and if required, defeat regional sources of instability, while promoting political integration and economic interdependence (Ends). NATO effects not only U.S. policies, but also influences a variety of U.S. national interests. By accepting this, and continuing to invest in the growth and strength of the alliance, the United States will direct its own diplomatic and economic destiny, and guarantee continued access and influence not only in Europe, but also around the world.


Author: Commander Jeff Guerrero

Published:

2013 National Strategy for the Arctic Region establishes the line of effort, “advance United States Security interests in the Arctic”, and stipulates that we must "enable our vessels and aircraft to operate through, under, and over the airspace and waters of the Arctic." While U.S. submarines have a proven track record of under-ice capability, U.S. surface force has limited capability to operate in the Arctic region except for a few weeks in mid to late summer. Expanding U.S. surface force capability to support Joint, Coalition or Interagency operations for longer durations will require additional resources in order to increase maritime capability in the Arctic. This paper will explore U.S. National Objectives in the Arctic, Strategic Concepts and National Power, available through current surface force capabilities, and project whether future maritime force capabilities require adjustment or alignment to support the overall Arctic Strategy.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Andreas S. Hau

Published:

This paper examines the reasoning behind Vladimir Putin’s intervention in the Syrian civil war within the historical context of Russian strategic needs and objectives in Europe and the Middle East. There are three main reasons for Russia’s intervention in Syria. The first reason is to protect Russia’s long-standing Syrian ally and Russia’s Mediterranean naval base located there. A second reason -- both evolving and opportunistic -- is to intensify the Syrian civil war in order to increase refugee migration to Europe and thereby destabilize the European Union (EU) and NATO. The final driver for Putin’s Syrian intervention is his desire to become a major stakeholder in the Syrian peace process. Three recommendations for overcoming Putin’s strategy are also presented. These include fully funding the United Nations request for Syrian refugees, increasing the participation rate of Gulf States in the mitigation of the refugee crisis, and finally pursuing diplomatic efforts to reach a peace deal inside Syria.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel (P) David R. Hibner

Published:

The United States and other nations have struggled to find a widely accepted strategy to defeat the Islamic State because they oversimplify understanding the operational environment by focusing on what can be seen by an outsider as a reflection of their own biases and experiences. The resulting lack of understanding of the deeper culturally and religiously oriented values and assumptions that provide the strength and purpose to ISIS and its corresponding strategic objectives is perpetuated throughout the strategic planning process. In order to develop effective strategies and policies to solve these problems, the Islamic State's culture, objectives, and strategy must be clearly understood from the perspective of those doing the fighting. By analyzing and understanding Islamic State operations from the deeper aspects of values and underlying assumptions of the organization, strategists and policy makers will have a better understanding of the unique strategic implications of the Islamic State, which is a necessary foundation for defining and following an effective, widely accepted strategy to contain or defeat them.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Christopher W. Hoffman

Published:

The Army's approach to Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) is not properly synchronized to adequately support National and Defense security objectives. The Army stakeholder groups and processes for CWMD are varied, complex, and not properly nested. There are three non-medical proponents that provide the bulk of the expertise for CWMD efforts; this, combined with the Army Medical Department's efforts, the responsibilities the Army holds in the Chemical Biological Defense Program, and its associated RDT&E infrastructure, challenge the Army's ability to produce a coherent and consistent CWMD strategy that can be understood by all stakeholders and leveraged in pursuit of resources in defense processes. The absence of one single synchronized Army CMWD strategy prevents the development of appropriate capability and capacity in ground forces to achieve strategic CWMD goals. Proper designation of a general/flag officer on staff as the CWMD synchronizer, appropriately enabled with existing staff, combined with streamlining of non-medical proponency under one authority, would go a long way to correcting this shortcoming and deliver ground forces capable of countering dynamic threats.


Author: Colonel Brant D. Hoskins

Published:

Beginning in the late 1990s, the U.S. government began to demonstrate a growing appreciation for the threats posed by Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). In near continuous efforts since that time, strategic leaders have developed policy, multiple iterations of strategy, and Joint doctrine to counter WMD (CWMD). At the same time, various proponents throughout the Army developed or enhanced operational, tactical, and technical capabilities to CWMD. While these developments are encouraging, they do not address the Army’s most significant CWMD challenge which is the lack of an effective CWMD program. Specifically, the Army Staff is not optimally organized for this task, the Army lacks a unifying CWMD vision and strategy to guide and synchronize CWMD programs and, operational doctrine lacks the clarity required for the entire force to plan, prepare and execute CWMD. In order for the Army to, “lead CWMD in the land domain” as declared in the 2014 Army Strategic Planning Guidance, the Army should consider establishing the office of Chief, CWMD at the two star level on the Army staff and him/her with the authorities required to develop, unify and enable a new CWMD program for the Army.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Keith Richard Jarolimek

Published:

Current Army doctrine for character development falls short of what the Army needs to develop leaders of character. This paper demonstrates an approach to improve character development for junior leaders. Impressions gained by junior leaders in their first operational assignment are formative for the rest of their service in the profession of arms. Battalion commanders and Command Sergeants Major play the most important role in character development as they are the moral exemplars and developers of junior officers and non-commissioned officers during this influential time. The character development portion of a battalion’s leader development program should include five components: an understanding of Army character attributes; appreciation of the origins and content of the Army Ethic; individual character assessment and feedback; training and feedback in moral dilemmas; and modeling of moral, ethical behavior. To support this character development strategy, the Army needs to adopt or develop a character assessment tool and update leader development doctrine.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Jason J. Jones

Published:

The Army must develop strategic leaders who can excel in a future operating environment marked by complexity and uncertainty. The questions becomes, is the Army developing officers that are prepared to serve as future strategic leaders? Unfortunately, operational demands placed on the military since 2001 created a culture that precludes this from happening. This culture rewards tactical experiences over the pursuit of broadening assignments and shaped a cohort of senior leaders that mentor subordinates to maximize time at the tactical level. These issues, combined with limited opportunities in an officer’s career timeline to pursue broadening assignments, created a miss-alignment between the Army Officer Professional Development Program and career management system. This research paper highlights those issues that led to this misalignment, offer recommendations that will alter the Army’s culture, change mentors attitudes, and increase time in an officer’s career timeline to pursue broadening opportunities. The application of these recommendations will realign these programs and lead to the development of diverse strategic leaders able to lead the Army into the twenty-first century.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Benjamin R. Jonsson

Published:

This strategy research project examines the relationship between the rhetoric of the Islamic State and their actions on the ground. This research effort aims to examine how the Islamic State's framing of its own role in the struggle for Syria explains the group's actions, provides insights on what to expect in the future, and analyzes areas of strategic vulnerability. The paper focuses on provincial Twitter posts from January 2016, drawing out the following key themes of the Islamic State’s narrative: battling God’s enemies, military strength, piety, and the caliphate as a prosperous place. Finally, the paper discusses implications for U.S. policy: Namely, that the United States urgently needs a robust information campaign, that it must address the increasingly sectarian nature of the Syrian conflict that will impact regional dynamics for decades, and that any strategy must be informed by the deeply religious appeal and claims of the Islamic State.


Author: Colonel Ernest J. Karlberg

Published:

The Army faces a challenge today similar to the one faced following the Vietnam War. The past decade of war created a generation of agile and adaptive leaders focused on the current fight. Army leadership of the 1970s developed concepts that generated the most tactically and technically proficient army in the world exhibited in the tactical success of Desert Storm. The Army leadership of today must prepare the force for the future while engaged in the challenges of today. General Milley’s initiative to make Readiness priority #1 and the recently published Army Directive 2016-05 set the conditions to create an Army prepared to train to win in a complex world. This strategic research project examines the training revolution following Vietnam, the effects of ARFORGEN on how the Army trains, and the initiatives outlined in Army Directive 2016-05. It goes on to examine the change effort of GEN Dempsey to engrain Mission Command in Army culture and compares that effort to GEN Milley’s effort to make readiness priority #1. Highlighting the critical challenge: failing to educate and train those required to execute the requirements and enable them to monitor and correctly report readiness status per the EXORDs puts the entire effort at risk.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Joshua Keisler

Published:

The cyber revolution is changing the characteristics of warfare. The land, sea, and air domains each have their own theorists who have attempted to provide the principals of warfare. Cyber does not have its own defining grand theorist, but perhaps it does not need one. Sun Tzu outlined an enduring framework for tactics. Kautilya provided a theory on statecraft. Clausewitz, Jomini, Mahan, Douhet and countless other theorists have provided characteristics of warfare that cross domain boundaries. Cyber does not need its own theorist. Existing theory sufficiently provides principals of warfare within the cyber domain. More so than theory, the cyber domain needs definition and behavioral norms. In order to maintain freedom within cyberspace, while also securing public, commercial, and governmental access, a framework for governance is needed. The U.S. should take an active role in leading the international community in developing a set of cyber norms.


Author: Colonel Jason Knight

Published:

The Secretary of Defense’s ‘Force of the Future’ initiative has yet to reform the up-or-out promotion system. This may be because senior leaders do not believe the case for change has merit or they may have difficulty visualizing an alternative. Valid concerns sufficient for driving change include a shift from an industrial to an information era, competition for talent, poor talent management, and a history of criticisms. Any alternative promotion system must account for the philosophies associated with the windows and ceilings that regulate officer flow through and out of the military. The three philosophies driving the current system are timelines, promotability, and generalization. However, relevant literature identifies the three philosophies that should be paramount: competencies, employability, and specialization. A viable alternative to the up-or-out promotion system uses competencies to determine promotion eligibility, focuses on employability to retain valuable members, and facilitates specialization. Implementing such a system will not be simple; however, the benefits will be worth the effort. If senior leaders become down and out about the up-or-out system, there is a viable alternative.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Bob Krumm

Published:

The U.S. military has proven itself adept at creating a decentralized culture that produces innovation during long periods of conflict, as in World War II and more recently during the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. However, the military has been less successful at being able to maintain that type of culture in peacetime. This paper analyzes the concepts of entrepreneurship, competition, and knowledge through the filter of the lessons of the “Austrian school of economics” and applies them to the current U.S. military. This analysis concludes that the military retains vestigial conscription-era controls that inhibit a culture that encourages disruptive innovation. This paper proposes that DoD move to a post-conscription professional model, redefine and make greater use of mission command, add bottom-up experimental units, and create an internal, competitive marketplace by giving greater requirements validation and funding authorities to the regional combatant commanders instead of to the service chiefs.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Joseph P. Kuchan

Published:

Russia seized Crimea by force, intervened militarily in Eastern Ukraine, and has shown no sign of stopping its aggression. The U.S. wants to deter Russian aggression but has been unable to find the right formula, especially when faced with fiscal constraints and other demands. Imperial Roman systems of deterrence, conventional deterrence theory, and examples of U.S. deterrence during the Cold War all provide insight into the current U.S. predicament in Europe. The U.S. must deter against both Russian conventional attacks and its so-called hybrid war. In order to do so, the U.S. should station a Joint Task Force-capable division headquarters, additional enablers, two additional armored brigade combat teams, and additional equipment in Europe to deter Russia through denial. Combined with effective diplomacy and deliberate communication, clear when required, vague when necessary, the U.S. will deter Russian aggression while maintaining a free and friendly Europe in furtherance of U.S. interests.


Author: Colonel Michael B. Lalor

Published:

Often the largest force in a joint area of operations, the Army owns the majority of the tasks and responsibilities required to set the theater. With finite resources and the preponderance of its sustainment units in the Reserve Component, the Army’s recent operational experiences in Afghanistan (2001-2002), Haiti (2010), and Liberia (2014) offer recurring and actionable lessons for planners, staffs, and commanders. The Army is often challenged to set the theater due to an inadequate logistics command and control structure, an inability to rapidly build logistics capacity to meet sustainment requirements, and incomplete planning and resourcing that routinely results in capability gaps during the opening phases of operations. The Army should improve the employment of its logistics force structure through a combination of different initiatives sponsored across the Army and the joint force. These initiatives will improve logistics command and control, provide more responsive support during contingency operations, and mitigate recurring capability gaps.


Author: Colonel Nicholas F. Lancaster

Published:

Combatant and Joint Force Commanders are comfortable weighing operational risk, however they must also weigh legal risk when operating in cyberspace. Four areas of legal risk for cyber operations include avoiding inadvertent armed attacks, complying with the law of armed conflict, following the intelligence oversight rules, and ensuring operations do not qualify as covert action. An armed attack under international law is the trigger for a response in self-defense, so commanders must conduct their cyber activities below this threshold and conduct their operations in accordance with the law of armed conflict. On the domestic side, commanders must carefully plan and supervise their operations to ensure they comply with intelligence oversight rules designed to protect U.S. persons. Finally, because cyber operations are innately devoid of attribution, commanders must be vigilant to ensure their operations do not qualify as covert action that the President must independently authorize and report to Congress.


Author: Captain Scott E. Langum

Published:

The Arctic is changing. U.S. policies and resource allocation must also change. On September 3, 2015, President Barak Obama became the first sitting President to travel above the Arctic Circle. The purpose of his trip was to raise awareness of regional issues created by climate change. This administration has advanced U.S. Arctic interests compared to its predecessors. However, there is still a long road ahead fraught with political and logistic challenges that must be resolved. As environmental conditions and technological advances have increased man’s ability to operate in the Arctic, the need for persistent presence has increased proportionally. Operational implications of these emerging missions have affected not only the USCG, but the Department of Defense and a plethora of other governmental agencies as well. As a nation, the U.S. currently does not have the physical nor the political resources to support national security objectives. However, by focusing on the four greatest areas of strategic interest economic expansion, international diplomacy, national security strategy, and the projection of power across the full range of military operations, one can begin to prioritize areas within the national strategy for resource allocation increases.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Paul Larson

Published:

This paper explores the dynamics of an emerging grand strategic competition between the United States and China over the future of the norms and institutions underpinning the liberal world order as we know it. By comparing China’s behavior in the South China Sea and Africa, we can begin to see the elements of a political-military “encirclement” strategy, designed to gradually advance China’s aims without resorting to direct armed conflict. It concludes with policy recommendations for the United States to begin countering China’s encirclement strategy.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Shawn Leonard

Published:

Despite being engaged in the region for over 15 years, the United States Army War College does not offer a perspective on Middle Eastern thought regarding warfare. Yet the War College’s students—senior officers—continue to receive a Western-based foundation of strategic thought centered on the writings of Clausewitz and Jomini. This short survey seeks to explore the writings of the Islamic social scientist, Ibn Khaldun, who described the world’s first social cycle and the tribal phenomenon which fuels it, known as “asabiyyah.” Next, the paper focuses on two of Islam’s foremost commanders, Khalid Bin al-Waleed and Saladin, who demonstrate the innate Arab-turn-Muslim reliance on mobility and surprise to consistently defeat numerically and technically superior opponents. Finally, the paper offers a pedagogical recommendations section to further discuss the rationale for introducing these topics into the AWC curriculum. There are clear linkages between the concept of “asabiyyah” and the strategic acumen of Bin al-Waleed and Saladin to America’s contemporary adversaries throughout the Middle East, sub-Saharan Africa, and Central and South Asia.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Sherri LeVan

Published:

Chinese provocative actions in the South China Sea (SCS) have intensified U.S. and Chinese military interactions and any corresponding miscalculation could bring the two nations into direct conflict. This paper examines the tensions in this region that stem from China's rapid and large-scale land reclamation projects in the SCS and overlapping claims with U.S. allies on islands in the region. It analyzes U.S. national interests that are directly opposed to China's "Core Interests" in the SCS and that are driving diplomatic, economic and military relations. Conflicting national interests coupled with China's escalatory actions against U.S. allies and partners contributes to the current military tension between the two nations. The paper concludes that China's continued provocative actions in the SCS will be a recurring source of friction. Thus, the U.S. should maintain its presence to preserve regional security and stability. More important, the U.S. can dictate how and when to respond to Chinese provocations and the paper argues that now is the time for the U.S. to draw the proverbial line in China's man-made sand.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Andrew Liffring

Published:

Energy security, defined as having assured access to reliable supplies of energy and the ability to protect and deliver sufficient energy to meet mission essential requirements, is a strategic issue for the United States. The U.S. Army is the DoD’s greatest energy user, consuming 36 percent of the DoD’s total in 2014, and therefore has a vested interest in increasing its energy security posture. However, the Army faces a critical energy security threat in the form of domestic utility disruptions due to the service’s dependence on commercial power grids, especially due to enemy action such as cyber-attack. However, the Army is only funded to meet current energy demands, receiving very little to invest in renewable energy projects. Currently, the Army must rely on third party financing and prioritize projects based on economic variables to increase energy security on Army installations. This strategy fails to increase readiness and allocate the Army’s limited means efficiently. By using the Energy Security framework proposed in this paper, the Army can better manage energy security projects in a risk-informed way.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Christopher G. Lindner

Published:

In January 2013, the Chief of Staff of the Army directed the Army Medical Department (AMEDD) to conduct a study aimed at improving development of its officers for leadership and command positions. The AMEDD determined that many officers inadequately develop as leaders through professional military education, training, and assignment experiences. The purpose of this research paper is to evaluate current AMEDD strategies to develop and employ talent in its active duty officer corps. Additionally, the paper identifies evidence-based courses of action derived from both military and private sector best practices to improve AMEDD’s talent management. Developing talent in the AMEDD requires an overhaul of competency identification and building, as well as performance management to meet current and future leader-development demands. The AMEDD must also adapt its practices of employing talent through matching talents to the right jobs, supported by more quantifiable talent management systems. Improving development and employment of talent in the AMEDD fosters an organization ready to meet future readiness demands, decrease costs, and improve beneficiary satisfaction.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Craig Maceri

Published:

There are multiple players in the global community - governmental, non-governmental, and private sector, who focus their efforts on economic development in post-conflict, fragile, or failed states. In 2006, a new player emerged from the Department of Defense, known as the Task Force for Business and Stability Operations, focused on promoting economic development in Iraq. This novel task force consisted mainly of civilian business personnel who leveraged their private sector expertise to help revitalize Iraq’s industrial economy. After eight years of operating in both Iraq and Afghanistan, the TFBSO shut down operations and transferred its open projects to United States Agency for International Development (USAID). This paper seeks to answer how successful the Task Force was in helping to promote a sustainable economy in Iraq and Afghanistan and what role the Department of Defense should play in economic development activities. It also provides recommendations on what actions should occur to regenerate a more effective capability for future contingencies.


Author: Colonel Robert E. Lee Magee

Published:

NATO is required to protect each Alliance member. Based on current political and military conditions in the Baltic States, NATO can no longer successfully deter Russian aggression as revealed by recent open source war games conducted by RAND. NATO would be left with nothing with bad options if Russia pursued a campaign similar to its efforts in Ukraine. Therefore, NATO must continue to adapt to the 21st Century and a resurgent Russia. This adaptation would include a military force capable of deterring Russia’s Western Military District, broadening its exercise program, and a earmarking a force capable of relieving the deterrent force. These military options would be supported by a NATO information campaign and political commitments. NATO must consider Russian interests and how best to work with and around President Vladimir Putin’s current administration.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Frank A. Makoski

Published:

The Asia-Pacific has the most natural disasters than any other region in the world. It is also an area of increasing economic growth and urbanization. The devastating costs associated with natural disasters have direct and indirect implications, not only for the region, but also for the United States. As the U.S. shifts its focus to Asia, it is essential to understand and mitigate the effects natural disasters have in the Asia-Pacific in order to promote stability and protect U.S. interests. This paper will examine the causes of natural disasters in the Asia-Pacific, assess the costs associated with these events, and link how environmental catastrophes in the region affect the United States and its interests in the region. In addition, it will provide recommendations on how the U.S. government can better support endeavours to build resilience against the effects of natural disasters with the goal of maintaining stability and security in the Asia-Pacific, and ultimately in the United States.


Author: Colonel Robert W. Marshall

Published:

The Army has made mission command the cornerstone of its operations and leadership doctrine. Despite its inclusion in doctrine for more than 10 years, the Army still struggles to fully enact mission command. There are significant cultural barriers that drive this inability to realize the full potential of mission command. This paper uses Kotter’s organizational change model and Schein’s methods of cultural change to analyze current Army culture and its level of misalignment with the precepts of mission command. From this analysis, it identifies cultural embedding and reinforcing mechanisms to enable senior leaders to create and sustain needed change to fully embrace mission command. Army senior leaders, at multiple levels, must make mission command a focus area and provide role-modeling and coaching to their subordinates. The Army must incorporate mission command principles into its philosophies and creeds and continue to tell the story of why mission command is necessary for future success. Army systems, including performance evaluation, education, training and assignments must be modified to create culture change to better align leader development with mission command.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Earl G. Matthews

Published:

Al-Shabaab is Al-Qaeda’s East African franchise and is in the midst of a diffuse ten-year insurgency against the United Nations-backed Federal Government of Somalia and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Consistent with its ultra-violent expansionist jihadist vision of an Islamic caliphate, al-Shabaab has in recent years grown into a transnational actor determined and able to orchestrate sensational and horrific terrorist incidents outside of the contours of Somalia. Al-Shabaab has been characterized as fiscal-military state. It has adapted an innovative and resilient funding model which has allowed the organization to sustain itself over the long haul, despite the loss of significant territory or the removal of key leadership figures. The United States has devoted significant resources to training and equipping AMISOM troop contributing nations and to identifying and directly targeting key leaders within Al-Shabaab. This paper argues that a necessary component of any successful effort to permanently cripple and ultimately defeat the organization will require a concerted whole-of-government effort to uncover and comprehend the al-Shabaab financial apparatus and to dismantle that operation. Cutting off al-Shabaab’s money flow will not alone achieve victory over the organization, however, without doing so, victory is unobtainable.


Author: Colonel Kevin A. McAninch

Published:

To be successful in the dynamic global security environment of the 21st century the United States Army must retain and develop its talent: its people. The Army places a premium on leadership and developing leaders through the best possible education, training and experiences. The Army’s 360-degree assessment tool, the Multisource Assessment and Feedback (MSAF), provides feedback to leaders on how well they are leading and gives leaders an opportunity to engage in self-development. However, the MSAF is not currently seen or utilized as a catalyst for the learning and development of leaders, and analysis shows there are negative trends with the program. Additionally, the leader competency of developing others is consistently rated as poor. Negative perceptions by the force regarding the MSAF’s utility have given rise to a high percentage of officers initiating an MSAF event only to fulfill the regulatory requirement of including a date on their officer evaluation report. In light of this, the Army has an opportunity to stop lying to itself and add needed structure to ensure the learning sticks, and that the organization doesn’t fall victim to the creation of a leadership gap in the formation.


Author: Mister Ryan Sean McCannell

Published:

As the United States winds down its stabilization operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development will face bureaucratic and political pressures to abandon their already modest reconstruction and stabilization (R&S) lines of effort in favor of more traditional diplomacy and development assistance priorities. Yet this period of relative peace allow policy makers to reflect on past challenges to creating a “civilian surge” capacity and determine feasible, acceptable, and suitable ways and means to ensure robust civilian participation in future R&S operations. The author recommends expanding the work of a recently created interagency task force on fragile states to include leading a new generation of civil-military planning tied explicitly to resources, since past planning efforts have not always done so effectively. Civilian agencies should work with the Department of Defense (DOD) to conduct formal interagency after action reviews on R&S activities outside of Iraq and Afghanistan, track and respond to congressional efforts at DOD reform, and encourage R&S knowledge centers to take stock of existing capabilities and reinvigorate their relationships with policy makers.


Author: Colonel J. Frank Melgarejo Jr.

Published:

This strategic research project (SRP) analyzes the challenge of combating transnational organized crime in Central America’s Northern Triangle. It then describes DoD programs and authorities which best support U.S. and partner nation CTOC efforts on the land domain. To determine the combination of DoD programs and authorities that could best support CTOC efforts, the SRP defines TOC; describes the Northern Triangle and its environment; reviews U.S. CTOC policies and supporting strategies; analyzes current DoD CTOC authorities and offers examples of how such authorities can be leveraged; and finally recommends how DoD can best support CTOC on the land domain in Central America’s Northern Triangle.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Michael D. Mierau, Jr.

Published:

Professions require rules for the conduct of its members, and a system to enforce those rules through discipline if necessary. The Army’s Judge Advocate General’s (JAG) Corps, which governs the profession of law within the Army and the Army’s courts, is no exception. Although the Army JAG Corps has both rules that govern the ethical conduct of lawyers and a system to investigate and discipline lawyers that violate those rules, an analysis of the studies done at the national level with regard to lawyer discipline demonstrates that the Army has room to improve its system of lawyer discipline. This paper proposes that the Army should designate a specific duty position for the role of disciplinary investigator and then train lawyers in that duty position in the specialized area of the law governing lawyer discipline. Additionally this paper proposes that the Army should change the standard of proof in lawyer disciplinary investigations to that of clear and convincing evidence. These changes will bring the Army system into greater compliance with the national standards for lawyer discipline established by the American Bar Association, and will afford greater consistency and fairness in the Army’s disciplinary system for lawyers.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Joseph C. Miller

Published:

The United States became an Arctic Nation in 1867 when it purchased the territory of Alaska and has demonstrated varying levels of interest, commitment, and concern for the region since that time. Rapidly changing climate conditions in the Arctic have resulted in melting ice and with it increased possibilities of commercial transit and an associated increase to security threats. These climatological realities, coupled with the increased attention the Arctic is garnering across the globe, has forced a relook at strategy. The United States has begun responding to the dynamic regional situation with an updated national policy and implementation plan, however, more should be done to lead change and in response to the actions of other Arctic nations. The current implementation of U.S. strategy falls short in forcing action in several key areas. The U.S. should ratify the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, formally appoint the State Department’s U.S. Special Representative for the Arctic to the rank of Ambassador, begin procuring icebreakers for the U.S. Coast Guard, incentivize civilian investments and partnerships, and explore future collaborative efforts with Russia to preserve the vision for a peaceful opening to the Arctic.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Christopher W. Muller

Published:

President Obama’s December 2014 announcement of the normalizing of relations with Cuba provides a tremendous opportunity for the Department of Defense. Collaboration between the Cuban and U.S. militaries could improve regional stability and increase homeland security by enhancing collaboration in the southern maritime approaches to the United States. The establishment of a new Embassy and Country Team will provide a golden opportunity for DoD to create a new model and finally divest themselves of the old two-sided model consisting of a hodge-podge of small DoD entities centered around a Defense Attaché Office and/or a Security Cooperation Office. Establishing just one DoD organization in Cuba as a test model could eventually lead to an update of the current 2013 DoD Instruction C-5205.75, "Implementing Instructions for DoD Operations at US Embassies." Adopting a single DoD concept would reduce the Department’s overall costs and personnel, reducing redundancy, avoiding unnecessary confusion for our partner nations, and streamlining mission accomplishment.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Matthew R. Nation

Published:

In 2012, the United States announced its Rebalance to the Pacific, creating a new focus on Asian security for U.S. policy makers. From ensuring universal access to the global commons, to managing China’s responsible growth, Washington requires a long-term strategic partner to share the burden and India is at the top of the list. India, a democratic nuclear power and home to a fifth of the world’s population, is looking east to forge partnerships to further its own economic and security interests. The U.S. and India have a spotty history together that warrants analysis, but since the turn of the century, more areas of convergence than divergence exist between them. With progressive leadership in both nations setting conditions for further meaningful relations, established military ties between the U.S. and India provide an optimal platform to advance mutual interests. With India’s long-standing policy of non-alignment as a backdrop, India must increase its role as a security provider. These former British colonies must work together to compliment each other’s policies to maintain a strategic equilibrium in the Indian Ocean and South East Asia regions.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Colin P. Nikkila

Published:

As demonstrated by the Boston Bombings, the threat of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) at home and abroad has not reduced since the end of major combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. It's been nearly three years since Boston. The President has published strategic policy to combat the threat, however actions taken by the Department of Defense to respond have been inadequate considering the threat and responsibilities. The DoD’s roles and responsibilities must be more clearly defined while in support of the homeland. Explosive Ordnance Disposal response is needed by the Interagency, but better efficiencies from the explosive enterprise stakeholders must be gathered and embraced. Both federal law and DoD policies must be updated to focus on all threats, and increased cooperation and interoperability within the Interagency must be realized.


Author: Commander Mark O’Connell

Published:

For 26 years Sri Lanka was embroiled in a brutal civil war to control much of its countryside. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), waged an insurgency against the government’s forces, the majority Sinhalese Sri Lankan Armed Forces (SLAF). LTTE attacked the SLAF with ferocity and ingenuity unmatched by any other terrorist organization. The LTTE were labeled “among the most dangerous and deadly extremists in the world” by the FBI; they revolutionized suicide attacks with the invention of the suicide belt, were the first terrorist organization to employ the use of chemical weapons, and the first to employ a cyber-attack against a state. In the early 2000’s the LTTE included a navy, air force, suicide wing, and an international funding organization that raised millions for the cause, while controlling almost a quarter of the Sri Lankan countryside. And yet in a little over four years, the LTTE was wiped off the map. This paper examines the conflict, its root causes, and the strategies used in order to garner insights.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Gregory O. Olson

Published:

The United States military has gained a significant amount of experience, knowledge and best practices from conducting Security Force Assistance (SFA) operations in Iraq and Afghanistan over the last decade. The Department of Defense (DOD) must ensure that the lessons learned from conducting SFA will be captured and be able to be regenerated the next time we are faced with conducting SFA on a large scale. This paper provides an overview of SFA and consists of four main sections. The first outlines the role of security force assistance in stability operations; the second is analysis of SFA using the construct of Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leader Development, Personnel and Facilities (DOTMLPF); the third is SFA effectiveness in recent operations and the fourth is SFA regeneration for future needs.


Author: Colonel Mark S. Parker

Published:

The United States continues to operate in a world that is volatile, unstable, complex, and ambiguous during the second decade of the twenty-first century. One of the more complex and strategically important regions in the world is Asia, where President Obama has refocused U.S. national power in direct support of U.S. national interests. To assist in these interests, the United States should improve strategic relationships with India, a rising regional and world power that would be a significant partner in Asia. India’s geopolitical position, with a democratic government and a rising economy and naval power to assist in regional security and containing the ambitions of China make them a prime partner for the United States. To improve the relationship, the United States is reaching out through key leaders to develop stronger economic and military ties through trade agreements and arms sales. While the United States sees increased partnership in the future, India is hesitant in creating too strong a relationship due to its non-alignment movement that is still prevalent in its government.


Author: Colonel Kimberly A. Peeples

Published:

To succeed in today’s complex environment, Army leaders must master vision, alignment, and change. Scholars have written a multitude of books on the concepts of visioning and change. However, alignment is more elusive in the research literature. Some leaders relate organizational alignment to nesting methods inherent in large, bureaucratic and hierarchical institutions. But scholars, George Labovitz and Victor Rosansky open the alignment aperture. They posit that the power of alignment occurs when an organization’s key elements – people, strategy, customers and process – remain tightly centered around its central purpose. This paper applies the Labovitz and Rosansky alignment framework to the equally elusive world of Army installation management. It chronicles the evolution of centralized installation management over the past 15 years to compare and contrast traditional nesting with a more comprehensive alignment approach. And it will challenge strategic leaders to think critically about the concept of alignment and its potential to not only improve operational performance but better position the Army to achieve its 2025 vision through targeted and sustainable change.


Author: Colonel David C. Phillips

Published:

With Congress’s renewed push for acquisition reform in 2016, the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Army must adapt their acquisition strategies to keep pace with the changing environment. Given the growing ends and diminishing budgets, the Army must look for new ways to reduce risk while prioritizing readiness. Acquisition reform is not new, and there is a long history of both success and failure. Recently, the DoD, the Army, and Special Operations Command have all seen that teams empowered with the right institutionalized authorities and culture can provide warfighters with innovative capabilities faster while meeting all the traditional requirements of cost, schedule, and performance. The Army should now seize two opportunities: first, institutionalize and reinforce rapid acquisition processes, authorities, and organizations; and second, use mission command to embed an operationally focused culture of integrity, innovation, and courage to take risk in its acquisition organizations. This will directly and positively impact future warfighters.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Carter L. Price

Published:

Although every career officer prepares for command, the fact is that very few will do so at the senior level. The vast majority of Senior Service College graduates will spend the remainder of their careers on various staffs as advisors to commanders or civilian leaders. With this in mind, it is important that the services focus institutional education toward building the competencies of senior strategic advisors. Military history is replete with leaders who functioned as strategic advisors during critical periods. One such advisor is Major General Fox Conner. Arguably responsible for the development of a President, Secretary of State and one of the most prolific military leaders of a century, Fox Conner is largely an unknown figure in American history. This paper discusses Conner’s background and the attributes that made him such an effective advisor and leader. This paper will evaluate him against disciplines that James E. Lukaszewski proposes are crucial to maximizing the effect of strategic advice: be trustworthy, be a verbal visionary, develop a management perspective, think strategically, understand the power of patterns, advise constructively and show others how to use your advice.


Author: Colonel Robert L Ralston

Published:

In the recent past, the Army has found itself woefully underprepared to conduct contingency contracting operations, requiring substantial augmentation from outside Agencies and Services. The Army is directed to add Contingency Contracting Administrative Services (CCAS) to its capabilities, relying on Army Contracting Command to assume full transition of responsibilities in January, 2016. This paper will exhibit that CCAS is essential to future military operations and when failure to ensure sufficient CCAS operations has occurred, astronomical loss has ensued. It will provide an operational framework recommending strategic changes to enhance Army contracting capabilities commensurate with providing adequate, responsible and sustained contracting services for future operations. The time has come that the Army expand its efforts and treat contracting administration services as a core competency by resourcing, training and equipping ACC for future contractor heavy contingency operations.


Author: Colonel Firman H. Ray

Published:

The U.S. Army is reducing its force to the lowest end-strength since before World War II. Officers will experience directed and involuntary drawdown measures in order to meet targets required for proper Year Group management. Potential costs of involuntary separation include: damage to officer trust, commitment, and general esprit de corps; adverse effects on accessions and the retention of quality officers; and public and Congressional opposition. To the Army’s detriment, and despite their regular occurrence and import, there exists no strategic framework for the comprehensive planning and execution of force reductions or expansions. The Army would benefit from the efficiency and effectiveness provided by an effective, strategic and comprehensive officer drawdown framework that heeds lessons learned, uses a Year Group construct to pin-point excess inventory, develops and employs tailored force shaping measures to meet drawdown requirements, and provides for continuous monitoring and assessment of force reduction measures to keep the drawdown trajectory on path toward desired end states.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Gary R. Reidenbach

Published:

In an effort to avoid another bitter and costly rivalry like that of the Cold War years, it is of supreme consequence for America to re-examine its relations with Russia and craft an engaged and cooperative approach to the future. The purpose of this paper is to propose that America’s relationship with Russia should strive in all possible contexts to promote and advance integration of Russia into the broader international political, economic, and security system. America’s approach, policies, and actions with regard to Russia, similar to American approaches in relation to other states, should consistently rely on the tenets of cooperative liberalism for inspiration and guidance. This paper briefly discusses the history and current state of American-Russian relations, examines the international relations theories of realism and liberalism and the insights they hold for influencing and shaping America’s approach to Russia, and analyzes key interests from both sides in search of areas for potential long-term liberalist inspired cooperation while identifying issues and interests likely to yield undesirable competitive friction or opposition.


Author: Colonel David E. Ristedt

Published:

Global Health Diplomacy is an increasingly recognized soft power element in support of the United States National Security Strategy. Multiple United States agencies employ personnel globally to positively affect host nation population health indicators, combat active or prevent emerging disease threats, build partner capacity and increase interoperability with the international community. Interagency coordination is a key element to synchronize medical efforts in support of global health activities. Several identified governance challenges lead to inefficient and desynchronized efforts. Health diplomats lack standardized training and education despite many of the same requirements. Interagency personnel distribution leaves potential gaps in global surveillance and limits effective support to Ambassadors. If the United States is to synchronize health diplomacy across the interagency, formalizing a governance structure with clearly articulated authorities as well as evaluating the attributes and distribution of health diplomats is strategically vital in improving global health effects in support of national security objectives.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Luis Rivera

Published:

Tactical decisions made by NCOs may have strategic implication, but the Army NCO Education System (NCOES) does not deliberately teach NCOs how to think strategically. To meet this challenge, the Army should educate NCOs how to “think strategically” throughout the NCO Professional Development System (NCOPDS). This paper provides a definition and context for thinking strategically, examines the current deficit in educating and evaluating NCOs to think strategically, examines why the PME is the appropriate venue to most effectively educate Army NCOs to think strategically, analyzes the new NCOPDS, and makes recommendations on how to address this topic with the Army Professional Military Education system.


Author: Commander James Roche

Published:

The Budget Control Act (BCA) of 2011 mandated reductions to the DoD budget and resulted in less money to support current manning levels, operations, weapons systems, and facilities infrastructure. These lower budgets have forced the Services to underinvest in facility maintenance, accelerating the deterioration of DoD asset portfolios. Moreover, as the Services reduce manning further, many current facilities will become redundant. DoD has long favored the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process to pare down its holdings, but for over a decade Congress has refused to authorize a new BRAC. DoD needs to concentrate its limited funds on preventing deterioration of its core strategic asset portfolios, those critical to core missions which often require a high degree of physical security, for which there is limited or no equivalent commercial capacity, and which cannot be easily recreated. DoD can shed less critical asset portfolios- and many unneeded buildings--by developing new public-private partnerships.


Author: Colonel Karen J. Roe

Published:

The nature of warfare has undergone revolutionary changes over the past several decades. Battles are no longer conducted solely by combat forces deployed into zones of hostilities. Today, combat takes many forms and is conducted by units fundamentally different from the conventional combat arms, operating in new domains and using ways and means never before considered. The Army's current system of official lineage and honors, however, reflects an outdated approach to capturing modern warfare. The TDA units are "non-deployable” or “strategic" and, as such, do not have official recognition of lineages and a historical record of honors. This creates a system of inequality that fails to recognize the new domains and nature of combat.


Author: Mr. Philip F. Romanelli

Published:

Talent management of officers in the United States Army is approaching a state of crisis and far-reaching changes are necessary. The impact on the US Army Reserve (USAR) is exacerbated by the fact that it is the smallest component of the Army, is tightly bound to the Active Component, and lacks the dual mission and resulting political strength of the Army National Guard. So to some extent the USAR may be the canary in the coal mine--anything negative may affect the USAR before the other components. This research paper examines four key areas: permeability (movement between components), promotions (who is selected to lead at the next level, when, and how), positions (the structure of the organizations and how they are filled), and proficiencies (how are skills captured and employed). In analyzing these challenges, this paper advocates swift change to selected policies, emphasizes talent management, and identifies needed law and policy updates to enable the Army to better respond to the ever-changing strategic environment.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Marlyce K. Roth

Published:

With the ever-growing cyber threat from state and non-state actors, U.S. national interests and those of U.S. allies are at a significant risk. Unlike the other domains, the cyber domain grows exponentially on a daily basis, so time is of the utmost importance for building and sustaining a cyber-ready force to protect against threats. The April 2015 DoD Cyber Strategy provides a solid foundation, for developing enterprise-wide programs and plans to build a cyber-ready force to meet the U.S. national military objectives that support the National Security Strategy.


Author: Colonel Philip J. Ryan

Published:

The 3D (Diplomacy, Development, and Defense) Planning Process is a novel concept meant to fuse together critical aspects of our nation’s whole of government approach to international affairs. Despite a bevy of key strategic documents, U.S. Foreign Policy lacks focus, structure, and accountability across the interagency to make it effective and efficient. From the local through the regional to the national level, issues of poor coordination, boundary confusion, and bureaucratic competition grow worse the higher one gets in the relations between the Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development, and the Department of Defense. American Foreign Policy requires effective synchronization of the different parts of government. This effort would involve national-level leadership and a comprehensive review of interagency collaboration, organization, and policies to address some of the obvious problems with the current approach.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Teresa A. Schlosser

Published:

When Secretary of Defense, Leon Panetta, rescinded the 1994 direct ground combat definition and assignment rule in January 2014 he set in motion changes that will have sociological impacts across the Army’s combat arms. Therefore, Army leaders need to be aware of sociological theories commonly associated with individual / group acceptance as they integrate females into previously all-male units. Social Learning Theory explains how individuals learn as much, or more, from watching those around them as from their own actions. In-group Bias addresses internal biases groups develop to differentiate themselves from those not in the group and how the group dynamic works to maintain the homogeneity of the original group. Stereotype Threat describes the various ways minority individuals cope with the feeling of being judged by their minority status versus their actual skills and abilities. Each of these theories provide valuable insight to leaders concerning the changing group dynamics within combat arms units, enabling them to tailor their leadership to integrate females successfully.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel James P. Schreffler

Published:

The United States power grid is a vital piece of the country’s infrastructure. However, due to an increased reliance on computers, the system has become increasingly susceptible to a cyber attack. This paper provides an overview of the power grid and discusses its vulnerability to a cyber attack that would result in a catastrophic blackout. The National Response Framework is examined to include the role of the National Guard in a response to such an attack. The paper finds that the Guard focuses more on its wartime mission and is not structured or equipped to provide effective assistance to state governors during a catastrophic blackout. The author raises several proposals and further research questions to include the establishment of a National Guard pre-positioned stocks program as well as the establishment of separate home defense forces at the state level.


Author: Commander Kristofer Scott

Published:

The early dismissal of Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Director Lieutenant General (LTG) Michael Flynn in 2014 for allegedly “disruptive” leadership raises a host of concerns for military professionals interested in organizational change. LTG Flynn’s attempt to reorganize DIA to provide better combat force support seemed to flag in the face of cultural resistance. It would appear that LTG Flynn’s forceful, top-down approach to change did not fare well at an established bureaucracy with an entrenched cultural identity due to an insufficient coalition of the willing to reinforce his message. In the end, this crippled his efforts and brought about an early end to his tour, despite his clear vision and tough communication. A more consensus-based style might have brought slower but more sustainable change. Also of note, an examination of resources might have begged the question of whether or not DIA should change at all--a point relevant to military change leaders in the current resource constrained environment.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Patrick E. Simon

Published:

Ever since independence from the United Kingdom (UK) in 1946, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan found itself immersed in a difficult geopolitical position. Jordan is perpetually surrounded by conflict, yet the country provides a stabilizing role in Middle Eastern affairs. For years, the political survival of Jordan has been attributed to the Kings deft management of international relations and shifting alliances between Jordan’s influential neighbors – Iraq, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and to a lesser extent Israel and Egypt. Jordan has difficulty in generating a sustainable economy, and the survival of the monarchy remains dependent on economic support from regional allies and international donors such as the United States. If Jordan succumbs to the regional war unfolding in Iraq and Syria, the remainder of the Levant and potentially the Arabian Peninsula could unravel changing the Sikes-Picot borders forever. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan’s continuing role as a key stabilizing force in the Middle East, the country’s economic security as a deterrent to political unrest, and a strong U.S. - Jordan strategic relationship is not only vital to Jordan’s survival, but also the survival of a region undergoing transformational changes.


Author: Colonel Jonathan B. Slater

Published:

The United States will not go to war in the foreseeable future without allies and international partners by its side. It is critical for the Department of Defense (DoD) to continue to pursue International Cooperative programs to promote interoperability, improve logistics efficiencies, harness the best technological capabilities among allies, and reduce costs for systems procurement. This paper will discuss the DoD International Cooperation guidance, national power (Diplomatic, Informational, Military, and Economic) aspects of international cooperative programs, international considerations, DoD acquisition policy, and Congressional actions needed to further support international cooperative programs. There are challenges in all of these areas that need to be considered by a program manager and the requirements owner to ensure that policy directives are balanced with needs of the user. Ultimately, international cooperative acquisition programs pose many benefits to all nations involved, such as reduced costs, better operational interoperability, and stronger alliances that warrant the additional efforts required to execute an international program.


Author: Commander Joseph W. Smotherman

Published:

As warfare evolves, new technology pushes the limits of acceptability and operations in cyberspace are no different. If attacks in cyberspace are assaults of one state against another, then the framework of Just War theory should still apply and Michael Walzer’s Legalist Paradigm provides a clearer lens on when an armed response to a cyber attack is morally permissible. While some parts of Just War theory directly apply to responses to Cyber Attacks, the others do not, beginning with Just Cause. Walzer describes Just Cause in terms of the natural rights of the citizens of a state, and when a cyber attack interrupts the ability of those citizens to make a life together or the “safe space” they create, then a physical response to a cyber attack could be justified. This paper outlines the relationship between Walzer’s Legalist Paradigm and justification for physical responses to cyber attacks, with the intent of providing senior leaders with a framework for those responses.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Stephen J. Snyder

Published:

This paper identifies six challenges facing U.S. stability operations. These include issues of policy, leadership, civil affairs force structure, assessment, joint coalition operations and resource scarcity. The identified challenges stem from both the findings of the Special Investigator for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and from personal observations from deployments as a civil affairs operator and planner. These challenges are framed against current U.S. policy, and department of defense, department of state and interagency capabilities. Potential remedies for each of the six challenges is provided, as well as suggestions for the way ahead for U.S. stability operations.


Author: Colonel Theodore M. Thomas II

Published:

As doctrinally written, developing and acquiring a capability-based force is the basis of the current Joint Capability Integration and Development System (JCIDS). This force is one developed agnostic of a specific threat or enemy, and rather on how a future enemy may fight. The new and current threat of persistent irregular warfare, plus emerging peer global competitors is a credible justification to adopt a threat-based model of capability development. Threat-informed capability development will ensure more relevant capabilities delivered to the combatant commanders to meet global requirements. JCIDS should adopt a hybrid process blending threat and capabilities based development. By using a blended and iterative approach that bases near and mid-term capability needs on current threats that pose a danger to U.S. interests, and long-term needs on a capability-based philosophy, the joint force can rapidly develop relevant systems to counter near-term threats that hold promise for a long service life against future threats. In addition, such a process will encourage the efficient use of limited budgetary resources and discourage technological overreach on immature technologies.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Douglas F. Tippet

Published:

Today the US faces a new era of uncertainty about where, when, and against whom it will militarily engage. Coupling that reality with A2AD and budget-induced re-posturing leaves America in a strategic predicament regarding force projection similar to the one it faced prior to WWII. Current trends suggest that the U.S. will continue to reduce overseas basing as a way to manage reduced end-strength and rising infrastructure sustainment costs. With fewer pre-positioned forces and a political desire to decrease large main operating base footprints, Combatant Commanders will need to gain quick access to airfields, seaports, and basing at the onset of crises. Complicating this strategic problem is the possibility that diplomatic leverage spent for negotiating use prior to hostilities may not result in actual use of bases during hostilities. To these ends, the historical evidence suggests a potential strategic benefit of using the “Lend-lease” concept to inform future policy formulation for contingency basing negotiations. These realities suggest that the U.S. must balance its goal of stabilizing regions through building partner capacity with the need to retain some type of leverage for future negotiations of airfields and ports during actual crisis.


Author: Ms. Andrea M. Tomann

Published:

The Defense Innovation Initiative and the Army Operating Concept provide a common vision for the future, and they demand innovation. Congressional and DOD leaders as well as Army’s CASAL survey of leader effectiveness suggest that there is a dramatic need for improvement in Army leader support for innovation. Despite senior leaders’ call to action, leaders can undermine their efforts to support. These conflicts represent lost opportunities to leverage the creativity and expert knowledge within the Army. Individual Army leaders can choose innovation; in fact, they must in order to sustain a competitive advantage against our adversaries. Creativity, critical thinking and collaboration provide the leader tools to cultivate. Leaders can avoid discouraging innovation by not blaming fiscal uncertainty, process or bureaucracy and by mitigating the attention, error and data blindness that interfere with their decision-making. Senior leaders provide a vision for the future of warfare and in doing so articulate the importance of innovation for success. Leaders must inspire creativity and critical thought across their organizations to create value-added solutions to the Army’s complex challenges.


Author: Ms. Sonya M. Tsiros

Published:

Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) were interagency teams employed in Iraq and Afghanistan to assist in stabilization and reconstruction operations. The experience of PRTs offers lessons for efforts to improve coordination of the activities of the various national security agencies at the strategic level. Many aspects of PRTs, including the physical colocation of different agency representatives and collaborative leadership structures, are necessary ingredients where close interagency coordination is required. Nonetheless, although PRTs provide a useful model, it is one that cannot be entirely duplicated in other environments. The key lesson PRTs offer is the importance of defined roles and mission, cross-agency funding to promote a unified effort, and coordinating structures at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.


Author: Ms. Rebecca R. VanNess

Published:

Today there exists numerous perspectives on what diversity is, as well as conflicting information about its potential advantages and disadvantages in both the private and public sector workforce. Research on this topic is complex, highlighting the need to refocus on this critical issue in order to see diversity through a much broader aperture and recognize diversity leadership as a key competency for leaders facing unique Twenty-First Century global challenges. This thesis adds to the growing body of knowledge on diversity leadership by examining current scholarship and understanding of diversity, offering arguments to support embracing new beliefs and attitudes about diversity, and providing a recommended framework for diversity education for Department of Defense senior leaders operating at the strategic level. The proposed framework is aligned with the Department of Defense Diversity and Inclusion Strategic Plan 2012-2017, and focuses on the key leadership competencies of Cultural Intelligence, Communication, and Building Cohesive Teams.


Author: Colonel Lance C. Varney

Published:

The Command and General Staff School (CGSS) plays a vital role in preparing mid-level officers for the demands of the operational environment. CGSS must develop leaders who can, as described in the Army Operating Concept “win” in a complex world. This requires developing leaders to be agile, adaptive, and innovative. The CGSS is adjusting its program to provide the cognitive foundations supporting these attributes but at the risk of other learning objectives. Feedback from various perspectives suggests the need to lengthen the course and increase academic discipline. The problem that CGSS faces is that while educational requirements expand or change the time allocated for CGSS does not. While modifications to the current 44-week program over the years have been helpful, meeting the intent of the AOC requires a change in the CGSS program structure. Expanding the current CGSS program is the best way to prepare majors to meet the needs of the Army in 2025. For many officers, CGSS represents the last formal military education opportunity. The benefits of preparing majors and future lieutenant colonels for success in the operational environment should be worth the cost of a longer CGSS program.


Author: Colonel Dina S. Wandler

Published:

This research establishes why the U.S. military’s policies barring transgender service members are outdated and out of synch with the values of diversity and inclusiveness. Just as racism is grounded upon incorrect assumptions about racial characteristics, transgender discrimination is based upon false assumptions about sex and gender. This paper specifically examines the policy implications in recruiting individuals who identify as transgender and integrating transgender service members who seek to come out and transition to their true genders. It provides key definitions regarding sex and gender identity in order to better understand the challenges of integration. Finally, it provides recommendations for policy changes affecting Military Equal Opportunity, privacy rights, personnel management, substance abuse detection programs, health care, facilities usage, billeting, and physical fitness and body fat composition programs, to allow for the out service of all members of the LGBT community.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Dalian Antwine Washington Sr.

Published:

Solving the United States’ 21st century “failed state” problem necessitates modifying the Cold War era national security solution set. Adding “S” to the U.S. Instruments of Power (IOP) paradigm (Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic) elevates social stability to its appropriate position. Doing so reduces the overreliance on the military to build institutional capacity within failed states. Transitioning to “DIMES” broadens the national IOP aperture and operationalizes disperse resources that are aptly suited to solve the failed state dilemma. Shifting to a DIMES paradigm expands the policymakers’ toolbox in the strategy development process. The DIMES acronym is aptly suited for the national security lexicon because it is simple, unexpected, credible, concrete, and emotionally connective, thus helping policymakers tell the U.S. national security strategy story. The DIMES acronym is also easy for policymakers to retain, recall, repeat and research.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Robert S. White

Published:

Despite tactical dominance and technical battlespace awareness, the Unites States is not achieving the results its overwhelming military capabilities seem to promise. This is indicative of a failure in operational art caused by a misapplication of force and misunderstanding its utility when used for purposes not intended and ultimately ill-suited. The utility of force resides in its ability to achieve, to the appropriate degree, regarding the amount of force required and utilized, a military objective aligned to and nested within the greater political goal. To better engage today’s adversaries, our strategic leaders and military practitioners need to embrace a new paradigm regarding applications of military force as they formulate strategies, plan campaigns, and conduct operations in pursuit of national interests. By challenging the underlying assumptions regarding the utility of force, our leaders can properly address the current cycles of confrontation and conflict. Ultimately, other instruments of national power must be relied upon – and bolstered where necessary. The use of force can create at best a stalemate. Other levers of national power must be applied to achieve the desired endstate or policy objective.


Author: Colonel Dominic J. Wibe

Published:

Designated as an operational force the Reserve Component is poised to support the Army and the joint force in routine operations. With a continually shrinking force the Army must look to provide capabilities once asked of BCTs and other units on the battlefield. The theater army’s role in protection is discussed along with current force structure in the RC to conduct protection missions. Five recommendations are made to cover the gap in protection: create a theater protection command (TPC); re-designate theater engineer commands as TPCs; re-designate maneuver enhancement brigades (MEB) to expeditionary protection commands (EPC); increase the three Army Reserve MEB/EPCs to five; re-designate existing military police commands as expeditionary Internment/resettlement commands (EI/RC) while creating two additional. The recommended changes in force structure will produce an integrated command structure able to coordinate and provide protection and produce readiness during peace time.


Author: Colonel Ryan Blaine Wolfgram

Published:

Russia’s strategic approach is complicated and uses an ambiguous form of warfare centered on non-military means to achieve its political ends. This makes it difficult for the U.S. to produce a coherent and synchronized foreign policy that can provide clear direction for actions to counter Russian aggression. During an interview with a member in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) for policy this comment was provided, “Policy is all over the place, coexists, and is sometimes contradictory and more often tangential.” An example is the U.S. effort to counter Vladimir Putin’s continued desire to extend his sphere of interest through the annexation of countries in his national interest. This window for the Baltic States to remain untouched by Russia’s aggression is quickly closing and the U.S. opportunity to enact a policy of action is now.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Mike Zernickow

Published:

In spring 2013, the world sees the emergence of ISIS as a terrorist organization as they start wreaking havoc in Syria and Iraq. ISIS now controls territory to give them operational capability and to manage logistics. Terrorism is the dominant feature today, and ISIS is now attacking abroad. Based on their radical ideology, destroying ISIS is important to maintaining regional / global order and security. The current United States strategy hinges on destroying ISIS through a comprehensive air campaign and limited advisors operating in Syria and Iraq. The preponderance of the burden to date has been placed on the United States due to a limited coalition not willing to contribute as much military power or resources. The United States needs to take a different approach in U.S. foreign policy and build a stronger coalition through diplomacy. Without effective boots the ground, a coalition of necessity is required to destroy ISIS.


Author: Lieutenant Colonel Andrew S. Zieseniss

Published:

In 2015, the movement of migrants from Africa and the Middle East caught the E.U. completely off guard. As the numbers grew over the year, many people throughout Europe began to see the migration crisis as a major cultural, economic, and physical security threat. Every incident, such as the Cologne New Year’s attacks, adds concern to traditionally homogeneous cultures still feeling the effects of the 2008 financial crisis and subsequent global recession. The influx of migrants has had immediate impacts throughout Europe. These impacts are an increase in discrimination, the growth in political turmoil, and the rise of right wing parties. If the E.U. does not successfully address the migrant crisis soon, there will be long-term consequences for the current structure of the union. The crisis threatens economic and political stability throughout Europe. A weakened E.U. will also lose its diplomatic leverage around the world. Finally, stability on the continent, the very reason the six original members founded the E.U. after WWII, could once again be at risk. As a key ally, a weakened E.U. will have adverse political and economic impacts for the U.S. Assisting the E.U. in resolving the crisis is an important interest for the U.S.


Author: Colonel Eric E. Zimmerman

Published:

A leader’s deliberate use of adaptive (positive) humor is a very powerful leadership tool. Research strongly suggests that humor can produce tangible benefits in the emotional, cognitive, and social contexts. It also suggests that the positive use of humor in the workplace can increase employee morale, improve communication, relieve tension, reduce stress, and increase team cohesiveness. Despite these benefits, the idea of humor is absent from current Army leadership doctrine and the idea of humor as an element of leadership is frequently dismissed as incompatible with organizational culture, purpose, and productivity and even irresponsible. This paper explores this topic through a literature review, presentation of historic examples, examination of the Army’s long and complex relationship with humor, and a review of previous Army leadership doctrine. This paper concludes with a recommendation to increase leader awareness and foster a deeper understanding of humor as an effective leadership tool.